Everett v. SchrammEverett v. Schramm
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Karen Everett and Marion Mickens (“plaintiffs“) brought this class action alleging illegalities in the administration of the State of Delaware‘s Aid to Families With Dependent Children (“AFDC“) program. Defendants Patricia Schramm and Charles Hayward were sued in their official capacities as, respectively, Secretary of the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services (“the Department“) and Director of the Department‘s Division of Economic Services. The district court, 587 F.Supp. 228 (D.C.Del.1984), found for the plaintiffs and granted declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to certain AFDC calculations made between October 1, 1981 and December 31, 1983. With respect to calculations since January 1, 1984, the district court found for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed and defendants cross-appealed. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
AFDC was one of four categorical assistance programs created by the Social Security Act of 1935, Sec. 401 et seq., 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1936). Though AFDC has frequently been amended over the years, the program‘s basic structure--an early example of cooperative federalism--has remained constant. Under the program, financially needy households that include dependent children receive monetary payments from the state. The payments are funded jointly by the state and federal governments. To be eligible for federal matching funds, a state must adopt a plan for aid and services to needy families in conformity with
States must set two standards for the program: the standard of need and the payment level. The standard of need is a set of amounts each state considers adequate to provide for the subsistence needs of households of various sizes. It is “a dollar figure set by each State reflecting the amount deemed necessary to provide for essential needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter.” See Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 737, 98 S.Ct. 2068, 2075, 56 L.Ed.2d 658 (1978). While a 1968 amendment to the federal law required that the standard of need be adjusted by July 1, 1969 to reflect increases in the cost of living,
The standard of need took on greater significance with the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (“OBRA“), Pub.L. No. 97-35, Secs. 2302, 2306, 95 Stat. 357, 845-46 (1982), which became effective October 1, 1981. First, OBRA declared any household whose gross income exceeded 150 percent of the state‘s standard of need ineligible for AFDC benefits.
The effects of the statutory changes wrought by OBRA are well-illustrated in the cases of the named plaintiffs. In January 1983, Karen Everett was receiving AFDC payments of $197 per month for herself and her infant child. At that time she took a part-time job with an expected average gross monthly income of $400. Shortly thereafter, she was notified that her AFDC payments would be terminated because her income exceeded 150 percent of what Delaware contends was its standard of need for a family of two.1 In February 1983, when Marion Mickens married Charles Mickens, she was receiving an AFDC grant of $266 per month for herself and her two children. Mr. Mickens had a gross income at that time of approximately $400 per month. Calculations required by
On April 15, 1983, Everett and Mickens filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class consisting of all Delaware AFDC recipients and applicants who were or would be denied benefits due to the state‘s application of OBRA‘s “150 percent” and “stepparent income” rules. They argued that Delaware had violated federal and state law by using its then-current AFDC payment level, rather than its actual (and allegedly much higher) standard of need, in making the calculations required under OBRA. There was no dispute that Delaware complied with the terms of
The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on this issue. On June 8, 1984, the district court ordered that:
Any claims against members of the plaintiff class by the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS), which were asserted before the date of this Order, for AFDC overpayments involving the application of
42 U.S.C. Secs. 602(a)(18) and602(a)(31) between October 1, 1981 and December 31, 1983, shall be recalculated utilizing the standards of need in this Order.9 In addition, all new overpayment claims initiated after the date of this Order shall be calculated using the standards of need in this Order.10
While this case was pending in district court, the Delaware assembly approved a bill (“S.B. 209“) that repealed the cost of living adjustment provision in Sec. 509 and amended Sec. 503(d) to read, in relevant part:
The standard of need for aid to families with dependent children on and after January 1, 1984, shall be as follows, based on family size: One person household--$152 per month; 2 person household--$212 per month; 3 person household--$287 per month; 4 person household--$336 per month; 5 person household--$416 per month; 6 person household--$475 per month; 7 person household--$534 per month; and $54 dollars per month for each additional person, beyond 7, in the household who qualifies for assistance.
Plaintiffs then claimed that S.B. 209 effected an impermissible reduction in the standard of need.11 Though they conceded that AFDC imposes no obligation on the states to account for post-1969 inflation in calculating their standard of need, they contended that once a state had recognized inflation as an element of its standard of need, it must consistently do so. The district court rejected this contention, and entered summary judgment for the defendants as to the S.B. 209 standard of need. In their appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in upholding the S.B. 209 standard of need. By cross-appeal, defendants contend that under the eleventh amendment and Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), the district court was without jurisdiction to enforce the former Sec. 509 cost of living adjustment, as this amounted to compelling state officials to comply with state law.12 We shall first address the Pennhurst II issue, and then the S.B. 209 standard of need issue.
II.
The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
It is well-settled as a matter of judicial construction that despite its limited and seemingly unambiguous language, the eleventh amendment constitutionalizes a much more far-reaching principle of state sovereign immunity. See generally Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv.L.Rev. 61 (1984); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1889 (1983). Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment prohibits a federal court from hearing a suit brought against a state by its own citizens, absent the state‘s consent. Where a state agency or department is named as defendant, that too is considered a suit against the state which is barred by the eleventh amendment. See Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Association, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981). Where officials are named as defendants, “[t]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1053, 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1963). This rule, however, is subject to an exception of vast import: where a suit seeks prospective injunctive relief against a state official for action contrary “to the supreme authority of the United States“, it is not deemed a suit against the sovereign. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). This so-called “stripping doctrine” has been limited to suits for prospective injunctive relief; the federal courts have no jurisdiction to award retroactive monetary relief in such cases. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).13
In Pennhurst II the Supreme Court confronted another variation on the Ex parte Young theme, a pendent claim against state agencies and officers seeking prospective injunctive relief for a violation of state law. The Court held that such suits were barred by the eleventh amendment:
In such a case the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court‘s grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.
465 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 911.
Defendants argue that under Pennhurst II the district court lacked jurisdiction to award prospective relief on the basis of a violation of a state statute, former
III.
Plaintiffs present three somewhat related arguments in support of their contention that Delaware violated federal law in enacting S.B. 209, which dramatically decreased its standard of need.15 First, plaintiffs argue that the “federal definition” of the standard of need as a “reasoned assessment” of the cost of providing for essential needs prohibits “arbitrary” reductions. Second, they argue that federal law incorporates a policy of “honesty” that requires that once a state has imposed upon itself an increase in the standard of need beyond 1969 levels, it cannot later reduce its standards of need in a way that “obscures” the previously determined amount necessary to provide for essential needs. Finally, they argue that by setting the standard of need equal to its payment level, Delaware thwarted the clear purpose of OBRA. In evaluating these arguments, it is important to keep in mind one matter that is not in dispute: that Delaware complied with the
Standard of Need As A “Reasoned Assessment“.
Plaintiffs argue that the essential characteristic differentiating a state‘s AFDC payment levels from its standard of need is that, while payment levels may be arbitrarily set, the standard of need must be a “reasoned assessment” of the cost of meeting basic needs. Thus, they argue, an “arbitrary” change--that is, one not supported by any evidence of an actual reduction in the cost of meeting basic needs--is prohibited by federal law.
Even assuming for present purposes that the reduction was arbitrary,16 we believe that federal law requires only that there be no reductions to levels below the July 1, 1969 standard of need. Some hypotheticals expose the fallacy in plaintiffs’ position. They concede that Delaware could, consistently with federal law, have kept its standard of need at the July 1, 1969 level, yet it is difficult to see how this would be significantly less arbitrary--in the light of inflation--than raising the standard of need and later bringing it back down to the original level. (The July 1, 1969 cutoff date is, in itself, an arbitrary element built right into the definition of the standard of need.) Moreover, we do not believe that plaintiffs would argue that had Delaware maintained its 1969 standard of need until the passage of S.B. 209, that it violated federal law by arbitrarily increasing its standard of need in a manner not proportional to inflation, yet that would seem to be a necessary implication of the argument they urge before us now. We conclude that the reduction in the standard of need effected by S.B. 209 did not violate the “federal definition” of the standard of need, even if it is not supported by any corresponding actual reduction in the cost of meeting basic needs.
The Policy of “Honesty“.
In Rosado v. Wyman, supra, the Supreme Court noted that
[W]hile it leaves the States free to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accomplishes within that framework the goal, however modest, of forcing a State to accept the political consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light the true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable.
Id. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation of this passage,
The holding in Rosado, as plaintiffs must concede, is far more limited than the rule they ask us to adopt here. In that case New York, which had previously computed its standard of need on an individualized basis, moved to a system, like Delaware‘s, of fixed allowances based on the number of individuals per household. 397 U.S. at 416, 90 S.Ct. at 1219. In so doing, it made no attempt to average certain expenses--such as telephone and laundry--that had been included in the individualized need determinations. This, the Court held, was impermissible:
[Section 602(a)(23) ] invalidates any state program that substantially alters the content of the standard of need in such a way that it is less than it was prior to the enactment of [Sec. 602(a)(23) ], unless a State can demonstrate that the items formerly included no longer constituted part of the reality of existence for the majority of welfare recipients. We do not, of course, hold that New York may not, consistently with the federal statutes, consolidate items on the basis of statistical averages.... Providing all factors in the old equation are accounted for and fairly priced and providing the consolidation on a statistical basis reflects a fair averaging, a State may, of course, consistently with [Sec. 602(a)(23) ] redefine its method for determining need.
397 U.S. at 419, 90 S.Ct. at 1221. Plaintiffs cannot bring this case directly within the scope of Rosado by characterizing “inflation” as a factor which Delaware included in its standard of need prior to S.B. 209, and which under Rosado could not be eliminated unless Delaware could demonstrate that it “no longer constituted part of the reality of existence for the majority of welfare recipients.” In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, supra, this court specifically rejected the contention that inflation could be “a ‘factor’ of need as that term was used in Rosado.” 483 F.2d at 726.18 In addition, Rosado dealt with factors that were included in the standard of need prior to enactment of
We, however, doubt that the policy behind
We do not believe that Delaware‘s action contravenes the policy of political accountability. The failure of Delaware‘s current standard of need (and its payment levels) to reflect inflation that has occurred since 1968 is there for the public to see, as is the dramatic and seemingly unjustified reduction that took place between 1983 and 1984. Under the statutory scheme, AFDC recipients and activists must avail themselves of the political process, not the judicial process, to use these figures to effect the changes they seek. Though some may question the wisdom or efficacy of relegating such persons and interests to the political process, see generally J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980), Congress clearly could determine that the extent of the statutory right to AFDC benefits be subject to the ebb and flow of state political power.20
The Purpose of OBRA.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that because the plain language of OBRA requires that the state‘s standard of need, rather than its payment levels, be used in the “150 percent” and “stepparent income” calculations, Delaware thwarted the clear purpose of OBRA by setting its standard of need equal to its payment levels. This argument need not detain us. Nowhere does AFDC--before or after OBRA--prohibit a state from setting its standard of need equal to its payment levels; indeed, that would seem to be the theoretically optimal situation. Again, some simple hypotheticals illustrate the flaw in plaintiffs’ argument. Under their reading of OBRA, a state would not thwart its purpose provided that it set its standard of need just one penny above or one penny below its payment levels, but that it does violate OBRA when it makes them exactly equal. We think it is clear that, given the complete discretion left to the states in setting the payment levels, by using instead the standard of need in OBRA calculations, Congress required only that the figures used at least reflect a state‘s 1969 cost of fulfilling essential needs. It is conceded that the figures used by Delaware meet this criterion, and therefore we find no violation of OBRA.
When an object designed to perform one relatively passive function is pressed into serving an entirely different and quite active function, unintended and perhaps even anomolous results can be expected. This, it appears, is what happened when the standard of need--originally just a “benchmark“--suddenly became central to AFDC eligibility determinations. Though we may agree that there is a certain illogic in permitting the legislative action that we uphold today, it is for Congress to determine whether the statutory scheme that permits it is in need of repair.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
Notes
Delaware used the following “standard of need” figures in making calculations under OBRA during the period October 1, 1981-December 31, 1983:
Household Size 1 $141 2 197 3 266 4 312 5 386 6 440 7 495 per each additional person 54
The 1968 study established the following standard of need:
Household size 1 $107 2 149 3 201 4 236 5 292 6 333 7 374 per each additional person 41
Prior to January 1, 1984, this section provided in relevant part:
The standard of need for old-age assistance, aid and services to needy families with children, aid to the blind or aid to the permanently and totally disabled shall be adjusted upward simultaneously with any percentage increase in old-age, survivors and disability insurance as provided by Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended [42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 402 et seq.]. The dollar amount of increased adjustment of this standard of need shall be the same as the dollar adjustment of the increase in old-age survivors and disability insurance.
As found by the district court, the adjusted figures for the relevant period were:
Household Size 1981 1982 1983 1 $258 277 287 2 359 386 399 3 484 521 539 4 569 611 632 5 704 756 783 6 803 862 892 7 901 969 1002 per each additional person 99 106 110
Prior to January 1, 1984, this subsection provided in relevant part:
The amount of assistance or supplementary services granted as aid to families with dependent children shall be determined by the Department with due regard to the resources and necessary expenditures of the family and the conditions existing in each case and in accordance with the rules and regulations made by the Department and shall be sufficient, when added to all other income and support available to the family, to provide such family with a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.
The figures in the AFDC plans were as follows:
Household Size 1968-71 1972-78 1979-83 1 $107 130 141 2 149 181 197 3 201 245 266 4 236 287 312 5 292 355 386 6 333 405 440 7 374 455 495 per each additional person 41 50 54
The following chart compares the pre- and post-S.B. 209 standards of need:
Household Size 1983 S.B. 209 1 $287 152 2 399 212 3 539 287 4 632 336 5 783 416 6 892 475 7 1002 534 per each additional person 110 54
Plaintiffs go further and argue that the reduction in the standard of need was not only arbitrary, it was in fact unintended by the legislature. They rely principally on an affidavit by the sponsor of S.B. 209 to the effect that his only purpose in introducing the bill was to raise payment levels 8%, and that he had relied on the expertise of the Department to draft a bill that would have only that effect. We need not decide what significance an inadvertent reduction would have, as we cannot conclude on the basis of such meager evidence that the legislature did not intend the immediate effect that its law, by its explicit terms, quite clearly accomplished
Plaintiffs do not now contend that Delaware‘s action was unconstitutional.
Indeed, even the Illinois Welfare Rights Organization case, on which plaintiffs rely, seems to understand the policy of Sec. 602(a)(23) to be principally one of accountability:
In effect, what [Sec. 602(a)(23) ] mandated was ‘honesty’ on the part of the administrators of state AFDC programs requiring them to inform the public to what extent the state was failing to meet the subsistence needs of its citizens in relation to the standard of need established by the state itself.