Drаkkar R. WILLIS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 49S02-1410-CR-617.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 24, 2015.
1 N.E.3d 1065
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Chandra K. Hein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
RUCKER, Justice.
Drakkar R. Willis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his con-
Facts and Procedural History
Working the late shift on Friday, January 18, 2013, Officer Christopher Clouse of the Indianаpolis Metropolitan Police Department was dispatched to the Watkins Family Recreation Center. A security alarm at the Center had been activated. While en route Officer Clouse received an additional dispatch declaring the alarm company reported hearing “[v]oices and noises” coming from inside the building. Tr. at 5. Arriving on the scene Officer Clouse observed a black male, later identified as Willis, “running in a field that was just west of the building,” tr. at 7, about “a hundred yards away...” Tr. at 6. Despite attempts by the Stаte to suggest that the Officer observed Willis running out of the building,1 the officer was explicit: “I didn‘t see him come out of the building, no, ma‘am.” Tr. at 7. In fact Officer Clouse testified that when he broаdcast a description of the person he saw running in the field, he did not recall whether he said the individual was running through the field or running from the building. He opined however, “[i]t probably would hаve said ... because I didn‘t see him come from the building. I probably would have said there‘s a subject running westbound in the field.” Tr. at 8 (omission in original). In any event other officers arrived in the аrea apprehending and arresting Willis. Entering the Center, Officer Clouse observed that a vending machine had been broken into and glass-like items were strewn throughout the building. An Indianaрolis Parks and Recreation supervisor testified that the Center closes at eight o‘clock on Fridays and no one other than property managers or poliсe officers have permission to enter the building after hours. Apparently Willis was neither.
On January 28, 2013, the State charged Willis with criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. After a bеnch trial held on September 16, 2013, the trial court found Willis guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced him to 365 days in the Marion County jail with forty-five days suspended to probation. Willis appealed challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. In a divided opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Willis v. State, 13 N.E.3d 460 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). Having previously granted transfеr thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, see App. Rule 58(A), we now reverse the trial court‘s judgment.
Discussion
We recite our familiar standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction. First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind.2009). Second, we only considеr “the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. (quoting Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind.2008)). A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond а reasonable doubt. Id. “It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an оffense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court‘s
The State charged Willis with criminal trespass under the provision of
Here, asserting that Willis was running from the crime scene the State contends “evidence of flight is relevant as circumstantial evidence of a defendant‘s guilt.” Br. of Appellee at 5 (citing Maxey v. State, 730 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind.2000) (finding error, if any, harmless in allowing testimony that police apprehended defendant out of stаte)). However, this Court has held “[t]he fact that a defendant flees or does not flee does not indicate either guilt or innocence of itself....” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232-33 (Ind.2001) (finding trial court error in giving the jury а flight instruction). We elaborated, “it is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of bеing apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.” Id. at 1233 (quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896)) (alteration omitted). Thus, something more than running from the scene is necessary in order to infer Willis’ guilt.
On this score, the State implies that Willis’ presence at the scene represents additional circumstantial evidence to support the conviction. See Br. of Appellee at 6 (declaring “the evidence strongly supports the reasonable inference that Willis had been inside the recreation center when the alarm sounded....“). We make the following observations. First, there is nothing in the trial transcript establishing that Willis was present at the
In sum, at best the record shows that Willis was running in a field near a recreation center sometime after the burglar alarm was activated. To be sure this conduct may have been considered suspicious, and perhaps Willis may even have had the opportunity to interfere with the possession and use of the recreation center without the owner‘s consent. But “[a] reasonablе inference of guilt must be more than a mere suspicion, conjecture, conclusion, guess, opportunity, or scintilla.” Mediate v. State, 498 N.E.2d 391, 393 (Ind.1986); see also Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind.2001) (“An inference cannot be based upon evidence which is uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.” (quotation and alteration omitted)). It appears to us that the еvidence in this case is insufficient to sustain Willis’ conviction for criminal trespass.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
RUSH, C.J., and DICKSON, DAVID and MASSA, JJ., concur.