EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. EBERSPAECHER NORTH AMERICA INC.
No. 21-13799
United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
May 10, 2023
[PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-mc-00891-RDP
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
This appeal involves the limitations on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission‘s (“EEOC“) investigatory powers. It arises from a district court order enforcing only part of an administrative subpoena issued by the EEOC against Eberspaecher North America (“ENA“), a company that manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi, Michigan and six other locations across the country.
An employee at one of these locations—ENA‘s Northport, Alabama plant—complained to the EEOC that he was fired for taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA“). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA“),1 listing only the Northport facility in the written charge.2 The EEOC then issued requests for information on every employee terminated for attendance-related infractions at each of ENA‘s seven domestic facilities around the nation. When ENA objected to the scope of those requests, the EEOC issued a subpoena and eventually sought judicial enforcement in federal district court.
The district court ordered ENA to turn over information related to the Northport, Alabama facility,
As we outline below, the EEOC‘s investigatory process is a multistep process designed to notify employers of investigations into potentially unlawful employment practices. First, an aggrieved employee, or the EEOC acting on behalf of an aggrieved employee, can issue a charge against an employer. This charge serves as notice that the EEOC is investigating the potentially unlawful employment practices specified in the charge, and it provides the employer the opportunity to comply with the investigation and rectify the targeted practices. However, if the employer does not voluntarily comply with the investigation, the EEOC can then subpoena the charged employer for information—but only for information relevant to the investigation of the issue set forth in the charge.
After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that the EEOC charged only ENA‘s Northport facility
I. Background
ENA, headquartered in Novi, Michigan, manufactures car components including heaters, A/C units, and service diagnostic tools at seven facilities in four U.S. states. In 2017, a former ENA employee at ENA‘s Northport, Alabama facility, Joseph White, filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that ENA violated the ADA by firing him from his job following a series of disability-related absences.3 White alleged that ENA used “a point system to discipline employees for absences and tardiness,” including for absences protected under the FMLA. According to ENA‘s employee handbook, employees receive two points for unscheduled absences, and ten points within a 12-month period result in termination. Per the handbook, ENA is not supposed to assign points for excused absences, including FMLA absences, but it allegedly did so in White‘s case.
The EEOC investigated White‘s complaint and, purportedly based on a review of the “employer‘s practices and the employee handbook,” concluded that ENA in Northport, Alabama was employing the same allegedly discriminatory practice with other employees—assigning points and firing employees for FMLA-protected absences. As a result, the EEOC charged ENA with unlawful employment practices under the ADAAA.
(a) The Charge
In July 2019, an EEOC Commissioner filed a charge stating: “I charge the following employer with unlawful employment practices. Eberspaecher North America, Inc. 6801 B 5th Street Northport, AL 35476.” “[T]he above-named employer . . . has violated . . . and continues to violate the [ADAAA] by discriminating against employees on the basis of disability with respect to qualified leave.” It then listed the alleged unlawful discriminatory practices such as “[f]ailing to properly categorize qualified absences protected under the ADAAA” and “[u]nlawful discipline and termination, and the improper assessment of occurrence points wherein an employee‘s absence is directly correlated to their disability.” The charge specified that the allegations were based on a review of the “employer‘s practices and the employee handbook,” and that “[t]he aggrieved individuals include all employees who have, have been, or might in the future be adversely affected by the” allegedly unlawful practices.
Several days later, the EEOC‘s Mobile, Alabama office sent ENA‘s Northport facility a notice of the charge. The notice informed ENA that “[t]he circumstances of the alleged discrimination are based on Retaliation and Disability, and involve issues of Discipline, Reasonable Accommodation, and Discharge that are alleged to have occurred on or about Jan 01, 2017 through Aug 02, 2019.” The notice did not suggest that the charge or investigation were of a nationwide scope.
(b) Requests for Information
The Commission also made its first request for information to ENA‘s Northport facility around that time. Similar to the notice, the initial request for information
The EEOC followed up and for the first time asked for nationwide data, which it claimed was “relevant to the instant charge of discrimination.” The Commission asked ENA to “[l]ist each employee discharged from Respondent‘s locations nationwide for the period from January 1, 2018 to the present, for attendance infractions” along with substantial accompanying documentation (e.g., information about the employee, the separation notice, the person who recommended discharging the employee, the person who made the final decision on discharge and so forth.). Notably, it did not request information about whether the discharged employees were disabled or otherwise unable to work for medical reasons.
ENA refused to provide the nationwide information, responding that “the underlying Charge [was] specific to the Northport, Alabama facility.” ENA and the EEOC went back and forth for months, with the EEOC pressing ENA for nationwide information about employees it terminated under the attendance policy. ENA resisted for several reasons pointing to the charge being specific to the Northport facility, the large burden of production for nationwide data, and the overbreadth of the Commission‘s nationwide requests given that the charge was based on allegations from a single employee.
(c) Subpoena
In August 2020, the EEOC issued the subpoena in question, sending it to ENA‘s CEO at the corporate headquarters in Novi, Michigan. The subpoena required ENA to produce and turn over nationwide information about employees that it terminated for attendance infractions at any of ENA‘s locations. ENA petitioned to revoke the subpoena, which the EEOC rejected as untimely. The EEOC then filed an application for judicial enforcement of the subpoena with the district court.4
(d) District Court Enforcement
In its application for a show cause order from the district court to enforce the administrative subpoena, the EEOC framed its investigation as an “investigation of a charge of nationwide unlawful employment practices.” The EEOC claimed the subpoena should be enforced because the charge was a nationwide charge; it did “not pertain to a single location.” Accordingly, the EEOC argued, among other things, that: (1) the requested information fell within the broad construction courts give to “relevance” in an EEOC subpoena enforcement action; (2) the nationwide information would help it assess whether ENA “failed to reasonably accommodate . . . disabled employees” under its attendance policy; and (3) if the EEOC concluded that ENA violated the ADAAA, the requested information would help it “identify specific victims of that unlawful employment practice.” ENA countered by arguing that the subpoena was too burdensome, indefinite, and had an “illegitimate purpose” in that
The district court ordered ENA to comply with the subpoena “but only as it applies to [ENA‘s] Northport facility.” Citing the charge‘s exclusive reference to the Northport facility‘s address, the district court found that only records that pertain to the attendance policy at the Northport facility were relevant to the charge. Reasoning that in order to bring a nationwide charge “the Commissioner must . . . stat[e] her intent within the four corners of the charge,” the court held that “[t]he Commissioner herself limited the scope of her charge to the Northport facility.” The EEOC timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court‘s decision to enforce an EEOC subpoena for an abuse of discretion.5 McLane Co., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 n.3, 1170 (2017). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n v. Marin, 982 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). “The relevance of documents in an administrative proceeding is a mixed question of law and fact, which implies that our standard of review of such determinations should look either to legal error or to clear error, depending on the circumstances.” E.E.O.C. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757, 760 (11th Cir. 2014).
III. Discussion
The EEOC argues that the charge was directed at ENA‘s facilities nationwide or, alternatively, that nationwide data is relevant to the EEOC‘s investigation even if the charge is directed only at the Northport facility. As explained below, we disagree on both counts.
With its enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress established the EEOC and charged it with responsibility for investigating potential unlawful employment practices, as defined by Title VII.
The ADAAA prohibits covered employers, such as ENA, from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in the “discharge of employees.”
The EEOC‘s enforcement procedure begins with the filing of an administrative “charge” alleging discrimination, which may be filed by or on behalf of an individual, or by a member of the EEOC.
After receiving a charge either from an aggrieved employee or a Commissioner, the EEOC must “serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on [the] employer” and “shall make an investigation thereof” to determine whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.”
“In connection with any investigation of a charge,” the EEOC “shall at all reasonable times have access to . . . any evidence” that “relates to unlawful employment practices covered by [the ADAAA] and is relevant to the charge under investigation.”
If an employer refuses to provide the EEOC with information the agency seeks as part of an investigation, the EEOC may issue an administrative subpoena.
If the charge is valid7 and the material requested relevant, the district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer establishes that the subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been issued for an “illegitimate purpose,” or is unduly burdensome. McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1165 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72 n.26 (1984)); see also E.E.O.C. v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449, 450 (11th Cir. 1996). At bottom, this case involves the threshold inquiry: whether the “material requested is relevant” to the charged misconduct. Because we decide this case at the threshold relevance inquiry, we need not consider whether the subpoena was “unduly burdensome,” “too indefinite,” or issued for an “illegitimate purpose.”
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in enforcing the subpoena only as to ENA‘s Northport facility. The EEOC makes two arguments on appeal. First, it contends that it did, in fact, charge nationwide conduct, such that the nationwide subpoena was valid and relevant to the charge. Second, in the alternative, the EEOC argues that nationwide data is still relevant to a charge solely against the Northport facility. For the reasons discussed below, both arguments fail.
(a) Whether the charge is directed only at ENA‘s Northport facility
We turn first to the EEOC‘s argument that it charged nationwide conduct. The EEOC‘s regulations require a charge to include, among other things, “[t]he full name and contact information of the person against whom the charge is made, if known.” See
The only employer listed in the charge is ENA‘s Northport facility, and the charge cannot be fairly read to target companywide misconduct. Specifically, the Commissioner‘s charge stated: “I charge the following employer with unlawful employment practices. Eberspa[e]cher North America, Inc. 6801 B 5th Street Northport, AL 35476.” (Emphasis added). And as the district court properly noted, the EEOC knows how to charge an employer with nationwide misconduct, as it has done so
We are unpersuaded by the EEOC‘s attempts to overcome the conclusion that it charged only the Northport facility. First, the Commission explains that the charge listed ENA‘s Northport facility (rather than the corporate headquarters) because the Birmingham office of the EEOC brought the alleged violations to the Commissioner and, therefore, that office was tasked with investigating the charge. But the involvement of the Birmingham office underscores that the allegedly discriminatory conduct at issue occurred at ENA‘s Northport facility, strengthening our conclusion that the charge targeted only the Alabama plant.
Second, the EEOC argues that other parts of the charge establish that the charge was directed at ENA‘s companywide practices. For example, the charge was based on a review of the employee handbook, which governs ENA‘s facilities companywide. And the charge describes “the aggrieved individuals” as “all employees” impacted by the allegedly unlawful practices. (Emphasis added.)
The problem with the EEOC‘s arguments about the handbook and broad definition of aggrieved employees is that they presuppose that the charge targets ENA facilities nationwide. To wit: the mention of the employee handbook in the charge comes in a sentence reading “[t]hese allegations are based upon a review of information regarding the employer, including the employer‘s practices and the employee handbook.” (Emphasis added.) That sentence does not suggest, let alone notify ENA, that the unlawful practices identified in the charge were allegedly occurring at all of ENA‘s facilities. As discussed above, the only “employer” mentioned in the charge is the ENA Northport facility. And stating that the EEOC also reviewed “the employee handbook” did not provide ENA with notice that the charge was alleging companywide unlawful practices.
The EEOC‘s argument about the definition of “aggrieved individuals” including “all employees” is similarly flawed. As the charge itself explicitly notes, “aggrieved individuals” includes “all employees” who have been adversely affected by the “unlawful employment practices set forth in the foregoing charge.” (Emphasis added.) Whether the “foregoing charge” is nationwide or Northport-centric, therefore, controls whether “all employees” means all ENA employees across the country or just the Northport ones. And as discussed above, the charge is best read as directed only at the Northport facility.
Third, the EEOC asserts that it was not required to identify ENA‘s address, if unknown, and therefore the inclusion of the Northport address is irrelevant. But here, the EEOC did include an address—the address for the Northport facility.9
(b) Whether companywide data is relevant to a charge specific to the Northport location
We turn next to the EEOC‘s relevance argument. The EEOC subpoenaed information on every attendance-related termination at all ENA facilities, irrespective of the terminated employees’ disability status or potential entitlement to FMLA leave. Below, and on appeal, the EEOC contends that, even if the charge is directed solely at the Northport facility, the nationwide data is still relevant to the charge, given the expansive definition of relevance in the Supreme Court‘s decisions and the fact that ENA‘s attendance policy “appears” to apply to all its United States facilities. It claims that nationwide information would “allow the EEOC to identify any individuals ENA discharged following disability-related absences.” We disagree that the information is relevant to the charge against the Northport facility.10
Even if we were to consider it, the EEOC‘s argument here is unconvincing. Specifically, the EEOC argues that “several” of our sister circuits have “reversed district courts that declined to enforce EEOC administrative subpoenas seeking information beyond the facility where the charge allegations arose, where the charge‘s allegations implicated a companywide policy.” In support, the EEOC cites to cases from three of our sister circuits, appearing to allude that a decision to the contrary would create a circuit split. We first note that because the question of whether requested information is relevant to an underlying EEOC charge is a fact-specific inquiry, we are not creating a circuit split.
Regardless, each of these cases are distinguishable. First, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. Kronos Inc., 620 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2010), where the Third Circuit held that a subpoena requesting nationwide information was relevant. Id. at 300. But Kronos is distinguishable, as the EEOC there had previously issued a notice expanding the charge to include “all facilities in the United States and its territories.” Id. at 293. In contrast, the EEOC here issued a single charge that specifically identified ENA‘s Northport facility but never expanded the charge to include any other ENA facilities.
The relevance of the material requested is linked to the scope of the Commission‘s charge against the employer. See
Next, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2012), where the Fourth Circuit held that a subpoena requesting statewide information was relevant. Id. at 450. But Randstad is also distinguishable, as the EEOC there originally sought nationwide information but voluntarily “narrowed the geographic scope” of the subpoena to a single state after the employer objected to the “nationwide scope of the subpoena.” Id. at 437–39. In contrast, the EEOC here is seeking nationwide information and has not indicated any plans to voluntarily cut the scope of its subpoena.
Finally, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 587 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2009), where the Second Circuit held that a subpoena seeking nationwide information was relevant. Id. at 140. But United Parcel Service is distinguishable as well, as the employee there who submitted the charge alleged that the company had a “pattern or a practice” of unlawful employment actions, which applied nationwide to all company facilities. Id. at 137-38. In contrast, and as discussed above, supra, the EEOC‘s charge here did not suggest that unlawful employment practices were occurring anywhere but ENA‘s Northport facility.
“The decision whether evidence sought is relevant requires the district court to evaluate the relationship between the particular materials sought and the particular matter under investigation—an analysis variable in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry.” McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1167–68 (quotation omitted). The relevance inquiry is “generally not amenable to broad per se rules” but is the “kind of fact-intensive, close call[] better suited to resolution by the district court than the court of appeals.” Id. at 1168 (quotation omitted).
As discussed above, the EEOC issued a charge against a single facility, based on the complaint of a single employee, about a specific kind of attendance-related discrimination: penalizing employees for taking FMLA-protected absences. Yet the EEOC requested information from every ENA facility in the country on all attendance-related terminations regardless of the terminated-employees’ disability status or entitlement to FMLA leave. Why ENA fired other employees at other facilities for any attendance-related reason is simply not relevant to whether the Northport facility engaged in ADAAA discrimination in administering its attendance policy. Holding that such an incredibly broad subpoena for such information was “relevant” to the charge against ENA‘s Northport facility would construe that term so broadly as to render it a “nullity.” See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 694.
Our decision in Royal Caribbean Cruises supports our decision here that the EEOC‘s demands for nationwide information are not relevant to the charged conduct. In that case, an employee filed a charge11 with the EEOC against Royal
The relevance that is necessary to support a subpoena for the investigation of an individual charge is relevance to the contested issues that must be decided to resolve that charge, not relevance to issues that may be contested when and if future charges are brought by others.
Id. at 761. We also explained that the EEOC‘s arguments in that case, much like their arguments on appeal in this case, “amounted to simply parroting the Supreme Court‘s statement that [relevant information was] information [that] ‘might cast light on the allegations’ against [Royal Caribbean].” Id. at 761 (quoting Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69).
The EEOC appears to be litigating this case much like it did in Royal Caribbean. For one, as mentioned above, the EEOC‘s arguments amount, almost exclusively, to pointing to the broad conception of relevance discussed in Shell Oil. But as we noted in Royal Caribbean, the Supreme Court also cautioned against reading the relevance requirement so broadly as to render it a “nullity.” Id. at 760 (quoting Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68–69). Accepting the EEOC‘s arguments would do just that.
We therefore hold that the EEOC‘s request for nationwide information was not relevant to its charge against ENA‘s Northport facility. When it issued its original charge against ENA‘s Northport facility, the EEOC put ENA on notice of the alleged discriminatory practices at that one facility and gave ENA an opportunity to comply with the investigation and rectify the targeted practices. As it targeted the Northport facility, the EEOC‘s charge did not, however, provide notice of an investigation into ENA‘s facilities nationwide. No one disputes that the EEOC could have amended this charge prior to issuing the administrative subpoena to put ENA on notice of a nationwide investigation—but the EEOC did not do so.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing the EEOC‘s subpoena of information only as to the Northport facility. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I disagree that this case presents an opportunity to limit an agency‘s investigatory powers. This subpoena falls well within the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission‘s (EEOC) investigatory power, and the charge before us raises no compelling reason to disturb the longstanding latitude the Supreme Court has afforded EEOC investigations.1
The Supreme Court has clearly explained, “[a] district court‘s role in an
Despite the Supreme Court‘s generous construction of subpoena validity and relevance, the majority opinion constrains the EEOC‘s investigation on two grounds: first, by limiting the geographic scope of the charge to the address listed therein, and second, by finding the nationwide information sought irrelevant. I address each argument in turn.
I.
The majority opinion places undue weight on the facility address listed on the charge, concluding that it alone restricts the geographic scope of the investigation to the Northport Alabama facility. While an EEOC charge must include, among other things, “the full name and contact information of the person against whom the charge is made,” the charge is not required to list an address.
The employer charged with unlawful conduct here is “Eberspacher [sic] North America, Inc.” (ENA), not Eberspaecher Northport, Alabama. The charge does not list the Northport facility as the employer, nor does it address the Northport facility as if it were a separate legal entity. The only Northport-specific language included within the charge is the address associated with the Northport location. To suggest that the inclusion of this single address limits the charge to this single facility turns a blind eye to basic notions of corporate structure and a plain reading of the charge. ENA, like many corporations, has multiple locations nationwide and consequently multiple addresses. ENA is a single legal entity with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.2 Despite each facility having a unique address, an address alone
Rather than fixate on the address, a far more natural reading of the charge reveals that the EEOC sought to investigate a pattern-or-practice charge against ENA nationwide. The charge refers to ENA‘s “unlawful discriminatory practices” and directly references ENA‘s “practices and the employee handbook” that applies nationwide. Further, the charge states that “[t]he aggrieved individuals include all employees who have, have been, or might in the future be adversely affected by the unlawful employment practices set forth in the” charge (emphasis added). As the district court reasoned, “the commissioner must . . . stat[e] her intent within the four corners of the charge.” It is plainly clear that located within the four corners of the charge is the intent to investigate ENA nationwide.
II.
Next, the majority contends that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is irrelevant to the Commissioner‘s charge. Although the EEOC is limited to accessing relevant information, the Supreme Court has held “[t]hat limitation on the [EEOC‘s] investigative authority is not especially constraining.” E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984). The term “relevant” has been construed broadly, and courts “have afforded the [EEOC] access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.” Id. at 68–69. An individual charge3 may be limited to investigating the individual employee‘s claim in that instance. E.E.O.C. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757, 761-62 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding an individual charge improperly overbroad where it sought to discover a potential class of employees or applicants who suffered from a pattern or practice of discrimination within the company rather than limit the charge to the individual employee‘s allegation).
The information related to ENA‘s allegedly unlawful employment practices nationwide is, under any construction of the term, relevant to the EEOC‘s investigation. The type and scale of information sought here to investigate an alleged discriminatory pattern and practice spanning multiple facilities nationwide is certainly the type of material “that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68–69. I see no reason to stifle the broad investigatory power clearly laid out by the Supreme Court. Additionally, our logic in Royal Caribbean is inapplicable here. In Royal Caribbean, the only charge at issue was an individual charge investigating an alleged ADA violation by the employer against a single employee. 771 F.3d at 759–60. The charge here is the Commissioner‘s charge, not Mr. White‘s individual charge, seeking to discover whether ENA‘s policy (which applies to all ENA employees nationwide) is discriminatory. Unlike in Royal Caribbean, where the companywide information was irrelevant to an individual charge, the companywide information sought here by the Commissioner is clearly relevant to this companywide investigation.
Furthermore, we have previously contemplated the precise case before us, as we suggested in Royal Caribbean that “[t]he Commission has the ability to file a Commissioner‘s charge alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination that could support a request for [companywide information].” 771 F.3d at 762. As we suggested then, and we should hold now, ENA companywide information is relevant to the allegation of pattern-and-practice discrimination.
Because I would hold that the EEOC satisfied its requirement to create a valid charge seeking relevant information and would therefore reverse the district court, I dissent.