Ex parte Jackson County Board of Education (In re: D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education)
1130738
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
REL: 09/26/2014
STUART, Justice.
SPECIAL TERM, 2014; Jackson Circuit Court, CV-13-900315
SPECIAL TERM, 2014
1130738
Ex parte Jackson County Board of Education
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education)
(Jackson Circuit Court, CV-13-900315)
STUART, Justice.
The Jackson County Board of Education (“the Board“) petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Facts and Procedural History
On April 25, 2012, Pruett Contracting submitted to the Board a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. On April 30, 2012, Kenneth Harding, the Jackson County superintendent of education, executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting began renovating the gymnasium. On June 8, 2012, Harding received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that “all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately” because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. On June 20, 2012, the Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. On July 22, 2012, Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for $91,268, representing the work that had been performed.
Standard of Review
“As this Court has consistently held, the writ of mandamus is a
“‘“drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.“’
”Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)). ‘“In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss by means of a mandamus petition, we do not change our standard of review....“’ Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep‘t of Transp., 937 So. 2d 56, 57 (Ala. 2006)(quoting Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala. 2003)).
“‘In Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147 (Ala. 2003), this Court set out the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:
“‘“A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002). Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299.”
”Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 563 (Ala. 2005). We construe all doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Drummond Co., 937 So. 2d at 58.”
Ex parte Alabama Dep‘t of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Ala. 2007).
Discussion
The Board contends that it has a clear legal right to the dismissal of the action filed against it by Pruett Contracting because, it says, that it is entitled to immunity from liability under
Pruett Contracting recognizes the holding in Ex parte Hale County Board of Education and its applicability to this case, but it maintains that that decision was ill advised. Pruett Contracting argues that this Court‘s determination that a county board of education is entitled to sovereign immunity is contrary to the
This Court has cloaked members and employees of school boards with
Pruett Contracting‘s argument that sovereign immunity should not protect the Board from a suit to enforce its contractual obligations is also unpersuasive. In State Highway Department v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872, 875 (Ala. 1991), this Court held that because an action seeking payment under a contract was “in the nature of an action to compel state officers to perform their legal duties,” the action was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See also Ex parte Alabama Dep‘t of Transp., 978 So. 2d at 23. As this Court recognized in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131-41 (Ala. 2013):
“‘... [C]ertain causes of action are not barred by
§ 14 :“‘“‘There are four general categories of actions which in Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1971), we stated do not come within the prohibition of
§ 14 : (1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform their legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial acts; and (4) actions brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act seeking construction of a statute and its application in a given situation. 287 Ala. at 229-230, 250 So. 2d 677. Other actions which are not prohibited by§ 14 are: (5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials in their representative capacity ....‘”“’Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep‘t of Transp., 937 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006)(quoting [Ex parte] Carter, 395 So. 2d [65,] 68 [(Ala. 1980)](emphasis omitted). ...’
“....
“... [T]his Court today restates the sixth ‘exception’ to the bar of State immunity under
§ 14 as follows:“(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State officials in their representative capacity where it is alleged
that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428 (1967), and (b) actions for damages brought against State officials in their individual capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, subject to the limitation that the action not be, in effect, one against the State. Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989).”
These exceptions to sovereign immunity adequately address and negate Pruett Contracting‘s concerns that, with regard to the enforcement of contractual obligations, granting a county board of education sovereign immunity is unjust.
Moreover, Pruett Contracting appears to recognize the exceptions to sovereign immunity in our caselaw. Indeed, Pruett Contracting maintains that the underlying action should not be dismissed because, it says, the amendment to its complaint adding as parties the proper officials in their official capacities and requesting that they “perform their legal duties” and pay Pruett Contracting as set forth in the contract remedies its error in not naming those parties initially. However, because the original complaint was filed solely against the Board, the trial court lacked subject-
Furthermore, Pruett Contracting‘s argument that the amended complaint should be treated as an initial filing under
Conclusion
The Board has established that it is entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action must be dismissed. Ex parte Alabama Dep‘t of Transp.,
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.
Moore, C.J., dissents.