Estate of Charles Howard Zimmerman, Robert Clayton Stevens, Personal Representative v. Erich E. Blatter, et ux.
No. 62
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
April 20, 2018
458 Md. 698 | 183 A.3d 223
Opinion by Watts, J.
September Term, 2017; Circuit Court for Frederick County, Case No. 10-C-14-001668; Argued: March 1, 2018; Hotten, J., dissents.
ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE – MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. (1974, 2015 REPL. VOL., 2016 SUPP.) (“RP”) § 14-108 – RP §§ 14-601 ΤΟ 14-621 – MARYLAND RULES 12-801 ΤΟ 12-811 – RETROACTIVE APPLICATION VERSUS PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION – REMAND – Court of Appeals held that
Barbera, C.J.
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Getty,
JJ.
This
On June 4, 2014, on the Estate‘s behalf, Stevens filed in the Circuit Court for Frederick County a complaint against Respondents seeking to quiet title to the Disputed Property, alleging that the Estate owned the Disputed Property through adverse possession.1 Respondents also claimed ownership of the Disputed Property, and filed a counterclaim against the Estate for trespass. No record owner of the Disputed Property was made a party to the action to quiet title. Following a two-day bench trial, the circuit court denied the counterclaim and ruled that, as between the parties, the Estate had the right to possess and use the Disputed Property by adverse possession. The circuit court noted that it could not rule that the Estate had “absolute ownership” of the Disputed Property because no record owner had been made a party to the action. On November 2, 2015, the circuit court issued an order consistent with its oral ruling, denying the counterclaim and determining that, “as between the parties[,]” the Estate had the right to possession and use of the Disputed Property by way of adverse possession. In other words, the circuit court‘s ruling would not be effective against the record owner of the Disputed Property or any other person with an interest in the Disputed Property, and the circuit court did not determine ownership of the Disputed Property.
Respondents appealed. On June 26, 2017, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the circuit court‘s judgment and remanded this case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss this case. The Court of Special Appeals determined that, although the circuit court correctly observed that the action to quiet title lacked a necessary party, i.e., the record owner of the Disputed Property, the circuit court erred in proceeding with “trial to determine which party to the action had a superior right to possess the Disputed” Property. Thereafter, the Estate filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Special Appeals denied. On September 19, 2017, the Estate filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See Estate of Zimmerman v. Blatter, 456 Md. 251, 173 A.3d 153 (2017).
In the meantime, while this case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, but before that Court issued its unreported opinion, effective October 1, 2016, the General Assembly amended the statute governing actions to quiet title,
Both before and after October 1, 2016,
(1) If a person required to be named as a defendant is dead, or is believed by the plaintiff to be dead, and the plaintiff knows of no personal representative, the plaintiff shall state those facts in an affidavit filed with the complaint.
(2) If the plaintiff states in an affidavit under paragraph (1) of this subsection that a person is dead, the plaintiff may join as defendants “the testate and intestate successors of __________ (naming the deceased person), deceased, and all persons claiming by, through, or under the decedent”.
(3) If the plaintiff states in an affidavit under paragraph (1) of this subsection that a person is believed to be dead, the plaintiff may join the person as a defendant, and may also join “the testate and intestate successors of __________ (naming the person), believed to be deceased, and all persons claiming by, through, or under the person believed to be deceased”.
Consistently,
Against this backdrop, we decide whether
Additionally, we hold that, when applied to this case, the new statutes and Maryland Rules do not require dismissal for failure to join a deceased record owner who has no known personal representative. To be sure, under
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand this case to that Court with instructions to vacate the circuit court‘s judgment and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, namely, the filing of an amended complaint to quiet title with the appropriate affidavit in accordance with the new statutes and Maryland Rules governing actions to quiet title. For purposes of the remand, we determine that there is no issue preclusion on the merits of complaint or counterclaim, and we express no opinion as to the merits of either party‘s claim to the Disputed Property or as to Respondents’ counterclaim for trespass.2
BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2014, on the Estate‘s behalf, Stevens filed in the circuit court a complaint against Respondents seeking to quiet title to the Disputed Property, alleging that the Estate owned the Disputed Property through adverse possession.3 In the complaint, the Estate alleged that the Disputed Property is unimproved real property, consisting of approximately six acres that were conveyed by a deed dated April 19, 1886 from Preston S. Devilbiss and Mollie L. Devilbiss, husband and wife, to Abner C. Devilbiss. The Estate alleged that the Disputed Property does not have a Maryland property tax identification number or a map/parcel number. The Estate also alleged that the Disputed Property lies between the Zimmerman Farm and the Laughlin Farm. The Estate alleged
In the complaint, the Estate requested that the circuit court determine, among other things, that: (1) the Estate “has actual peaceable possession of the” Disputed Property; (2) in the alternative, the Estate “is in constructive and peaceable possession of the” Disputed Property; (3) its possession of the Disputed Property is “under color of right by reason of” its and its “predecessor‘s adverse possession for more than the statutory period”; (4) as between the parties, the Estate “has absolute ownership of the” Disputed Property and “the right of disposition of the” Disputed Property. Accordingly, the Estate requested that the circuit court “[e]nter a decree” that, as between the parties, the Estate has “absolute ownership of[,]” “and the right of disposition of[,] the” Disputed Property.
On August 25, 2014, Respondents filed an answer to the complaint, denying that the Estate was in actual or constructive peaceable possession of the Disputed Property and that the Estate had the right to possess the Disputed Property through adverse possession. On the same day, Respondents filed a counterclaim against the Estate, alleging that the Disputed Property “has always been regarded as a part of the” Laughlin Farm “and deemed by all parties who had involvement with either parcel to be a part of the” Laughlin Farm, including the late Charles Howard Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”). Respondents alleged that they, and previously the Laughlin family, had given permission to Zimmerman and his wife “for limited use of the” Disputed Property, but that they had “formally noted the withdrawal of their consent and license for any use of the land by the heirs of the Estate . . . by letter.” Respondents requested that the circuit court issue an order prohibiting the Estate and “its agents, successors, heirs, and assigns” from trespassing onto the Disputed Property.
On September 24, 2014, the Estate filed an answer to the counterclaim denying that Respondents held title to the Disputed Property, arguing that Respondents failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and asserting affirmative defenses.
On September 15 and 16, 2015, the circuit court conducted a bench trial. At the beginning of trial, the Estate‘s counsel attempted to clarify an issue in the case, advising the circuit court that the dispute between the parties pertained “not necessarily [to] ownership[,]” but rather concerned “the degree of possession that the [E]state has exercised over” the Disputed Property. The Estate‘s counsel explained that “legal ownership of the” Disputed Property “is with Abner C. Devilbiss, that the land was conveyed to him in 1886, deed recorded in the land records, and there ha[ve] been no further conveyances[.]” The Estate‘s counsel stated that Abner had died, and that the Disputed Property‘s legal owner “would be the personal representative of his granddaughter[,] but they are not a party to th[is] case.” At that point, the circuit court asked the Estate‘s counsel how this case could be decided and whether there was a lack of a necessary party. The Estate‘s counsel responded that the dispute at issue was strictly between the parties, and that the circuit court could issue a judgment in the matter, although
I think . . . it would have required opening at least three decedents’ estates, and trying to find[ ] heirs of[ ] parties . . . one of whom has been dead for almost 120 years. The second party, I believe, died in 1958. And [] the granddaughter, I think, died in the 1970s. . . . The last decedent died after 1970, which means [that] whatever interest she had would have gone to her estate. . . . Her estate was administered in Allegany County, but there‘s nothing in the inventory that shows any. . . . [T]he [Disputed P]roperty has been forgotten about . . . because they thought -- you have this 160-acre farm here. And the six acres that[ are] in dispute w[ere] considered part of the whole, and, [] conveyed out. No thought was given to the fact that the later deeds did not specifically mention [the Disputed Property.]
In response, Respondents’ counsel argued that the Estate‘s failure to join the Disputed Property‘s record owner rendered the circuit court unable to decide the matter. Stated otherwise, according to Respondents’ counsel, the record owners were necessary parties. The circuit court advised Respondents’ counsel that “[t]he want of a necessary party is a required pretrial motion[,]” and that it would treat Respondent‘s counsel‘s argument as a motion to dismiss. The circuit court recessed to review the parties’ arguments and consider the matter. After a brief recess, the circuit court stated that it had reviewed the case law, and determined that it could decide the issue between the parties and determine whether one party‘s claim was superior to the other party‘s claim, but that it could not grant title or allow conveyance of the Disputed Property in the absence of its record owner. The circuit court asked whether the parties desired to proceed with the understanding that the circuit court could decide only which party had a superior claim, and counsel for both parties responded in the affirmative. Thereafter, the trial proceeded.
At trial, to demonstrate satisfaction of the elements of adverse possession, witnesses testified on behalf of the parties concerning each party‘s use of the Disputed Property. And, through exhibits and witness testimony, the following pertinent evidence was adduced. Beginning in the 1950s, Zimmerman and his wife resided on what is now known as the Zimmerman Farm with their “foster child,” George, and Zimmerman and George began operating the Zimmerman Farm as a dairy farm. By a deed dated September 28, 1965, Hilda Davies conveyed the Zimmerman Farm to Zimmerman and his wife, as tenants by the entireties.4 Later, George‘s son, Stevens, who also grew up on the Zimmerman Farm, helped George and Zimmerman with the dairy farm. In 1999, the Zimmerman Farm ceased to operate as a dairy farm.
On December 20, 2001, Respondents purchased Laughlin Farm from John Laughlin, successor trustee of the Henry P. Laughlin Family Trust. According to Respondents, they believed that they owned the Disputed Property from the
In 2010, Zimmerman had a land survey conducted. Stevens testified that he first learned that the ownership of the Disputed Property was unknown upon review of the survey results. On January 29, 2011, Zimmerman died. In a letter dated October 5, 2011, Dr. Maharaj wrote to Stevens, who was serving as the Estate‘s personal representative, and claimed ownership of the Disputed Property. In a letter dated January 18, 2012, Dr. Maharaj opened a claim with her title insurance company, stating that she believed that the Disputed Property was inadvertently excluded from the Laughlin Farm deed and asking who rightfully owned it. In a letter dated December 13, 2012, the title insurance company‘s assistant vice president and claims counsel traced the chain of title for Respondents’ property and concluded that the Disputed Property was conveyed out of Respondents’ chain of title through “two out-conveyances” by deeds dated March 20, 1857 and April 19, 1886. The title insurance company‘s vice president and claims counsel did not identify the record owner of the Disputed Property. The title insurance company ultimately determined that Respondents’ “property [was] described as insured[,]” and denied Dr. Maharaj‘s claim.
At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court heard closing arguments and recessed to consider the case. Thereafter, the circuit court orally ruled from the bench, denying the counterclaim and ruling that, as between the parties, the Estate had the right to possess and use the Disputed Property through adverse possession. The circuit court first addressed the counterclaim, ruling that it could not grant the relief requested, i.e., a no-trespass order, in the absence of evidence that Respondents had title to the Disputed Property. As to the Estate‘s adverse possession claim, the circuit court summarized the evidence relating the elements of adverse possession and ruled:
And so I do find that the use of [the Disputed P]roperty meets the criteria of adverse possession. I do find that, as between the parties, the right to possess the [Disputed Property] is with the Estate[.] That is[] by adverse possession. And that[,] henceforth, between the parties, the[ Estate] ha[s] the right of use of th[e Disputed Property].
I cannot rule that the[ Estate] ha[s] absolute ownership of the [Disputed Property.] . . . [The Estate] certainly did not prove that.
On November 2, 2015, the circuit court issued an order consistent with its oral ruling, denying the counterclaim and ordering
that[,] as between the parties to this action, the right to possession and use of the [Disputed Property], Six (6) acres, two (2) rood, and twenty-five (25) perches +/- which comprise the area of unknown ownership between the properties of the [Estate] and [Respondents], is with the Estate . . . by adverse possession.
In other words, the circuit court‘s ruling and subsequent order was to be ineffective against the record owner of the Disputed Property or any other person with an interest in the Disputed Property. The circuit court did not identify, either in its oral ruling or subsequent order, who the record owner of the Disputed Property is; rather, the circuit court determined only that, as between the parties, the Estate had the superior claim to the right to possess and use the Disputed Property.
On November 30, 2015, Respondents
The Court of Appeals‘[s] interpretation of
[RP § 14-108] leaves no room for doubt in this case. The record owner is [a] necessary party and must be joined to a quiet title action.[RP] § 14-108(b) . Outstanding claims to a property are clouds on that property‘s title and prevent a court from granting the relief provided for in the quiet title action—absolute ownership and the right to dispose of the property. Id. The limited relief granted by the circuit court was a clear indicator that something was amiss. As the Estate admitted at trial, there was a record owner it did not name as a defendant in the action.[RP] § 14-108(b) plainly required the Estate to join the record owner. We hold, therefore, that the [circuit] court erred in conducting trial without ordering the Estate to join the record owner or any person who may “claim[] to have a hostile outstanding right” to the Disputed [Property] as a party, and we reverse the judgment of the [circuit] court with instructions to dismiss this case.
Id. at *7. As to the amendment of
Subtitle 6 prescribes precise procedures for actions to quiet title that did not exist prior to 2016. Although Subtitle 6 [had] not [been] enacted [when] the Estate filed the quiet title action in this case, its provisions further inform and support the purpose of quiet title actions related here.
Id. at *4 n.9. Because the Court of Special Appeals determined that the Estate‘s failure to join a necessary party to the action to quiet title was dispositive, it did not address Respondents’ arguments that the Estate had failed to meet its burden to prove adverse possession. See id. at *4 n.8.
The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Special Appeals denied. On September 19, 2017, the Estate filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues, among others:
- Do new
RP §§ 14-601 [to] 14-621 and new[Maryland] Rules 12-801 [to] 12-811 , all of which concern quiet title actions and took effect during the pendency of this appeal, apply to this appeal? - If the answer to Question #1 is “yes”, do the new procedural statutes and [Maryland R]ules eliminate any requirement in prior law that a quiet title action is subject to automatic dismissal for nonjoinder of a deceased record owner who has no personal representative?
DISCUSSION6
The Parties’ Contentions
The Estate contends that the new statutes and Maryland Rules governing actions to quiet title, which took effect while this case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, apply to this case. According to the Estate, the changes in the law altered the procedures concerning actions to quiet title, and did not impair any substantive or vested rights, and, thus, the changes apply to all actions, including pending actions, unless there is an express intent to the contrary. In other words, the Estate argues that the new statutes and Maryland Rules governing actions to quiet title apply retroactively, even to cases pending on appeal. The Estate points out that the Rules Order adopting the new Maryland Rules governing actions to quiet title expressly states that the changes shall “apply to all actions [that were] commenced on or after April 1, 2017 and, insofar as practicable, to all actions [that were] then pending[,]” and that, in enacting the new statutes governing actions to quiet title, the General Assembly did not express an intent that the statutes apply only prospectively. The Estate maintains that Respondents “do not appear to have any substantive or vested rights” to the Disputed Property such that applying the new statutes and Maryland Rules would impair a right possessed by Respondents.
The Estate contends that the new statutes and Maryland Rules eliminated any requirement of automatic dismissal of an action to quiet title for nonjoinder of a deceased record owner who has no personal representative. The Estate maintains that, because the new statutes and Maryland Rules apply retroactively and eliminated any requirement of automatic dismissal for nonjoinder of a deceased record owner with no personal representative, this Court should remand this case to the Court of Special Appeals with instructions to review and decide the other questions presented by the parties in their briefs to the Court of Special Appeals.
Respondents respond that
Respondents contend that the Court of Special Appeals correctly instructed the
Standard of Review
When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
In Bottini v. Dep‘t of Fin., 450 Md. 177, 187, 147 A.3d 371, 377 (2017), we explained the standard of review applicable under
We give due regard to the trial court‘s role as fact-finder[,] and will not set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. The appellate court must consider evidence [that is] produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[,] and[,] if substantial evidence was presented to support the trial court‘s determination, it is not clearly erroneous[,] and cannot be disturbed. Questions of law, however, require our non-deferential review. When the trial court‘s decision involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [this] Court must determine whether the trial court‘s conclusions are legally correct. Where a case involves both issues of fact and questions of law, this Court will apply the appropriate standard to each issue.
(Cleaned up).
Actions to Quiet Title
In 1955, the General Assembly enacted
(a) Any person in actual peaceable possession of property, or, if the property is vacant and unoccupied, in constructive and peaceable possession of it, either under color of title or claim of right by reason of his or his predecessor‘s adverse possession for the statutory period, when his title to the property is denied or disputed, or when any other person claims, of record or otherwise to own the property, or any part of it, or to hold any lien encumbrance on it, regardless of whether or not the hostile outstanding claim is being actively asserted, and if an action at law or proceeding in equity is not pending to enforce or test the validity of the title, lien, encumbrance,
or other adverse claim, the person may maintain a suit in equity in the county where the property lies to quiet or remove any cloud from the title, or determine any adverse claim. (b) The proceeding shall be deemed in rem or quasi in rem so long as the only relief sought is a decree that the plaintiff has absolute ownership and the right of disposition of the property, and an injunction against the assertion by the person named as the party defendant, of his claim by any action at law or otherwise. Any person who appears of record, or claims to have a hostile outstanding right, shall be made a defendant in the proceedings.
Id. at 459-60. No other statutes or Maryland Rules specifically governed actions to quiet title or set forth procedures relating to actions to quiet title.
Effective on October 1, 2016, through House Bill 920, the General Assembly amended RP (2015) § 14-108 and added a new subtitle governing actions to quiet title to the Real Property Article—
authoriz[e] a certain action to be brought to establish title against adverse claims to property; establish[] that the court is deemed to have possession and control for the purpose of an action under this Act; provid[e] for the venue and application of certain rules in an action under this Act; establish[] requirements for a complaint, an answer to a complaint, naming of defendants, joinder of parties, and service of process in an action under this Act; authoriz[e] the court to take certain actions in an action under this Act; requir[e] the recording of a certain judgment; provid[e] for the effect of a judgment in an action under this Act; provid[e] for the construction of this Act; mak[e] stylistic changes; defin[e] certain terms; and generally relat[e] to actions to quiet title.
Id. at 5703 (cleaned up). House Bill 920 was to “take effect October 1, 2016[,]” id. at 5711, during which this case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals.
House Bill 920‘s bill file provides additional information concerning the
amendment of
The purpose of an action to quiet title is to determine conflicting claims to real property or remove a cloud on title to property. However, State law does not specify the procedures to be followed in an action to quiet title.
. . . Any person who appears on record, or claims to have a hostile outstanding right, must be made a defendant in the proceedings.
The Maryland Land Title Association reports that its members are seeing inconsistent processes used from case to case and county to county. In addition, because of the uncertainty concerning the process under existing laws, title
insurance underwriters may refuse to insure the title of a person who has brought an action to quiet title.
Id. at 4-5.
The Fiscal and Policy Note also included a summary of House Bill 920. See id. at 1-4. In relevant part, as to parties to an action to quiet title, the Fiscal and Policy Note summarized House Bill 920‘s provisions as follows:
The plaintiff must name as defendants the persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff that are of record or known to the plaintiff or reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property against which a determination is sought. . . .
If a person required to be named as a defendant is dead the plaintiff knows of a personal representative, the personal representative must be joined as a defendant. If a person required to be named as a defendant is dead, or is believed by the plaintiff to be dead, and the plaintiff knows of no personal representative, the plaintiff must state those facts in an affidavit filed with the complaint. The bill specifies how persons who are unknown, dead, or believed to be dead must be named in a complaint.
The court on its own motion, or on motion of any party, may issue any appropriate order to join any additional parties to the action that are necessary and proper. Any person who has a claim to the property described in a complaint may appear in the proceeding.
Id. at 2-3. The Fiscal and Policy Note also observed that, under House Bill 920, a trial court is required to order service by publication and mailing where a plaintiff demonstrates by affidavit, “to the [trial] court‘s satisfaction[,] that the plaintiff has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity and residence of and to serve a summons on the persons named as unknown defendants and persons joined as testate or intestate successors of a person known or believed to be dead.” Id. at 3.
The existing statutory language of
(a) Any person in actual peaceable possession of property, or, if the property is vacant and unoccupied, in constructive and peaceable possession of it, either under color of title or claim of right by reason of the person or the person‘s predecessor‘s adverse possession for the statutory period, when the person‘s title to the property is denied or disputed, or when any other person claims, of record or otherwise to own the property, or any part of it, or to hold any lien encumbrance on it, regardless of whether or not the hostile outstanding claim is being actively asserted, and if an action at law or proceeding in equity is not pending to enforce or test the validity of the title, lien, encumbrance, or other adverse claim, the person may maintain a suit in accordance with Subtitle 6 of this title in the circuit court for the county where the property or any part of the
property is located to quiet or remove any cloud from the title, or determine any adverse claim. (b) The proceeding shall be deemed in rem or quasi in rem so long as the only relief sought is a decree that the plaintiff has absolute ownership and the right of disposition of the property, and an injunction against the assertion by the person named as the party defendant, of the person‘s claim by any action at law or otherwise. Any person who appears of record, or claims to have a hostile outstanding right, shall be made a defendant in the proceedings.
And, in relevant part,
As to the defendants in an action to quiet title,
(1) If the claim or the share or quantity of the claim of a person required to be named as a defendant is unknown, uncertain, or contingent, the plaintiff shall state those facts in the complaint.
(2) If the lack of knowledge, uncertainty, or contingency is caused by a transfer to an unborn or unascertained person or class member, or by a transfer in the form of a contingent remainder, vested remainder subject to defeasance, executory interest, or similar disposition, the plaintiff shall also state in the complaint, so far as is known to the plaintiff, the name, age, and legal disability, if any, of the person in being who would be entitled to the claim had the contingency on which the claim depends occurred before the commencement of the action.
In addition to the persons required to be named as defendants in an action under this subtitle, the plaintiff may name as defendants “all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to the plaintiff‘s title, or any cloud on the plaintiff‘s title to the property.”
As to a deceased defendant, as opposed to an unknown defendant,
(1) If a person required to be named as a defendant is dead, or is believed by the plaintiff to be dead, and the plaintiff knows of no personal representative, the plaintiff shall state those facts in an affidavit filed with the complaint.
(2) If the plaintiff states in an affidavit under paragraph (1) of this subsection that a person is dead, the plaintiff may join as defendants “the testate and intestate successors of ____________ (naming the deceased person), deceased, and all persons claiming by, through, or under the decedent”.
(3) If the plaintiff states in an affidavit under paragraph (1) of this subsection that a person is believed to be dead, the plaintiff may join the person as a defendant, and may also join “the testate and intestate successors of ____________ (naming the person), believed to be deceased, and all persons claiming by, through, or under the person believed to be deceased”.
And, generally, as to joinder of additional parties,
With respect to service on unknown and deceased defendants,
If, on affidavit of the plaintiff, it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the plaintiff has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity and residence of and to serve a summons on the persons named as unknown defendants and persons joined as testate or intestate successors of a person known or believed to be dead, the court shall order service by publication in accordance with Rule 2-122 of the Maryland Rules and the provisions of this subtitle.
With respect to judgments in actions to quiet title,
Shortly after the new subtitle became effective, on October 13, 2016, in its One Hundred Ninety-First Report, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Category 10 consists of a new Chapter 800 to Title 12 (Rules 12-801 through 12-811), dealing with actions to quiet title to property, and a conforming amendment to Rule 1-101. Such actions have been authorized for many years by [RP] § 14-108, but no Rules were adopted to set forth the procedures for prosecuting them, and the Maryland Land Title Association reported that inconsistent procedures were being used in the various counties. The [General Assembly] responded by enacting [RP] §§[ ]14-601 through 14-621[]. The new statute[s] set[] forth uniform requirements and procedures for such actions, but the [Rules] Committee is of the view that a set of Rules to implement the statute would be useful.
Id. at 16. On December 13, 2016, this Court adopted
The new Maryland Rules set forth procedures related to actions to quiet title that correspond to
(d) the names of all persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff that are of record, known to the plaintiff, or reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property;
. . .
(g) if the name of a person required to be named as a defendant is not known to the plaintiff, a statement that the name is unknown and, if applicable, a statement that there are persons unknown to the plaintiff who may (1) have a legal or equitable interest in the property or (2) assert that there may be a cloud on plaintiff‘s title[.]
Similarly,
With respect to a deceased defendant with a known personal representative,
[i]f, on affidavit of the plaintiff, it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the plaintiff has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity and residence of the persons named as unknown defendants and persons joined as testate or intestate successors of a person known or believed to be dead[.]
As to judgments in actions to quiet title,
Retroactive Application Versus Prospective Application
As to whether a statute applies retroactively or prospectively, in Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406, 754 A.2d 389, 394 (2000), this Court stated that the question is “ordinarily [] one of legislative intent[,]” and, “[i]n determining such intent . . ., there is a general presumption in the law that a[ statute] is intended to have purely prospective effect. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retro[a]ctive effect.” (Cleaned up). Nonetheless, this Court has “long adhered to four principles” concerning retroactivity of statutes:
(1) statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a contrary intent appears; (2) a statute governing procedure or remedy will be applied to cases pending in court when the statute becomes effective; (3) a statute will be given retroactive effect if that is the legislative intent; but (4) even if intended
to apply retroactively, a statute will not be given that effect if it would impair vested rights, deny due process, or violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Pautsch v. Md. Real Estate Comm’n, 423 Md. 229, 263, 31 A.3d 489, 509 (2011) (citations omitted). This Court has distilled the following two-part test from those four principles: (1) “we must determine whether the [General Assembly] intended the statute to have the kind of retroactive effect that is asserted”; and (2) “[i]f we conclude that the [General Assembly] did intend for the statute to have retroactive effect, we must then examine whether such effect would contravene some Constitutional right or prohibition.” Id. at 263-64, 31 A.3d at 510 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
[W]here the effect of [a] new statute is not to impair existing substantive rights, but only to alter the procedural machinery involved in the enforcement of those rights, or the remedies available to enforce them, such legislation is
usually construed as operating on all proceedings instituted after its passage, whether the right occurred before or after that date.
Id. at 419, 754 A.2d at 401. As to the second exception, i.e., where a statute is remedial and does not impair vested rights, in Langston, id. at 408-09, 754 A.2d at 395-96, we explained:
Generally, remedial statutes are those [that] provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries. They also include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes[,] and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the [S]tate. The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated as a statute that relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights.
. . .
[A]n act is remedial in nature when it provides only for a new method of enforcement of a preexisting right. Under Maryland law, statutes are remedial in nature if they are designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances[,] and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good.
(Cleaned up).
Importantly, even if a statute is procedural or remedial, “this does not completely address whether th[e] statute may be applied retroactively. Generally, a remedial or procedural statute may not be applied retroactively if it will interfere with vested or substantive rights.” Id. at 418, 754 A.2d at 400; see also Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 559-60, 766 A.2d 98, 112 (2001) (“[I]n the final part of a retroactivity analysis, a court must determine whether the retroactive application of the statute . . . would interfere with vested rights.” (Cleaned up)). A vested right is “simply a right [that,] under particular circumstances[,] will be protected from legislative interference. . . . [A] vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present fixed right of future
enjoyment.” Langston, 359 Md. at 420, 754 A.2d at 401 (citations omitted).7
Maryland has consistently followed the rule that an appellate court is bound to decide a case according to existing laws, even though a judgment [that was] rightful when rendered by the [trial] court [] should be reversed as a consequence. An appellate court will apply a change in the law after a [trial court‘s] decision unless vested or accrued substantive rights would be disturbed[,] or unless the [General Assembly] shows a contrary intent.
(Cleaned up).8
Analysis
Here, we hold that
Additionally, we hold that, when applied to this case, the new statutes and Maryland Rules do not require dismissal for the failure to join a deceased record owner who has no known personal representative. To be sure, under
remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings, so that the Estate can follow the procedures that are outlined in the new statutes and Maryland Rules concerning
As an initial matter, we conclude that the circuit court improperly proceeded with trial in the absence of joinder of a necessary party, i.e., the record owner of the Disputed Property, and with making a determination as to who, between the parties, had the right to possess and use the Disputed Property without the record owner of the Disputed Property being joined as a defendant. Under
plaintiff has absolute ownership and the right of disposition of the property[.]” It is undisputed in this case that the Estate did not name and join the Disputed Property‘s record owner as a defendant in the action to quiet title, although
We disagree, however, that reversing the circuit court‘s judgment and remanding this case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the case is the correct disposition of the case. Instead, we hold that
Here, it is evident that the new statutes and Maryland Rules governing actions to quiet title are procedural and remedial in nature—i.e., that they fall within the exceptions
to the presumption of prospective application, and that the new statutes and Maryland Rules do not impair
Especially significant to this case, the new statutes and Maryland Rules prescribe specific procedures by which a plaintiff may file an action to quiet title and include all necessary defendants, despite the existence of a defendant who is not known to the plaintiff or a deceased defendant, whether that deceased defendant has a personal representative. See
defendant who is believed to be deceased, with no known personal representative);
The new statutes and Maryland Rules introduce procedures that are related to service by publication on unknown and deceased defendants. See
In sum, a review of the new statutes and Maryland Rules confirms that they establish uniform procedures and rules of practice concerning actions to quiet title, i.e., that they effect a change in procedure only. These procedures govern the process
file an action to quiet title and join all necessary defendants, and relate generally to the filing and adjudication of actions to quiet title. Additionally, the new statutes and Maryland Rules do not substantively change the law with respect to the ability to quiet title, or otherwise create or alter a substantive right with respect to actions to quiet title. The ability and right to seek to quiet title, i.e., a substantive right, has long been provided for in
Additionally, we conclude that
governing actions to quiet title and standardizing existing law concerning actions to quiet title across the State. Thus, the new statutes and Maryland Rules have a remedial effect, and fall under the exception to the presumption of prospective application. See Gregg, 409 Md. at 715, 976 A.2d at 1008.
Although we conclude that
Having concluded that
811 are procedural and remedial and do
With respect to an intent to apply retroactively, we note that nothing in the language of
And, significantly, House Bill 920‘s Fiscal and Policy Note is replete with
information that clearly demonstrates that the purposes of the new statutes are to establish procedures and uniform processes to be followed in actions to quiet title. For example, at the outset, the Fiscal and Policy Note stated that House Bill 920 “establishes rules of practice and procedures for actions to ‘quiet’ title (that is, to determine the validity of adverse claims or other clouds on title) to real property and requires an action to quiet title under existing law to be maintained in accordance with the bill‘s provisions.” Fiscal and Policy Note at 1. In summarizing the current law and background of House Bill 920, the Fiscal and Policy Note stated, in relevant part, that “State law d[id] not specify the procedures to be followed in an action to quiet title[,]” and that the Maryland Land Title Association had “report[ed] that its members [were] seeing inconsistent processes used from case to case and county to county[,]” which caused “uncertainty concerning the process under existing laws,” resulting in some title insurance underwriters “refus[ing] to insure the title of a person who has brought an action to quiet title.” Id. at 4-5. The Fiscal and Policy Note also summarized House Bill 920‘s provisions, outlining the various procedures established by House Bill 920. See id. at 1-4. In other words, the Fiscal and Policy Note shows that the General Assembly‘s main purpose in enacting the new statutes was to establish and implement uniform procedures governing actions to quiet title, and to remedy the problems that were caused by then-existing inconsistent processes.
As a final point, given the clear legislative intent that the new statutes are procedural and remedial in nature, we note that House Bill 920‘s effective date clause—i.e., that House Bill 920 “shall take effect October 1, 2016[,]” 2016 Md. Laws 5711 (Vol. VII, Ch. 396, H.B. 920)—does not express an intent to limit the applicability of the new statutes only to
actions to quiet title that were initiated after October 1, 2016.
Similarly, we note that, although nothing in the language of
In short, the legislative and rule history of
Rules 12-801 to 12-811, respectively, confirms that the new statutes and Maryland Rules are procedural and remedial, and intended to apply retroactively, thus overcoming the presumption of prospective application. And, we have no difficulty in concluding that retroactive application does not contravene any Constitutional right or prohibition. Accordingly, whether under the exceptions to the presumption of prospective application or the two-part test for retroactive application, it is plain that
In our view, applying
defendant to an action to quiet title—and, undisputedly, that did not occur in this case—under the instant circumstances, we determine that the proper course of action is to reverse the Court of Special Appeals‘s judgment and remand this case to that Court with instructions to vacate the circuit court‘s judgment and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. On remand, the Estate should follow the procedures that are outlined in the new statutes and Maryland Rules concerning joinder of a defendant who is a deceased record owner with no known personal representative. In other words, on remand, the Estate would be permitted to file an amended complaint that is accompanied by the necessary affidavit that is described in
Having determined that
[T]his Court has described the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as follows: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the following four-part test must be satisfied:
- Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?
- Was there a final judgment on the merits?
- Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
- Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?
(Cleaned up). We further explained that “[c]ollateral estoppel is concerned with the issue implications of the earlier litigation of a different case[.]” Id. at 626, 175 A.3d at 725 (citation omitted). Moreover,
when collateral estoppel applies, facts or issues [that were] decided in the previous action are conclusive only if [they are] identical to facts or issues [that are] presented in the subsequent proceeding. Stated otherwise, collateral estoppel may be invoked when[,] in a second suit between the same parties, even if the cause of action is different, any determination of fact that was actually litigated and was essential to a valid and final judgment is conclusive.
Id. at 668-69, 175 A.3d at 750 (cleaned up).
In this case, we conclude that there is no issue preclusion with respect to the complaint to quiet title or counterclaim. As a practical matter, because we are vacating the circuit court‘s judgment, there is no longer a final judgment on the merits concerning the complaint or the counterclaim, and any facts or issues that were decided by the circuit court, and that
judgment and remanding this case for further proceedings in the same case, there is but one action between the parties, not two. In short, we determine that there is no issue as to collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, given that we are ordering that the circuit court‘s judgment be vacated and that this case be remanded for the filing of an amended complaint. And, for purposes of the remand, we refrain from expressing an opinion as to the merits of either party‘s claim to the Disputed Property or as to Respondents’ counterclaim for trespass, but we note that the counterclaim barely makes out a cause of action, consisting of only six one-sentence paragraphs.10
In sum, we hold that
record owner with no known personal representative. Finally, for purposes of the remand, we determine that there is no issue preclusion as to the complaint or counterclaim, and we express no opinion as to the merits of either party‘s claim to the Disputed Property or as to Respondents’ counterclaim for trespass.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AND REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. 10-C-14-001668
Argued: March 1, 2018
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 62
September Term, 2017
ESTATE OF CHARLES HOWARD ZIMMERMAN, ROBERT CLAYTON STEVENS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
v.
ERICH E. BLATTER, ET. UX.
Barbera, C.J.,
Greene,
Adkins,
McDonald,
Watts,
Hotten,
Getty,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J.
Filed: April 20, 2018
Respectfully, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
In an action to quiet title, the record owner is a necessary party.
For the reasons expressed above, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.