Ellis v. Housing Authority
436 Md. 331
| Md. | 2013Background
- Two consolidated suits (Ellis; Johnson) against Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) alleging lead-paint exposure in HABC-owned residences and claiming negligence and MCPA violations. Suits filed decades after initial blood-lead tests/observations.
- Ellis: elevated blood-lead levels in 1992 (14 µg/dL then 12 µg/dL); no record that Ellis or her mother ever notified HABC of a claim in writing; HABC had a notation it received a form letter from Dr. Rubin but no evidence family delivered test results to HABC. Ellis sued in 2010.
- Johnson: mother alleges oral complaints in 1993–94 to an HABC manager about chipping paint and threatened to sue if not fixed; Johnson’s elevated blood-lead level was not identified until ~2000; Johnson sued in 2011.
- HABC moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiffs failed to comply with the LGTCA written 180-day notice requirement and did not show good cause to excuse noncompliance; circuit court granted summary judgment for HABC.
- Maryland Supreme Court affirmed: plaintiffs did not substantially comply with the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) notice requirement, did not show good cause to excuse failure, and the notice requirement as applied to a minor in a lead-paint suit against HABC does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Substantial compliance with LGTCA notice (CJP §5-304) | Plaintiffs: HABC had actual or presumed notice—Ellis: HABC received early blood-lead result; Johnson: mother made oral complaint and threatened suit; HABC’s inspection duties and prevalence of lead suits meant HABC was on notice | HABC: No written notice as required; receipt of test results did not indicate intent to sue; oral complaints insufficient and not written to corporate authorities | Court: No substantial compliance—no written notice, test results and oral complaints did not apprise HABC of intent to sue or possible liability |
| Good-cause to excuse notice requirement | Plaintiffs: Minority, delayed discovery, HABC’s inspection duties, and alleged communications justify tolling or excuse | HABC: Plaintiffs (and their guardians) failed to prosecute diligently; minority alone is not per se good cause | Court: No good cause—plaintiffs (or parents) failed to act with ordinary diligence; minority not per se good cause (following Rios) |
| Constitutionality (Article 19) as-applied to minor in lead-paint suit | Plaintiffs: LGTCA notice unreasonably restricts minors’ access to courts because minors depend on parents/guardians to give notice; HABC operates like private landlord (proprietary activity) so extra protection applies | HABC: Public housing operation is governmental (statutory purpose, no profit motive), and LGTCA conditions are permissible; if proprietary, requirement is reasonable | Court: As-applied to minors in lead-paint suits against HABC, LGTCA does not violate Article 19 because HABC’s operation of public housing is governmental and the General Assembly may set conditions (including notice) when waiving immunity |
| Whether HABC’s statutory inspection duty or awareness of lead litigation substitutes for claimant notice | Plaintiffs: HABC’s inspection obligations and widespread lead claims meant HABC had constructive/presumed notice | HABC: Statutory duties and background awareness do not replace the claimant’s statutorily required written notice | Court: Rejected plaintiffs’ argument—plaintiff must in fact give notice; governmental inspection duties do not substitute for LGTCA notice |
Key Cases Cited
- Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284 (2002) (defines substantial compliance test and purpose of LGTCA notice requirement)
- Moore v. Norouzi, 371 Md. 154 (2002) (good-cause may exist where claimant reasonably relies on governmental contractor representations)
- Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104 (2005) (minority does not per se constitute good cause; LGTCA notice constitutionally permissible as-applied to minors for governmental activities)
- Halloran v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 185 Md. App. 171 (2009) (demand to fix a defect sent to a maintenance division did not constitute notice of claim to corporate authorities)
- Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 (2013) (standard of review for summary judgment where no genuine dispute of material fact)
- Ross v. Housing Auth. of Balt. City, 430 Md. 648 (2013) (explains causation links in lead-paint litigation)