FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION v. MICHELLE WILLETTE
No. 2015-0108
6th Circuit Court-Hooksett District Division
January 12, 2016
Submitted: November 10, 2015
Stephen W. Wight, of Lawrence, Massachusetts, by brief, for the defendant.
DALIANIS, C.J. The defendant, Michelle Willette (Willette), appeals a decision of the 6th Circuit Court-Hooksett District Division (Spath, J.), issuing a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). On appeal, Willette argues that the district division erred in issuing the writ of possession because: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the possessory action; and (2) Freddie Mac failed to obtain judgment pertaining to its possessory action in both the superior court and the federal district court. We affirm.
The record establishes the following facts. In February 2013, Freddie Mac purchased, through a foreclosure sale, Willette‘s
In April 2014, Freddie Mac removed the title action from the superior court to the federal district court. The federal district court granted Freddie Mac‘s motion to dismiss Willette‘s title action. Afterward, Freddie Mac filed a motion in superior court for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied.
Freddie Mac then requested a hearing in the district division on the merits of its possessory action. At the hearing, Willette argued that the district division lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. The district division disagreed and issued the writ. This appeal followed.
We first address whether the district division had jurisdiction to issue the writ of possession. “The ultimate determination as to whether the district division had jurisdiction in this case is a question of law, subject to de novo review.” Friedline v. Roe, 166 N.H. 264, 266 (2014). “In order to answer this question, we need to engage in statutory interpretation.” Id. “In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Eskeland, 166 N.H. 554, 558 (2014) (quotation omitted). “We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“The district division of the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred upon it by statute.” Friedline, 166 N.H. at 266. The district division “has the power to entertain possessory actions under
If the defendant shall plead a plea which may bring in question the title to the demanded premises [s]he shall forthwith recognize to the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in such sum as the court shall order, to enter [her] action in the superior court for the court at the next return day, and to prosecute [her] action in said court, and to pay all rent then due or which shall become due pending the action, and the damages and costs which may be awarded against [her].
After the filing of such plea and the entry of such recognizance no further proceedings shall be had before the [circuit] court, but the action may be entered and prosecuted in the superior court in the same manner as if it were originally begun there.
See also Friedline, 166 N.H. at 266-67.
“The filing of a plea of title in the district division does not immediately halt the possessory proceedings.” Id. at 267. However, “[w]hen the plea of
Willette argues, however, that, after she filed the recognizance required by the district division and brought her title action in superior court, the language in
There is no dispute that, before Willette filed her title action, the district division had the jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession pursuant to
We are not persuaded that the language in
Willette next argues that the district division erred because “as a matter of record, the parties agreed to transfer the case to the Superior Court in order to reach a final resolution of the case; including the issue of possession.” Her argument misstates the record.
Willette‘s title action was not “transferred” to the superior court. When she first raised the issue of title in the district division, she filed a motion to have the matter transferred to superior court, which the court granted. In a subsequent order, the district division clarified that it had granted the motion in error, explaining that “if the defendant still wishes to file a plea of title action, she must do so as a new separate filing with [the] Superior Court.” (Emphasis added.) This was consistent with our interpretation of
Willette also argues that the district division did not retain jurisdiction over the possessory action because, in her title action, she requested that the superior court “[e]njoin any further possessory action against [her] in this matter.” However, she has not provided, as part of the appellate record, a superior court order granting her request, and we are not persuaded that Willette‘s request for relief, standing alone, deprived the district division of jurisdiction over Freddie Mac‘s possessory action.
Willette next argues that the federal court‘s dismissal of her title action “is fatal” to Freddie Mac‘s ability to obtain a writ of possession in the district division. This argument, however, relies upon Willette‘s assumption that the possessory action was transferred to superior court, which as explained above, the record does not support. Therefore, we need not address it.
Finally, Willette argues that: (1) Freddie Mac waived its right to obtain judgment on the possessory action because it failed to obtain a judgment prior to removing the action to federal court; and (2) Freddie Mac engaged in improper “forum shopping” by requesting the writ of possession from the district division after having its motion for issuance of a writ of possession denied in superior court. We conclude that these arguments do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).
Affirmed.
HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.