IVONNE ESCOBAR v. STEELESOFT MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.
Civil Action No. GLR-12-2426
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
July 24, 2019
George L. Russell, III, United States District Judge
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Ivonne Escobar’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41).1 The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND2
From June 2005 to May 2012, Escobar worked for Defendant Steelesoft Management, LLC (“Steelesoft”) at its Baltimore, Maryland office. (Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1). During Escobar’s еmployment with Steelesoft, Defendant Scott R. Steele was President
Starting in October 2011, Escobar and other Steelesoft employees began receiving their paychecks late. (Compl. ¶ 22; Mar. 17, 2013 Escobar Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 41-5). Between November 2011 and May 2012, Defendants did not pay Escobar during eight pay periods. (Compl. ¶ 23; Pl.’s Mot. Ex. B at Steelе0000535–Steele0000542, ECF No. 41-4; Mar. 17, 2013 Escobar Aff. ¶¶ 7–8). Specifically, Defendants “failed to provide [Escobar] any compensation” for the following pay periods: November 12, 2011 through November 25, 2011; November 26, 2011 through December 9, 2011; December 10, 2011 through December 23, 2011; December 24, 2011 through January 6, 2012; March 3, 2012 through March 16, 2012; March 17, 2012 through March 30, 2012; March 31, 2012 through April 14, 2012; and April 14, 2012 through April 27, 2012.3 (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25; Mar. 17, 2013 Escobar Aff. ¶¶ 7–8; see Steele Dep., 299:20–300:10; 300:19–302:18, Feb. 21, 2013, ECF No. 41-7). As a result, Escobar resigned from Steelesoft on May 3, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 28).
On December 24, 2012, Steele filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the case against him. (Sugg. Bankr. ¶ 2, ECF No. 11). With the exception of Steele’s deposition and some outstanding written discovery, discovery closed on February 15, 2013. (Sched. Order at 2, ECF No. 8; Feb. 11, 2013 Order, ECF No. 15). On March 18, 2013, Escobar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment agаinst Steelesoft. (ECF No. 20). The Court has no record that Steelesoft filed an Opposition.
On April 11, 2013, the Court granted Escobar’s unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment against Steelesoft. (Apr. 11, 2013 Order at 1, ECF No. 21). The Court concluded that Escobar was a non-exempt employee, and that Steelesoft improperly withheld Escobar’s earned wages and failed to рay her overtime wages. (Id. at 1–2). The Court awarded Escobar a total of $65,095.15: (1) treble damages on $8,200.00 in unpaid wages, totaling $24,600.00 in damages; (2) $829.60 in unpaid overtime, doubled as liquidated damages; and (3) $39,665.55 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.). The Court also administratively closed the case pending resolution of Steele’s bankruptcy proceedings. (Id. at 2).
On February 4, 2019, Escobar filed her Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 41). Steele filed his Opposition on March 8, 2019. (ECF No. 43). Escobar filed a Reply on March 25, 2019. (ECF No. 44).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Conversion of Escobar’s Motion
As a threshold matter, the Court addresses Steele’s contentions that he has not had “the benefit of full discovery or evidence” to support his Opposition because the case against him was stayed on December 16, 2012. (Def.’s Opp’n at 1, ECF No. 43). As a result, Steele asserts, the Court should deny Escobar’s Motion and permit him to engage in further discovery. The Court is not persuaded.
To raise sufficiently the issue that more discovery is needed, the non-movant must typically file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), explaining the “specified reasons” why “[he] cannot present facts essential to justify [his] opposition.”
Here, Steele invokеs Rule 56(d) and submits an Affidavit. In his Affidavit, Steele avers that the statements in his Opposition are “true” and that the statements in Escobar’s Motion and Affidavit are “false.” (Steele Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6, ECF No. 43-1). Steele devotes the bulk of his Affidavit to asserting that Escobar owes approximately $20,000.00 to Steelesoft for taking unearned vacation and time off. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9–10). Besides stating that he has not “had the opрortunity to complete discovery,” and therefore “cannot fully respond” to Escobar’s Motion without “this crucial evidence,” Steele does not specify the evidence he seeks that would create a genuine dispute of material fact. (Id. ¶ 3). In his Opposition, Steele states that he would gather evidence from and depose Escobаr, interview witnesses, seek evidence of “the hours [Escobar] worked but didn’t,” records of Escobar’s “false time logged,” and records of wages paid to Escobar and hours that she worked. (Def.’s Opp’n at 7–8). Steele overlooks the fact that Steelesoft is likely in possession of much of this evidence, not Escobar. Indeed, Steele’s Affidavit supports this conclusion because he attests that Steelesoft’s Controller told him that Escobar took unearned vacation time, suggesting that the evidence for Steele’s assertions were, at least at one point, in Steelesoft’s possession. Further, Steele’s requests merely seek to re-litigate the Court’s
2. Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in the rеcord, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify evidence showing there is genuine dispute of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). The nonmovant cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere speculation
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a party’s case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)). Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. A “genuine” dispute concerning a “material” fact arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmovant has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case where she has the burden of proof, “there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
3. Analysis
Escobar contends that because the Court granted summary judgment in her favor and against Steelesoft on her FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL claims, the Court only needs to determine whether Steele is an “employer” under these statutes and is therefore jointly and severally liable for the judgment against Steelesoft. For his part, Steele disputes the judgment against Steelesoft and requests more time for discovery; he only briefly disputes
The FLSA premises liability upon the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 83 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Benshoff v. City of Virginia Beach, 180 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999)). The employee has the burden of pleading and proving that relationship. Id. (citing Benshoff, 180 F.3d at 140). The FLSA defines “employer,” in relevant part, as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employeе.” Id. (quoting
Under the economic reality test, the Court considers several factors. These factors include whether the alleged employer: (1) “had the power to hire and fire the employees”; (2) “supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment”; (3) “determined the rate and method of payment”; and (4) “maintained employment records.” Kerr, 824 F.3d at 83 (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court may also consider the individual’s job description and “financial interest in the enterprise.” McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 47 F.Supp.3d 260, 274 (D.Md. 2014) (first quoting Gionfriddo v. Jason Zink, LLC, 769 F.Supp.2d 880, 890 (D.Md. 2011); and then citing Roman v. Guapos III, Inc., 970 F.Supp.2d 407, 416 (D.Md. 2013)), aff’d, 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016). No one factor is dispositive; rather, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances. Kerr, 824 F.3d at 83.
Here, Escobar avers that Steele “had the authority to hire, fire, suspend, and issue disciplines for employees,” including her, and that Steele “was responsible for creating employment policies followed by Steelesoft [e]mployees.” (Escobar Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 41-18). Escobar further attests that Steele reviewed and approved her time
In his Opposition, not his sworn Affidavit, Steele counters that he was not Escobar’s “direct supervisor, never determined her work schedule, never review[ed] any employee of [Steelesoft]’s timesheets,” and that “managers handled the employees and payroll.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 8). Steele also disputes Escobar’s assertions regarding off-the-clock and overtime hours, as well as his apprоval of Escobar not being paid for eight pay periods. In his sworn Affidavit, however, Steele avers that Steelesoft’s Controller informed Steele, “as manager of [Steelesoft],” that Escobar allegedly “was paid for time she did not work” and took excess vacation time; therefore, she owed Steelesoft $20,000.00 in wages to which she was not entitled. (Steеle Aff. ¶¶ 9–10). Steele states that he addressed the matter with Escobar and gave her the option to repay the $20,000.00 in full, enter into a repayment plan, or “reduce the amount of money owed by working it off.” (Id. ¶ 10). Steele avers that Escobar chose to work off the money she owed, that “the [C]ontroller and I left the meeting on terms everyone seemed satisfied with,” and that “I as manager allowed her to honor working the time off.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–11) (emphasis added). Steele further states that he advised Escobar that “she would need to work the hours agreed to in her employment offer letter to remain[ ] employed,” that “what she did was unacceptable,” and that Escobar was paid for two months “to ease the repayment schedule.” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14). Thus, desрite his assertions to the contrary, Steele’s own statements reflect that he had the power to fire and discipline Escobar, and controlled the conditions of her employment by entering into an
In sum, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Steele was an “employer” under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL. Accordingly, the Court will grant Escobar’s Motion.
B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
In her Motion and Reply, Escobar requests that the Court award her supplemental attorneys’ fees and costs and that the Court order Steele to pay the previous attorneys’ fеes award against Steelesoft. Steele does not address Escobar’s requests.
The FLSA mandates the award of “reasonable attorney’s fee[s] . . . and costs” to the prevailing plaintiff.
Here, Escobar embeds her request for attorneys’ fees in her Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply; they do not provide “a detailed description of the work performed” or a “listing of expenditures” as required under Local Rule 109. Nor do they provide any of the other information required under the Local Rules. To be sure, Escobar attaches to her Motion an itemized list of attorneys’ fees, Affidavits from her counsel, an invoice for the deposition of Steele, and a receipt for the filing fee. (Pl.’s Mot. Exs. K–O, ECF Nos. 41-13 through 41-17). But the itemized list of attorneys’ fees is for work performed between July 11, 2012 and March 18, 2013—it does not include informatiоn on the time period for which Escobar is currently requesting attorneys’ fees. (See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. L). Similarly, counsel’s Affidavits attesting to their respective levels of experience are dated March 18, 2013. (Millman Aff. at 5, ECF No. 41-13; Luchansky Aff. at 2, ECF No. 41-15). And the current hourly billing rate to which Millman attests in his Affidavit, $225.00, (Millman Aff. ¶ 9), is $100.00 less than the rate he is now requesting, (see Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. at 15). Because Escobar’s counsel has not submitted documentation to support the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees requested in compliance with the Local Rules, the Court will deny Escobar’s request for supplemental attorneys’ fees without prejudice. The
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Escobar’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41) and deny without prejudice her request for an award of supplemental attorneys’ fees. The Court will also deny Steele’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, to Postpone Until Completion of Discovery (ECF No. 43). A separate Order follows.
Entered this 24th day of July, 2019.
/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge