ERIC P. EARLY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. XAVIER BECERRA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
C089943
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Filed 2/8/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-80002902-CU-WM-GDS)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Richard K. Sueyoshi, Judge. Affirmed.
Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, Peter D. Scott; Steve Cooley and Associates, Steve Cooley, Brentford Ferreira; Parris Law Firm and R. Rex Parris for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Kaufman Legal Group, Stephen J. Kaufman, George M. Yin, Gary S. Winuk; Downey Brand and Jay-Allen Eisen for Defendants and Respondents Xavier Becerra and Becerra for Attorney General 2018.
Steven J. Reyes and Lisa M. Alarcon for Defendant and Respondent Dr. Shirley
Xavier Becerra and his election committee (collectively, Becerra) successfully defended a petition for writ of mandate brought by Eric P. Early and his election committee (collectively, Early) seeking to remove Becerra as a candidate for Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot. We affirmed the decision of the trial court denying the petition. (Early v. Becerra (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 325, 329.) Early alleged that Becerra was ineligible for the office of Attorney General because his state bar status was “inactive” during the five years preceding the election and therefore he was not “admitted to practice” in the state as required for that period under
Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining under subdivision (b) of
Lastly, we find no abuse of discretion in the amount of fees the trial court awarded for the work of Becerra‘s attorneys on the fees motion. It is axiomatic that an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of legal services rendered in the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.
In Early v. Becerra, we detailed the facts and events leading to the trial court‘s ruling that the language of
The judgment entered in favor of Early on July 31, 2018, stated that Early‘s application for attorney fees under
On October 1, 2018, Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under
Becerra maintained he had no alternative but to incur the legal expense of opposing Early‘s petition because no public entity or official could lawfully expend public resources on behalf of a political candidate. Becerra conceded that he had a personal stake in preserving his candidacy for Attorney General but contended the financial burden of the litigation exceeded his personal interest.
Finally, Becerra argued that the fees incurred were reasonable given the qualifications of his counsel, the reasonableness of their hourly rates, the
On March 22, 2019, Early filed an opposition to the motion. Early contended that Becerra did not defend the litigation to give voters greater choice in the election but to reap the pecuniary benefits of the Attorney General‘s office. Early argued that Becerra‘s motion should be denied because he failed to conduct the required cost/benefit analysis. Early maintained that such analysis would demonstrate that Becerra‘s financial stake greatly exceeded the attorney fees he claimed to have incurred because he stood to gain more than $2 million, consisting of the discounted value of the Attorney General‘s salary and benefits for a four-year term and, after leaving office, an estimated $200,000 annual salary in the private sector for 10 years due to his status as a former Attorney General. Early also suggested that Becerra‘s attorneys never actually billed their fees but worked pro bono, and, if the fees were charged, Becerra‘s campaign, not Becerra, paid them. Finally, Early contended (1) any fees awarded could not include amounts spent on writ proceedings in this court and the California Supreme Court, and (2) the fees sought for preparing the fees motion were exorbitant.
In reply, Becerra argued, inter alia, that attorney fees had routinely been awarded in election cases and the issue of eligibility under
On May 1, 2019, the trial court issued a ruling on Becerra‘s motion for attorney fees. The court found that Becerra‘s successful defense vindicated an important right in the public interest and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by
The trial court then turned to the requirement of subdivision (b) of
The trial court rejected Early‘s argument that fees incurred in appellate proceedings were not recoverable as based on case authority regarding writs that originated in an appellate court. The court also noted authority that an award of costs in the appellate court has no bearing on a party‘s ability to seek attorney fees. However, the court agreed with Early that the amount Becerra sought for time spent on the fees motion was excessive and reduced it by half from $21,189 to $10,594.50. The court refused Early‘s request to deny such fees in their entirety, observing that the motion “raised interesting and arguably novel issues concerning the application of section 1021.5 under the facts of this case.”
On May 23, 2019, the trial court issued an amended judgment awarding Becerra fees under
DISCUSSION
Section 1021.5
” ‘As a general rule, parties in litigation pay their own attorney‘s fees. [Citation.]
” ’ [E]ligibility for
When the statutory criteria have been met, fees must be awarded “unless special circumstances render such an award unjust. [Citation.]” (Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 391 (Robinson).)
“The statute ’ “draws no distinctions between plaintiffs and defendants.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, a real party in interest who successfully defeats a petition for writ of mandate may recover [his or] her attorney fees under
“The determination whether a party has met the requirement for an award of fees and the reasonable amount of such an award are matters best decided by the trial court in the first instance. [Citation.] That court ’ ” ‘must realistically assess the litigation and determine from a practical perspective whether the statutory criteria have been met.’ ” ’ [Citation.] We will uphold the trial court‘s decision to award attorney fees under
” ’ ” ‘However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Sandlin, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 828-829; La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1156 [“To the extent we construe and define the statutory requirements for an award of attorney‘s fees, our review is de novo; to the extent we assess whether those requirements were properly applied, our review is for an abuse of discretion“].)
In addition, the appellate court does not have to defer totally to the trial court when the litigation results in a published appellate opinion. “In that case . . . the appellate court is often well situated to decide (1) whether the legal action has a significant impact on the law because it enforces an important legal right, and (2) whether that decision confers a significant benefit on a substantial segment of the citizenry.” (Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1258-1259; Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1, 8-10 (Los Angeles Police Protective League).) Here, the trial court did not know that the litigation would result in a published opinion interpreting the meaning of “admitted to practice” in
Enforcement of an Important Right of Significant Benefit to the General Public
Early claims that the trial court erred in finding that Becerra‘s suit met the first two criteria of
The trial court, however, discussed both cases, neither of which presented issues of the complexity or magnitude of the issues presented here. In Bradley, the court determined that under the
In Willard, a candidate for office challenged his opponent‘s ballot designation as misleading. He lost and the opponent, who prevailed, sought attorney fees. In denying the fee request the court said his “victory did not confer a significant benefit to the electorate.” (Willard, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.) “[T]he litigation regarding the petition more closely resembles the ‘mundane squabbles over the factual accuracy of a statement peculiar to one candidate‘s personal history . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) As in Bradley, the benefit of the court‘s decision was largely confined to the prevailing candidate who was permitted to retain what he believed was a favorable job description on the ballot.
This case resulted in (1) our published opinion (2) interpreting a statute setting forth the requirements for the office of Attorney General. In Early v. Becerra, Early argued that Becerra should be removed from the ballot as ineligible for the office of Attorney General under
In Los Angeles Police Protective League, the court observed that an appellate court‘s decision to publish an opinion may not be conclusive but it is strong evidence that the underlying action ” ‘vindicated an important right.’ ” (Los Angeles Police Protective League, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 12.) The court said that “where as here the reason for publication of the opinion is to announce a rule not found in previously published opinions the decision clearly vindicates a right and one deemed important enough to warrant publication.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, this case involves election law.
Further, both Bradley and Willard relied on Hammond, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 115. (See Bradley, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 [citing only Hammond in its analysis]; Willard, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1056-1058.) In Hammond, a city council candidate successfully defended a challenge to his statement of opposition to a commercial airport in the voters’ pamphlet as misleading and beyond the scope of the term “qualifications” as used in
The candidate moved for attorney fees under
In Hammond, the court held that litigation resulting in a published appellate decision resolving the question whether a candidate “has the right under [
However, unlike Hammond, there were no components of attorney‘s trial work that did not concern the interpretation of
Taking into account all pertinent circumstances, including our published decision in Early v. Becerra, we conclude that Becerra‘s motion for attorney fees met the criteria of
Financial Burden
In considering whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants awarding attorney fees under
” ’ “An award on the ‘private attorney general’ theory is appropriate when the cost of the claimant‘s legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff ‘out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘This requirement focuses on the financial burdens and incentives involved in bringing the lawsuit.’ [Citation].” (Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) “However, ‘[w]hen each of the [
“To weigh the costs and benefits, ‘[t]he trial court must first fix—or at least estimate—the monetary value of the benefits obtained by the successful litigants themselves. . . . Once the court is able to put some kind of number on the gains actually attained it must discount these total benefits by some estimate of the probability of success at the time the vital litigation decisions were made which eventually produced the successful outcome.’ [Citation.] After approximating an estimated value of the case, the court then determines the cost of the litigation. [Citation.] Finally, the court ‘place[s] the estimated value of the case beside the actual cost and make[s] the value judgment whether it is desirable to offer the bounty of a court-awarded fee in order to encourage litigation of the sort involved in this case . . . . [A] bounty
The trial court did not engage in this analysis but rather found that Becerra “neither expected nor could expect any direct pecuniary benefit from this litigation.” The court also observed that Early made assertions about the value of the Attorney General‘s salary and benefits and future income in the private sector but provided no supporting evidence. Early has now made an unopposed request for judicial notice, which we granted, that the Attorney General‘s annual salary is $182,189, arguing that “Becerra stood to receive for the next four years after his election as California Attorney General (a total of $728,756).”
However, the trial court said that if proper evidence had been supplied, Early‘s argument “would still be based upon improper speculation.” We agree. As the court explained, Becerra‘s “potential success in this case would not result in Becerra receiving any salary or benefits for the position of Attorney General. Rather, a successful defense would result only in Becerra remaining on the ballot for the 2018 general election.” Thus, the financial benefit Becerra might receive was ” ‘at least once removed from the results of the litigation.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 310, quoting Heron Bay Homeowners Assn. v. City of San Leandro (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 376, 395.) ” ‘Where personal benefits are a step removed from the results of the litigation, the potential benefit is indirect and speculative, and thus, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in concluding that the financial burden criterion is satisfied for purposes of [
Moreover, the trial court cited Los Angeles Police Protective League regarding the interrelation of
Fees Incurred in Fee Motion
Early contends that while “[t]he trial court found that the time spent by Becerra on his Fees Motion is ‘excessive and in part [] unreasonable,’ ” it only “adjusted the fee downward by one half,” and the “entirety of Becerra‘s request for fees concerning preparation of his fees motion should have been stricken.” We disagree.
In Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, the California Supreme Court held that the private attorney general doctrine “will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim. The rule . . . is that, absent facts rendering the award unjust, parties who qualify for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent, including those on fee-related matters.” (Id. at pp. 632-633, fn. omitted; see also Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 580.) The court in Serrano observed that, “[i]n cases where entitlement is vigorously contested . . . the hours demanded could dwarf those spent to establish the claim on the merits.” (Serrano, at pp. 634-635, fn. omitted.)
Early complains that Becerra‘s attorneys spent 39 hours on the fee motion versus 120 hours on the merits, including appellate work. However, Early vigorously opposed the fees motion, which, the trial court said, “raised interesting and arguably novel issues concerning the application of section 1021.5 under the facts of this case,” and accordingly denied Early‘s request to entirely deny Becerra fees for the fees motion. The validity of the court‘s comment is borne out by the transcript of the hearing on Becerra‘s fees motion which runs to 28 pages and the court‘s ruling which is 13 single-spaced pages. By contrast, the transcript of the hearing on the merits of Early‘s petition for writ of mandate is 25 pages and the court‘s ruling is just six pages.
Moreover, “[t]he ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) “The only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) Early has not convinced us that the trial judge here was clearly wrong in reducing the fees incurred by Becerra on his fees motion from $21,189 to $10,594.50, nor that this portion of the fees award was so large or small as to suggest passion and prejudice influenced the award.
DISPOSITION
The amended judgment awarding Becerra the amount of $69,718 under
/s/
RAYE, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
HOCH, J.
/s/
RENNER, J.