Fernandez v. Superintendent, Downstate Correctional FacilityFernandez v. Superintendent, Downstate Correctional Facility
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Vincent L. Briccetti
Briccetti, J.:
Plaintiff Jesus Fernandez, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to
Now pending is Supt. Morton‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to
For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint (Doc. #5 (“AC“))2 and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff‘s favor as summarized below.
At all relevant times, plaintiff, who alleges he is a practicing Muslim, was detained at Downstate.
Plaintiff alleges that as part of the reception process at Downstate, he was escorted to a medical examination room with a “curtain” for a door, where he was instructed to strip down to his underwear and socks. (See AC at ECF 5). Plaintiff further alleges that, with the curtain open and in plain view and earshot of passing staff members, P.A. Badami performed a medical examination of plaintiff comprising (i) a physical inspection of plaintiff‘s eyes, ears, throat, chest, and testicles, and (ii) an oral review of plaintiff‘s medical history. P.A. Badami allegedly refused plaintiff‘s request for a male physician to perform the examination, despite his protests that a physical examination by a member of the opposite sex violated his Muslim beliefs.
According to plaintiff, Supt. Morton, for his part, “was aware of the constitutional violations occurring in the intake area” because he received “multiple [unspecified] grievances”
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to
To survive a
The Court must liberally construe submissions of a pro se litigant and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (collecting cases). Applying the pleading rules
II. Constitutional Claims
Supt. Morton argues plaintiff‘s claims against him must be dismissed because plaintiff fails adequately to plead Morton‘s personal involvement in any violation of plaintiff‘s constitutional rights.
The Court agrees.
A. Personal Involvement
To adequately plead a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must “plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official‘s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. To establish a defendant‘s liability, a plaintiff must show “the defendant‘s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). “Failing to allege that a defendant was personally involved in, or responsible for, the conduct complained of renders a complaint ‘fatally defective on its face.‘” Swinson v. City of New York, 2022 WL 142407, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2022) (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1987)).
A defendant‘s position as a supervisor does not impute personal involvement to that individual liability under Section 1983 requires that the “defendant, through the official‘s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Accordingly, a plaintiff must plead “the elements of [each] underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.” Id. at 620. And “‘the factors necessary to establish a [Section 1983] violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue’ because the elements of different constitutional violations vary.” Id. at 618 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).
B. Underlying Constitutional Claims
Liberally construed, the amended complaint pleads violations of plaintiff‘s rights under the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments.
An inmate asserting a claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment must allege that the practice asserted is religious and the belief is sincerely held; the challenged conduct infringes upon the inmate‘s religious belief; and the challenged practice does not further a legitimate penological objective. Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
Similarly, an inmate asserting a claim under the Fourth Amendment for invasion of privacy must allege that the challenged conduct is “unrelated to any legitimate penological goal or . . . designed to intimidate, harass, or punish.” Holland v. City of New York, 197 F. Supp. 3d 529, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Finally, “for deliberate-indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment against a prison supervisor, the plaintiff must plead . . . that the supervisor had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and disregarded it.” Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d at 616.
Here, even a liberal reading of the amended complaint fails to implicate Supt. Morton in any of the elements of any of the constitutional violations discussed above.
Liberally construed, each of the alleged constitutional violations squarely arises out of the medical examination performed by P.A. Badami. First, plaintiff alleges Badami‘s examination of plaintiff with his clothes off infringed upon his sincerely held Islamic belief that men should not reveal their genitals to members of the opposite sex, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Second, plaintiff appears to plead Badami‘s examination of plaintiff without his consent and her review of plaintiff‘s medical history within earshot of others constituted an improper invasion of his right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Third, plaintiff alleges that subjecting him to such an examination in violation of his religious beliefs and in plain view of others constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
However, even assuming plaintiff adequately pleads such constitutional violations as to P.A. Badami,4 plaintiff fails to supply any facts permitting the inference that Supt. Morton was directly involved in or even aware of P.A. Badami‘s medical examination. For example, plaintiff does not allege Supt. Morton made any individualized decisions regarding plaintiff‘s medical examination, nor does plaintiff allege Supt. Morton ordered P.A. Badami to perform the examination.
At most, plaintiff alleges Supt. Morton was made aware of the purportedly constitutionally deficient medical examinations that took place during the intake process at
Accordingly, plaintiff‘s Section 1983 claims against Supt. Morton must be dismissed.5
III. Leave to Amend
Here, the amended complaint, even liberally construed, does not contain allegations suggesting plaintiff has a claim against Supt. Morton that he has merely “inadequately or inartfully pleaded” and therefore should “be given a chance to reframe.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d at 112. On the contrary, the Court finds repleading would be futile because the problems with plaintiff‘s claims against Supt. Morton are “substantive,” such that “better pleading will not cure [them].” Id.
Accordingly, the Court declines to grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint respecting his claims against Supt. Morton.
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
All claims against defendant Superintendent Robert Morton are dismissed, and the Clerk is instructed to terminate Supt. Morton from this action.
The motion to dismiss as to defendant Physician‘s Assistant Maria Badami is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. By February 28, 2022, the Attorney General‘s Office, which has appeared on behalf of Supt. Morton, shall advise the Court by letter whether it will accept service of process on behalf of P.A. Badami.
The Court certifies pursuant to
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #24).
Dated: February 14, 2022
White Plains, NY
SO ORDERED:
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge