Lead Opinion
This opinion consolidates two cases in which Brittany Ellis (“Ellis”) and Tyairra Johnson (“Johnson”) (together, “Appellants”), separately sued the Housing Authority for Baltimore City (“HABC”), Appellee, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (“the circuit court”) for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act arising out of Appellants’ alleged exposure to lead paint in properties that HABC owned and operated.
We must decide: (I) whether the circuit court erred in concluding that Appellants did not substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“the LGTCA”), Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. (1987, 2013 Repl.Vol.) (“CJP”) § 5-301 et seq.; (II) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; and (III) whether, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice requirement violates Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
For the reasons below, we hold that: (I) the circuit cоurt properly concluded that Appellants did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; (II) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; and (III) as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
A. Ellis v. HABC
On January 10, 1989, Ellis was born. She first resided with her mother at 1004 North Washington Street. In 1989, Ellis and her mother moved to 2708 Giles Road. On September 10, 1990, Ellis and her mother moved to 26 South Exeter Street. All three properties were owned and operated by HABC.
On April 3, 1992, the University of Maryland Pediatric Ambulatory Center (“the University”) tested Ellis’s blood-lead level and reported 14 micrograms per deciliter (g,g/dL). In a letter to Ellis’s mother dated June 9, 1992, the University stated: “Your child recently was tested for lead. His/her lead level is not dangerously high. However, the results show that he/she may be at risk for high lead in the future. He/she shоuld have her lead retested every 3-4 months.” (Emphasis in original).
On June 19, 1992, the University tested Ellis’s blood-lead level and reported 12 pcg/dL. A University form signed by Dr. J. Rubin states that Ellis was seen on June 19, 1992, “for repeat lead testing (blood lead test was lb on 4/3/92)[.]” (Emphasis in original). An HABC form entitled “Summary of Interviews” pertaining to Ellis’s mother states that on June 24, 1992, HABC received a “form letter from [the University], from Dr. Rubin ... regarding [Ellis]’s test result. Dr. Rubin stated [Ellis]’s level of 14 was an indication there was some exposure to lead, however, the level was not cause for treatment, only frequent testing.” On April 27, 1993, Ellis and her mother moved to 725 George Street, which HABC owned and operated.
On January 7, 2010 (approximately eighteen years after Ellis’s first blood-lead level test occurred), in the circuit court, Ellis sued HABC
During discovery, HABC produced a “tenant folder” pertaining to Ellis’s mother’s tenancy at 26 South Exeter Street and 725 George Street, containing the form entitled “Summary of Interviews.” Nothing in the “tenant folder,” however, indicates that Ellis’s mother complained of or expressed concern about the presence of lead paint in any of the premises occupied by Ellis.
On March 13, 2012, HABC moved for summary judgment, contending that Ellis failed to strictly or substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. HABC also argued that Ellis did not show good cause for her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. In an affidavit that was attached to the motion for summary judgment, William M. Peach III, Director of the Housing Management Administration at HABC, averred that he was “not aware of any written complaints, letters, notices or related documentation received from [ ] Ellis or anyone in her family prior to January 20, 2010 regarding her intention to bring a claim against [ ] HABC for alleged exposure to lead-based paint at the subject properties.”
On April 23, 2012, the circuit court conducted a hearing and granted thе motion for summary judgment, concluding that Ellis did not: (1) substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; or (2) show good cause for her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. Ellis noted a timely appeal. On February 22, 2013, while the appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court granted certiorari on its initiative. See Ellis v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City,
On July 1, 1990, Johnson was born. Johnson first resided with her mother at 1620 Booker Court, which HABC owned and operated. In an affidavit dated March 13, 2012, Johnson’s mother averred that, “from 1990 through 1996[,]” “every day for several hours at a time[,]” Johnson visited her grandmother at 601 North Brice Street, which HABC owned and operated. In her affidavit,
was approximately three[-]years[-]old[, Johnson’s mother] noticed chipping paint at 1620 Booker Court.... [Johnson’s mother] saw [Johnson] put paint in [her] mouth[]. [Johnson’s mother] immediately complained to a housing manager of [HABC] about the chipping paint.... [Johnson’s mother] told the [h]ousing [m]anager that [she] was concerned that the chipping paint ... contained lead and that [Johnson] had been exposed to lead when [she] put the paint in [her] mouth[]. [Johnson’s mother] asked the [h]ousing [m]anager to come fix the deteriorated paint---[Johnson’s mother] threatened to sue [HABC] if [HABC] did not fix the violations causing injuries to [Johnson].
No one from any health clinic informed [Johnson’s mother] that [ ] Johnson had any lead in her blood until she was seen at the Kennedy Krieger Institute ... in 2000.
In 2000[,] Kennedy Krieger Institute informed [Johnson’s mother] that [ ] Johnson had suffered from elevated blood[-]lead levelsf.]
On June 24, 2011, in the circuit court, Johnson sued HABC for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act arising out of Johnson’s alleged exposure to lead paint at 1620 Booker Court and 601 North Brice Street.
On April 23, 2012, the circuit court conducted a hearing and granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding that Johnson did not: (1) substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; or (2) show good cause for her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. Johnson noted a timely appeal. On March 5, 2013, while the appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court granted certiorari on its own initiative. See Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City,
DISCUSSION
I.
Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in concluding that they did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. Specifically, Appellants argue that HABC had timely and presumed notice of their injuries because HABC was: (1) legally required to inspect properties for deteriorated lead paint; and (2) generally aware of the frequency of lead paint actions. Ellis asserts that HABC had actual notice of her claim because HABC received the results of her first blood-lead level test via Dr. Rubin’s letter. Johnson maintains that HABC had notice of her claim because her mother orally complained timely to an HABC housing manager about chipрing paint and threatened to sue HABC if it did not fix the chipping paint.
HABC responds that the circuit court properly concluded that Appellants did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. Specifically, HABC contends that it
Where there is no genuine dispute of material fact, an appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. See Koste v. Town of Oxford,
An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s conclusion as to whether a plaintiff substantially complied with the LGTCA notice requirement. See generally Faulk v. Ewing,
Under the LGTCA, “an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local government ... unless the notice of the claim ... is given within 180 days after the injury.” CJP § 5-304(b)(l). “The notice shall be in writing and shall state the time, place, and cause of the injury.” CJP § 5-304(b)(2). “[T]he notice shall be given to the corporate authorities of the defendant local government.” CJP § 5-304(c)(4).
Even if a plaintiff does not strictly comply with the LGTCA notice requirement, a plaintiff substantially complies with the LGTCA notice requirement where: (1) the plaintiff makes “some effort to provide the requisite notice”; (2) the plaintiff does “in fact” give some kind of notice; (3) the notice
to apprise [the] local government of its possible liability at a time when [the loсal government] could conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and [the local government’s] responsibility in connection with it.
Faulk,
For example, in Faulk, id. at 307-08,
By contrast, in Halloran v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Works,
A. Ellis v. HABC
Ellis did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. HABC has no record of any complaint by Ellis or any of her family members regarding chipping, flaking or peeling lead paint. In fact, the record does not indicate that, before Ellis sued HABC, she or her mother ever contacted HABC about deteriorated paint conditions in any property, or that Ellis or her mother ever alleged that property owned or operated by HABC was the cause or source of Ellis’s injury (i.e., Ellis’s elevated blood-lead level).
Our conclusion is unchanged by the circumstance that HABC received the results of Ellis’s first blood-lead level test. Neither the test results themselves, nor the manner in which HABC received the test results, indicated that Ellis intended to sue HABC. A plaintiff does not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where purported notice does not “apprise [the] local government of its possible liability[.]” Faulk,
B. Johnson v. HABC
Johnson did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. It is true that, before Johnson sued HABC, Johnson’s mother allegedly orally complained to an HABC housing manager about chipping paint and threatened to sue HABC if it did not fix the chipping paint. For two reasons, however, Johnson’s mother’s alleged oral complaint did not apprise HABC of its possible liability.
First, Johnson’s mother threatened to sue HABC if it did not fix the chipping paint; thus, Johnson’s mother essentially advised that the threatened action against HABC would be a landlord-tenant action (in which Johnson’s mother sought that HABC fix the chipping paint), not a lead paint action (in which Johnson sought damages for her alleged injury resulting from exposure to lead paint). Simply put, through her alleged oral complaint, Johnson’s mother neither explicitly nor implicitly indicated that she intended to sue HABC regarding any injury. A plaintiff does not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff demands that a local government fix a defect, but neither explicitly nor implicitly indicates that the plaintiff intends to sue the local government regarding an injury resulting from the defect
Second, Johnson’s mother did not learn of Johnson’s injury (i.e., Johnson’s elevated blood-lead level) until approximately six or seven years after her oral complaint; thus — in addition to Johnson’s mother’s failure to give notice of an intent to initiate a lead paint action — at the time of Johnson’s mother’s oral complaint, it was not possible for Johnson’s mother to give notice of an injury allegedly caused by HABC.
We reject Appellants’ contention that HABC had notice of their injuries because HABC was legally required to inspect properties for deteriorated lead paint and generally aware of the frequency of lead paint actions involving older rental dwellings in Baltimore City. A plaintiff does not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff does not “in fact” give some kind of notice. Faulk,
For the above reasons, we hold that the circuit court properly concluded that Appellants did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement.
II.
Appellants contend that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. Specifically, Appellants argue that they showed good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement because they were minors at the time of their injuries, and because HABC was: (1) legally required to inspect properties for deteriorated lead paint; and (2) generally aware of the frequency of lead paint actions. Ellis asserts that she showed good cause for her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice
HABC responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellants failed to show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. Specifically, HABC contends that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement because Appellants’ mothers did not diligently prosecute their claims while Appellants were minors. HABC argues that minority does not per se constitute good cause for failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement.
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s conclusion as to whether a plaintiff showed good cause for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. See generally Prince George’s Cnty. v. Longtin,
“[U]pon motion and for good cause shown the court may entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given.” CJP § 5-304(d). A plaintiff shows good cause for his or her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff “prosecute[s] his [or her] claim with th[e] degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.” Rios,
A plaintiff shows good cause for his or her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff reasonably relies on “misleading” representations by a
However, a plaintiff does not per se show good cause for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff is a minor at the time of the injury. See id. at 144,
By contrast, in Moore v. Norouzi,
Here, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellants failed to show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement.
A. Ellis v. HABC
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Ellis did not show goоd cause for her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. As early as 1992, Ellis’s mother knew that Ellis’s blood-lead level was 14 |xg/dL. However, the record does not indicate that Ellis or her mother took any action regarding Ellis’s potential claim until 2010, when Ellis sued HABC. A plaintiff does not show good cause for his or her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff does not “prosecute[ ] his [or her] claim with th[e] degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.” Rios,
B. Johnson v. HABC
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Johnson did not show good cause for her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. As the circuit court noted, Johnson’s mother did not “become aware of [Johnson’s] elevated blood[-lead] level until 2000.” The record does not indicate that Johnson or her mother took any action regarding Johnson’s potential claim between 2000 and 2011, when Johnson sued HABC.
Our conclusion is unchanged by the circumstance that, in either 1993 or 1994, Johnson’s mother allegedly orally com
C. Ellis v. HABC & Johnson v. HABC
We reject Appellants’ contention that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement because Appellants were minors at the time of their injuries. A plaintiff does not per se show good cause for his or her failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement because the plaintiff is a minor at the time of the injury. See Rios,
We reject Appellants’ contention that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement because HABC was: (1) legally required to inspect properties for deteriorated lead paint; and (2) generally aware of the frequency of lead paint actions. In determining whether a рlaintiff shows good cause for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the LGTCA notice require
For the above reasons, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement.
III.
Appellants contend that, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice
HABC responds that, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Specifically, HABC contends that HABC’s operation of public housing is a governmental — as opposed to proprietary — activity because, by statute, HABC’s purpose is to promote the welfare of the whole public. Alternatively, HABC argues that, еven if its operation of public housing is a proprietary activity, the LGTCA notice requirement’s restriction upon a minor’s access to the courts is reasonable because the LGTCA notice requirement is not unduly burdensome.
An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s conclusion as to whether a law is constitutional. See Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc.,
Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states:
[E]very man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without*354 sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land.
In an action arising out of a governmental — as opposed to proprietary — activity by a lоcal government, as applied to a minor plaintiff, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Rios,
This is so because “the LGTCA does not restrict a traditional remedy or access to the courts[.]” Id. at 139,
By contrast, it appears that, in an action arising out of a proprietary — as opposed to governmental — activity by a local government, as applied to a minor plaintiff, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights if and only if the LGTCA notice requirement’s “restriction upon access to the courts ... is [ ]reasonable[,]” id. at 137,
An activity is governmental where the activity “is sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the [local government], and tends to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no element of private interest[.]” Id. at 128-29,
For example, in City of Balt. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.,
Here, we unequivocally hold that, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as the lead paint action arises out of a governmental — as opposed to proprietary — activity (i.e., HABC’s operation of public housing). See Rios,
For four reasons, HABC’s operation of public housing is a governmental activity. First, according to statute, HABC “exercises public and essential governmental functions[.]” Md.Code Ann., Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Art. (2006) (“HCD”) § 15-104(1) (emphasis added). Second, HABC’s operation of public housing is sanctioned by legislative authоrity. See HCD § 12-502(b)(6) (“A[housing] authority may ... carry out the purposes of the [housing] authority.”); HCD §§ 15-103(5), 15-103(1) (HABC’s purpose is “to remedy” the “shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing” in Baltimore City.). Third, HABC’s operation of public housing tends to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole public. See HCD §§ 15-103(2), 15-103(3) (“[0]vercrowded and congested housing [and tenants’] payfing] too much of their income for shelter” “require too much public money to be spent for public health and safety, fire and accident protection, crime prevention and punishment, and other public services and facilities[.]”). Fourth, HABC’s operation of public housing does not cause profit or emolument to inure to HABC. See HCD § 12-401(a)(2) (“[A housing] authority ... may not operate for profit or as a source of revenue to the political subdivision.”). An activity is governmental where the activity “is sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the [local government], and tends to benefit the publiс health and promote the welfare of
We reject Appellants’ contention that, under Reed,
We reject Appellants’ contention, made at oral argument, that a lead paint action arises out of a proprietary activity— namely, HABC’s compliance with its legal requirement to inspect properties for deteriorated lead paint. HABC’s compliance with its legal requirement to inspect properties for deteriorated lead paint is part and parcel of HABC’s operation
We are unpersuaded by the cases from other jurisdictions on which Appellants rely. For example, in Hous. Auth. of City of Providence v. Oropeza, 713 A.2d 1262, 1264, 1268 (R.I.1998), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that providing security in public housing is a proprietary activity because “the activity [at issue] was one that a private person or corporation would be likely to carry out.” (Alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to housing authorities in Rhode Island, HABC does what private enterprise has failed to do. See HCD § 15-103(4) (“[T]he shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing cannot be wholly relieved through private enterprise^]”). Similarly, in Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hampton Redevelopment & Hous. Auth.,
For the above reasons, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
IN CASE NO. 16, JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.
IN CASE NO. 17, JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.
BATTAGLIA and ADKINS, JJ., concur in No. 16, Sept. Term, 2013.
Notes
. Ellis also sued Ernesto Gonzalez and C.B. & A., Inc. concerning a property located at 2814 Miles Avenue. On May 18, 2010, the circuit court dismissed Ellis’s claims against C.B. & A., Inc. On June 14, 2012, Ellis dismissed her claims against Gonzalez.
. Ellis also sued HABC for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act arising out of Ellis’s alleged exposure to lead paint at a fifth property, 475 George Street. In this Court, however, Ellis raises no issue as to her alleged exposure to lead paint at 475 George Street.
. For clаrity, we reorganize the averments in Johnson’s mother’s affidavit in chronological order.
. Johnson also sued HABC for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act arising out of Johnson’s alleged exposure
. Although the General Assembly has recodified the LGTCA since 1992 (when Ellis’s first blood-lead level test occurred), the General Assembly did not change the substance of the above language. To avoid confusion, we refer to the current version of the LGTCA.
. It is undisputed that Appellants did not strictly comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. No member of Ellis’s family or Johnson's family ever gave HABC notice of a claim in writing. CJP § 5-304(b)(2).
. It is not relevant that: (1) in an agreement between HABC and Ellis’s mother dated April 27, 1993, Ellis’s mother stated that she would "notify [HABC] immediately if the unit in which [she] live[d] ha[d] flaking, chipping or peeling paint"; and (2) in answers to HABC’s interrogatories, Ellis stated that, "[d]uring [her] tеnancy, there was a problem with flooding water and [HABC] had to enter the property ... to malee [ ] repairs. [HABC] was in the property and could observe the condition of the deteriorated paint.” There simply is no record of Ellis’s mother ever notifying HABC of an intent to initiate an action, or of an issue as to any conditions associated with lead paint at any property that Ellis occupied.
. This standard does not unduly burden potential lead paint plaintiffs. We do not hold that, to substantially comply with the LGTCA notice
. It is true that Johnson’s mother told the HABC housing manager that Johnson put paint in her mouth. However, Johnson’s injury was not her putting paint in her mouth; instead, Johnson's injury was her elevated blood-lead level. See generally Ross v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City,
. Absent misleading representations by a defendant to a claimant or representations that a claimant relies on to his or her detriment, a good cause finding is grounded on the actions of the claimant and whether those actions demonstrate that the claimant pursued his or her claim diligently-namely, "whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.” Heron v. Strader,
. We need not discuss whether the lack of notice prejudiced HABC. Prejudice to a local government due to lack of notice is at issue only if a plaintiff shows good cause for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. See Halloran,
. In this Court, the Maryland Association of Housing and Redevelopment Agencies and its member housing authorities filed an amicus brief in each case, contending that, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, the LGTCA notice requirement does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
. Both before and after the General Assembly enacted the LGTCA, local governments were not immune to torts that arose out of proprietary- — as opposed to governmental — activities. See Rios,
. Here, we decline to apply Tinsley v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
. Appellants misinterpret Reed,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring, in which ADKINS, J., joins.
I concur with the majority’s opinion in Brittany Ellis v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City that Brittany Ellis (Brittany) failed to prove substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Acts (LGTCA) and also failed to prove good cause for not complying with the notice requirements, but I write separately to state that if reliance had been proven on a notice provided by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (the Notice), which was attached as an exhibit to Brittany’s Opposition to the Housing Authority of Baltimore City’s (HABC) motion for summary judgment, I may have come to a different conclusion.
The Notice was what Brittany’s Opposition referenced as “HABC[’s] form warning of dangers of lead” signed by Carrie Ellis (Ms. Ellis), Brittany’s mother, on April 27, 1993,
You should notify the Housing Authority and/or the landlord immediately if the unit in which you live has flaking, chipping or peeling paint, water leaks from faulty plumbing or defective roofs. You should cooperate with the Housing Authority and/or landlord’s efforts to repair any deficiencies and keep your unit in good shape. Don’t attempt any abatement work yourself. Sсraping or sanding can create dust which could result in a greater risk of exposure. The use of heat or paint removers could create a vapor or fume which may cause poisoning if inhaled over a long period of time.
Whenever possible, the removal of lead-based paint should take place when there are no children and pregnant women on the premises.
Since your child can acquire lead paint from sources other than your home, you should continue to watch out for symptoms of lead poisoning.
YOUR ATTENTION TO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CAN MINIMIZE EXPOSURE RISK
Remember that you as a parent play a major role in the prevention of lead poisoning. Your actions and awareness about the lead problem can make a big difference.
(emphasis in original). In the Circuit Court or this Court, Brittany did not allege that Ms. Ellis detrimentally relied on the Notice by only informing, through Brittany’s doctor, the HABC of a potential lead issue, rather than complying with the notice requirements of the LGTCA, and therefore, I agree with the majority’s assessment that Brittany did not substantially comply with the notice requirements of Section 5-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2008 Supp.).
Good cause to waive the notice requirements also may have existed. To determine good cause, we consider “whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similаr circumstances.” Rios v. Montgomery Cnty.,
The absence of proof of reliance, however, leads me to concur in the opinion in Brittany’s case.
Judge ADKINS has authorized me to state that she joins this concurring opinion.
. Only one page of the Notice was attached as an exhibit in Brittany's Opposition filed in the Circuit Court because, according to Brittany’s
. Former Section 504, Alabama Code (1940) provided:
No recovery shall be had against any city or town, on a claim for personal injury received, unless a sworn statement be filed with the clerk, by the party injured, or his personal representative, in case of his death, stating substantially the manner in which the injury was received, and the day and time, and the place where the accident occurred, and the damages claimed.
This provision is currently codified at Section 11-47-192, Alabama Code (2013).
. Specifically, the county alleged non-compliance with Section 59:8-4 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated (1972), which provided:
A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his behalf and shall include:
a. The name and post office address of the claimant;
*362 b. The post-office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent;
c. The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted;
d. A general description of the injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim;
e. The name or names of the public entity, employee or employees causing the injury, damage or loss, if known; and
f. The amount claimed as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed.