Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Authority
651 F.3d 118
D.C. Cir.2011Background
- Parsons estate sues the Palestinian Authority under the Anti-Terrorism Act for material support (18 U.S.C. § 2339A) and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)) to kill a U.S. national outside the United States.
- On Oct. 15, 2003, a U.S. State Department convoy in the Gaza Strip was bombed, killing Mark Parsons and two colleagues; PA security forces handled the site and investigations, alongside US and Israeli authorities.
- Evidence includes Amer Qarmout’s statement about bomb planning, FBI/PA forensic findings that the bomber used urea nitrate and a 30–40 kg device, and a two-page anonymous PA memo alleging PA involvement, with arguments about its reliability.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the PA, holding that the Parsons family failed to prove bomber identity and that theories linking PA to the attack were too speculative, including material-support and conspiracy theories.
- On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the material-support claim could be supported by evidence that PA National Security forces at a checkpoint provided service by looking away, while the conspiracy claim was upheld for PA as to lack of sufficient basis, leading to reversal on material support but affirmance on conspiracy.
- The court left open remand on discovery issues related to the material-support claim; three judges split on scienter and vicarious liability questions, with a narrow holding guiding further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Material support viability under 2339A | Parsons argues PA provided material support by service at the checkpoint aiding the bomber. | PA contends no actionable material support under 2339A and that evidence fails to show knowledge or intent to assist a US-national killing. | Material support claim survives summary judgment; reasonable juror could find service by checkpoint personnel constituted material support. |
| Conspiracy claim viability under 2332(b) | Parsons contends PA employees conspired with the bomber to kill Parsons. | PA argues no agreement or know-how to commit the underlying crime; theories are too speculative. | Conspiracy claim fails; district court’s summary judgment in favor of PA affirmed. |
| Scienter standard for civil liability under 2339A | Parsons asserts knowledge or intent to aid the killing can be shown by a civil-recklessness standard. | PA argues no sufficient scienter; standard not met under the statute for civil liability. | Court adopts civil-recklessness framework for scienter, but the holding on material support is not limited by this discussion; the conspiracy remains unaffected. |
| Vicarious liability under ATA for PA actors | Parsons seeks vicarious liability for PA officials who aided the bombing. | PA challenges vicarious liability under Kolstad and related principles. | Not addressed on the core holding; the conspiracy claim was affirmed, and material-support liability addressed on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (defines 'service' in material-support context and influences 2339A interpretation)
- Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (crucial discussion of scienter in civil ATA claims; civil recklessness standard adopted by some circuits)
- U.S. v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (conspiracy elements under § 2332(b))
- In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (conspiracy requirements under § 2332(b) clarified)
- United States v. Reeves, 586 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (arguments forfeiture and scope of evidence on appeal)