Cosmin DUMITRESCU, Plaintiff, v. DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 16-1680 (ABJ)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
June 30, 2017
AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge
Although Petitioner has submitted voluminous briefs, both before and after the Court converted the pending motion to one for summary judgment, he has failed to provide the Court with any credible evidence that could impugn the Government‘s motives behind issuing the Summons, and to thereby suggest that the Summons was issued without good faith, or for some improper purpose. Rather, Petitioner primarily seems to contend that he is not subject to federal taxation, because he is either not a citizen of the United States (but rather a citizen of the state of Missouri), or because federal taxation does not extend to the state of Missouri. The Court shall not countenance these arguments, which have been routinely rejected, and in any event, Plaintiff‘s contentions do nothing to dislodge the conclusion that the Government has established that it acted in good faith and that there was a proper investigatory purpose for issuing the Summons. See Maxwell v. O‘Neill, No. CIV.A.00-01953, 2002 WL 31367754, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2002) (“courts have readily dismissed [tax protest claims] as frivolous“); Order, Nevius v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 13-cv-4228, 2014 WL 1631385 (W.D. Mo. April 24, 2014) (ECF No. 39) (finding that Petitioner‘s challenge to an earlier summons issued to PNC Bank “consist[ed] of nothing more than tired, tax protestor rhetoric that has been consistently rejected for reasons that have been clearly and repeatedly articulated and thus merit no recitation here“) (collecting cases). To the extent Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of this Court, that argument is foreclosed by statute. See
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Summons may be enforced, and that no further proceedings in this matter are warranted, as Plaintiff has failed to bring to the Court‘s attention, despite multiple opportunities to do so, any “specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith.” Clarke, 134 S.Ct. at 2367.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent‘s [9] Motion, and DENIES the [1] Petition to Quash. Summary judgment is entered in favor of Respondent, and this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
John Michael Remy, Jackson Lewis P.C., Reston, VA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Cosmin Dumitrescu has brought a breach of contract action against defendant DynCorp International, LLC. Plaintiff is a Romanian citizen who was a contract employee of DynCorp, a government contractor performing work in Afghanistan. He alleges that defendant breached an implied contract with him to refrain from employment discrimination after it terminated his employment in response to his reports of sexual harassment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that defendant had a contract with the State Department to provide certain services in Afghanistan. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. While plaintiff does not specifically allege the exact requirements of DynCorp‘s contract with the State Department, he alleges that he worked for defendant at the Kunduz Regional Training Center and Kabul Gibson Training Center in Afghanistan from March 2006 until his termination on July 8, 2015. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8, 10.2 According to plaintiff, beginning around April 2015, plaintiff‘s direct supervisor attempted to pursue a sexual relationship with plaintiff‘s female coworker. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that when he voiced his objections to these sexual advances, the supervisor began to “engage in a campaign of retaliation and harassment against” him. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Plaintiff claims that ultimately, he was terminated on July 8, 2015 in retaliation for objecting to the harassment of his coworker. Id. ¶ 15.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 17, 2016, alleging that defendant retaliated against him in violation of Title VII, and that it breached an implied contract with him to comply with United States anti-discrimination laws in its performance of
On December 29, 2016, defendant filed its motion to dismiss. Def.‘s Mot. Plaintiff opposed the motion on January 12, 2017, Pl.‘s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Opp. to Def.‘s Mot. [Dkt. # 9] (“Pl.‘s Opp.“), and defendant filed a reply on January 19, 2017. Reply in Supp. of Def.‘s Mot. [Dkt. # 10] (“Def.‘s Reply“).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc‘y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In order to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the “plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.” First Chi. Int‘l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988). To establish that personal jurisdiction exists, the “plaintiff must allege specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum.” In re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG Litig., 590 F.Supp.2d 94, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2008), citing Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A plaintiff “cannot rely on conclusory allegations” to establish personal jurisdiction. Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 34, 42 (D.D.C. 2003).
II. Venue
“In considering a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff‘s well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff‘s favor, and resolves any factual conflicts in the plaintiff‘s favor.” Pendleton v. Mukasey, 552 F.Supp.2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2008), quoting Darby v. U.S. Dep‘t of Energy, 231 F.Supp.2d 274, 276-77 (D.D.C. 2002). The court may consider material outside of the pleadings. Artis v. Greenspan, 223 F.Supp.2d 149, 152 (D.D.C. 2002), citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947). “Because it is the plaintiff‘s obligation to institute the action in a permissible forum, the plaintiff usually bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.” Freeman v. Fallin, 254 F.Supp.2d 52, 56 (D.D.C. 2003). “Unless there are pertinent factual disputes to resolve, a challenge to venue presents a pure question of law.” Williams v. GEICO Corp., 792 F.Supp.2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2011).
ANALYSIS
I. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: “general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). General jurisdiction applies regardless of the nature of the claim, but it is only available based on “a limited set of affiliations with a forum.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014). “For an individual, the paradigm
When subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity, this Court‘s “personal jurisdiction over a defendant is coextensive with that of a District of Columbia court.” Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Consistent with the Daimler standard, the District of Columbia Code provides for general jurisdiction over a defendant who is “domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintain[s] his or its principal place of business in” the District.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would establish general personal jurisdiction over defendant. While plaintiff alleges that defendant “regularly conducts business” in this district, Am. Compl. ¶ 2, that conclusory assertion is not sufficient. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that DynCorp is a “foreign corporation, which has its principal place of business in McLean, Virginia,” id., and this allegation does not satisfy the D.C. Code or the need to establish for constitutional purposes that the corporation is “at home” in the District of Columbia.
The second type of jurisdiction—specific jurisdiction—“is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. To establish specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, “a court must engage in a two-part inquiry.” GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). First, the court must examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state‘s long-arm statute. United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). If it is, the court must then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process. Id.
Under the District of Columbia‘s long-arm statute, a “court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person‘s ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia.”
Plaintiff insists that the Court can exercise specific jurisdiction because “DynCorp is primarily engaged in the business of contracting to the government of the United States of America,” Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Pl.‘s Opp. at 2, and he points to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985), Pl.‘s Opp. at 4 n.1. It is true that a defendant has minimum contacts with a forum if it “enters into a contract that has a ‘substantial connection’ with [that] forum.” Helmer, 393 F.3d at 205, quoting McGee v. Int‘l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). And the Supreme Court held in the Burger King
But it is not clear that plaintiff‘s claim “arises from” DynCorp‘s work in the in the District of Columbia. See
Plaintiff also points to sections
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia; [or] ... (6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the District of Columbia at the time of the contracting, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Both sections are unavailable to plaintiff in this case, because both pertain to circumstances in which a non-resident defendant contracts to supply a service or perform some act within the District and a claim then arises from that contract. See id. Here, plaintiff specifically alleges DynCorp‘s contract called for work to be performed “in dangerous areas of Afghanistan,” and he has not alleged that he has any claim arising out of a contract in which defendant contracted to supply services in the District of Columbia. See Am. Compl. ¶ 23.3
II. Venue is Not Proper in the District of Columbia
Defendant has also moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) on the ground that venue in this district is improper. Def.‘s Mot. at 1. By statute, civil actions may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giv-
Plaintiff has premised venue in this district on
Although lack of personal jurisdiction and venue are sufficient reasons for the Court to dismiss claims, the Court is permitted to instead exercise its discretion to transfer those claims to an appropriate district.
Here, the interest of justice requires the Court to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Virginia where defendant DynCorp has its headquarters. See Def.‘s Mot. at 1; Def.‘s Mem. in Supp. of Def.‘s Mot. [Dkt. # 8-1] at 8-9.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant and that the District of Columbia is not an appropriate venue for plaintiff‘s claims, but that jurisdiction and venue in the Eastern District of Virginia appears to be proper, the Court will transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
A separate order will issue.
Tyrone PRINCE, et al., Plaintiffs v. ARAMARK CORP., et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 16-cv-1477 (CKK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Filed 06/30/2017