EDDINGTON v TORREZ
Docket No. 320882
Court of Appeals of Michigan
June 23, 2015
311 Mich App 198
Submitted June 10, 2015, at Lansing. Leave to appeal denied 498 Mich 951.
The Court of Appeals held:
A claim of defamation requires proof of the following elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. In this case, the second element was in dispute. Under Shinglemeyer v Wright, 124 Mich 230 (1900), an absolute privilege arises in the context of defamation claims that covers any report of criminal activity to law enforcement personnel. Persons who make statements to the police when reporting crimes or assisting the police in investigating crimes enjoy a privilege in those statements against the police divulging them for any purpose other than law enforcement. Accordingly, those statements may not be used to sustain a defamation claim. The trial court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of defendants and correctly denied plaintiff‘s motion for reconsideration.
Affirmed.
TORTS — DEFAMATION — PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS — STATEMENTS MADE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.
An absolute privilege arises in the context of defamation claims that covers any report of criminal activity to law enforcement
The Mastromarco Firm (by Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr., and Russell C. Babcock) for plaintiff.
Law Office of John C. Candela (by John C. Candela) for defendants.
Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and MURPHY and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM. In this defamation per se case, plaintiff appeals by right the trial court‘s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants pursuant to
A trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion brought under
A claim of defamation requires proof of the following elements:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Mitan v Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 24; 706 NW2d 420 (2005).]
At issue in the present case is the second element, specifically whether statements made to the police regarding criminal activity are absolutely privileged and therefore immune from suit for defamation.
The privilege asserted here had its genesis in Shinglemeyer v Wright, 124 Mich 230; 82 NW 887 (1900). In that case, the defendant‘s bicycle was stolen, and he reported to the police that he believed the plaintiff had stolen it and the plaintiff was of unsavory character; on that basis, the plaintiff was arrested but subsequently released when it was established that she had not in fact stolen the bicycle. Id. at 231-238. The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant for, in relevant part, slander, premised on the defendant‘s statement to the police officer. Id. at 231. Our Supreme Court held that the trial court should not have admitted the defendant‘s statements to the police because the statements
were privileged communications. They were introduced and admitted for the purpose of showing malice. The trial judge was in doubt as to their competency, but finally admitted them. Privileged communications cannot be used for that purpose. Defendant‘s property was stolen,
and it was not only his privilege and right, but his duty, to give to the detectives, who, in this case, were specially appointed for the purpose, all information he had, and, if he had suspicions of any person, to state who the person was, and the reasons for suspecting him. Such communications are made in the strictest confidence, and are as sacred, in the eye of the law, as the communications between client and lawyer, or patient and physician. To be evidence of malice, these communications must in themselves have been malicious, and would, therefore, form the basis themselves for an action for slander. If this be the law, no person would be safe from prosecution in communicating to police officers, whose duty it is to examine into the case and hunt for the criminal, his suspicions, or statements which might tend to implicate a person. Public policy forbids the adoption of such a rule. These detectives were under legal, as well as moral, obligations to keep these communications secret. They were not made for publication, and the officers had no right to divulge them to others. It is very doubtful if these detectives could be compelled to disclose in court such privileged communications. Such officers, especially in large cities, are entitled to know from the citizen against whom a crime has been committed all his suspicions and knowledge, both in regard to the person suspected, and also in regard to his character and habits. The defendant did not make these statements for repetition. He made them for the exclusive use and benefit of the trusted and sworn officers of the law. They should have been forever locked in their breasts, and never disclosed; otherwise, few persons would dare to disclose to an officer the name of a suspect, or anything they had learned about his character. [Shinglemeyer, 124 Mich at 239-240.]
Consequently, persons who make statements to the police when reporting crimes or assisting the police in investigating crimes enjoy a privilege in those statements against the police divulging them for any purpose other than law enforcement. Accordingly, those statements may not be used to sustain a defamation claim.
Furthermore, the important principles underlying the decision in Shinglemeyer remain just as valid today as they were at the turn of the last century: we could not reliably have practical law enforcement if crime victims, or those with knowledge of crimes, were forced to risk a lawsuit upon reporting what they know or what they suffered. The law is not blind to the fact that such reports are occasionally maliciously fictitious: it is a crime to lie to a police officer about an ongoing investigation,
Affirmed.
RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and MURPHY and SERVITTO, JJ., concurred.