OPINION
{1} When the Legislature lawfully delegates authority to a state agency to promulgate rules and regulations, may a court intervene to halt proceedings before the agency adopts such rules or regulations? This question is one of substantial public interest because court intervention in administrative proceedings before the adoption of rules or regulations may thwart the public’s right to participate in such proceedings. We hold that a court may not intervene in administrative rule-making proceedings before the adoption of a rule or regulation for three reasons. First, the separation of powers doctrine forbids a court from prematurely interfering with the administrative processes created by the Legislature. Second, only upon completion of administrative rule-making proceedings will a party be certain that it is aggrieved, since it is not known whether a regulation will even be adopted by the agency. Third, since the administrative proceeding is not complete, there is no actual controversy to be resolved by a declaratory judgment action.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} The Legislature empowered the Environmental Improvement Board (Board) to prevent or abate air pollution and to adopt or promulgate regulations consistent with the Air Quality Control Act. NMSA 1978, § 74-2-5 (1967) (as amended through 2007). This matter originated in a proposal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions that Petitioner New Energy Economy (New Energy) filed with the Board. The Board held a public meeting on January 5, 2009 in Santa Fe to determine whether to hold a hearing on New Energy’s proposed regulation. At the hearing were representatives from the Public Service Company of New Mexico, the Dairy Producers of New Mexico, the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association, and the New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau, who asked the Board not to conduct a hearing, contending that the Board lacked the authority under the Air Quality Control Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 74-2-1 to -17 (1967) (as amended through 2007), to regulate greenhouse gas emissions unless it first established an ambient air quality standard. The Board decided to allow briefing on the matter and scheduled a hearing on the issue of its jurisdiction and authority for April 6, 2009.
{3} At the hearing on April 6, 2009 in Santa Fe, New Energy argued that (1) the Board had the authority to hold hearings on the matter, (2) the final regulation might vary from their proposed rule, and (3) the Board could adopt an ambient air quality standard in the rule-making context. The Board determined that it had the required authority to hear the matter and entered an order establishing a hearing schedule. The groups opposing the petition moved for a temporary stay of the proceedings and filed objections to the scheduling order. On December 31, 2009, public notice was given on New Energy’s proposed rule. On January 13, 2010, those who had objected to the proposal during the hearings before the Board and others (the plaintiffs) filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Fifth Judicial District Court in Lea County. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Board from conducting further administrative proceedings, arguing that the Board lacked statutory authority to consider or adopt New Energy’s petition. New Energy and the Board filed motions to dismiss the action. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.
{4} The Board and New Energy petitioned this Court for a writ of superintending control or prohibition and requested a stay of the district court proceedings. The plaintiffs, as real parties in interest, opposed Petitioners’ requests. We reviewed the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. LaBalbo v. Hymes,
II. DISCUSSION
{5} The central issue is whether the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the Board from completing the rule-making process. The plaintiffs contend that the issue is answered by State ex rel. Hanosh v. Environmental Improvement Board [hereinafter Hanosh I],
{6} In the two Hanosh cases, the district court was asked to construe a statute to determine whether the Environmental Improvement Board was acting within its legislative authority when it adopted regulations addressing automobile emissions. We affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that a declaratory judgment action is an appropriate procedure to challenge the Board’s statutory authority to adopt regulations. Hanosh I,
{7} The plaintiffs argue that this case is precisely like the Hanosh cases because in Hanosh I the Board was in the process of considering proposed regulations when the plaintiffs filed their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. They contend that because we upheld the Hanosh I court’s jurisdiction to entertain the action, reasoning that the question before it was purely legal and did not require “special agency expertise or additional fact-finding,” the court in this case should have the same authority.
{8} We do not find the Hanosh cases controlling. Although the complaint in the Hanosh cases was filed before the adoption of the regulations, those regulations were adopted on the same day the plaintiffs delivered their complaint to the Board. Hanosh I,
{9} In addition, while we agree that the Board was not engaged in adjudicative fact-finding, the Board was attempting to hold hearings to develop legislative facts.
Unlike adjudicative facts, legislative facts do not concern individual parties, such as who did what, when, where, and how____ Legislative facts are those which help the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take.
Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
A. Separation of Powers
{10} Although we have never specifically stated that our cases addressing the relationship between administrative proceedings and declaratory judgment actions are controlled by the doctrine of separation of powers, that doctrine has been implicit in our reasoning. When we wrote in Smith v. City of Santa Fe,
against using a declaratory judgment action to challenge or review administrative actions if such an approach would foreclose any necessary fact-finding by the administrative entity, discourage reliance on any special expertise that may exist at the administrative level, disregard an exclusive statutory scheme for the review of administrative decisions, or circumvent procedural or substantive limitations that would otherwise limit review through means other than a declaratory judgment action.
Id. We repeated this admonition in Stennis v. City of Santa Fe,
{11} Most of our recent cases addressing the interaction of declaratory judgment actions and administrative proceedings involved administrative adjudications; that is, the application of existing law to the facts of a particular matter. See, e.g., Baca,
{12} In those cases, we concluded that when the matter at issue (1) is purely legal, (2) requires no specialized agency fact-finding, and (3) there is no exclusive statutory remedy, it is a proper matter for a declaratory judgment action and does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Smith,
{13} In all of these eases, we acknowledged that in creating the declaratory judgment action, the Legislature provided, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person ... whose rights ... are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction ... arising under the ... statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” NMSA 1978, § 44-6-4 (1975). We also implicitly recognized that the Legislature has frequently delegated to administrative agencies the authority to resolve disputes involving its expertise arising under specific statutes and regulations.
{14} The limitations we have placed on the use of the declaratory judgment action respect the role of each branch of government in the constitutional scheme and the administrative processes put in place by the Legislature. Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution divides state government into “three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial.” Although we have recognized “that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers permits some overlap of governmental functions,” State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson,
B. Because the Administrative Proceedings Were Not Complete, the Declaratory Judgment Action Was Not Ripe, and There Was Not an Actual Controversy
{15} Petitioners argue that because the rule-making process was incomplete, there was no final agency action, and the declaratory judgment action was premature and not ripe for review. They note that in the context of judicial review of administrative regulations, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine whether a regulation is ripe for review. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
{16} The plaintiffs respond that a ripeness analysis is not applicable in this case because the federal doctrine of ripeness relied on by Petitioners has no basis in the New Mexico Constitution. We agree that the New Mexico Constitution does not expressly impose a “cases or controversies” limitation on state courts like that imposed upon the federal judiciary by Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. However, we have also held that the judicial power to resolve disputes in a government built upon a foundation separating the legislative, executive, and judicial functions should be “guided by prudential considerations.” N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson,
{17} The Declaratory Judgment Act itself requires the presence of an “actual controversy” before a district court can assume jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action. See NMSA 1978, § 44-6-2 (1975). In the absence of any actual case or controversy, it is improper to issue a declaratory judgment. Yount v. Millington,
{18} Thus, even if a purely legal question is presented for declaratory judgment, it is not justiciable unless it is ripe. In Yount, our Court of Appeals wrote that ‘“[t]he mere possibility or even probability that a person may be adversely affected in the future by official acts’ fails to satisfy the actual controversy requirement.”
{19} Under these circumstances, the question of whether the Board’s rule-making actions exceeded its legislative authority is not ripe for judicial review because no final rule-making action occurred. Judicial action that disrupts the administrative process before it has run its course intrudes on the power of another branch of government. Therefore, we use our power of superintending control to prevent the judicial branch from interfering with the administrative process. See In re Extradition of Martinez,
III. CONCLUSION
{20} Because judicial action in this matter interfered with the processes of another branch of government, we exercise our power of superintending control and order the district court to dismiss the complaint, dissolve the preliminary injunction, and remand the matter to the administrative agency.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.