Escobar v. SteeleSoft Management, LLC
1:12-cv-02426
D. MarylandJul 24, 2019Background
- Escobar worked for Steelesoft from 2005–2012, regularly working overtime without overtime pay; she was paid a salary and experienced repeated late or missed paychecks between Nov. 2011 and May 2012.
- Escobar resigned May 3, 2012, and sued Steelesoft and Scott R. Steele alleging violations of the FLSA, Maryland Wage & Hour Law (MWHL), and Maryland Wage Payment & Collection Law (MWPCL).
- In April 2013 the Court granted unopposed summary judgment against Steelesoft, awarding Escobar unpaid wages, liquidated/treble damages, and $39,665.55 in attorneys’ fees and costs; the case was then administratively closed pending Steele’s bankruptcy.
- After Steele’s bankruptcy dismissal and reopening of the case, Escobar moved for summary judgment (2019) to hold Steele individually liable; Steele opposed and sought further discovery, asserting counter-claims about Escobar owing Steelesoft unpaid vacation/time.
- The Court denied Steele’s request for additional discovery (Rule 56(d) insufficiently specific), applied the FLSA/Maryland “economic reality” test, found Steele exercised control (hire/fire, discipline, time approval, ownership interest), and held Steele was an “employer” jointly and severally liable.
- The Court granted summary judgment against Steele, denied Escobar’s request for supplemental attorneys’ fees without prejudice for Rule/local-rule deficiencies, and entered judgment for the prior $39,665.55 attorneys’ fee award against Steele.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Scott Steele is an “employer” under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL | Steele exercised control over employment (hire/fire, discipline), approved time records, directed unpaid/off-the-clock work, and owned/managed Steelesoft, so he is jointly and severally liable | Steele asserts he was not direct supervisor, did not set schedules, managers handled payroll/timesheets, and needs discovery to rebut Escobar’s facts | Court held Steele was an “employer” under the economic reality test and granted summary judgment against him |
| Whether Steele is entitled to additional discovery under Rule 56(d) before summary judgment | N/A (plaintiff opposed delay) | Steele contended the stay prevented full discovery and filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit seeking more time to gather evidence | Court denied additional discovery: Steele’s affidavit was conclusory and failed to identify essential specific evidence; prior judgment against Steelesoft barred re-litigation |
| Whether Escobar is entitled to supplemental attorneys’ fees and costs from Steele | Escobar sought supplemental fees/costs and enforcement of prior fee award against Steele | Steele did not meaningfully contest the fees request | Court denied supplemental fees without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule 109 documentation requirements, but entered judgment enforcing the prior $39,665.55 fee award against Steele |
| Whether the earlier summary judgment against Steelesoft should be revisited | N/A (plaintiff relied on prior ruling) | Steele asked reconsideration instead of filing Rule 60, arguing he lacked counsel earlier | Court refused to revisit: Steelesoft had counsel and opportunity to oppose earlier motion and LLC must be represented by counsel; Steele cannot litigate on Steelesoft’s behalf |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (use of summary judgment standards)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment/genuine dispute standard)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment burden shifting)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (failure of proof defeats opposition)
- Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62 (Fourth Circuit adopting economic reality test for FLSA employer status)
- Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298 (economic reality factors)
- Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132 (economic reality factors enumerated)
- Friolo v. Frankel, 942 A.2d 1242 (Md. law — discretionary award of fees under MWHL/MWPCL)
