Mawji v. Commissioner
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
865
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and HILL, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Court that Mohamed Mawji and Fatema Mawji (taxpayers), petitioners-appellants, are liable for income tax deficiencies, and accuracy-related penalties, for their taxable years 2008 and 2009. The Tax Court entered its decision based on the proposed stipulation of facts submitted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner), respondent-appellee.
As the taxpayers did not participate in the stipulation process, the Tax Court deemed the facts and evidence established under Rule 91(f). Rule 91(f) prescribes the procedures to be followed when “a party has refused or failed to confer with an adversary with respect to entering into a stipulation in accordance with this Rule [91].”
We have carefully reviewed the record in this appeal. It is clear from the record that, almost flagrantly, the taxpayers failed to cooperate in the stipulation process. It is clear that the Commissioner made countless efforts to secure the taxpayers’ cooperation; these efforts were either stonewalled or ignored.
On the other hand, it is also clear from the record that the taxpayers neither filed nor asserted anything to indicate that they disagreed with the Commissioner‘s proposed stipulation of facts. Also, it is clear that the taxpayers failed to make any offer of proof.2
Upon completion of our record review, and our consideration of the briefs and the arguments of counsel, we find no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.
AFFIRMED.
Earl C. MEGGISON, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gerald BAILEY, Individually and in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13-15863
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 12, 2014.
Non-Argument Calendar.
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
Earl C. Meggison, Sr., Kissimee, FL, pro se.
Albert J. Bowden, III, Pam Bondi, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This case arises from the efforts of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to require Earl Meggison Sr., who pled guilty to molesting his stepdaughter in 1990, to comply with Florida‘s sex-offender registration laws passed in 1997. See
On appeal, Meggison argues the district court erred in dismissing his claim as time barred because it incorrectly calculated the date his cause of action accrued and, alternatively, because his claim was timely under the continuing-violation doctrine. Upon review,1 we reject each of Meggison‘s arguments and affirm.
In arguing the district court incorrectly calculated the date his cause of action accrued, Meggison does not dispute that the FDLE notified him of its intent to require him to register as a sex offender on October 27, 2005, or that, if his cause of action accrued on this date, he would have failed to file the instant claim within Florida‘s applicable four-year statute of limitations. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating Florida‘s four-year statute of limitations applies to
Meggison‘s argument is meritless and unsupported by any legal authority. “[T]he standard rule [is] that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The basis of Meggison‘s claim is that “[t]he defendant, acting under color of state law, wrongfully required [Meggison] to register as a sexual offender under Florida law in direct contravention” of Meggison‘s constitutional
That the harm Meggison allegedly suffered was temporarily and partially remedied by a stay issued during the pendency of a state action does not change that his cause of action was “complete and present” at the moment the FDLE required Meggison to register. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389. It is true that Meggison was able to postpone the harms caused by the registration requirement by obtaining a stay in state court, but the very fact that he filed a lawsuit in state court on the basis of the FDLE‘s requirement that he register demonstrates not only that his cause of action was complete and present but also that he was aware of it and the facts supporting it. See Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he statute of limitations begins to run from the date the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining the date on which Meggison‘s cause of action accrued.
We also reject Meggison‘s argument that his claim is timely under the continuing-violation doctrine. The continuing-violation doctrine extends the limitations period for a violation that continues from the past into the present. Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579, 580-81 (11th Cir. 1994). We must contrast that scenario from a scenario in which a discrete, one-time violation in the past continues to have effects into the future without itself remaining ongoing. Id. Here, the act Meggison contends violated his due-process rights was his classification as a sex offender subject to Florida‘s registration requirements. This classification will continue to have effects on Meggison into the future, but a new act has not occurred every time Meggison feels one of those continuing effects. See Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Here, the defendants’ act ... was a one time act with continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended.“). For this reason, the continuing-violation doctrine does not apply to Meggison‘s claim, and the district court did not err in dismissing his claim as untimely.
AFFIRMED.