EARTHWORKS’ OIL & GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT and NEW MEXICO WILDERNESS ALLIANCE v. NEW MEXICO OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION and NEW MEXICO OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION
NO. 33,451
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
February 24, 2016
New Mexico Environmental Law Center
Eric Jantz
R. Bruce Frederick
Douglas Meiklejohn
Jonathan Block
Santa Fe, NM
New Mexico Wilderness Alliance
Judith Calman
Albuquerque, NM
for Petitioners
Energy, Minerals & Natural Resources Department
William R. Brancard, Special Assistant Attorney General
Keith W. Herrmann, Special Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Respondent
Holland & Hart LLP
Michael H. Feldewert
Santa Fe, NM
for Intervenor
KENNEDY, Judge.
{1} Petitioners appeal the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission‘s (the Commission) order promulgating a 2013 version of
{2} We conclude that the pending appeals did not deprive the Commission of jurisdiction to promulgate the 2013 Rule. We further conclude that the Commission adequately explained its reasoning for the rule‘s adoption in the final rule and satisfied the statutory requirements for issuing notice. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
{3} In 2008, the Commission approved a version of the Pit Rule (the 2008 Rule). In 2009, the Commission amended a portion of the 2008 Rule (the 2009 Amendment). Both the 2008 Rule and its 2009 Amendment were appealed to the First Judicial District Court by entities affiliated with the oil and gas industry, and the district court certified the appeals to this Court; we stayed our proceedings on these cases. In January 2012, the Commission, acting on petitions from the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association and Independent Petroleum Association of New Mexico, announced its intention to hold hearings on the petitions. Parties who opposed the proposed rule-making secured a writ of prohibition from the First Judicial District Court in February 2012, ordering the Commission to cease proceedings to amend the Pit Rule. That writ was quashed the following month. The Commission issued its notice that it would have a public hearing on the applications, and took evidence, heard argument, deliberated, adopted the rule, and filed an order promulgating the 2013 Rule. Earthworks’ Oil and Gas Accountability Project submitted a request for rehearing in an effort to have the Commission reconsider the 2013 Rule. The Commission did not act upon that request within ten days; it was deemed denied pursuant to the New Mexico Oil and Gas Act (Oil and Gas Act),
Conceding that the Oil and Gas Act,
II. DISCUSSION
A. Commission‘s Jurisdiction to Amend 2013 Pit Rule
{4} Petitioners assert that the Commission had no authority to amend the Pit Rule because there had not yet been a final order issued in the appeals of the 2008 Rule or the 2009 Amendment and that pending judicial appeals must stay ongoing rulemaking on the particular issue concerned. However, Petitioners direct us to no authority compelling any new rulemaking on a particular subject to be held in abeyance while the appeal of a previous rule is pending. “We assume where arguments in briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable to find any supporting authority.” In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. In support of their argument, Petitioners urge us to instead apply the rule that an appeal divests a lower adjudicatory tribunal of jurisdiction where it is acting in an adjudicatory capacity. Petitioners also have not provided any authority to relate a stay on appeal of agency adjudications to agency rulemaking activity. For reasons that follow, we are unpersuaded by Petitioners’ argument.
1. Distinctions Between Rulemaking and Adjudication
{5} Throughout their argument that the Commission had no jurisdiction to issue the 2013 Rule, Petitioners repeatedly conflate an administrative agency‘s adjudicatory authority with an agency‘s rulemaking authority. These two types of administrative authority are quite distinct in their application and function. While rulemaking creates generally applied standards to which an agency and individuals are held, adjudication is the resolution of particular disputes involving specific parties and specific problems, by applying such rules. See Uhden v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm‘n, 1991-NMSC-089, ¶ 7, 112 N.M. 528, 817 P.2d 721 (holding that acting on petition to create an exception to the Oil Conservation Rule with statewide application that will apply to limited situation and specific parties is “adjudicative rather than rulemaking“); see Rauscher, Pierce, Refsnes, Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep‘t, 2002-NMSC-013, ¶ 42, 132 N.M. 226, 46 P.3d 687 (quoting Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448 (9th Cir. 1994));1 Rayellen Res., Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Props. Review Comm‘n, 2014-NMSC-006, ¶ 27, 319 P.3d 639 (citing In re Application of Timberon Water Co., 1992-NMSC-047, ¶ 23, 114 N.M. 154, 836 P.2d 73 (categorizing administrative action as regulatory when it furthers the public interest under the state‘s police powers and adjudicatory when it is based on adjudicating a private right rather than implementing public policy)).
{6} It is well established that the Legislature can properly delegate rulemaking power to administrative agencies through an enabling statute. New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Shoobridge, 2010-NMSC-049, ¶ 14, 149 N.M. 42, 243 P.3d 746 (per curiam). Our Legislature delegated concurrent rulemaking authority under the Oil and Gas Act to the Oil Conservation Division and the Commission. See
2. Judicial Action May Not Preemptively Stop Administrative Rulemaking That is Otherwise Permissible
{7} We note that Petitioners’ action to obtain a writ of prohibition against the Commission to prevent the proceedings that resulted in the 2013 Rule currently on appeal was ultimately quashed, and Petitioners did not appeal the final order. Our Supreme
When the Legislature lawfully delegates authority to a state agency to promulgate rules and regulations, may a court intervene to halt proceedings before the agency adopts such rules or regulations? This question is one of substantial public interest because court intervention in administrative proceedings before the adoption of rules or regulations may thwart the public‘s right to participate in such proceedings. We hold that a court may not intervene in administrative rule-making proceedings before the adoption of a rule or regulation[.] [T]he separation of powers doctrine forbids a court from prematurely interfering with the administrative processes created by the Legislature.
{8} Petitioners’ contention that the Commission lacked authority to promulgate the 2013 Rule because of pending appeals related to the 2008 Rule and 2009 Amendment is similar to the petitioner‘s argument in Shoobridge. To forestall rulemaking in this way would permit the courts to halt agency rulemaking proceedings prior to the issuance of a new rule. See id. (“[A] court may not intervene in administrative rule-making proceedings before the adoption of a rule or regulation.“). Administrative agencies routinely promulgate superseding rules on various topics. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stapleton v. Skandara, 2015-NMCA-044, ¶ 3, 346 P.3d 1191 (discussing
{9} Thus, to the extent that the 2013 Rule changed the 2008 Rule and the 2009 Amendment, the previous rule(s) are repealed by implication. Because the promulgation is final, Petitioners are free to challenge the rule on its merits. See
B. The Commission‘s Decision to Adopt the 2013 Pit Rule Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious
{10} In reviewing an administrative order on its merits, we conduct the same review as the district court sitting in its appellate capacity. Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm‘n, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 16, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806. Thus, we determine: “(1) whether the agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, or capriciously; (2) whether based upon the whole record
{11} The party challenging a rule adopted by an administrative agency carries the burden of showing that the rule is arbitrary or capricious by demonstrating that “‘the rule‘s requirements are not reasonably related to the legislative purpose[.]‘” Old Abe Co. v. N.M. Mining Comm‘n, 1995-NMCA-134, ¶ 10, 121 N.M. 83, 908 P.2d 776 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also N.M. Att‘y Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm‘n, 2013-NMSC-042, ¶ 9, 309 P.3d 89 (placing the burden on the parties challenging the agency order). When reviewing an agency‘s rulemaking decision we use a deferential standard:
An agency‘s rule-making function involves the exercise of discretion, and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on that issue where there is no showing of an abuse of that discretion. Rules and regulations enacted by an agency are presumed valid and will be upheld if reasonably consistent with the statutes that they implement.
Wilcox v. N.M. Bd. of Acupuncture & Oriental Med., 2012-NMCA-106, ¶ 7, 288 P.3d 902 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{12} In adopting a new rule, an administrative agency is required to provide a statement of reasons for doing so. Although formal findings are not required, “the record must indicate the reasoning of the Commission and the basis on which it adopted the [rule].” City of Roswell v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm‘n, 1972-NMCA-160, ¶ 16, 84 N.M. 561, 505 P.2d 1237. The Commission need not state its reasons for adopting each provision in a rule or respond to all concerns raised in testimony; such a requirement would be “unduly onerous . . . and unnecessary for the purposes of appellate review.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm‘n, 2004-NMCA-073, ¶ 13, 136 N.M. 45, 94 P.3d 788. We require only that “the public and the reviewing courts are informed as to the reasoning behind the [rule.]” Pharm. Mfrs. Ass‘n v. N.M. Bd. of Pharmacy, 1974-NMCA-038, ¶ 17, 86 N.M. 571, 525 P.2d 931.
{13} Petitioners contend the Commission‘s decision to issue the 2013 Rule was arbitrary and capricious for five reasons: (1) the 2013 Rule is radically different from the 2008 Rule, despite being based on largely the same evidence; (2) the Commission did not entirely explain its reason for departing from the 2008 Rule; (3) the Commission did not explain why the 2013 Rule is performance-based, instead of prescriptive; (4) the Commission gave no explanation of its lowered groundwater contamination criteria, and (5) the Commission gave no explanation of how it was able to accomplish more cost saving measures than the 2008 Rule while still protecting water supplies, public health, and the environment. Petitioner‘s assertions all follow the same line of reasoning. The Commission heard the same evidence in the hearings related to the 2013 Rule as it did in relation to the 2008 Rule, yet the 2013 Rule is so different from the 2008 Rule that it must be arbitrary and capricious. As explained in detail below, Petitioners’ assertions of error are not stated in terms of legal standards that indicate a need for reversal, but instead are groundless claims of error based on differences between the old and new versions of the Pit Rule. Petitioners supported the 2008 Rule and the 2009
1. Differences Between 2008 Rule and 2013 Rule Do Not Automatically Render the Latter Rule Arbitrary and Capricious
{14} Petitioners assert that the order issuing the 2013 Rule is arbitrary and capricious because it represents a “radical departure” from the 2008 Rule and 2009 Amendment despite being based on “identical” evidence. We decline to follow this interpretation. Petitioners also point out that the Commission took administrative notice of the 2008 proceedings when considering the 2009 Amendment and argue that we should follow suit because the 2013 Rule and 2008 Rule are so interrelated as to require us to take judicial notice of the 2008 Rule proceedings and the 2009 Amendment proceedings. However, during the proceedings below, with which we are presently concerned, the Commission denied Petitioners’ request that it take administrative notice of the 2008 Rule and 2009 Amendment proceedings.
{15} Petitioners do not argue that the Commission erred when it refused to consider the records from the 2008 and 2009 rulemaking hearings. Instead, Petitioners argue that it is proper for this Court to take judicial notice of those records. Petitioners direct us to nothing that suggests we should expand our review from the record below, or why it would be meet to do so. To act as if a new rule that differs from an old one requires review of more than the record generated by the new rulemaking would be contrary to the well-established rules that “district courts engaged in administrative appeals are limited to the record created at the agency level[,]” Montano v. N.M. Real Estate Appraiser‘s Bd., 2009-NMCA-009, ¶ 17, 145 N.M. 494, 200 P.3d 544, and “absent a specific statutory provision to the contrary, an appeal from an administrative hearing will be based solely on the administrative record.” Rowley v. Murray, 1987-NMCA-139, ¶ 16, 106 N.M. 676, 748 P.2d 973; see also Swisher v. Darden, 1955-NMSC-071, ¶ 9, 59 N.M. 511, 287 P.2d 73 (stating that in determining whether an agency‘s decision is arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable, or capricious, “the court in its review, is limited to the record made before the administrative tribunal“), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Aguilera v. Bd. of Educ., 2006-NMSC-015, 139 N.M. 330, 132 P.3d 587. The Oil and Gas Act limits appeals from rulemaking decisions to the record made by the Commission.
{16} In light of Petitioners’ failure to provide authority to support their suggestion that we take judicial notice of the record in previous administrative rulemaking hearings, we decline to do so. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2 (acknowledging that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists). Our review is therefore limited to whether the Commission‘s order adopting the 2013 Rule was arbitrary or capricious in light of only the evidence presented to it during the 2013 rulemaking hearing.
2. The Reasoning Behind the 2013 Rule Is Adequate
{17} After holding several hearings, the Commission adopted the 2013 Rule that is now on appeal. The Commission enumerated its reasons for adopting the 2013 Rule in a section of its order entitled “ultimate facts
{18} The Commission is not required to respond to all concerns raised during rulemaking hearings. For the purposes of appellate review, the reasons listed above, although general, are adequate to support its decision to issue the 2013 Rule, particularly in light of the detailed findings that the Commission provides for each general reason. For example, the Commission‘s order is divided into eight substantive categories: pit waste constituents, vadose zone modeling, soil transport, construction and design, operation and administration, closure and revegetation, siting, and multi-well fluid management pits. Each section contains detailed summaries of the evidence presented on the subject, including descriptions of the tests, studies, and models presented, as well as the results of those tests, studies, and models. The Commission then compiled that information in its conclusions section to reach results as to acceptable constituent levels, necessary soil depths, revegetation requirements, siting considerations, and tank integrity. In all, the Commission‘s order spans fifty pages and is replete with the bases for, and reasoning behind, the 2013 Rule. We therefore conclude that the Commission sufficiently stated its reasons for adopting the 2013 Rule.
{19} Petitioners maintain that “[t]he Commission also failed to grapple with the facts and circumstances that were the fundamental bases of the 2008 Rule, but which it rejected without explanation in 2013.” Petitioners point to nothing in the statute or regulations to support their assertion that the Commission is required to address the facts giving rise to a previous rule when promulgating a new rule. Our review of the record reveals that the Commission stated sufficient reasons for the creation of the 2013 Rule. Petitioners have not shown any deficiency in the evidence proffered during the 2013 rulemaking to suggest that the Commission‘s conclusions were arbitrary and capricious. See Santa Fe Expl. Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm‘n, 1992-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 10-11, 114 N.M. 103, 835 P.2d 819 (assertions must be accompanied by citations to the record);
3. Performance-Based Rule vs. Prescriptive Rule
{20} Petitioners’ brief asserts that the Commission failed to explain its reason for adopting a more performance-based rule, rather than the prescriptive rule that they allege the 2008 Rule enacted. More specifically, Petitioners complain that the Commission provided no explanation as to why a performance-based rule is required as opposed to a prescriptive one.
{21} Petitioners’ insistence on a particular type of rule misstates the Commission‘s obligation. The Commission is required only to comply with its statutory duties and provide an indication of the reasoning and basis that it used when adopting the rule. Outside of those requirements, the Commission has no obligation to promulgate prescriptive versus performance-based rules or give a detailed explanation of its reasons for issuing a certain type of rule. Nowhere in our review of the Oil and Gas Act, and its accompanying regulations, do we find any requirement that the rules promulgated by the Commission be performance-based or prescriptive; they need only satisfy the purposes set forth in
{22} Rather than provide authority that binds the Commission to one type of rule over any other, Petitioners base their challenge on a comparison between the 2008 Rule and the 2013 Rule, given their belief that the
4. Lowered Groundwater Contamination Standards
{23} Petitioners contend that the Commission failed to justify its departure from the standards in the 2008 Rule that protected groundwater. As discussed above, the Commission is not required to “justify its departure” from the 2008 Rule; it is only required to explain its reasoning for adopting the 2013 Rule and how the 2013 Rule accomplishes the Commission‘s statutory duties. Id., 1972-NMCA-160, ¶ 16.
{24} With regard to groundwater contamination, the Commission‘s order identified evidence detailing the depth and concentration of contamination levels, and how things like soil density, weather, temperature, and moisture affect the speed at which contaminants traveled certain distances. For instance, the Commission acknowledged that, after hundreds of years, chloride, which is used as a non-toxic measurement of contaminant movement, would reach depths at which groundwater generally exists. The Commission then used that information to reach conclusions regarding infiltration of fluids, desirable pit slope angles, and mobility of various compounds. The Commission also considered evidence where samples taken from over thirty pits around the state were analyzed according to EPA methodology, and the resultant contaminant levels were compared to “published regulatory criteria.” The Commission used that information to compile a list of contaminants that warranted monitoring as well as their acceptable levels. The Commission then concluded that the levels it specified in the 2013 Rule “provide reasonable protection of fresh water, public health and the environment[,]” and it explained how it reached that conclusion. It detailed the level of contamination permissible when groundwater is found at varying depths, and reasoned that the evidence presented supported its conclusions. In addition, the Commission‘s order provides citations to portions of the record that it relied on in making its findings and conclusions.
{25} For reasons detailed previously, we do not take up Petitioners’ argument that the Commission‘s adoption of the 2013 Rule is arbitrary and capricious because Petitioners do not explain why the 2013 Rule is different from the 2008 Rule with respect to groundwater standards. That is not the standard that we apply; we instead
look to whether the Commission‘s actions are consistent with the statute it is charged with implementing. Wilcox, 2012-NMCA-106, ¶ 7. The Commission is assigned the task of regulating “the disposition of water produced or used in connection with the drilling for or producing of oil or gas . . . in a manner that will afford reasonable protection against contamination of fresh water supplies[.]”5. Economic Considerations
{26} Petitioners assert that the Commission acted improperly in promulgating the 2013 Rule because it did so in order to further economic development, and the furtherance of economic development is not part
a. Economic Considerations Were Not the Commission‘s Primary Purpose in Promulgating the 2013 Rule
{27} The Oil and Gas Act intends that all oil fields be allowed to produce and market a share of the oil produced and marketed in the state, “insofar as [that] can be effected economically and without waste.”
{28} We do not regard the Commission‘s mandate so broadly as to accept its contention that economic considerations stand as the basis for its other duties under the Oil and Gas Act. See
{29} In its order, the Commission stated many reasons that the 2013 Rule was necessary, including the Commission‘s desire to encourage reuse and recycling of oilfield fluids and reduce surface impacts, which was inspired by changes in oilfield practices. These considerations were enacted to protect the environment and public health in accordance with the Oil and Gas Act. See
{30} We conclude that the Commission acted within its statutory authority when including economic considerations in its stated reasons for promulgating the 2013 Rule. Economic
b. The Commission‘s Reasoning is Adequate
{31} Petitioners assert that the Commission gave no explanation of how it was able to accomplish more cost saving measures than the 2008 Rule, yet still protect water supplies, public health, and the environment. This argument is based on the order adopting the 2008 Rule, which stated that the Commission made all changes it could to lessen potential effects on small businesses while still protecting fresh water, human health, and the environment. Petitioners argue that because the Commission took all possible measures in 2008, it is implicit that there were no cost-saving measures remaining to be made in the 2013 Rule. Thus, they argue, the decision to include any changes related to cost-saving measures in the 2013 Rule must be arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners state no factual basis for this, and the record does not support their argument. Again, our standard of review does not contemplate a comparison of the old and new rules, but rather requires that we consider whether the Commission has provided an adequate explanation of its reasoning, see City of Roswell, 1972-NMCA-160, ¶ 16, and whether its decision is unreasonable in light of the whole record. See Archuleta, 2005-NMSC-006, ¶ 17.
{32} Relying on evidence presented during the 2013 proceeding, the Commission made findings regarding misconceptions regarding tank requirements that underlie the 2008 Rule and the 2009 Amendment and the unnecessary costs incurred through compliance with that rule. In addition, the Commission made findings as to the general decline of the oil business in recent years, including reduced number of wells drilled, higher cost of drilling, businesses leaving the state due to increased cost, and operator reluctance in attempting to obtain exceptions from the 2009 Amendment owing to its language and complexity. Based on those findings, the Commission reached the conclusion that the 2013 Rule was necessary to make compliance with the Pit Rule less cumbersome and more understandable for the regulators and regulated community. The Commission‘s order promulgating the 2013 Rule lists ten reasons for altering the Pit Rule, including making compliance with the rule less costly, more efficient, more consistent, and more understandable. Findings as to correlative rights and economic waste are sufficient to satisfy our requirement that administrative agencies state their reasoning for issuing an order. Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Oil Conservation Comm‘n, 1975-NMSC-006, ¶ 18, 87 N.M. 286, 532 P.2d 582 (stating that findings as to correlative rights and economic waste are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the Commission make basic conclusions of fact or findings); see also
{33} We conclude that the explanation given was adequate to explain the Commission‘s reasoning in promulgating the 2013 Rule. In addition, we conclude that Petitioners have not demonstrated that the Commission abused its discretion in concluding that the 2013 Rule‘s provisions are adequate to protect public health and the environment. We therefore defer to the Commission‘s discretion and uphold the 2013 Rule as reasonably consistent with the Oil and Gas Act. See Wilcox, 2012-NMCA-106, ¶ 7.
C. Notice
{34} The Oil and Gas Act requires the Oil Conservation Division to create rules governing the procedure to be followed in hearings and other proceedings before it.
{35} Notice of rulemaking hearings must be published on behalf of the State of New Mexico, be signed by the Commission‘s chairman, and bear the Commission‘s seal.
{36} The Commission‘s notice was issued on behalf of the State of New Mexico, was given under the Commission‘s seal, and was signed by the chairman of the Commission. It also stated the date, time, and place of the hearing, and it gave the date by which written comments were required to be submitted. Notice was published in the Albuquerque Journal, on the Commission docket, which was mailed electronically to those who requested it, in the New Mexico Register, and on the Oil Conservation Division‘s website. All notices were timely. Given these facts, we conclude that the Commission satisfied all notice requirements prescribed by statute and regulation.
{37} Petitioners’ challenge to the adequacy of the Commission‘s notice focuses on one of the fifteen proposed amendments listed in the notice, namely, the one pertaining to “multi-well fluid management pits.” Petitioners assert that the notice was inadequate to reasonably inform the public of the substance of the proposed rules. Petitioners point out that the notice did not describe the purpose of those multi-well pits, their anticipated size, their anticipated operating duration, or their anticipated impacts on air, water, and public health. Petitioners contend that, because the notice was inadequate, they were deprived of an adequate opportunity to prepare expert witnesses or prepare adequate cross examinations of witnesses.
{38} Petitioners cite to
{39} Despite the Commission‘s compliance with its statutory obligation to issue notice, Petitioners contend that the language in the notice referring to “multi-well” pits was misleading or unintelligible. Notice may be inadequate to fulfill its statutory purpose of notifying interested persons if it is insufficient, ambiguous, misleading, or unintelligible to the average citizen. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 1977-NMSC-107, ¶ 9, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 1340; see also Johnson, 1999-NMSC-021, ¶ 23 (acknowledging that purpose of “reasonable notice” in the Oil and Gas Act is to notify interested persons). Although it is conceivable that the average citizen might not know what a requirement pertaining to multi-well pits might include, the notice provides more information than simply a cursory reference to a cryptic term. The notice indicates how copies of the proposed amendments to the Pit Rule can be obtained: through the Oil Conservation Division‘s Administrator—whose phone number is included—or through the Oil Conservation Division‘s website—which is also included. The proposed amendments include a lengthy definition of what a “multi-well fluid management pit” is, and detail what permit applications for multi-well pits require, where multi-well pits may not be located, and what construction requirements were for multi-well fluid management pits. If Petitioners were, indeed, misled by, or unaware of, the Commission‘s notice, they could have received significantly more information about multi-well pits and what changes were being considered by reaching out to the Division. We therefore reject Petitioners’ argument that the Commission‘s notice was inadequate. It not only satisfied the statutory and regulatory requirements, but also provided additional information by making the proposed amendments available upon request.
III. CONCLUSION
{40} Petitioners’ assertions of error must fail. They point to no legal basis for their assertion that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue its order and create the 2013 Rule. In promulgating the 2013 Rule, the Commission satisfied its statutory duties and gave adequate reasons for its actions. As such, we conclude that there was no error, and affirm.
{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge