Estate of Helle v. HensleyEstate of Helle v. Hensley
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Daniel H. Grna, for appellant.
Michael J. Manahan, for appellees.
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HANDWORK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment issued by the Williams County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, one the owner and one the occupant of a home in which appellant‘s decedent was injured and died as a result of a fall. Because we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we affirm.
{¶ 3} Sandra Hensley financed the Montpelier house through a mortgage in her name and held title to the property. She and her son had agreed that he would live in the home, provided that he paid for her monthly mortgage payments. When Hensley missed several payments, however, his mother made the payments. Mrs. Hensley and her son had a verbal agreement that he would purchase the property from his mother when he could afford it. No written agreement regarding the purchase or any other arrangement existed between the two regarding the property.
{¶ 4} For a short time prior to the incident, Mellissa Sayre (“Sayre“), had been living with Hensley at the house. On March 8, 2008, the day of the incident, at Sayre‘s invitation, Helle had come to visit her and was invited to spend the night at the house. That evening, the three socialized for around four hours until about 3:00 a.m. At that point, Hensley and Sayre went to sleep in a bedroom on the first floor of the house. Helle
{¶ 5} At around 3:30 a.m., Hensley and Sayre heard three loud bumps. Hensley investigated and discovered that Helle had fallen down the basement staircase. While clearly injured, Helle was moving under his own power and was helped up the stairs. Both Hensley and Sayre insisted that he receive medical treatment but Helle refused. At around 5:30 to 6:00 a.m., the three went back to sleep with Helle resuming his place on the couch. When he awoke at around 11:00 a.m., Hensley found Helle‘s body on the floor next to the couch. The coroner concluded that he had died from a brain hemorrhage.
{¶ 6} In his deposition, a Williams County sheriff‘s deputy said that, during his investigation at the house, Hensley told him that while the three were still in the basement, Helle said he had been looking for the bathroom when he fell down the stairs. Neither Hensley nor Sayre recall this statement. There is some conflict in whether the dining room outside the basement door was lighted. Hensley testified that no lights were on when the three initially went to bed. However, Sayre said that a light above the dining room table was set on dim, which was in an area close to the basement door.
{¶ 7} Helle had visited the home of Hensley on at least two prior occasions. On one visit, Sayre gave Helle a tour of the home, including showing him the basement stairs area. While viewing the stairway together, Sayre told Helle that Hensley “did not want anybody in the basement because it was a work in progress.” Hensley also said that he had told Helle not to go in the basement before the three initially went to bed. When
{¶ 8} Appellant‘s suit against Mrs. Hensley was in part premised on claims that she had allegedly breached her duty of care as a landlord under
{¶ 9} Appellant appealed that judgment and argues the following six assignments of error:
{¶ 10} “I. The trial court committed error when it found that Sandra Hensley was not a landlord for purposes of imposing liability upon her pursuant to Chapter 5321 of the Ohio Revised Code and committed further error in concluding that appellant‘s claims under Chapter 5321 were barred.
{¶ 11} “II. The trial court committed error when it ruled that appellant‘s statutory claims were barred by the open and obvious doctrine.
{¶ 12} “III. The trial court committed error when it ruled that appellant‘s statutory and common law claims were barred under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
{¶ 14} “V. The trial court committed error when it ruled that Mr. Helle was a trespasser.
{¶ 15} “VI. The trial court committed error in dismissing appellant‘s qualified nuisance claims.”
{¶ 16} Appellant‘s assignments of error are all based upon the underlying issue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105. Summary judgment is proper when: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party reasonable minds can come but to one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party.
{¶ 17} In its first assignment of error, appellant claims that Sandra Hensley was a landlord under Ohio statute and, pursuant to
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} Although there appears to have been an understanding that Matt Hensley would live in the house if he paid Mrs. Hensley‘s mortgage payments on the house, there is no evidence that this was a rental agreement. He missed several mortgage payments and Mrs. Hensley, his mother, still allowed him to live on the premises. Although Matt lived in the house there is no evidence he had exclusive right to the property. There is nothing further in the record which would indicate there was a lease, written or oral. Therefore, no evidence was presented that a rental agreement existed that complied with
{¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant‘s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 21} We will address appellant‘s second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error together since they all address the court‘s finding that, under the open and obvious doctrine, appellant cannot sustain its statutory or common law negligence claims.
{¶ 22} We initially note that, pursuant to our determination that Mrs. Hensley was not a landlord, appellant‘s statutory claims cannot be sustained, regardless of whether the open and obvious doctrine applies. Therefore, appellant‘s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 23} To establish a claim for negligence, a complainant must show the existence of a duty, and a breach of the duty that proximately causes injury to the defendant. Manifee v. Ohio Welding Prods. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77. A host who invites a social guest into his home has a duty “to warn the guest of any condition of the premises which is known to the host and which one of ordinary prudence and foresight in the position of the host should reasonably consider dangerous, if the host has reason to believe that the guest does not know and will not discover such dangerous condition.” Scheibel v. Lipton (1951), 156 Ohio St. 308, paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 24} A landowner owes no duty, however, to persons on his property regarding dangers that are open and obvious. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, ¶ 5, citing Sidle v. Humphrey (1963), 13 Ohio St.2d 45, paragraph one of the syllabus. Open and obvious dangers are those which are so obvious that a person may be expected to discover them and protect himself or herself against the conditions.
{¶ 25} As a sub-category of the open-and-obvious doctrine, the “step-in-the dark” rule provides that one who intentionally steps from a lighted area into total darkness, without knowledge, information, or investigation as to what the darkness might conceal, is liable for his or her own injuries as a matter of law. Leonard v. Modene, 6th Dist. No. 05-WD-085, 2006-Ohio-5471, ¶ 54, citing Flury v. Central Pub. House (1928), 118 Ohio St. 154 and McKinley v. Niederst (1928), 118 Ohio St. 334. “‘Darkness’ is always a warning of danger, and for one‘s own protection it may not be disregarded.” Jeswald v. Hut (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 224, paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 26} The open-and-obvious doctrine remains viable even after the enactment of Ohio‘s comparative negligence statute. Armstrong, supra, at ¶ 14. When applicable, the open-and-obvious doctrine obviates the duty to warn and acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims, as the Ohio Supreme Court explained: “We continue to adhere to the open-and-obvious doctrine today. In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate that when courts apply the rule, they must focus on the fact that the doctrine relates to the threshold issue of duty. By focusing on the duty prong of negligence, the rule properly considers
{¶ 27} Thus, the advent of comparative negligence does not necessarily preclude a grant of summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Ross (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 75. Summary judgment may be granted to the defendant in a negligence suit where, “after construing the undisputed evidence most strongly in favor of plaintiff, a reasonable person could only conclude that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was greater than the combined negligence” of the defendants. Miljikovic v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (Oct. 12, 2000), 8th Dist. No. 77214, citing to Mitchell, supra. See, also, Tharp v. Whiteleather (Nov. 27, 2000), 5th Dist. No. 1999CA00411.
{¶ 28} In this case, the record shows that the room outside the door leading to the darkened basement stairway was either dark or dimly lit. If the room was dark, then Helle walked from darkness into darkness. If the room was lit, Helle walked from a lighted area into the darkened stair area. In either case, the darkness was a danger that was open and obvious and Helle entered the doorway of the basement stairs without properly investigating. Even if he had not been warned about the condition of the basement stairs, Helle was in an unfamiliar house, making it even more necessary that he heed the obvious danger of the darkness.
{¶ 30} Accordingly, appellant‘s second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are not well-taken.
III.
{¶ 31} In its sixth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its claims under the theory of qualified nuisance. We disagree.
{¶ 32} To prevail under qualified nuisance, a plaintiff must establish that a landowner created an unreasonable risk of harm due to negligence of a condition. Kramer v. Angel‘s Path, L.L.C., 174 Ohio App.3d 359, 2007-Ohio-7099, ¶ 21, citing State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-6716, ¶ 59. A nuisance arises from a failure to exercise due care, and, thus, requires a showing of negligence by the defendant. Taylor v. Cincinnati (1944), 143 Ohio St. 426, 436. Again the open-and-obvious doctrine is, however, a defense to any openly hazardous condition, even if it constitutes a qualified nuisance. See Moody v. Coshocton Cty., 9th Dist. No. 05CA0059, 2006-Ohio-3751.
{¶ 34} Accordingly, appellant‘s sixth assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 35} The judgment of the Williams County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Peter M. Handwork, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J.
_______________________________
Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
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JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.