CITY OF FAIRFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIA GAIL RENEE EUBANKS, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2013-11-207
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
9/2/2014
[Cite as Fairfield v. Eubanks, 2014-Ohio-3781.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM FAIRFIELD MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. 2013TRD2066
Heather Felerski, P.O. Box 181342, Fairfield, Ohio 45018, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Maria Eubanks, appeals her conviction in the Fairfield Municipal Court for failing to stop after an accident.
{¶ 2} On July 27, 2013, Eubanks was charged with failing to stop after an accident in violation of the Fairfield Municipal Code. The charge stemmed from an allegation that after Memories Bar closed in the early morning hours on July 27, 2013, Eubanks clipped the knee of Jacques Robinson, a bar employee, with her car as she was pulling out of a parking spot
{¶ 3} Eubanks appeals, raising the following two assignments of error.
{¶ 4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 5} THE CITY OF FAIRFIELD PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT.
{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT‘S FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 8} Eubanks argues her conviction for failing to stop after an accident is not supported by sufficient evidence because the city failed to prove she knew she had been involved in an accident.1 Eubanks also argues her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because “there are sufficient differences between the witnesses’ testimony to cause reasonable doubt as to [Eubanks‘] guilt.”
{¶ 9} Whether the evidence presented is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, an appellate court‘s function is to
{¶ 10} When considering whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence in a bench trial, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction where the trial court could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the state has proven the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Godby, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-03-056, 2006-Ohio-205, ¶ 4, citing State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 59 (1988). In conducting its review, an appellate court examines the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trial court “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Cooper, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-05-113, 2011-Ohio-1630, ¶ 7.
{¶ 11} Eubanks was charged with failure to stop after an accident, in violation of Fairfield Municipal Code Section 335.13, which states:
In case of accident or collision resulting in injury or damage to persons or property upon any public or private property other than public roads or highways, due to the driving or operation thereon of any motor vehicle, the person driving or operating the motor vehicle, having knowledge of the accident or collision, shall stop, and, upon request of the person injured or damaged, or any other person, shall give that person the driver‘s or operator‘s name and address, and, if the driver or operator is not the owner, the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, together with the registered number of that motor vehicle, and, if available, exhibit the driver‘s or operator‘s driver‘s or commercial driver‘s license.
{¶ 12} In the case at bar, the relevant elements of Section 335.13 are: (1) an accident
{¶ 13} At trial, Robinson testified that when Eubanks “gunned out” of the parking spot, she clipped his knee with her car and left the scene of the accident. Robinson testified he did not fall and pushed off Eubanks’ car to get away. When asked whether he yelled or screamed when the car hit him, Robinson replied: “I said stop, but she has done – after I was – as many times as I told her it‘s time to go, it is time to go, it is time to go, she knew, because at that point when I did walk and look at her plate and I walked back up and said it is time to go, she cut the wheel.”
{¶ 14} Long testified that as Eubanks pulled out of the parking spot, Robinson screamed, “she just tried to hit me.” Long further testified that at no time did he see Eubanks’ car strike Robinson, and that although Robinson was on the phone at the time of the incident, he did not say anything about being hit by a car.
{¶ 15} Eubanks testified she pulled out of the parking spot quickly and left the parking lot. Eubanks further testified she felt no impact on her car whether from Robinson‘s body or from Robinson slapping her car or putting his hands on her car, and had no knowledge of the accident until after she was pulled over by a Fairfield police officer. In fact, she believed she was being pulled over for a DUI and was surprised to hear about the allegation.
{¶ 16} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the city, we find that the city
{¶ 17} Our determination that Eubanks’ conviction for failure to stop after an accident is not supported by sufficient evidence moots her further argument that the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we need not address that argument. See State v. Ross, 2d Dist. Clark No. 06CA0046, 2007-Ohio-3164; State v. Rosa, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 60, 2013-Ohio-5867;
{¶ 18} Eubanks’ conviction for failure to stop after an accident is therefore vacated, and Eubanks is discharged.
{¶ 19} Judgment reversed and Eubanks discharged.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.