Rocco Mediate was convicted of burglary, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 85-48-2-1 (Burns 1979 Rep!.) and theft, a class D felony, Ind. Code § 385-48-4-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.), upon charges that he broke into the home of Joseph Montgomery and stole property. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of twelve years for the burglary conviction and three years for the theft conviction. We affirm.
We have consolidated the issues raised by appellant to a sole question: what quantum of additional evidence, if any, is necessary to sustain a conviction based principally upon a fingerprint?
The State's case in chief was based upon the following evidence. On November 21st, Spencer Ivy discovered that his black and silver pick-up truck, containing tools labeled with his employer's address, was missing, and he reported the theft to the police. The same day, Jimmy Edwards, a maintenance man at an apartment building, observed two men remove items from a black and silver truck into an apartment dumpster. Edwards identified appellant in court as one of these men. Edwards removed from the dumpster some of the items which were labeled with the address of Ivy's employer. The jury found appellant not guilty of this theft.
The same day, William S. Van Buskirk observed a black truck in Joseph Montgomery's driveway. A few moments later Van Buskirk saw a shadowy unidentifiable figure placing something in the truck. Officer Robert Hawkins responded to the Montgomery burglary after receiving a dispatch that a black and silver Ford truck, license plate number 5782 or 578824 could be involved. The certificate of registration indicated that Ivy's truck had a license plate number of 57882A.
When Montgomery, a gun dealer, left his house on November Zist, the house was locked and the door of the attached garage was closed, but not locked. No one had permission to be in his house while he was absent. The jam of the front door was broken when he returned. A VCR, micro *393 wave oven, television, and five guns were stolen. Appellant's apartment was searched twenty hours after the crime, but none of the stolen items were recovered.
A box of twelve gauge super-x shotgun shells apparently had been moved from the closet to the floor of the garage by the burglar. Officer Hawkins found latent fingerprints on the shotgun shell box which were determined by an expert to match appellant's fingerprints. Hawkins did not take fingerprints from the two men who were arrested for the theft of Ivy's truck.
Montgomery sold this type of shotgun shell at his gun store. - He did not know whether Mediate had ever been in the store because of the volume of customers and the possibility that an employee may have served appellant. Montgomery purchased these shells from a discount store, but he did not remember the date of purchase nor did he label the boxes. When asked whether the box of shells had ever been offered for sale at his place of business, Montgomery responded, "Not that 1 know of."
As an appellate tribunal, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the State and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Freeze v. State (1986), Ind.,
The rule of law defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt is well settled:
It requires the trier of facts to be so convinced by the evidence that as a prudent man he would feel safe to act upon such conviction in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own nearest, dearest and most important interests under cureumstances where there was no compulsion or coercion to act at all.
Eastson v. State (1967),
When the principal evidence which establishes that an appellant committed the theft or burglary is latent fingerprints, sufficiency of the evidence is an important and difficult question. In many cases in which appellant argues that the only evidence supporting the conviction is his fingerprints, the State also presents additional direct evidence which alone would be suffi-client to sustain the conviction or overwhelming circumstantial evidence. Other factors considered by this Court are legitimate access to the fingerprinted object, relocation of the object from its point of origin, and authorization to enter the dwelling or structure. The only cireumstances under which fingerprint evidence was alone sufficient to sustain a conviction is when the print was found at the point of entry.
Additional evidence may provide the basis upon which the State establishes an element of the crime or the trier of fact may infer an element from circumstantial evidence. Hanks v. State (1985), Ind.,
The preclusion of legitimate access to the object supports the inference that the fingerprints were not made in a lawful manner. Whether the fingerprinted object was located in a public or private place is an important factor. When defendant's fingerprint is found on an object which was never accessible to the public a - reasonable inference arises that the print was made during the crime. Staggers v. State (1985), Ind.,
Furthermore, a defendant's fingerprint on an object which had been moved during the commission of the offense creates a reasonable inference that defendant left his print on the object when the crime was committed. Hanks,
A fingerprint found at the point of entry is accorded substantial weight because of its direct relationship to the element of illegal entry. Fingerprints found near the point of entry on the interior of dwelling may be sufficient standing alone. Scott,
In the case at bar, defendant's fingerprints were found on an object which may have been previously accessible to the public. The conviction may be sustained only if appellant's legitimate access to the box of shotgun shells is precluded by the evidence presented at trial. If legitimate access is not precluded, then the jury's verdict would be based upon speculation rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The possibility of legitimate access was adequately foreclosed. Montgomery testified that, while he did sell this type of ammunition at his store, he did not believe that this particular box had been offered for sale there. The reasonable inference to be derived from this testimony and the relocation of the box from its point of origin is that appellant is the burglar whose prints were impressed on the box during the course of the crime.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.