We consider here whether a recently amended provision (§ 8-1808(c)(4)) of the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays Critical Area Protection Program (“Critical Area Law”), Md. Code (1973, 2007 Repl.Vol. & Supp.2009), Natural Resources Article, §§ 8-1801-8-1817, applies to a variance application filed three and one-half years before the General Assembly amended the statute and where the object of the application was to cure violations of the Critical Area Law occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment.
1
For reasons we shall explain, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and conclude that the amended provision does not apply retrospectively to the subject variance application.
2
In reaching that conclusion, we revisit a line of cases, somewhat peculiar to land use and zoning matters, regarding when statutory enactments have prospective only or retrospective application to pending matters and litigation.
See e.g., York-
*150
dale Corp. v. Powell,
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3
DCW Dutchship Island, LLC (“DCW”) owns a 1.92 acre (83,635.2 square feet) island, known as Little Dobbins Island (“the Island”), located in the Magothy River in Pasadena, Anne Arundel County (the “County”), Maryland. It is designated as a limited development area (“LDA”) under the County’s Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Program. 4 Because it is surrounded by tidal waters of the Chesapeake Bay and contains slopes of 15% grade or greater, the entirety of the Island lies within either the buffer or the expanded buffer of *151 the Critical Area (the significance of the buffer and expanded buffer designations will be elaborated later in this opinion).
DCW obtained the Island from Dutchship, LLC, in 2000. At that time, the Island contained a three-bedroom summer cottage of about 1,911 square feet of floor area, which had existed on the Island for approximately fifty years (well before the advent of the Critical Area Law). Also located on the Island at that time was a boat house and deck, two small sheds, a pier, a dirt cart path, and some steps. At that time, the total man-made impervious surface area on thе Island was approximately 3,005 feet.
In or about 2001, Daryl Wagner, a member of DCW and a Maryland registered home builder, acting on behalf of DCW, demolished the old summer cottage and removed the debris, without the necessary permits or variances required by the Critical Area Law and County ordinances. Then, Wagner constructed the following structures or impervious surface areas on the Island: (1) a new 2,883 square foot home; (2) replacement sheds for the two preexisting sheds; (3) a 66 square foot gazebo; (4) a boat ramp and concrete driveway with approximately 2,668 square feet of surface area to accommodate his amphibious vehicle; (5) 846 square feet of sidewalks; and (6) a pool and deck totaling 1,433 square feet.
Some of the aforementioned improvements were located in areas of the Island that, prior to Wagner’s construction activities, contained slopes of 15% or greater. Wagner regraded some of these areas to accommodate the improvements. He did not obtain any permits or seek approval of the construction or plans for it from the County. 5 In November 2004, the *152 County authorities discovered the construction activities on the Island and notified DCW of the numerous violations. On 28 December 2004, DCW sought variances from the unobserved requirements of the Critical Area Law for each of the structures and improvements on the Island. 6 DCW sought also an amendment to the critical area buffer map, which prohibits most development activity within 100 feet of the shoreline.
A County Administrative Hearing Officer heard the evidence for and against the requests for variances. The Magothy River Association (“MRA”) appeared at the variance hearings on 5 June 2005 and 20 September 2005 to oppose DCW’s requests. The Hearing Officer granted some of the variances on 27 October 2005. Wagner appealed administratively the denials, and the MRA, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation (“CBF”), and the Maryland Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays (the “Commission”) appealed the decisiоn to grant the variances, all to the County Board of Appeals.
While the variance case was percolating, on 20 October 2005, the County Planning and Zoning Officer approved in part the buffer map amendment request. MRA and CBF sought judicial review of that decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
The Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr. of the Circuit Court, in a separate case from the present one, but arising from the same facts as the present controversy, described the relevant proceedings before the Board of Appeals: 7
*153 The Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (“the Board”) heard the appeals of both the variance decisions and the buffer map amendments. Owing to the complexity of and public interest in the Little Island dispute, the Board scheduled a series of consolidated hearings on both the buffer map amendments and the variance requests. Prior to the first hearing date, [the Commission] moved to bifurcate the hearings into separate proceedings because it had not participated in the buffer map appeal. The Board denied the motion to bifurcate. Thereafter, in hearings scattered over 24 days in 2006, the Board heard testimony from 80 witnesses, and considered ... hundreds of pieces of evidence. On January 3, 2007, the Board issued a written Memorandum of Opinion and Order ... that mapped Little Island “as partially buffer modified”, and revised the Hearing Officer’s decision in order to impose certain conditions on the grant of the variances.
(Footnotes omitted). Pursuant to § 604 of the Anne Arundel County Charter, the Commission filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the grant of the variances on 16 January 2007. The CBA and the MRA each sought judicial review on 31 January 2007 and 2 February 2007, respectively. DCW and Wagner filed a cross-petition in the Circuit Court on 2 February 2007.
While the foregoing battles were ongoing, on 25 September 2008, Margaret McHale, Chair of the Commission, filed another action (the present one) in the Circuit Court, a Complaint for Restoration and Mitigation against DCW and Wagner pursuant to an amendment to the Critical Area Law, Md. Code, Nat. Res. Art. § 8-1815(a)(2)(i)(l), еnacted earlier in 2008. 8 She filed this action for restoration and mitigation *154 based on amendments made to the Critical Area Program statutory scheme by the General Assembly during the 2008 Legislative Session. The General Assembly enacted an amendment to § 8-1808(c) of the Natural Resources Article, which provides the minimum standards for a local (in this case, the County) program sufficient to meet the goals of the Critical Area Program. The amendment at issue here required that, before a local jurisdiction could issue a permit, approval, variance, or special exception, the applicant shall prepare, and the local jurisdiction shall approve, a “restoration or mitigation plan ... to abate the impacts to water quality or natural resources as a result of the violation; ----” § 8-1808(c)(4)(ii). The applicant, before the local jurisdiction may take action, for example, on a variance application seeking relief from the Law’s requirements, also must perform the abatement measures in the approved version of thе mitigation/abatement plan. § 8-1808(c)(4)(iii). Because DCW had not prepared or carried out an approved restoration or mitigation plan, McHale alleged in her complaint that the variances granted by the Board of Appeals were null and void by operation of § 8—1808(c)(4), as amended. She sought relief in the form of the “deconstruction,” removal, and abatement of the structures and improvements erected by Wagner and that the court order Wagner and DCW to restore and provide mitigation in accordance with a mitigation plan to be approved by the County.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the 2008 amendment should not be applied retrospectively to the variance application, which, by the time the Complaint was filed by McHale, had been granted (in part) by the Board of Appeals. Judge Silkworth, in a written Memorandum Opinion and Order, granted the defense motion to dismiss, with prejudice, finding (1) that thе Legislature
*155
intended for the 2008 amendment to be applied prospectively only and (2) that the changes made to the statute were procedural and not substantive, and, therefore, the Act should not be applied retrospectively.
9
McHale noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before consideration of the appeal in the intermediate appellate court, we, on our initiative, issued a writ of certiorari,
Did the trial court err in concluding that the provision of the 2008 Amendments to the Critical Area law requiring restoration, mitigation and abatement of Critical Area violations prior to receipt of a critical area variance does not apply to critical area violations in litigation at the time that the amendments took effect?
We answer that question “No” and hold that the trial court did not err.
II. ANALYSIS
A Standard of Review
When considering on appellate review the grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which rеlief may be granted,
a court must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, *156 if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.
RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc.,
B. Relevant Critical Area Program Statutory Framework
In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the Critical Area Law “[t]o establish a Resource Protection Program for the Chesapeake and the Atlantic Coastal Bays and their tributaries by fostering more sensitive development activity for certain shoreline areas so as to minimize damage to water quality and naturаl habitats ....”§ 8-1801(b)(l). The passage of the Critical Area Law was based on the Legislature’s recognition that the quality and productivity of the waters of the Chesapeake Bay “have declined due to the cumulative effects of human activity that have caused increased levels of pollutants, nutrients, and toxics in the Bay System and declines in more protective land uses such as forestland and agricultural land in the Bay region____” § 8-1801(a)(5). The Legislature found also that “[t]he cumulative impact of current development and of each new development activity in the buffer is inimical to [the restoration of the Bays and their tributaries and minimizing further impact to water quality and the shoreline], and it is therefore imperative that State law protect irreplaceable State buffer resources from unpermitted activity ____” § 8-1801(a)(9). The “critical area” includes “all land and water areas within 1,000 feet beyond the landward boundaries of State or private wetlands and the heads of tide designated under Title 16 of the Environment Article.” § 8-1807(a)(2).
*157 The Generаl Assembly vested the Commission with “all powers necessary for carrying out the purposes” of the Critical Area Law, including the authority to promulgate regulations for the administration and enforcement of the program, including regulations governing the establishment of comprehensive standards and procedures for buffer establishment and the protection and conservation of the buffer. § 8-1806(a)-(b). The “buffer” “means an existing, naturally vegetated area, or an area established in vegetation and managed to protect aquatic, wetlands, shoreline, and terrestrial environments from manmade disturbances.” § 8-1802(a)(4). At the time of the operative facts of this case, the “buffer” was, at minimum, a 100-foot area “landward from the mean high water line of tidal waters, tributary streams, and tidal wetlands.” 10 COMAR 27.01.09.01 C(l) (2007). With certain exceptions, “[n]ew development activities, including structures, roads, parking areas, and other impervious surfaces, mining and related facilities, or septic systems may not be permitted in the Buffer....” COMAR 27.01.09.01 C(2). The General Assembly charged the local jurisdictions, however, with the primary responsibility of developing and implementing a critical area program, subject to review and approval by the Commission. § 8-1808(a). The local jurisdiction may grant a variance to the Critical Area criteria when a “literal enforcement of provisions within the jurisdiction’s Critical Area program would result in unwarranted hardship to an applicant.” 11 *158 COMAR 27.01.11.01 A. The Anne Arundel County Code extends the buffer “to include contiguous sensitive areas, such as slopes of 15% or greater----” Anne Arundel County, Md., Code, § 18-13-104(a) (2005). The contiguous sensitive areas are known as the “expanded buffers.” § 18-13-104. All of those provisions were in place before Wagner commenced his extra-legal demolition and construction activities on the Island.
Critical to the present case, in 2008, the General Assembly adopted House Bill 1253, which amended the Critical Area Law to include a new provision restricting a local jurisdiction from issuing “a permit, approval, variance, or special exception unless the person seeking the рermit, approval, variance, or special exception has ... prepared a restoration or mitigation plan, approved by the local jurisdiction, to abate impacts to water quality or natural resources as a result of the violation” and “[performed the abatement measures in the approved plan in accordance with the local critical area program.” § 8-1808(c)(4)(ii)(iii). We shall elaborate on relevant portions of the Session Law of this enactment shortly.
*159 C. Retrospective Application of Statutes
Whether the application of a newly enacted statutory provision may be applied in a retrospective manner to given situations has proven tricky business in the appellate reports over the years. The conundrum sometimes presented by this query becomes more complex when the given situation implicates a land use or zoning context. This is so because of a somewhat anachronistic line of cases that carve out a special rule for such contexts. See infra note 14.
Generally, all “statutes are presumed to operate prospectively.”
Layton v. Howard County Bd. of Appeals,
There is, however “ ‘no absolute prohibition against retroactive application of a statute.’ ”
Grasslands Plantation, Inc. v. Frizz-King Enters., LLC,
If retrospective construction of a statute would interfere, impair, or divest a vested right, a court should construe prospectively the statute. Singer,
supra,
§ 41:6. The converse is that the court may construe a statute as applying retrospectively that affects a non-vested right or mere expectancy, if there is a demonstrated legislative intent to that end.
Id. See also Grasslands,
The distinction between vested rights and mere expectancies is perhaps the principal reason this Court identified and continues to recognize an exception in the context of land use and zoning cases tо the general presumption in favor of prospective applications of statutes. In
Yorkdale Corp. v. Powell,
*161
“Yorkdale,
as an exception to the general rule, provides for the retrospective application of changes to statutes that impact land use issues made during the course of litigation in land use and zoning cases.”
Layton,
We re-affirmed the principles of
Yorkdale
in
Layton.
Lay-ton operated an exotic wildlife refuge and sanctuary in Howard County for six years before the County issued a notice to Layton that she was in violation of a zoning regulation by operating a charitable and philanthropic institution without an approved special exception. Layton filed a petition for a special exception to operate the existing wildlife rehabilitation center and primate sanctuary. The Board of Appeals granted in part and denied in part the petition. Specifically, the Board granted а special exception to operate as a charitable and philanthropic institution, including the permitting of an animal rehabilitation center on the property, but denied an exception to operate a primate or other exotic wildlife sanctuary. Lay-ton appealed to the Circuit Court for Howard County. Prior to even a hearing before the Circuit Court, Howard County amended the County Code to allow an exotic or wild animal sanctuary as a permitted use. Thus, under the new law, as amended, Layton’s sanctuary may have been allowed. The Circuit Court, however, declined to apply the new law retrospectively to Layton’s petition. Layton appealed to this Court and we held that the
Yorkdale
rule applied because the change to the Howard County zoning law was a substantive change.
Id.
at 70,
We re-affirmed Yorkdale expressly and highlighted that in Yorkdale, after Howard County changed the ordinance, we set that case for re-argument:
It is clear that the Court realized the importance of what it was doing. The Court had already heard the сase, then directed that it be reargued based upon the possible retrospective applicability of a change in law. The Yorkdale rule was not an unintended holding related to some larger issue. *163 It was specifically considered by the Court and it was the major holding of the case. It is a holding that has stood the test of time.
We noted that, following
Yorkdale,
“we have reaffirmed those principles in relation to land use and zoning cases several times.”
Id.
at 56,
Yorkdale and its progeny have never been overruled. They are still good law and are determinative in evaluating whether, in a land use or zoning case, a change in statutory law taking place during the course of a litigated issue should have retrospective application. As discussed supra, we shall consider zoning cases based upon the law as it exists at the time the case is before us.
*164
We revisited the
Yorkdale
rule most recently in
Grasslands,
a case involving a challenge to a subdivision application by an adjacent property owner. In that case, the County passed ordinances during the pendency of a subdivision application appeal in a circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals. The new ordinances required the local Planning Commission, when considering whether to approve a proposed subdivision or site plan, to determine (1) whether the proposed development conforms to the visions, objective, and policies of the County’s Comprehensive Plan Conformity Ordinance (“Conformity Ordinance”) and (2) whether the plan provides for public safety through compliance with the State Fire Code and with any applicable County or municipal fire codes (“Emergency Service Ordinance”). The new ordinances did not contain clear expressions of legislative intent regarding prospective versus retrospective application.
As to whether the new ordinances should be applied on remand, we reaffirmed in considered dicta the principle enunciated in
Yorkdale
and
Layton
that there is a “general presumption
in favor of
retroactivity in zoning and land use cases.”
Id.
at 220,
We concluded in
Grasslands
that the Emergency Services Ordinance was substantive, and, thus, should be applied at the new hearing “because it is the law in effect at the time of the hearing, and does not impair vested rights.”
Id.
at 228,
*167
In
Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council,
We re-affirmed again the
Yorkdale
doctrine in
Scrimgeour v. Fox Harbor, LLC,
In the present case, as noted supra, the Circuit Court concluded that the enactment of § 8-1808(c)(4) should not be applied retrospectively because it (1) effects a procedural change to the Critical Area Law, as opposed to a substantive change, and (2) the Legislature intended for the law to apply prospectively. The Commission argues that the 2008 amendments apply to DCW’s development activities on the Island, notwithstanding the fact that the revisions became effective approximately three and one-half years after DCW filed its application for variances, the object of which applications was to cure the violations of the Critical Area Law that also predated the 2008 amendments. Citing Yorkdale, the Commission asserts that the Circuit Court should have applied retrospectively the amendments because they affected a substantive change in that they established new duties and obligations that both property owners and local jurisdictions must satisfy before a property owner may obtain a variance.
DCW argues that the Yorkdale doctrine' does not apply because the amendments represent procedural, rather than substantive, changes, i.e., the amendments do not change the standards by which the Board would approve or disapprove a variance. Furthermore, DCW argues that the Yorkdale doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it does not involve a classical “land use” issue, although conceding that the Critical Area Law on which this case hinges may be classified as a “land use” regulation. Rather, DCW argues *169 that this is simply an enforcement action meant to punish DCW.
We shall address first the applicability of
Yorkdale
and its progeny to the context of a Critical Area Law variance application. Is it a zoning or land use case? Although this Court, before today, has not applied the
Yorkdale
doctrine in connection with a Critical Area Law matter, the Court of Special Appeals has done so in
Becker v. Anne Arundel County,
Becker,
similarly to the present case, involved an application for a variance from a local Critical Area Law and program requirement. The landowners filed an application for a variance, which the Board of Appeals denied. The Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision. While the case was pending before the Board of Appeals, the General Assembly amended the requirements for obtaining a variance. The Court of Special Appeals, although not citing or discussing
Yorkdale,
acknowledged that “absent an express statement to the contrary by an enacting legislative body, changes to both State and County land use laws, affecting the status of property, apply to matters that are pending and not yet decided by the agency responsible for de novo decision making.”
Wharf at Handy’s Point
involved an amendment to a Kent County zoning ordinance which provided for direct appeal to the Circuit Court from orders of the county Planning Commission. At the time of the administrative hearing, the zoning ordinance provided that the County Board of Appeals shall hear appeals of a local administrative decision.
In the Court of Special Appeals, the wharf owner sought to dismiss the Commission’s appeal on the ground that the Commission did not exhaust its administrative remedies because it failed to аppeal to the Board of Appeals. The parties agreed that the amendment to the ordinance was procedural and, accordingly, the court held that the
Yorkdale
doctrine did not apply.
Id.
at 674, 675 n. 8,
Our review of
Yorkdale
and its progeny indicates that, in land use and zoning cases, the general presumption is that, in the absence of contrary legislative intent, a substantive change to the law occurring during the pendency of land use litigation and before any substantive rights vest, is to be applied to the pending litigation matter, i.e., understood therefore to be аpplied retrospectively to some extent.
Yorkdale,
however, recognized the primacy of the Legislature’s intent when determining whether a change to the law applies prospectively or retrospectively.
See Yorkdale,
Thus, we apply the traditional rules of statutory construction when there is indication that the Legislature intended for the land use or zoning statute to have prospective application only. Our primary duty when interpreting the language of a statute is to effectuate and ascertain the intent of the Legislature.
Rosemann v. Salsbury Clements,
We consider, as the Circuit Court did, the uncodified language in Section 5 of House Bill 1253, as enacted in Ch. 119 of the 2008 Laws of Maryland, to shed light on the legislative intent. Section 5 provides:
That for the purpose of a criminal prosecution under § 8-1815(a)(2)(ii) of the Natural Resources Article, as enacted under Section 1 of this Act, this Act shall be construed prospectively to apply only to a Critical Area violation alleged to have arisen out of an act or omission that originated on or after July 1, 2008, and this Act may not be applied or interpreted tо have any effect on or application *172 to an alleged critical area violation that originated before the effective date of this Act.
2008 Md. Laws Ch. 119, § 5 (emphasis added). DCW claims that Chapter 119 expresses that the Legislature intended for the amended § 8-1808(c)(4) to be applied prospectively only. The Commission argues that the first clause implicating criminal prosecutions in § 5 indicates that the Legislature intended for the rest of that section to apply only to criminal prosecutions, and not to an enforcement action. We conclude this section to be unambiguous, albeit somewhat oddly worded. Section 5 contains two clauses. The first, as noted supra, involves criminal prosecutions under § 8-1815(a)(2)(ii) of the Natural Resources Article and provides for a three-year statute of limitation for a criminal prosecution for a Critical Area violation. Thus, the first clause of Section 5 provides that, with regard to a criminal prosecution for a Critical Area violation, the three-year statute of limitаtion shall only apply prospectively to acts or omissions that originated on or after 1 July 2008, the effective date of the Act.
The second clause of § 5 provides: “and this Act may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or application to an alleged critical area violation that originated before the effective date of this Act.” 1 July 2008 was the effective date. 2008 Md. Laws Ch. 119, § 10. We read the second clause as declarative of a different, but related, intent from the first. The Legislature’s use of the conjunctive (“and”) to introduce the second part of the section indicates that it did not intend for the prospective nature of the statute to be limited only to criminal prosecutions. Acceptance of the Commission’s argument would render meaningless and nugatory the second clause of the section. ‘We construe the [language of a statute] so as to give effect to each word so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.”
Foley v. K. Hovnanian at Kent Island, LLC,
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Natural Resources Article of the Maryland Code.
. We assume, for the sake of argument, that the Chairperson of the Maryland Critical Area Commission, Margaret McHale, possessed the authority to bring the enforcement action that initiated this litigation, see Anne Arundel County’s Amicus Curiae Brief at 10-11, 18, though it is argued that she does not because (1) she has not exhausted her administrative remedies and (2) that the ability to "void” a variance is outside her authority granted by State law. Because this issue, raised in the amicus brief, is not encompassed fairly in our grant of the writ of certiorari in this case, we shall not address its merits.
. Because this is an appeal from the Circuit Court’s grant of a defense motion to dismiss, we take as true all factual allegations in the Complaint.
RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc.,
. A 2008 amendment to § 8-1802 defined a "limited development area” to mean an area:
1. That is developed in low or moderate intensity uses and contains areas of natural plant and animal habitat; and
2. Where the quality of runoff has not been substantially altered or impaired.
§ 8—1802(a)(l 5)(i). An LDA includes an area:
1. With a housing density ranging from one dwelling unit per five acres up to four dwelling units per acre;
2. With a public water or sewer system;
3. That is dominated by agricultural land, wetland, forests, barren land, surface water, or open space; or
4. That is less than 20 acres and otherwise qualifies as an intensely developed area under paragraph (13) of this subsection.
§ 8-1802(a)(15)(ii).
The Anne Arundel County Code provides that the uses allowed in the LDA are those "allowed in the underlying zoning district in accordance with the requirements of the district in which the use is located, except that the maximum density allowed is the more restrictive of four dwelling units per acre or the density allowed in the zoning district in which the use is located.” Anne Arundel County, Md., Code, § 18-13-205 (2005).
. According to the Complaint, however, either Wagner, DCW or Dutch-ship, LLC, received permits or approvals from the County to replace the windows and siding on the now demolished cottage and “the placement of a 496 linear foot stone revetment along the southern shore of the Island, which was to serve the purpose of stabilizing and preventing erosion from the Island’s southern shore.” The Commission alleges that the work on the cottage did not occur. With respect to the revetment, the Commission alleges that it exceeded the scope of the permit in that the revetment is actually 676 feet in length.
. Apparently, Wagner and/or DCW subscribe to the business principle that it is better to seek forgiveness than permission.
. Other than by way of Judge Harris's opinion and that of Judge Ronald A. Silkworth of the Circuit Court in the present case, the proceedings before the Board of Appeals were not made part of the record here. The proceeding before Judge Harris was for judicial review of the Board of Appeals’s decision to grant some of the variances. An appeal of that case is pending in the Court of Special Appeals.
. Section 8-1815(a)(2)(i), in addition to supplying the new requirements that are at the heart of Appellant’s Complaint, purported to grant the Chair authority to bring suit against a person who violates an aspect of the Critical Area law:
A person who violates a provision of an order, permit, plan, local program, this subtitle, or regulations adopted, approved, or issued under the authority of this subtitle shall be:
*154 1. Subject to prosecution or suit in circuit court or district court by the chairman or local authorities, who may invoke the sanctions and remedies afforded by State or local law....
. With regаrd to the conclusion that the Legislature intended for the 2008 amendments to have prospective application only, the Circuit Court adopted the reasoning of Judge Harris's opinion in the separate case involving the Commission’s Petition for Judicial Review of the variances granted by the Board of Appeals. Judge Silkworth, in the present case, stated that he adopted Judge Harris's opinion, and could dispose of the motion on that ground, but nevertheless wrote further "to examine if, assuming that the Legislature did not intend the Act to be given prospective effect, the changes made by the Act would be deemed procedural or substantive.” Hence, Judge Silkworth's "belt- and-suspenders” exposition regarding the procedural versus substantive nature of the statutory amendment.
. In 2008, the General Assembly increased the minimum buffer area to “200 feet from tidal waters or a tided wetland.” § 8-1808.10(b)(l)(i); 2008 Md. Laws Ch. 119, § 1. The minimum buffer remained at 100 feet for a tributary stream. § 8-1808.10(b)(1)(h); 2008 Md. Laws ch. 119, § 1. The newly enacted legislation superseded the regulations, which no longer exist.
. The local jurisdiction is to make provisions for the granting of variances. At a minimum, the variance provisions must provide for the following:
(1) That findings are made by the local jurisdiction which demonstrate that special conditions or circumstances exist that are peculiar to the land or structure within the jurisdiction’s Critical Area program, would result in unwarranted hardship;
*158 (2) That a literal interpretation of this subtitle or the local Critical Area program and related ordinances will deprive the applicant of rights commonly enjoyed by other properties in similar areas within the Critical Area of the local jurisdiction;
(3) That the granting of a variance will not confer upon an applicant any special privilege that would be denied by this subtitle or the local Critical Area program to other lands or structures within the jurisdiction’s Critical Area;
(4) That the variance request is not based upon conditions or circumstances which are the result of actions by the applicant, nor does the request arise from any condition conforming, on any neighboring property;
(5) That the granting of a variance will not adversely affect water quality or adversely impact fish, wildlife, or plant habitat within the jurisdiction’s Critical Area, and that the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the general spirit and intent of the Critical Area law and the regulations adopted in this subtitle; and
(6) That applications for a variance will be made in writing to the local approving authority with a copy provided to the Commission.
COMAR 27.01.11.01 A(l)-(6).
. At least in the context of statutory construction, there is no significant difference between "retrospective” and “retroactive.” They "are synonymous in judicial usage and may be employed inter-changeably. They describe acts which operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of the act.”
Grasslands,
. Apparently, Banner was not reported in the Atlantic Reports.
. Although continuing to honor the Yorkdale doctrine here, we are not unmindful of Judge Wilner’s thoughtful dissenting opinion in Layton. *164 Although acknowledging that the majority opinion was based on well established precedent, he expressed his disagreement with the speсial treatment the Court gives to zoning and land use cases with regard to analysis of prospective versus retrospective application of changes in law occurring during pending litigation. He opined that, subject only to constitutional restrictions, the Court defers typically to the Legislature's determination, expressed in the statute, whether a law should be applied retrospectively. The problem arises when there is no apparent intent discernable on this score. In that instance, Judge Wilner noted that generally we take the opposite approach from that we take in land use and zoning cases.
In those situations, we have generally applied the principle that, if the change is one of procedure only, we will apply the new law even if doing so would produce a different result than not doing so. If the change affects substance, however, we will not apply the new law, at least if doing so would produce a different result. In that circumstance, we do not permit the rules to be changed mid-stream.
When we start carving out categorical exceptions to them, however, both their rationality and their jurisprudential basis are eroded. Why just zoning or land use cases? What is so special about them? They involve property, but only real property. Is real property somehow more, or less, sacred than other kinds of property, including contractual rights?
Id. He failed to see "any legitimate reason for drawing a distinction between zoning cases and other lands of cases.” Id.
.
Luxmanor
held that an amendment to a county zoning ordinance requiring an affirmative vote of four member of the Board of Appeals, rather than a majority as the ordinance required formerly, did not render invalid the Board's decision to grant a special exception to construct and operate a medical clinic.
. In
Arundel Corp. v. County Commissioners,
Arundel appealed to thе Circuit Court, which found that the new ordinance contained substantive changes to the law. Finding the Board's dismissal of the application to be 'unfair,” the trial court remanded the matter to the Board with instructions that it consider the application in accordance with the provisions in place at the time Arundel filed its applications.
The Court, without discussing
Yorkdale
or any cases following
York-dale,
held that the Board dismissed improperly the application and we remanded the matter to the Board.
. DCW argues that a retrospective application of the 2008 amendments is unconstitutional as it is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause and represents an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Because we hold that the Legislature intended for the 2008 Amendments to apply prospectively only, we shall not address DCW’s constitutional arguments.