JON VIRGIL ELLIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF CALAVERAS et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. C078705
Third Dist.
Feb. 25, 2016
245 Cal. App. 4th 64
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 17, 2016, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 15, 2016, S233530. Corrigan, J., did not participate
COUNSEL
Law Office of Alan D. Hamilton and Alan D. Hamilton for Plaintiff and Appellant.
David E. Sirias, Assistant County Counsel, and Julie Moss-Lewis, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendаnts and Respondents.
BUTZ, Acting P. J.—Plaintiff and appellant Jon Virgil Ellis appeals from a judgment of dismissal following the trial court‘s order sustaining the demurrer of County of Calaveras (the County), the assessment appeals board for the County of Calaveras (the AAB), the assessor for the County of Calaveras (the assessor), and the auditor-controller for the County of Calaveras (the auditor-controller) to Ellis‘s petition and cоmplaint relating to property taxes assessed against his real property. We will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ellis owned real property in Calaveras County on which he was constructing a large detached garage. In 2009, he was assessed property taxes based on an appraised value of the garage set by the assessor at $140,000 (90 percent of the estimated total cost of construction of $156,800). Ellis sought а reduction of the assessment from the AAB. Following an evidentiary hearing in July 2010, the AAB reduced the value of the garage to $117,600, based on a finding that construction was only 75 percent complete. In February 2011, Ellis contested that finding by seeking writ relief from the trial court, but the parties reached a settlement before the trial court ruled on the merits.1
The parties’ settlement agreement, dated July 2011, provided that “the assеssed value of the [garage] for property tax purposes for the 2009 lien date [was] $25,000” and that the structure was “75 [percent] complete as of the 2009 lien date.” The settlement also required the AAB to rescind its findings of fact, to issue new findings of fact consistent with the settlement agreement, to authorize the assessor to correct the tax roll, and to authorize the auditor-controller to issue a tax rеfund to Ellis. The AAB‘s new findings stated that “[f]or the 2009 lien date only, the valuation [of the incomplete construction] for the 2009 Tax Roll shall be $25,000. Such [construction] shall be deemed 75 [percent] complete as of the 2009 lien date . . . .”
In 2010, Ellis was assessed property taxes based on the partially constructed garage having a “base year value” in 2010 of $117,600. In light of this assessment, in December 2011, after he had received a property tax assessment as of the 2011 lien date, Ellis moved in the trial court writ proceedings mentioned above for enforcement of the settlement agreement. Namely, he sought an order from the trial court directing county officials to “correct” the tax roll for the 2010 and 2011 lien dates to reflect the
When his attempts to enforce the settlement agreement failed, Ellis filed an application with the AAB to reduce the assessment for his 2010 property taxes. He designated the application, which was filed November 29, 2012, as a claim for a tax refund, and he indicated his challenge was premised on the base year value being incorrect and there having been no new construction as of the 2010 lien date. By the time Ellis filed his application, construction of the garage had been deemed complete and a supplemental assessment had been issued. He also received a regular assessment as of the 2012 lien date.
In July 2013, the AAB heard Ellis‘s appeal of his 2010 tax assessment. The assessor argued that neither the agreed-upon amount nor the amount entered for the 2010 tax roll were “base year value[s],” and that Ellis‘s appeal was time-barred because it was not filed on or before November 30, 2010. Ellis argued the $25,000 agreed-upon amount was the “base year value,” that it had to be applied in subsequent years until more construction was completed, and that his appeal was timely filed within four years of the base value being entered on the tax roll. The AAB determined Ellis‘s appeal was not timely filed, and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction tо hear the appeal.
In March 2014, Ellis petitioned the trial court seeking a traditional or administrative writ of mandate, refund of his property taxes, and declaratory relief. In his subsequently amended petition and complaint, Ellis claimed the AAB‘s decision was arbitrary, in excess of its discretion, and violated the law because the AAB erroneously concluded that neither the $25,000 amount nor the $117,600 amount was the “base year value” for the incomplete garage; the AAB did not address his contention that there was no time limit to his appeal; and the decision is based on erroneous assumptions and misguided applications of law. Ellis specifically sought orders from the trial court determining and declaring that the settlement amount was a base year value to be applied in subsequent years absent complеtion of additional construction, and that the 2010 assessment was also a base year value which could be challenged within four years and that could be corrected at any time; directing the AAB to rescind its findings of fact in Ellis‘s appeal of the 2010 tax assessment; directing the assessor to enter corrected values on the tax roll as of the 2010 lien date; directing the auditor to issue a refund of property tаxes for the 2010 and subsequent tax years; and declaring that Ellis is entitled to damages and attorney fees.
The trial court ruled that, though dubbed a petition for mandamus and complaint, the entire pleading was actually a petition for writ of mandamus “to have the 2009 tax year settlement amount established as the base year value for all future tax years.” The trial court further ruled that “as the 2012 deemed completion was used to establish the base tax year, this in turn started the running of the four year statute of limitations to file an appeal with the [AAB] or challenge this determination pursuant to
DISCUSSION
The County, AAB, assessor, and auditor-controller contend the trial court properly dismissed the action because Ellis‘s claims are time-barred because they do not challenge a “base year value,” are barred by the principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata, are barred by Ellis‘s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, the assessor and auditor-controller are improperly joined as parties, and
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing a judgment based on a demurrer, we accept well-pleaded facts, but not adjectival descriptions or legal conclusions, to determine whether a cause of action exists. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]; Smyth v. USAA Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1473 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].) We take as true “the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and matters of which judicial notice has been taken” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621]) and ignore “deductions or conclusions of law” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 831 P.2d 317]). “The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.‘” (Ibid.)
II. Statutory Challenge Deadlines
The Revenue and Taxation Code contains separate provisions authorizing a taxpayer to challenge an assessor‘s determination of (1) base year value, and (2) аn assessment for any particular tax year. To challenge a given year‘s assessment, the taxpayer must apply for a reduction to the county assessment appeals board or county board of equalization during a specified time period, generally in the same year in which the assessment is made. (
However, where the challenge addresses not a particular year‘s assessment, but a base year value determination, the challenge must instead comply with
III. Base Year Value Determination
Therefore, we turn to whether the value indicated in the 2010 property tax assessment of the partially constructed garage was a “base year value.” The County argues it was a regular assessment and that no base year value is assessed until the construction is complete. Ellis contends it is a base year value pursuant to
We acknowledge this holding is contrary to the guidance provided by the Board of Equalization in the Assessors’ Handbook, which states, without reference to statutory or regulatory authority, that “[p]artially completed new construction does not acquire a base year value. Instead, new construction in
Additionally, our conсlusion that the assessment of the partially completed construction as of the 2010 lien date was a base year value does not, contrary to Ellis‘s contention, necessarily mean that value had to be used in each subsequent year subject only to inflationary adjustment until construction was complete. Rather, it is clear that where construction is not complete as of the lien date, the “[n]еw construction in progress on the lien date shall be appraised at its full value on such date and each lien date thereafter until the date of completion, at which time the entire portion of property which is newly constructed shall be reappraised at its full value.” (
IV. No Entitlement to Relief Sought
Moreover, just because his appeal was timely filed, does not mean Ellis is entitled to the relief he seeks.
And, the assessment value would only be reduced for purposes of a refund of taxes in the year in which the application was filed and in succeeding tax years. (See, e.g., Metropolitan, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 938, 947-948 [application for relief submitted in 1995 to 1996 tax year for error in 1992 base year value did not permit refund for 1992 through 1994 years]; Osco Drug, Inc. v. County of Orange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 189, 194 [272 Cal.Rptr. 14] (Osco) [application for relief submitted in 1984 for error in 1981 base year value did not permit relief for 1981 through 1983 tax years; “while new 1981 base-year values were established, they did not affect any assessment prior to 1984“]; see Osco, supra, at pp. 191-192.) This is true whether the appeal is made pursuant to
Here, Ellis did not file his application challenging the 2010 base year value and seeking a refund until 2012; thus, he would not be entitled to a reduction in the assessment for purposes of a refund of the taxes paid in 2010 or 2011. Therefore, he has failed to state a cause of action for refund of his taxes for those years. To the extent his petition and complaint could be interpreted to contain a cause of action for a refund of taxes, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer as to that cause of action. And, to the extent he desires an order from the trial court or this court directing such a refund, he is not entitled to such relief as a matter of law. Nor is he entitled to a reduction of his regular assessment in 2012, even if he correctly challenges the 2010 base year value, because there had been two interceding assessments of the partially completed construction in the meantime, neither of which was challenged in Ellis‘s appeal to the AAB. Therefore, because he is barred, as a matter of law, from obtaining the relief he sought, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to Ellis‘s petition and complaint.
Additionally, Ellis had an adequate remedy at law, which generally renders equitable aсtions for mandamus and declaratory relief unavailable to him. (William Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Orange County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 642]; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283-284 [165 Cal.Rptr. 122, 611 P.2d 463]; Schoderbek v. Carlson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1037-1038 [170 Cal.Rptr. 400]; County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 654, 672 [108 Cal.Rptr. 434].) Ellis could have sought a refund of the 2010 taxes by appealing to the AAB in
V. Attorney Fees
Finally, Ellis contends he is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (
Mauro, J., and Hoch, J., concurred.