Lead Opinion
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.
While providing security for a U.S. State Department convoy in the Gaza Strip, Mark Parsons was killed by a roadside bomb. Parsons’s estate and his family sued the Palestinian Authority under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, alleging that the Authority had provided material support for and conspired with the terrorist or terrorists who detonated the bomb. Concluding that the Parsons family had produced insufficient evidence to create genuine disputes of material fact on these Anti-Terrorism Act claims, the district court granted summary judgment to the Palestinian Authority. Although we agree with the district court that the family’s conspiracy claim theories are too speculative to survive summary judgment, we believe a reasonable juror could conclude that Palestinian Authority employees provided material support to the bomber. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to the conspiracy claim but reverse as to material support.
I.
In the midst of the Second Intifada, on October 15, 2003, a United States Depart
Immediately after the bombing, Palestinian Authority security and police forces took control of the site, gathered forensic evidence, and launched an investigation run by the Palestinian Authority’s Preventive Security Services. United States and Israeli authorities also launched their own investigations.
During its investigation, the Palestinian Authority detained and interrogated six suspects, “a number of’ whom, according to the official having overall responsibility for the investigation, “admitted to possessing and planting explosive charges in the past, targeted at Israeli military incursions into Gaza.” One of those suspects was Amer Qarmout, a leader of the Popular Resistance Committees (“PRC”). During his interrogation, Qarmout recounted how, two or three days prior to the bombing, he supervised the digging of a hole on Salahadeen Street in which he planned to place a bomb. Qarmout and “fellow members in the Resistance” dug the hole “in front of the [Palestinian Authority] National Security Service.” Qarmout explained: “I introduced myself to the National Security soldiers and asked them to turn their attention from the young men who were planting the device.” But denying he ever planted a bomb, Qarmout claimed that after the “explosion targeting the U.S. convoy took place ... I called Joma’a Abou Loze[, who had helped dig the hole,] and asked him not to move about in the place and not to plant the device because of the dangers involved.”
Qarmout also admitted to having possessed three bombs one month prior to the bombing. He described the bombs as using detonating cables, employing urea as the explosive material, and weighing 30 to 35 kilograms, 20 to 25 kilograms, and 10 to 12 kilograms. According to Qarmout, it was the 12 kilogram bomb that he had intended to plant on Salahadeen Road.
In the course of their investigations, the Palestinian Authority and the FBI conducted forensic analyses of the bomb that killed Parsons. Both determined, among other things, that the bomb contained urea nitrate. The Authority’s analysis added that the bomb weighed approximately 30 to 40 kilograms and was detonated using cables. Moreover, a memo found in the Palestinian Authority’s investigative file concludes, based on “[t]he lid of the device, the type of detonator, the cables used, the poorly connected batteries, the type of explosive material, [and] the outer casing of the device[,] ... that the structure of this device is the same structure used by the Popular Resistance Committees.”
To this day, neither the Palestinian Authority nor Israel nor the United States has publicly identified the bomber. The reason, according to the Palestinian Authority, is that all three investigations remain open and the “identity of the individuals or group responsible for planning and carrying out the bombing has never been determined.” Appellees’ Br. 2. The Parsons family disputes whether the Palestinian Authority has indeed failed to identify those responsible for the attack.
Nearly four years after the bombing, Parsons’s estate, his siblings, and his par-
Among the evidence the Parsons family offered to prove these theories, three documents — discovered in the Palestinian Authority’s investigative file and that the parties and the district court have thus far treated as admissible — are central to this case. The first document (quoted above) is Qarmout’s statement to Palestinian Authority interrogators in which Qarmout admits that he prepared to plant a bomb on Salahadeen Road in approximately the same location as the bomb that killed Parsons. In that statement, Qarmout also describes the three bombs he possessed in the month prior to this attack. The second piece of evidence (also referenced above) is the FBI’s forensic report. Lastly, the family relied on a two-page memo having an unidentified author addressed to the “Director General of the Preventive Security Service,” the significance of which the parties forcefully debate. In a section titled “Conclusion and personal interpretation of what happened according to the information in my possession,” the memo includes several statements about the role Palestinian Authority employees played in the bombing including:
• “The explosive device was planted 20 meters away from the National Security checkpoint, a fact that indicates that those present in front of the checkpoint that day have previous knowledge of the presence of the device.”
• “[Ajfter information of the arrival of U.S. embassy staff was leaked, either by the National Security personnel at the checkpoint or by those who were accompanying the convoy, the person responsible for the explosion detonated the device.”
The memo also includes several observations about the bomb, see supra at 120, as well as two statements about when the device was prepared and buried:
• “After examining the material used, we learned it had been prepared more than twenty days earlier and that a substantial portion of the nitric acid had been lost, separated from the urea, and reacted with the iron in the outer casing.”
• “As we mentioned above, the device was present for 20 days at least....”
In addition, the Parsons family claimed they could prove that Amer Qarmout and/or the Popular Resistance Committees directly carried out the attack. Moreover, the family insisted that even if they were unable to identify the actual bomber, they could nonetheless prevail so long as they could show what role the Palestinian Authority had played.
The district court, focusing on the three items of evidence, granted the Palestinian Authority’s motion for summary judgment. The court first held that plaintiffs advanc
II.
The Parsons family brought their material support and conspiracy claims under the civil liability provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, which gives United States nationals killed or injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism” (or their estates, survivors, or heirs) the right to bring a civil lawsuit in federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 2333. The Act defines “international terrorism” as activities that, among other things not relevant to this appeal, “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State.” Id. § 2331(1)(A). In other words, to prevail, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant would have violated any one of a series of predicate criminal laws had the defendant acted within the jurisdiction of the United States. Here, the Parsons family alleges that the Palestinian Authority violated two federal criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which makes it a crime to “provide[ ] material support or resources ... knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of’ specific violent crimes, including 18 U.S.C. § 2332, which prohibits the killing of a United States national outside the United States; and 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b), which makes it a crime to conspire to kill a United States national outside the United States. The family’s Anti-Terrorism Act claims thus turn on whether they can prove the elements of either section 2339A (the material support claim) or section 2332(b) (the conspiracy claim). In this opinion, we consider the material support claim and announce our judgment with respect to the conspiracy claim.
Material Support
The family first disputes the district court’s interpretation of section 2339A as requiring them to identify the actual bomber. The family may prevail, they claim, so long as they show that the Palestinian Authority provided material support to whoever directly carried out the attack. On this point, the Palestinian Authority never directly challenges the family’s statutory analysis, and for good reason. As the family correctly observes, “[t]he emphasis in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A is upon the material support provider — ‘whoever provides material support or resources’ — not the recipient.” Appellants’ Br. 18.
That said, the family’s theory that Amer Qarmout planted and detonated the bomb and that Palestinian Authority employees gave him material support to that end, would, if proven, at least be sufficient to sustain their material support claim. Accordingly, we first consider whether a rea
Evaluating whether evidence offered at summary judgment is sufficient to send a case to the jury is as much art as science. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). But what makes for a “genuine” factual dispute? The Supreme Court answered that question in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., explaining that the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence ... will be insufficient” to defeat summary judgment.
We believe that the Parsons family’s evidence is sufficient to meet this burden with respect to whether Qarmout planted and detonated the bomb. Qarmout himself admitted that two or three days prior to the attack, he prepared to plant a bomb in the approximate location of the bomb that killed Parsons. Qarmout also said that around the time of the killing he possessed a bomb that weighed 30 to 35 kilograms, employed urea as the explosive, and used cable detonators. The bomb described by the FBI and the Palestinian Authority’s analyses largely matches that profile. Both describe a bomb employing urea nitrate as the explosive material, and the Authority analysis reports that the bomb weighed 30 to 40 kilograms and used cable detonators. Moreover, the memo in the Palestinian Authority’s investigative file concludes that “the structure of this device is the same structure used by the Popular Resistance Committees”' — -the very same terrorist organization of which Qarmout was a leader.
The district court took note of most of this evidence, acknowledging that “[e]vidence that someone prepared to do something [i.e., that Qarmout prepared to plant a bomb] is of course relevant to the question of whether the person actually did it,” Estate of Parsons,
Supplementing the district court’s analysis, the Palestinian Authority argues that in light of Qarmout’s history of targeting the Israeli military “[tjhere is no evidence that Qarmout would have targeted a U.S. diplomatic convoy.” Appellees’ Br. 37. At oral argument, the Authority also pointed to Qarmout’s statement that he intended to plant his 12 kilogram bomb, not the 30 to 35 kilogram one. Recording of Oral Arg. 17:54-18:57.
Although these evidentiary criticisms certainly have force, they are, given the teachings of Liberty Lobby, more properly directed to the jury. In our view, a reasonable juror could conclude that Qarmout never planted a bomb; that the actual bomb had been in the ground for twenty days, long before Qarmout began digging his hole; that Qarmout planted a different bomb; or even that he planted the bomb to target Israelis but never detonated it. A reasonable juror, however, could also believe Qarmout’s incriminating statements but disbelieve his exculpatory ones, and thus conclude that he lied about calling off the bombing. Likewise, a reasonable juror could find that Qarmout planned to and did plant the 30 to 35 kilogram bomb that had been in his possession, as opposed to the 12 kilogram bomb referred to in his statement. And it would hardly be unreasonable for a juror to conclude that the reference in the Palestinian Authority memo to the bomb having been in the ground for twenty days was a misstatement and that in fact the memo’s author meant to write only that the bomb had been prepared, but not necessarily planted, twenty days earlier. After all, the memo first says the bomb “had been prepared more than twenty days earlier,” meaning that its later statement — “as we mentioned above, the device was present for 20 days at least” — could be read as only cross-referencing that earlier statement. Sorting out these contradictions, deciding how much weight to give evidence that supports or undermines the family’s case, and evaluating how much credibility to assign Qarmout’s incriminating versus exculpatory statements are prototypical jury functions that courts may not commandeer. Liberty Lobby,
The Authority next disputes on both evidentiary and legal grounds whether the family can show that the Palestinian Authority provided Qarmout with material support. As for its evidentiary objection, the Authority questions any assertion that the National Security personnel at the checkpoint complied with Qarmout’s request to “turn their attention” away from the planting of a bomb. It points out not only that Qarmout’s statement makes no mention of whether and how the guards responded, but also that Qarmout describes only a conversation while he was digging a hole, not during the more serious activity of planting a bomb. Moreover, relying on another passage in Qarmout’s statement in which he describes how personnel at a different National Security checkpoint thwarted one of Qarmout’s previous bomb-planting missions, the Authority argues that the personnel at this checkpoint would have stopped Qarmout from planting a bomb. Appellees’ Br. 38.
Once again, such evidentiary arguments are properly addressed to the jury, not to the court. Recall that at summary judgment the non-moving party is entitled to
The Authority accuses the family of failing to “parse the language of the material support statute” or to “cite any legal authority” establishing that complying with Qarmout’s request to look the other way while he planted a bomb, constituted material support within the meaning of section 2339A. Appellees’ Br. 43. The family responds that the security forces’ conduct falls under two categories listed in section 2339A(b)(l)’s definition of “material support or resources” — namely, “service” and “personnel.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(l).
We begin with “service.” Although section 2339A nowhere defines that term, the Supreme Court provided a definition just last year in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, — U.S.-,
Assuming, as we must at this stage of the litigation, that the checkpoint personnel acted as the Parsons family claims, we think the security forces’ conduct falls comfortably within Humanitarian Law Project’s definition of “service.” As security personnel assigned to a checkpoint, they were presumably responsible for preventing terrorists from planting and detonating bombs nearby. Moreover, they allegedly acted in response to Qarmout’s request. In effect, then, at a terrorist’s behest, these security officers agreed to and did affirmatively remove the threat that local law enforcement officers would themselves interfere with the terrorist’s efforts to plant a bomb — actions functionally the same as distracting a beat-cop so that someone else can safely break the law without police intrusion. Because that is surely an act done in concert with and for the benefit of a terrorist, it constitutes providing a “service” and therefore materi
Given this conclusion, we need not address the trickier question of whether the security forces’ alleged conduct also constitutes providing “personnel.” We say trickier because we are at least unsure whether that conduct qualifies as providing “personnel” as section 2339B defines that term and because although some courts have concluded that “personnel” has a different and broader meaning in section 2339A, at least one of those courts has also acknowledged the existence of strong arguments to the contrary. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
In sum, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find on the basis of the family’s evidence that Qarmout planted the bomb that killed Parsons and that Palestinian Security forces at the nearby security checkpoint complied with Qarmout’s request not to interfere with his effort to plant a bomb. Because such acts qualify as providing material support under section 2339A, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Palestinian Authority on the family’s material support claim. Having reached this conclusion, we have no need to consider the Parsons family’s other evidentiary theories with respect to their material support claim. We note, however, that because the panel is divided on the issue, we have reached no binding decision about whether the Parsons family has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to the scienter element of their material support claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (criminalizing the provision of “material support or resources ... knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of’ specific violent crimes, including 18 U.S.C. § 2332, which prohibits the killing of a United States national outside the United States (emphasis added)). Compare Opinion of Judge Henderson 127-32 (“Henderson Op.”) (concluding that the Parsons family has failed to satisfy the scienter element), with Opinion of Judge Brown 139-43 (“Brown Op.”) (concluding that the Parsons family has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to the scienter element), and Opinion of Judge Tatel 137-39 (“Tatel Op.”) (treating as forfeited any argument that the Parsons family has failed to satisfy the scienter element).
Conspiracy
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the family’s conspiracy claim. See Henderson Op. at 127 n. 1, 132; Tatel Op. at 132-38. But see Brown Op. at 143-50.
III.
Finally, the Parsons family argues in the alternative for additional discovery, a request the district court denied. Although we find no abuse of discretion in that decision with respect to the family’s conspiracy claim, see Dunning v. Quander,
So ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA or Act) authorizes a United States national (or his estate, survivors or heirs) injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism” to sue in federal court for money damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). The Act defines “international terrorism” as activities that, as relevant here, “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A). To prevail, therefore, the plaintiffs (Parsons family) must show that defendant Palestinian Authority (PA), had it acted within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State, would have violated a criminal law of the United States or of the State. On appeal, the Parsons family alleges two such violations: (1) the PA provided material support for the killing of a U.S. national in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and (2) the PA conspired to kill a U.S. national in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b). I would affirm the district court on the alternative ground that the Parsons family has failed to establish the scienter requirement of sections 2339A and 2332(b). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part.
I take no exception to the majority opinion’s explanation of the underlying facts. My disagreement is legal, not factual. Section 2339A criminalizes the provision of “material support or resources ... knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of’ certain criminal statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (emphasis added). One criminal statute — 18 U.S.C. § 2332 — prohibits the killing of a U.S. national outside the United States. Section 2339A makes clear that providing material support or resources alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation. The criminal defendant must provide material support or resources “knowing or intending” that the resources “are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out,” the underlying crime' — here, the killing of a U.S. national outside the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a); see also United States v. Stewart,
The knowledge required to violate section 2339A in the context of the ATA’s
[a] knowing donor to Hamas — that is, a donor who knew the aims and activities of the organization — would know that Hamas was gunning for Israelis ..., that Americans are frequent visitors to and sojourners in Israel, that many U.S. citizens live in Israel ... and that donations to Hamas, by augmenting Hamas’s resources, would enable Hamas to kill or wound, or try to kill, or conspire to kill more people in Israel.
Id. at 693-94. In other words, the court concluded that knowingly donating money to Hamas is a criminally reckless act sufficient to violate sections 2333(a), 2339A and 2332. Three dissenting judges found the court’s reasoning “awfully vague” and accused the court of “sliding] over the statutory requirement ... that the entity providing material assistance must know that the donee plans to commit terrorist acts against U.S. citizens.” Id. at 725 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Abecassis v. Wyatt,
I express no opinion on the Seventh Circuit’s application of criminal recklessness to establish civil liability under the ATA for a violation of section 2339A because the Parsons family failed to establish even criminal recklessness. Significantly, the Boim court’s determination that the donors acted recklessly relied on “State Department data that in 1999 there were about 184,000 American citizens living in Israel, accounting for about 3.1 percent of the country’s population.”
Judge Brown contends that the two-page memorandum is an “official government record” that is “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Opinion of Judge Brown (Brown Op.) at 141 (citing PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Comm’r,
The memorandum does not explain, moreover, why it concludes that PA personnel “leaked” news of the U.S. convoy’s arrival. The relevant portion of the memorandum states in full:
As we mentioned above, the device was present for 20 days at least, which means that the device was planted either after the problem with Ismail Hameed or it was planted for one of the vehicles of the Israeli occupation army. However, after information of the arrival of U.S. Embassy staff was leaked, either by the National Security personnel at the checkpoint or by those who were accompanying the convoy, the person responsible for the explosion detonated the device.
Id. The memorandum contains no factual basis for its conclusion that “National Security personnel” leaked news about the U.S. convoy. To conclude that the memorandum’s author “inferred” the conclusion “from the bomb’s proximity to the eheck
Because the Parsons family offers no admissible evidence to demonstrate that the PA intended or knew (or even recklessly disregarded whether) its conduct— assuming arguendo it provided material support or resources to whoever planted and detonated the bomb — would aid in the killing of a U.S. national, the PA is entitled to summary judgment on the Parsons family’s section 2339A claim.
Judge Tatel would avoid section 2339A’s scienter requirement by maintaining that the PA did not “identiffy] section 2339A’s state of mind requirement as a problem for the specific theory” accepted by the majority — “namely, that the personnel posted at the checkpoint agreed to Qarmout’s request not to interfere with his efforts to plant a bomb.” Tatel Op. at 138 (emphasis in original); see Brown Op. at 143. To the contrary, the PA repeatedly argues that the Parsons family failed to satisfy section 2339A’s scienter requirement. See Appellees’ Br. 33-34 (The Parsons family “offered no facts that could be presented in admissible form that the PA provided any kind of material support to the PRC, let alone that the PA provided such support ‘knowing or intending’ that it was ‘to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out,’ the killing of a U.S. national, as the statute requires.” (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339A)); id. at 41-42 (“Even if someone in the PA had given Qarmout a weapon, there is no evidence that they did so ‘knowing or intending that they are to be used’ in carrying out the killing of a U.S. national or other terrorist act, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A ....”); id. at 37 (“There is no evidence that Qarmout would have targeted a U.S. diplomatic convoy.”); id. at 43 (“Plaintiffs ... do not explain how a failure to adequately guard a security checkpoint and prevent the planting of an explosive charge meets the definition of ‘material support’ under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (which requires an affirmative act of support engaged in with the requisite knowledge and intent, rather than an act of omission or negligence).” (emphasis added)). Nor is it “unfair to the Parsons family for us to consider whether the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to” a necessary element of their claims. See Tatel Op. at 138. The PA raised the lack of admissible evidence meeting section 2339A’s scienter requirement both in its brief in this court and in its motion for summary judgment in district court. See Appellees’ Br. 33-34, 37, 41-43; Mem. of Points & Auths. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 14, Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth.,
The PA is likewise entitled to summary judgment on the Parsons family’s section 2332(b) conspiracy claim. Section 2332(b) makes it a crime to “attempt! ] to kill, or engage! ] in a conspiracy to kill, a national of the United States” outside the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b). “To prove a conspiracy charge, the [evidence] must show that the defendant agreed to engage in criminal activity and ‘knowingly participated in the conspiracy’ with the intent to commit the offense.... ” United States v. Hemphill,
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm in toto the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the PA and, accordingly, dissent from the reversal of summary judgment on the 18 U.S.C. § 2339A claim.
Notes
. I join the judgment affirming the summary judgment grant to defendant Palestinian Authority on the Parsons family’s conspiracy claim.
. [Redacted] was [Redacted] Gaza” at the time of the explosion. [Redacted] Deck ¶ 7. In that role he [Redacted] into the event. Id. ¶ 8.
. Judge Brown urges that a statement by a former head of the PSS that Palestinian security forces aided Hamas and martyred themselves during the Second Intifada “tends to support [the] conclusion” that PA personnel at the security checkpoint at least disregarded the risk that their conduct would aid in the killing of Americans. Opinion of Judge Brown at 142-43. The PSS official’s statement is an English translation found on the website of Palestinian Media Watch, an Israeli research institute, of an excerpted news clip from 2007. Assuming arguendo the website accurately translated the statement, the statement does not suggest that PA personnel would have known the bomb would target Americans.
. I find the Parsons family’s claim speculative for another reason. For PA personnel at the checkpoint — and even more so, in the convoy — to have "tipped” the bomber to the U.S. embassy staff's arrival means that those personnel had to have calibrated with pinpoint accuracy that the explosion would not affect them — otherwise, they risked their own lives as well.
. I disagree with Judge Brown that the [Redacted] Declaration supports inferences favorable to the Parsons family regarding the reliability and knowledgability of the memo
The PSS kept an investigative file documenting the investigation, interviews, interrogations and the forensic analysis provided by the FBI. Copies of those files were provided to counsel for the PA and PLO in this matter, and I understand copies were then provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel. I was responsible for collecting, assembling, and producing the investigative file produced in this matter and for verifying that the records produced are authentic copies of records kept in the course of the investigation into the bombing.
[Redacted] Deck ¶¶ 17-18. [Redacted] statement that he was responsible for verifying that the records were "authentic copies” does not mean that he also verified the substance of each record. It means only that he verified that the records provided to counsel for the PA and PLO were accurate reproductions of records held by the PSS' — without necessarily endorsing any statements or conclusions in those records. After the above-quoted passage, moreover, the Declaration discusses — in several paragraphs that all begin "I have reviewed the investigative file .... "• — the evidence contained in Qarmout’s statement, a "true and correct copy” of which is attached to the Declaration as exhibit 1. See id. ¶¶ 19-22. In contrast to the extensive discussion of Qarmout's statement, the Declaration does not mention the memorandum. Nor is the memorandum attached as an exhibit to the Declaration, as Qarmout's statement is. Accordingly, I find nothing in the [Redacted] Declaration that supports the reliability or authoritativeness of the memorandum.
. Even under his compartmentalized approach, moreover, Judge Tatel concedes that the PA raised section 2339A's scienter requirement as a defense to the Parsons family's "Qarmout theory.” Tatel Op. at 138. He nonetheless contends that the PA's claim that “[tjhere is no evidence that Qarmout would have targeted a U.S. diplomatic convoy,” Appellees’ Br. 37 — which claim immediately follows the PA’s explanation that Qarmout was known to attack Israeli military targets— "deals with whether Qarmout committed this attack, not with the state of mind of the personnel at the checkpoint.” Tatel Op. at 138. If, however, the personnel at the checkpoint did not believe — because there was no evidence to support the belief — that Qarmout would target a U.S. convoy, any support they may have provided Qarmout would not have been given knowing or intending (or recklessly disregarding whether) it would be used to kill a U.S. national.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I write separately to explain my reasons for joining our affirmance of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Palestinian Authority as to the Parsons family’s conspiracy claim. I also explain why I would decide neither the scienter
I.
Although the parties appear to disagree about the exact elements of an Anti-Terrorism Act civil conspiracy claim, they agree, as do I, that the Parsons family must prove at least the existence of an agreement between Palestinian Authority employees and whoever planted the bomb. Compare In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa,
Before addressing those theories, however, I briefly consider the family’s argument that we should take account of two pieces of evidence the district court disregarded. First, the district court ruled inadmissible a document from the website archive of the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center purporting to summarize a “captured” Palestinian Authority document allegedly describing plans to create a nitric acid factory to support bomb production. According to the district court, this document is inadmissible because “[i]ntelligenee reports that contain multiple levels of hearsay are not admissible evidence.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth.,
The family also relies on a video snippet of a 2007 interview purportedly with Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Services from 1999 until 2002 and Palestinian Minister of State Security from April until September 2003, in which Dahlan said (according to a translation on the Palestinian Media Watch website): “Forty percent of the Martyrs in this Intifada belonged to the Palestinian security forces. The Palestinian security forces were those who protected and hid half of the Hamas [military] leadership and of the Hamas military force during the Intifada.” Palestinian Media Watch, http://www.palwatch.org/main. aspx?fi=713&flcLid=713&doc_id=864 (last visited July 22, 2011). The Palestinian Authority describes this video as “unauthenticated,” suggesting that the video would be inadmissible at trial. Appellees’ Br. 34. But to defeat summary judgment, a party need only produce evidence “capable of being converted into admissible evidence,” Greer v. Paulson,
Notwithstanding the family’s valiant effort to build an entire case out of this single sentence, I think it too slender a reed to support the weight of the conspiracy claim. Applying Liberty Lobby, I focus on both the “quantity” and the “caliber” of the family’s evidence.
This second theory is just as dependent on incredibly little and incredibly low quality evidence — and so just as speculative— as the first. Not only would the family ask a jury to make two quite substantial inferences — that the security forces knew of the bomb and that they affirmatively helped plant it — but, as the Palestinian Authority points out, they would do so based on evidence that leaves a number of important questions unanswered, such as “whether the checkpoint was manned 24-hours a day” and “whether the bomb could have been planted unseen at night.” Appellees’ Br. 44. Such a tower of inferences built atop a gap-filled foundation is too unstable to stand. I thus agree with the district court that the family’s generic theory about the help personnel posted at the checkpoint must have provided in planting the bomb is also inadequate to defeat summary judgment.
Given that the Parsons family has failed to defend their conspiracy claim with any evidentiary theory other than the two just rejected, I would ordinarily end my analysis here. But because we have already explained in the context of the family’s material support claim that a reasonable juror could find that “at a terrorist’s behest” the Palestinian Authority personnel posted at the checkpoint “agreed to and did affirmatively remove the threat that local law enforcement officers would themselves interfere with the terrorist’s efforts to plant a bomb,” Maj. Op. at 125 (emphasis added), one might wonder (as does Judge Brown, see Brown Op. at 139, 143-48) how the family could have failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of an agreement in the context of their conspiracy claim.
According to Judge Brown, however, the family “properly [put Qarmout’s statement] before the court as to the conspiracy claim, not just the material support claim.” Brown Op. at 145. I disagree. The conspiracy section of the family’s brief mentions the Qarmout evidence only in a single sentence, while devoting three full pages to the two-page memo discovered in the Palestinian Authority’s investigative file. Appellant’s Br. 33-36. By contrast, the family spends six pages of the material support section on the Qarmout and Popular Resistance Committee evidence. Id. at 22-24, 26-29. Moreover, in the conspiracy section, the family refers to the Qarmout evidence only in support of “the ... generic evidentiary theory that someone at sometime planted the bomb with some kind of assistance from th[e] security forces,” supra at 135; the family never suggests that this evidence describes the specific conspiracy that is the basis for liability. Given the family’s approach, it is hardly surprising that the Authority never once mentions the Qarmout evidence in responding to the family’s conspiracy claim arguments — not even to incorporate arguments made earlier with respect to the material support claim. Appellees’ Br. 45-50. Indeed, the Authority expressly states its understanding that the evidence on which the family relies to support the conspiracy claim “consists of only the two-page memo.” Id. at 46 (emphasis added). Of course, appellees sometimes miss appellants’ arguments, but when they do we can usually count on appellants to point that out in their reply brief — something the Parsons family never does. So, far from misconstruing the family’s brief — and far from “ignorfing]” any evidence, Brown Op. at 143 —my approach to the family’s conspiracy claim simply abides by the basic “premise of our adversarial system ... that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan,
Judge Brown insists that “[o]ur forfeiture doctrine applies to legal arguments, not facts.” Brown Op. at 143. Not true. There is no such categorical distinction and Judge Brown has not identified even a single forfeiture case saying otherwise. Brown Op. at 144. To the contrary, our district courts’ Local Civil Rule 7(h) expressly authorizes courts to treat as forfeited evidence — including record evidence — that the parties fail to highlight at
We apply forfeiture to unarticulated evidentiary theories not only because “judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs or the record,” id. at 553 (Williams, J., concurring) (internal quotations marks omitted); accord Brown Op. at 144^15, but also because such a rule ensures fairness to both parties. To deny a summary judgment motion based on an evidentiary theory the nonmoving party never developed would necessarily deprive the moving party of the opportunity to poke holes in that theory. See Gardels v. CIA
Fairness is implicated as well where, as here, the nonmoving party develops an adequate evidentiary theory in defense of one but not another claim — at least where the two claims have different elements. After all, an argument useless for attacking a theory in the context of one claim may be devastating to that same theory in the context of the other claim. It is hardly surprising then that in Vickers v. Powell, we did exactly what I do here — namely, in reviewing a district court’s summary judgment decision, we expressly declined to consider relevant record evidence with respect to one of the nonmovant’s claims because the nonmovant had relied on that evidence only to defend a different claim.
II.
My colleagues debate whether “the Parsons family has failed to establish the scienter requirement of’ their two claims. Henderson Op. at 127. Compare id. (genu
According to Judge Henderson, the Authority did raise this argument — indeed, “repeatedly.” Henderson Op. at 131. But two of these “repeated[]” references appear in sections of the Authority’s brief devoted to evidentiary theories other than the Qarmout theory. See Appellees’ Br. 33-34 (PRC theory); id. at 43 (the so-called proximity theory). Nor are Judge Henderson’s two citations to the Authority’s Qarmout-based section any more on point. The first — “[tjhere is no evidence that Qarmout would have targeted a U.S. diplomatic convoy,” Appellee’s Br. 37— deals with whether Qarmout committed this attack, not with the state of mind of the personnel at the checkpoint. The second — “[e]ven if someone in the [Palestinian Authority] had given Qarmout a weapon, there is no evidence that they did so ‘knowing or intending that they are to be used’ in carrying out the killing of a U.S. national or other terrorist act,” Appellees’ Br. 41^2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)) — clearly refers only to the theory that the Authority provided Qarmout with weapons, rather than the theory that the personnel posted at the checkpoint agreed to Qarmout’s request not to interfere with his efforts to plant a bomb. Because these references point to evidentiary theories other than the Qarmout theory or to elements of the Qarmout theory other than the state of mind element, they are hardly adequate to put the Parsons family on notice of the specific element of the specific evidentiary theory that Judge Henderson now addresses. Under these circumstances, then, it would be unfair to the Parsons family for us to consider whether the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to the security forces’ state of mind when allegedly aiding Qarmout.
Moreover, even if the Authority had properly raised the scienter issue, I would exercise our discretion not to reach it. The district court never decided this issue and on appeal the parties address it, at best, in passing, and at worst, not at all, see supra at 123-24. As my colleagues’ debate well demonstrates, the issue is both novel and complex. Under these circumstances, I think it most “prudent to remand the ... issue[ ] to the district court for an initial evaluation.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock,
Judge Brown also addresses the Authority’s contention that it may not be held vicariously liable under the Anti-Terrorism Act for the acts its checkpoint employees allegedly took to aid Qarmout. Brown Op. at 147-52. Again, I have no need to reach this issue as to the family’s conspiracy claim. See supra at 119-25. As for the material support claim, although the Authority raised its vicarious liability theory
III.
I agree with Judge Brown about the virtue of our “narrow holding”: “we have at least avoided making bad law.” Brown Op. at 150. As the thoughtful legal analyses of my colleagues reveal, the Anti-Terrorism Act’s civil liability provision raises many difficult and still unresolved questions. What scienter showing does the Act require? What is the scope of vicarious liability? Does the intent requirement apply to every element of the Act? That the parties, in addition to outright forfeiting several arguments, barely, or at best poorly, address these other questions confirms my judgment to cut a narrow path in deciding this appeal.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
• I concur in reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) on the Parsons family’s material support claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. I dissent from the court’s affirmance of summary judgment on the family’s conspiracy claim under § 2332(b). For three reasons, each of which is necessary to my conclusion, I would reverse summary judgment on that claim too. First, I respectfully disagree with Judge Henderson’s conclusion that the Parsons family’s evidence is insufficient to prove the PA “knowingly” provided material support to, and conspired with, the terrorist who killed Mark Parsons. Second, I respectfully disagree with Judge Tatel that the Parsons family forfeited, as to its conspiracy claim, facts we agree the family properly asserted about alleged bomber Amer Qarmout in the material support context; and that the evidence is insufficient to prove conspiracy. Finally, the district court erred in concluding the Palestinian Authority may not be held vicariously liable under the Anti-Terrorism Act for the acts of its agents.
I
Judge Henderson would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Palestinian Authority as to both claims, because she thinks the Parsons family has not satisfied the relevant scienter requirements for civil liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(a) and 2332(b). Like Judge Tatel, I disagree with Judge Henderson, but we disagree for different reasons. Judge Tatel relies on forfeiture, Tatel Op. at 137-38, and I would reach the merits.
A
The Anti-Terrorism Act provides a civil remedy for U.S. nationals injured by an act of international terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). “[International terrorism” is defined to mean extraterritorial or transnational activities that “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State ... [and] appear to be intended” to achieve the coercive ends of terrorism. Id. § 2331(1). The Parsons family alleges the Palestinian Authority committed the predicate criminal offense of “provid[ing] material support or resources ... knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out a violation of section ... 2332,” id. § 2339A(a), which in turn sanctions “[w]hoever kills a national of the United States, while such national is outside the United States,” id. § 2332(a).
Because the Parsons family conceded as much, see Oral Arg. 9:50-10:06, I assume the intent requirement of § 2339A(a) applies to each element of § 2332(a), even though the latter section contains no intent requirement of its own. Cf. Flores-Figueroa v. United States,
But the scienter requirement for material support entails another interpretive problem: Section 2339A is a criminal statute, but it is a predicate for civil liability under § 2333(a). In the context of civil liability, we judge a violation of § 2339A differently than we would if this were a criminal matter. For example, the Parsons family need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance of the evidence. Likewise, the civil intent requirements apply, not their criminal counterparts.
Viewed through the lens of civil liability, the “knowing or intending” requirement of § 2339A is satisfied by criminal recklessness, a deliberate indifference to the attendant risk — here, the risk that the material support would be used to kill an American. See Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief & Dev.,
Deliberate indifference about the risk to Americans may be reasonably inferred from the interaction of four main pieces of evidence: Qarmout’s statement that he solicited the cooperation of National Security personnel at the checkpoint where he may or may not have actually planted the bomb, the proximity of the bomb to that checkpoint, the presence of a Palestinian Authority car at the head of the American convoy, and the PA’s own investigative report, which concludes National Security personnel tipped off the bomber about the approaching American convoy. Viewed together, this evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude the Palestinian Authority’s agents at least knew of the risk that Americans would be targeted and disregarded that risk.
Judge Henderson points out that the unsigned PA report requires a jury to infer something about the “reliability and knowledgability of the statement’s author,” Henderson Op. at 129, but I think the origin, form, and substance of the report reasonably support such an inference. See Talavera v. Shah,
An official government record such as this is entitled to a presumption of regularity, rebuttable only upon a showing of “clear or specific evidence.” PNC Fin. Servs. Group v. Comm’r,
Judge Henderson assumes, in favor of the moving party, that the report’s author was a rogue investigator who reached unfounded conclusions despite unparalleled access to the evidence. See Henderson Op. at 129-31. Contra Talavera,
The report’s author inferred from the bomb’s proximity to the checkpoint that National Security personnel “ha[d] previous knowledge of the presence of the device.” S.A. 305. Based on “the information in [his] possession,” the report’s author also concluded that the checkpoint personnel or the other National Security personnel accompanying the convoy “leaked” “information of the arrival of U.S. Embassy staff’ to the bomber. Id. A jury could reasonably infer that this conclusion too was based on the bomb’s proximity to the checkpoint— a detail that the report’s conclusion mentions twice. Id. That the evidentiary basis for this conclusion is only implicit in the report does not void the presumption of regularity. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,
This evidence may not be overwhelming, but at the summary judgment stage it need only be sufficient. A jury could reasonably be persuaded by the same evidence that convinced the Palestinian Authority’s own investigator — someone who presumably had access to the scene of the bombing and knowledge of the environment. If the report is correct, the checkpoint personnel acted with more
B
The same evidence that proves material support is sufficient to prove the existence of a civil conspiracy. Qarmout’s statement that he asked the National Security personnel at the checkpoint to “turn their attention from the young men who were planting the device” days before the explosion, S.A. 323, supports a reasonable inference of “an agreement to take part in an unlawful action.” Hall v. Clinton,
II
Judge Tatel, who casts the deciding vote on each of the Parsons family’s claims, splits the baby by separating with almost surgical precision the evidence advanced in this court for the various theories supporting each claim. The court affirms summary judgment on the conspiracy claim because Judge Tatel ignores the very same evidence we use to reverse summary judgment on the material support claim— Qarmout’s statement that, soon before Mark Parsons was killed on Salahadeen Street, Qarmout took steps to plant a bomb there and asked the National Security personnel at the checkpoint to “turn their attention from the young men who were planting the device.” S.A. 323. According to Judge Tatel, we can overlook the most probative evidence of conspiracy because (1) a party forfeits facts as to any theory for which they are not explicitly argued on appeal, and (2) “the family never defends their conspiracy claim by arguing, as they do with respect to their material support claim, that Qarmout planted the bomb with the help of those stationed at the checkpoint.” Tatel Op. at 135. I respectfully disagree with both premises.
A
Forfeiture is the “failure to make a timely assertion of a right.” United States v. Olano,
As Judge Tatel notes, I have “not identified even a single forfeiture case saying” our forfeiture doctrine does not apply to facts. Tatel Op. at 136. But my failure to find precedent proving this negative only highlights the novelty of his argument. Far more telling is Judge Tatel’s failure to identify a single ease holding that facts properly raised as to one claim are forfeited as to another,
Granted, facts not in the record may not be relied upon in this court, see Carr v. Corning,
Especially at the summary judgment stage, it makes little sense to speak of “forfeiting” facts as to one claim but not another. For at this stage, the scope of our review is at its zenith. “In passing on a summary judgment motion, a court may consider materials specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) as well as ‘any material that would be admissible or usable at trial.’ ” Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
B
Even if we had to sever a plaintiffs claims from one another and examine in isolation the evidence proffered for each claim, I would still disagree with the suggested application of this new rule. At the critical point in the operation, the Solomonic scalpel slips. As Judge Tatel must acknowledge, the Parsons family does rely on Qarmout’s statement, not only for the material support claim, but also for the conspiracy claim. In the section of its brief addressing the conspiracy claim, the Parsons family cites the relevant evidence and argues, “[i]t is clear from known-PRC-terrorist Qarmout’s statement that anyone that planted the bomb on [Salahadeen] Street that killed Mark Parsons must have obtained the cooperation of the PA security checkpoint on the road, which was 20 meters from the site of the detonated bomb that killed Mark Parsons.” Appellants’ Br. 33. Assuming the validity of Judge Tatel’s compartmentalized approach to the evidence, Qarmout’s statement is properly before the court as to the conspiracy claim, not just the material support claim.
Judge Tatel acknowledges this reference to Qarmout’s statement but construes it narrowly as an argument that someone other than Qarmout himself conspired with the Palestinian Authority to plant, conceal, or detonate the bomb. Tatel Óp. at 137. The court thus affirms summary judgment on the conspiracy claim for want of an explicit allegation that Qarmout conspired with the Palestinian Authority, despite the Parsons family’s argument — based on Qarmout’s own statement — that whoever
C
Even if it were possible to forfeit facts, and even if the Parsons family had forfeited the Qarmout evidence as to their conspiracy claim, I would not ignore that evidence. We have discretion to address forfeited issues, though we exercise it “only in exceptional circumstances” or to correct plain error. Salazar v. District of Columbia,
I disagree with Judge Tatel’s conclusion that the Palestinian Authority suffered prejudice from the alleged forfeiture. The Parsons family made no secret of its evidence that Qarmout planted the bomb after procuring an agreement from National Security personnel, and the family clearly articulated a theory of conspiracy to match. Under these circumstances, the Palestinian Authority was on notice of the evidence it needed to rebut. Indeed, at oral argument the Palestinian Authority repeatedly, and on its own initiative, ventilated its arguments against the probative value of the Qarmout evidence in the conspiracy context. See Oral Arg. 14:06-20, 15:20-16:37. Where a party responds to an issue despite defects in its presentation, that party has suffered no prejudice and a court need not consider the argument forfeited. See MBI Group, Inc. v. Credit Fonder du Cameroun,
Given the nature of the Parsons family’s allegations, evidence sufficient to prove their material support claim is also sufficient to prove conspiracy. Either way, the Parsons family alleges the Palestinian Authority agreed to cooperate with whoever planted the bomb. Where the prevailing theories of material support and conspiracy overlap as they do here, a defendant is unlikely to specially tailor a novel argument against the sufficiency of the evidence to prove conspiracy that he has not already raised in the material support context. The same counterargument that fails to defeat the material support claim necessarily fails in the conspiracy context. The overlapping character of the family’s claims was not lost on the Palestinian Authority. As the PA expressed it, the Parsons family is “sort of cloaking what is a conspiracy theory in a material support theory.” Oral Arg. 28:09-14. It is no wonder then that the Parsons family did not devote equal space to the Qarmout evidence in each section of its brief. Cf. Tatel Op. at 136. That would have been
D
Finally, even if I were persuaded to ignore the Qarmout evidence, I would still vote to reverse the grant of summary judgment against the Parsons family’s conspiracy claim. The conclusion of the Palestinian Authority’s own investigative report and the video recording of Muhammad Dahlan, former Palestinian Minister of State Security, are sufficiently probative to get this question to a jury.
Judge Tatel concludes the PA report is of insufficient “caliber” to persuade a reasonable jury because it is anonymous, undated, and leaves unstated some of the facts on which it bases its inference of PA complicity. Tatel Op. at 134 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 254,
Judge Tatel also finds insufficiently probative then-Security Minister Muhammad Dahlan’s statement that
Forty percent of the Martyrs in this Intifada belonged to the Palestinian security forces.
The Palestinian security forces were those who protected and hid half of the Hamas [military] leadership and of the Hamas military force during the Intifada.
Palestinian Media Watch, supra note 3. Judge Tatel is right that Dahlan’s statement, by itself, does not prove “personnel at this checkpoint were complicit in this attack.” Tatel Op. at 135. But this additional evidence certainly lends credibility to the conclusions of the PA’s investigative report. Treating each piece of evidence in isolation may lead to an erroneous view of the whole. See Al-Adahi v. Obama,
Ill
The district court stated without explanation that “we have no basis on which to assign vicarious liability to the PA for the alleged criminal acts of a few employees.” Estate of Parsons,
“[W]e start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law.” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., — U.S.-,
The Palestinian Authority argues it cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ acts because the ATA awards treble damages, which the Palestinian Authority equates with punitive damages; and punitive damages may only be awarded under a vicarious liability theory if the principal authorized, ratified, or approved the act, or if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and committed the act within the scope of his employment. Appellees’ Br. 51 (citing Kolstad v. ABA,
The Palestinian Authority’s central premise is false. Treble damages are statutory or liquidated damages — not punitive damages. The Restatement, on which the Kolstad Court relied, explicitly exempts treble damages from the punitive damages exception to its vicarious liability rule. See Restatement (Second) § 217C, cmt. (c) (“The rule stated in this Section does not apply to the interpretation of special stat
The Supreme Court’s statement of the punitive damages exception to vicarious liability is entirely consistent on that score with the underlying opinion of this court, which explicitly distinguished treble damages from punitive damages. Kolstad v. ADA
The district court evaluated the Palestinian Authority’s report and Qarmout’s testimony under the false assumption that they would have to support “a conspiracy claim against the entire PA” to go to a
IV
In my experience, it is rare for three appellate judges to disagree with each other so thoroughly, but in this hard case it may be just as well. With only a narrow holding between us, we have at least avoided making bad law.
. Consistent with Judge Tatel's compartmentalized approach to the evidence, which I address below, see infra pp. 143-47, he deals with Judge Henderson’s scienter argument by finding the Palestinian Authority "never identifies section 2339A’s state of mind requirement as a problem for the specific theory we now accept, namely, that the personnel posted at the checkpoint agreed to Qarmout’s request not to interfere with his efforts to plant a bomb.” Tatel Op. at 138. But the PA's argument is the same for every theory— namely, that the guards did not know they were materially supporting the killing of an. American as opposed to, say, an Israeli. I think it is sufficient for a party to raise a statutory scienter defense once for the whole claim to which it applies. It is not necessary to rehearse the same statutory argument for each specific theory of liability. Precise arguments certainly benefit the judicial process, but we are judges, not robots. Cf. Henderson
. Judge Henderson notes the [Redacted] Declaration does not explicitly discuss the PA report as it does Qarmout’s statement. Henderson Op. at 129-30 n. 5. But [Redacted] failure to single out the report from the rest of the PA’s investigative file is hardly evidence that it is unreliable.
. Contrary to Judge Henderson’s implication, cf. Henderson Op. at 129 n. 3, the record contains not just an English translation, but the video clip of Dahlan’s statement itself, complete with Arabic audio. See Palestinian Media Watch, PA Security Forces Aided Ha-mas During Intifada, PMW, http://www. palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=713&fld_id= 713&doc_id=864 (last visited July 22, 2011). Presumably the video and its translation could be authenticated at trial. See Tatel Op. at 133.
. That facts and law are cut from different cloth is evident in the general rule that parties may stipulate facts but not legal conclusions. See Weston v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
. Judge Tatel cites one case in which he says we treated factual assertions properly raised as to one claim as though forfeited for purposes of another claim. Tatel Op. at 137-38 (citing Vickers v. Powell,
. As Judge Tatel points out, facts alleged at summary judgment by the moving party are treated as "admitted” unless controverted by the non-moving party. Tatel Op. at 136-37 (citing D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 7(h)(1)). This only illustrates the principle that a party cannot rely on facts it has failed to timely assert, and that a party is bound by its admissions. But once controverted, a fact is controverted for all purposes. By the same token, a fact asserted for one purpose is asserted for all purposes. It either happened or it did not happen. The rule of constructive admission offers no support to Judge Tatel’s notion that a fact asserted in the context of one legal theory is forfeited as to another unless restated in the new context.
. Judge Tatel faults the Parsons family's reply brief for not correcting the Palestinian Authority's misimpression that the PA report was the only evidence relevant to the conspiracy claim. Tatel Op. at 136-37. I agree the family could have been clearer, but its reply brief does demonstrate the PA’s error by merging its treatment of material support and conspiracy into a single discussion about the sufficiency of the Qarmout evidence. Appellants' Reply Br. 9-12.
. The Palestinian Authority does not mention that Kolstad and the Restatement also allow punitive damages against a principal who "acts recklessly in employing the malfeasing agent” See Kolstad,
. See Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB,
. The ATA’s legislative history confirms that the primary purpose of the statutory multiplier is to deter future acts of terrorism, not to punish the defendant's moral culpability. See Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the S. Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. 34 (1990) (statement of Steven R. Valentine, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division) ("[The ATA] provides a federal forum for any national of the United States to seek compensation in the form of treble damages for injuries resulting from acts of international terrorism”); id. at 85 (statement of Joseph A. Morris, President and General Counsel of the Lincoln Legal Foundation) C’[B]y its provisions for compensatory damages, treble damages, and the imposition of liability at any point along the causal chain of terrorism, it would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of terrorism’s lifeblood: money.”).