History
  • No items yet
midpage
Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
814 F.3d 1159
11th Cir.
2015
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 dence, Responsible Doctors for Gun WOLLSCHLAEGER, Bernd Dr. Ju Dr. Ownership, National Rifle Association Schaechter, Tommy Dr. dith Schecht America, of American Medical Associ man, Academy American of Pedia ation, Florida, ACLU Foundation of trics, Chapter, Florida American County Society, Alachua Medical Academy Family Physicians, of Flori Association, American Public Health Phy Chapter, College da American of American Suicidology, Association of sicians, Chapter, Inc., Florida Roland Suicide Awareness Voices of Edu Gutierrez, Stanley Sack, Shannon cation, Law Center to Prevent Gun Fox-Levine, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Violence, Amicus Curiae. No. 12-14009. OF THE GOVERNOR STATE OF United States Appeals, Court of FLORIDA, Secretary, State of Flori Circuit. Eleventh da, Surgeon of the General State of Secretary, Florida, Health Care Ad Dec. Florida, ministration of State Director, Department Division Florida Health, Quality Division of Medical

Assurance, George Thomas, Jason

Rosenberg, Zachariah, Zachariah P. Tucker, Espinola, Trina

Elisabeth Stringer, Orr, Gary

Merle James Win

chester, Sanadi, Nuss, Nabil El Robert Lage, Bearison,

Onelia Fred Donald

Mullins, Brigette Goersch, Rivera

Bradley Levine, Defendants-Appel

lants. County Association,

Broward Medical County Society,

Broward Pediatric County Society,

Palm Beach Medical Association,

Florida Public Health

University of Miami School Law Clinic,

and Youth Children’s Health Legal Duty, Inc., Early

care is a Foundation,

Childhood Initiative Academy Pediatrics,

American Academy

American of Child and Ado Psychiatry,

lescent American Acade

my Family Physicians, American

Academy Surgeons, Orthopaedic College Surgeons,

American Ameri College Medicine,

can of Preventive College

American of Obstetricians Gynecologist, Congress American Gynecologists,

of Obstetricians Psychiatric Association,

American Jurispru

Center for Constitutional

David H. Thompson, Cooper Kirk, & PLLC, Washington, DC, Thomas Richard Julin, Isani, Zysk Jamie Yoakley Gunster Stewart, PA, & Nancy Abudu, Ghana Ma- ria Kayanan, ACLU Foundation of Flori- da, Inc., Gerald Edward Greenberg, Gel- PA, ber Schachter Greenberg, & Grace Mead, Lee Stearns Weaver Miller Weis- Sitterson, PA, Miami, FL, sler Alhadeff & Marshall, Randall C. American Civil Liber- Union, AL, ties Montgomery, for Amicus Curiae. WILSON,

Before TJOFLAT and Circuit Judges, COOGLER,* Judge. District ON PETITION FOR REHEARING TJOFLAT, Judge: Circuit sponte We sua vacate and reconsider matter, our opinion revised in this report- ed 797 F.3d 859. We substitute in its place following opinion.

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Bruce S. Florida, The Governor of the State of Manheim, Jr., E. Lowy, Daniel officials, Jonathan other Florida and members of the Vice, R. Augustine Ripa, Ropes Gray,. & Board of Medicine of the Florida Depart- LLP, DC, Washington, Kainen, Dennis G. “State”), ment of Health (collectively, the Weisberg Mark, PL, Lucas, Kainen Hal M. appeal from the District grant Court’s Lucas, P.A., Hal Mullins, M. Edward M. summary judgment injunction and an Davis, Miami, FL, Astigarraga for Plain- group favor of a of physicians physi- tiffs-Appellees. cian-advocacy groups (collectively, “Plain- tiffs”) enjoining enforcement of Florida’s Vail, Jolly E. Jason Peterson & Truek- (the “Act”) Firearm Privacy Owners Act1 enbrod, PA, Winsor, Bondi, Allen C. Pam on First and Fourteenth Amendment Osterhaus, Timothy David Attorney Gen- grounds. Office, Tallahassee, FL, eral’s for Defen-

dants-Appellants. The Act protect patient privacy seeks to by restricting irrelevant Caso, inquiry and rec-

Anthony T. Chapman Univ. School Law, CA, ord-keeping by physicians Orange, Bryan H. the sensitive Heckenlive- Olsen, Tolies & ly, Munger LLP, issue of firearm ownership by prohib- San Francisco, CA, Levenstein, Harry iting Richard harassment and discrimination on the & Levenstein Sopko PA, Stuart, Kramer basis of ownership. firearm The Act does FL, Patterson, Cooper, Charles J. Peter A. prevent physicians from speaking with * (codified Coogler, Honorable L. Scott United States 1. 2011 Fla. Laws 112 at Fla. Stat. Judge 381.026, 456.072, 790.338). District for the Northern District of §§ Alabama, sitting by designation. *9 disclosed, information having from generally. Nor firearms about

patients inadvertently. deliberately whether or record- specific inquiry it prohibit does important a but hole The Act closes small a firearm-owner- patient’s keeping about larger patient-privacy-protec- in Florida’s determines when ship status understanding of tion scheme. Given this the circumstances faith, in based good Act, light longstanding in case, that such informa- patient’s of that authority of States to define the bound- patient’s medical tion is relevant practice, we hold good aries of medical safety of others. or the safety, care or is, face, permissible Act on its a that the traditionally physi- accorded Society has Physicians physician speech. restriction degree of deference due high a cians been-— n always free —as have remain knowledge, pedi- educational superior their rights as their First Amendment to assert “charismatic prestige, and gree, position of any defense in actions an affirmative “symbolic their resulting from authority,” not, by But brought against them. we will and death.” conquerors of disease role as Act, effectively hand striking down the A Amendment Toward First Berg, Paula a declaration that such defense Plaintiffs Discourse and Doctor-Patient Theory of will be successful. Medical to Receive Unbiased Right the District Accordingly, we reverse (1994). Advice, 201, 226 74 B.U. L.Rev. judgment in grant summary Court’s in the apex its deference reaches This Plaintiffs, injunc- and vacate the favor patients are room where examination against tion enforcement of the Act. Pa- powerlessness. relative position of physi- in the their trust place tients must I. physi- and submit to guidance cians’ Rick June Florida Governor On authority. cians’ Act law. The Act signed Scott into authority great comes great this With 790.338, § entitled created Fla. Stat. patients, society protect To responsibility. firearms; concerning privacy “Medical upon physicians certain long imposed has prohibitions; penalties; exceptions,” and that define the and restrictions duties Florida Patient’s Bill of amended the keep- care. In good medical boundaries Fla. Rights Responsibilities, Stat. tradition, passed the State ing with this 381.026, § to include several of the same commonsense Act codifies the the Act. The Fla. provisions. The Act also amended care good medical does conclusion 456.072, for dis- Stat. entitled “Grounds record-keeping regard- require inquiry enforcement,” pro- cipline; penalties; unnecessary pa- to a ing when firearms for violation disciplinary vide for measures in- not when that especially tient’s care— legislature passed of the Act. The Florida such a record-keeping constitutes quiry or response complaints the Act in upon patient priva- intrusion substantial personnel that medical were constituents care never re- cy good medical —and asking questions regarding unwelcome or harassment of quires the discrimination ownership, and that constituents firearm firearm owners. on ac- faced harassment or discrimination so, important an plays ques- In the Act to answer such doing count of their refusal as fire- gets patient’s simply what into a tions or due to their status protecting role record, arm owners.2 thereby protecting any kept firearms in her widely publicized incident mother whether she example, 2. For in a Florida, Ocala, question pediatri- Because she felt that the place home. that took cian, visit, privacy, the patient's an invasion of her during constituted a routine asked *10 provides, part, patient family The Act relevant that whether a or their owns firearms, practitioner unless the or facility practitioners licensed healthcare and facili- in good believes faith that the “information (1) “may intentionally ties not enter” infor- patient’s is relevant to the medical care or concerning patient’s ownership mation a of id. others,” safety, safety or the of patient’s into the medical record firearms (3) 790.338(2); § “may not discriminate” practitioner that the knows is “not relevant against patient a on the basis of firearm patient’s safety, to the medical care or or id. (4) ownership, 790.338(5); § and id. (2) others,” 790.338(1); § safety unnecessarily “should refrain from harass- right a respect patient’s privacy “shall patient about firearm ownership,” id. a ing inquiring and should refrain” from as to 790.338(6).3 § pediatrician facility mother refused to answer. The or a health care licensed under their, relationship chapter may intentionally any then terminated and ad enter days concerning vised the mother that she had 30 to find disclosed information firearm ownership patient’s a new & into the medical doctor. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health record Servs., (2011) practitioner if Analysis knows that such Human H.B. 155 Staff informa- Hiers, 2011); patient’s (Apr. Family tion is not relevant to the see also Fred medical safety, safety care or tangle or the of others. pediatrician gun question, and over (2) StarBanner, practitioner A health care licensed July http://www. Ocala chapter facility under 456 or a health care ocala.com/article/20100724/articles/7241001. chapter respect licensed under 395 shall a incident, physicians In another refused to patient's right privacy and should refrain provide nine-year-old care to a “be- medical making inquiry asking a written cause wanted to know if child's [the questions concerning ownership of a family] had a in their home.” Audio firearm by patient by firearm or ammunition Regular CD: Session Senate Floor Debate on family patient, pres- a member of the or the by (Apr. HB held the Florida Senate 27- private ence of a firearm in a home or other 28, 2011) (remarks Evers) (on at 26:32 of Sen. patient family domicile of the or a member file with Florida Senate Office of the Secre- patient. Notwithstanding provi- of the this tary). example, legislator In a another stated sion, practitioner a health care or health that, during appointment daugh- an with his facility good care that in faith believes that ter, pediatrician legislator a asked that the patient’s this information is relevant to the gun remove his from his home. Audio CD: safety, safety medical care or or the of oth- Regular Session House Floor Debate on HB ers, may make such a verbal or written by Representa- held the Florida House of inquiry. 26, 2011) (remarks (Apr. Rep. tives at 26:20 Artiles) (on Repre- file with Florida House of (5) practitioner A health care licensed Clerk). legis- sentatives Office of the Another chapter facility under 456 or a health care reported complaint lator a from a constituent chapter under licensed not dis- provider falsely that a healthcare told him against patient solely a criminate based disclosing ownership firearm was a Med- upon patient’s exercise of the constitu- (remarks requirement. icaid Id. at 13:40 right possess tional to own and firearms or Brodeur). Rep. legislator relayed That also ammunition. complaint separated about a mother who was (6) practitioner A health care licensed from her children while medical staff asked chapter facility under 456 or a health care the children whether the mother owned fire- chapter respect licensed under 395 shall arms. Id. patient's legal right possess to own or Further incidents are recounted in a Joint firearm and should refrain from unneces- Undisputed Statement of Facts filed sarily harassing about firearm parties District Court below. Wollsch ownership during an examination.... Farmer, laeger v. No. 1:11-CV-22026 § Fla. Stat. 790.338. (S.D.Fla. 2011), Nov. Doc. 87. provisions The Act related also contains challenged provisions 3. The full text of the are concerning emergency personnel medical as follows: companies, affirming right insurance practitioner A health patients physician ques- care licensed to decline answer tions, chapter affirming under [of the Florida that the Act does not alter Statutes] discrimination, provisions harassment of the any provisions Violation facially the First and disciplinary ac of the Act violate grounds Act constitutes 456.072(2). § Fla. Stat. Fourteenth Amendments the United tion under 456.072(l)(nn). Furthermore, contended “[viola Constitution. Plaintiffs States " (1)- unconstitutional, of subsections an provisions imposes that the Act tions of *11 disciplinary for ac grounds speech, restriction on constitute content-based 456.072(2) §§ overbroad, and unconstitutionally vague. ] Stat. [Fla. tion under and 790.338(8). Thus, § Fla. 395.1055.” Stat. 14, 2011, that September finding On Florida Medicine of the if the Board of likely succeed on the Plaintiffs were to (the “Board”) finds of Health Department merits, preliminarily District Court en- Act, physician that a has violated joined inquiry, enforcement of the record- in measures disciplinary faces physician discrimination, keeping, and harassment fine, practice, re cluding a restriction Act, provisions together with fees, or probation, suspension and turn of providing discipline physi- for provisions Fla. their medical license. revocation of Wollschlaeger who violate the Act. v. cians 456.072(2). culmi investigation § An Stat. Farmer, F.Supp.2d may action be initi nating disciplinary (S.D.Fla.2011). by Depart against physician a ated 2, 2012, per On June the District Court by a triggered ment of Health in manently enjoined enforcement of the § Fla. complaint. citizen’s Stat. 456.073. discrimination, and quiry, record-keeping, 2, 2011, meeting of The minutes of a June togeth provisions harassment the Act— Committee of the Rules/Legislative disciplinary provi the related er with prepared that the Board is Board indicate for holding, on cross motions sum sions— disciplinary proceedings against initiate to provisions that all mary judgment, four Act, stating a who violates the Amendment, facially violated the First and' determined [has] that “the Committee record-keeping, inquiry, violation of falls under [that] [the Act] Act provisions of the were void harassment comply legal obligation with a failure to Farmer, vagueness. Wollschlaeger disciplinary guidelines for and the current (S.D.Fla. F.Supp.2d 1267-69 Fla. Bd. apply.” would this violation Comm., Rules/Legislative 2012). Meet Medicine (Jun. 2, 2011), at

ing Report, at 3 available The District Court held that Plaintiffs http://wwlO.doh.state.fl.us/pub/medicine/ standing to Plaintiffs had sue because Agenda_Info/Public_Information/Public_ engaging self-censorship were to avoid Minutes/2011/Committees/R-L/060211_ action, which consti- potential disciplinary Minutes.pdf. injury-in-fact that was cognizable tuted fairly to the Act and redressable traceable days four after Gover-

On June by injunction. Id. at 1258-59. The Dis- law, the Act into Plaintiffs signed nor Scott trict Court also held that Plaintiffs’ claims § seeking filed a U.S.C. 1983 action noting delayed review ripe, were declaratory injunctive against relief Plaintiffs, who hardship would “cause the State in the United States District Florida, engage continue to self-censor- Court for the Southern District of would development that further factual alleging inquiry, record-keeping, ship,” that the held, provisions apply existing regarding physician's do not law authori- because these 790.338(3), regulate any patients. physicians or do not conduct zation to choose Id. (4), (7). physicians, standing to chal- appear challenge Plaintiffs lack Plaintiffs do not and, lenge provisions, the District Court them. these discrimination, unnecessary. record-keeping, of the issues was Id. at and harass- provisions ment Act pass could not constitutional muster. Id. 1265-67. merits, Turning to the the District Court The District Court found that the State imposed physicians Act held provide any had failed to content-based restriction of on the evidence that the at 1261. The subject of firearms. Id. confidentiality of information regarding rejected argu- District the State’s Court patients’ risk, firearm ownership was at permis- ment that the Act “constitute[s] noting patient may that a simply decline to regulation professional speech sible information, provide such and that state occupational imposed conduct that a mere pertaining and federal laws to the confi- speech.” incidental burden on Id. at 1262. dentiality of provide medical records ade- that, The District Court noted unlike the quate protection patients. Id. at 1267. *12 Act, provisions regulations of the “[s]uch regard regulation to the With of the medi- govern practice profes- the access or of cal profession, the District Court found sion; they prohibit not or truth- do burden that the Act lacked specificity,” “narrow ful, non-misleading speech scope within the directly because the Act targets speech profession.” of the Id. merely imposing rather than an incidental The District Court then assessed the burden on at speech. Id. 1266-67 (quota- in passing State’s asserted interests omitted). reasons, tion marks For similar acknowledged Act. The District Court that the District Court further found that the protecting has an in its State interest Act is not the least restrictive means of right citizens’ to keep Second Amendment achieving the State’s interests. Id. at arms, right and bear but found that such a Thus, 1267. the District Court held that is “irrelevant” to the Act and therefore is tip significantly the “balance of interests in legitimate compelling not “a or interest for safeguarding favor of practitioners’ ability it.” Id. at 1264. The District Court found speak freely patients.” to their Id. that, because the acted on State the basis purely pro- of anecdotal information and The District Court also held that vided no evidence discrimination or inquiry, record-keeping, and harassment ownership harassment based on firearm Act provisions of the were unconstitution- pervasive, legiti- the State does not have a ally vague. regard Id. at 1267-69. With in compelling protecting mate interest inquiry to the and record-keeping provi- receipt its citizens “from barriers to the sions, the District Court found that arising medical care from discrimi- [such] provide “relevance standard” failed to suf- (quotation nation or harassment.” Id. guidance ficient as to what conduct the Act omitted). However, marks the District at prohibits. regard Id. 1268. With to the legitimate— Court found that Florida has provision, harassment the District Court perhaps compelling interests, but not “in — noted that the term “harass” has an ordi- protecting patients’ privacy regarding clear, nary readily meaning but their firearm or use” in ownership and regulation ‘unnecessary professions. Id. constitutes harass- “[w]hat anyone’s guess.” ment’ is left to Id. at Balancing physicians’ speech rights free that it 1268-69. The District Codrt noted in against protecting the State’s interests argu- to address Plaintiffs’ did need privacy regulating the and medical ment that the Act is overbroad because held that— profession, the District Court doing change so would not the outcome. regardless scrutiny of whether strict applied- inquiry, some lesser standard Id. at 1270 n. 7. —the however, independent an ex concluding the we conduct Thus, District Court — record, subjecting the Act are severa- amination of the whole remaining provisions “ for sum- findings Plaintiffs’ motion ‘constitu the District Court’s granted ble-— mary judgment, and granted part and “that facts’ ”—those facts involve tional motion for sum- the State’s part denied took the chal [defendant] reasons the According- Id. at 1270. mary judgment.4 action”—to de novo review. ACLU lenged en- permanently Court ly, Bd., the District Fla., Cty. Inc. v. Miami-Dade Sch. enforcing the record- joined Cir.2009). from (11th the State 557 F.3d We harassment, and discrim- inquiry, keeping, concerning questions review de novo also Act, 790.338(1), § provisions ination subject-matter jurisdiction, such our (6), (2), (5), enforcing and Basham, standing ripeness. Elend 790.338(8), provided extent that § to the (11th Cir.2006). 1199, 1204 471 F.3d 790.338(1) (2) con- § that violations of action, and III. disciplinary for grounds stitute 456.072(l)(nn), pro: that it § to the extent begin by taking up the We issue 790.338(1), (2), violations of vided that justiciability. The District Court held (6) disciplin- grounds constitute standing Plaintiffs had to sue because ary action. Id. self-censorship, which engaging were timely ap- the State July

On cognizable injury-in-fact fair- constituted a judgment. We pealed the District Court’s Act and ly traceable to the redressable *13 to 28 U.S.C. jurisdiction pursuant have at injunction. F.Supp.2d 880 1258-59. §§ and 1291. 1331 this error The State contends that was prohibit physi- because the Act does not

II. asking patients cians from about firearm grant a district court’s review We safety ownership, providing firearm coun- novo. Thomas summary judgment de recording concerning information seling, Inc., 1361, 506 Lighting, F.3d Cooper ownership. The State patients’ firearm Cir.2007). (11th judg “Summary 1363 may engage in such argues physicians that gen when ‘there is no appropriate ment is patients’ to conduct when is relevant fact and ... of material uine issue relevant, care, the Act and even when not judgment a as a party is entitled to moving that merely suggests physicians “should ” (alteration original) in Id. matter of law.’ inquiring as to firearm own- refrain” from 56(c)). genuine A (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 790.338(2). Fla. Such hor- ership. Stat. “if evi material fact exists issue of tatory language, argues, the State does not jury a that reasonable could dence is such physicians constitute a mandate that not nonmoving party.” a verdict for the return Thus, inquire. argues the State that be- Real v. Four Parcels United States actually in fact cause the Act does not (11th Cir.1991) 1428, F.2d Prop., 941 Plaintiffs wish to en- prohibit the conduct omitted). marks (quotation in, standing Plaintiffs lack to chal- gage they have not dem- lenge the Act because legal a district court’s We review Moreover, injury-in-fact. onstrated ordinarily and re de novo determinations obligation have an to read argues, State we findings for clear error. view its factual Amendment, a recommendation that the Act as mere In the context of the First (4), (7), 790.338(3), finding physicians, § granted the State’s mo- 4. The District Court challenge respect standing to these summary judgment with to Plaintiffs lacked tion for Wollschlaeger, F.Supp.2d provisions. at apply to provisions of the Act that neither by practitioners regulate any conduct nor inquiry speech theoretically from irrelevant could physicians refrain raise a First firearms, record-keeping about in or- Amendment defense. der to construe the Act as valid. mounting In a challenge facial to the Act, however, sought Plaintiffs a First that the We find District Court any Amendment brought defense action properly held that Plaintiffs’ claims are against a speech based on tar- justiciable. standing, In order to have “a geted by the Act. The State contends that present injury claimant must an only proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ First concrete, particularized, and actual or im Amendment proceeding defense is live minent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s brought words, under the Act. In other behavior; challenged likely to be re arguing that challenge Plaintiffs’ facial ruling.” dressed a favorable Davis v. justiciable, saying the State is FEC, 2759, wait challenge Plaintiffs must the Act (2008). However, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 until subjected have been to some “[sjtanding dispensed gross. is not adverse action. Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press resolving standing Crucial sought.” and for each form of relief that is question is the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. (citations Id. 128 S.Ct. at 2769 law, controlling “Under case we apply the omitted). quotation marks injury-in-fact requirement loosely most outset,

At the we note that Plaintiffs’ where rights First Amendment are in volved, challenge First Amendment to the Act lest free be chilled even equivalent be viewed as the functional regulation before the law is enforced.” argument Bar, of a First Amendment raised as Harrell v. The Fla. 608 F.3d (11th Cir.2010) hypothetical an affirmative defense (citing Hallandale brought against physician asking ease Fighters 'l Fire Local v. City Prof questions (11th irrelevant about firearms con- Hallandale, 922 F.2d Cir. trary good practice. physi- 1991)). medical A *14 cian could in raise such a defense a disci- alleged injury Plaintiffs’ sole is self-

plinary proceeding brought under the Act censorship, may cognizable which a in be malpractice for such conduct or in a action. jury-in-fact standing purposes. for See id. a example, patient For could file a lawsuit (“[I]t is well-established that ‘an actual alleging physician that a mal- committed injury plaintiff can exist when the is chilled practice by unnecessarily harassing the pa- exercising right expres from her to free tient firearm ownership just about as a — in forgoes expression sion or order to patient potentially could file a al- lawsuit ” consequences.’ (quot avoid enforcement leging physician malprac- that a committed Cole, ing Pittman v. 267 F.3d by unnecessarily harassing tice (11th Cir.2001))). any topic. physician about other The cognizable To establish a self- to purportedly could choose admit to the censorship injury purposes for the of a harassing speech plead and the First claim, defense, plaintiff a as an in First Amendment “must Amendment affirmative that, rejection that show as a result of his desired ex contending effect the court’s (1) pression, prose of the affirmative defense would he was threatened with constitute (3) cution; prosecution likely; action in is state violation of the Constitution. Indeed, Act, leaving prosecution.” aside the a there is a credible threat of omitted). facing malpractice liability (quotation a marks If for wide Id. professional activity involving plaintiff proceeds swath of a under the credible- in example, poisonous must chemicals prong, he dem- threat-of-prosecution home, alcohol, tobacco, “[Fjirst, swimming and seriously that he wishes onstrate: Act, Plaintiffs pools). passage After of the that is at least engage expression law, practice have curtailed or eliminated this by pertinent arguably forbidden facing discipline.5 for fear of second, there is at least some and challenged probability minimal Plaintiffs have established that Id. if rules will be enforced violated.” they engage wish to conduct that is at citations, quotation and marks (emphasis, arguably least forbidden the Act. In omitted). challenged “If a law or rule was medicine, practice preventive their enacted, au- enforcing or if the recently questions wish to ask and record Plaintiffs challenged law or thority defending a mat regarding information firearms as court, an intent to enforce the rule rule a making particu ter of routine —without Id. at 1257. may be inferred.” larized determination of relevance —which that, as of the explain part Plaintiffs implies inquiry that some such and recor- care, preventive physi- some practice of will not be to the health dation relevant routinely patients they ask whether cians safety patients and or others and thus verbally own firearms —either or via prohibited by would the Act. The Act screening questionnaire provide enacted, fire- recently was and the State —and counseling, larger it, safety part defending arm so we infer that there is battery counseling probability and re- Act questions at least some will Thus, safety (including, health and risks be enforced if violated.6 Plaintiffs garding Complaint lays specifics sage they good 5. Plaintiffs' out the of the Act because believe in practices regarding physicians' individual questions that such are faith information inquiries safety counseling. However, For firearm patients’ relevant to their care. Act, example, prior passage of the Dr. they asking follow-up ques- now refrain from Wollschlaeger patients complete asked his patients parents tions when or their seem questions questionnaire that included re- when, upset by screening question the initial ownership, routinely garding firearm Act, prior passage they of the would not orally patients asked whether owned fire- Similarly, have refrained. Dr. Gutierrez con- present risk arms if other factors were —such patient questionnaire tinues to use a that in- home; patients as when had children in the question ownership, cludes a about firearm addiction, suffering depression, were asking any but has resolved to refrain from ideation; family suicidal had an unstable en- follow-up questions patient initially should vironment; or involved in a domestic- were appear topic. disinclined to discuss the Dr. provide safety violence situation'—to firearm previous practice Sack has ended his of be- counseling patient's tailored to the circum- ginning safety counseling by firearm his ask- Act, passage stances. After Dr. *15 ing patients they whether have a firearm in Wollschlaeger has removed the firearms-relat- However, the house. he has continued to questions questionnaire ed from his and no safety counseling, provide framing firearm it longer orally questions regarding asks firearm hypothetical pa- terms not tailored to his ownership part or discusses firearms as of his tients' individual circumstances. Dr. Fox-Le- preventive counseling. standard has, Act, passage vine since of the removed physicians party The other who are to this questions regarding ownership firearm practice asking ques- suit have limited their questionnaire her intake but continues to ad- providing counseling and tions about firearm patients safety, vise some about firearm fram- safety, varying degrees. still do but so to For Act, ing hypothetical example, prior her advice in terms. passage Dr. . routinely and Schaechter Dr. Schectman provide 6. We note that the Act does not for patients questions regarding asked their fire- penalties, only disciplinary criminal but ac- ownership arm and entered related informa- Nevertheless, standing by the for patients’ They tion Board. tion into their medical records. practice pas- purposes, disciplinary have continued this even after the threat of action stage, self-censor- cognizable have established a ultimate merits of Plaintiffs’ ar- gument, accept we that injury language for their First Amendment ship point Plaintiffs to is at arguably least claims.7 Thus, vague. Plaintiffs have established a Similarly, cogni to establish a cognizable self-censorship injury for their injury pur for the self-censorship zable vagueness claim. claim, plaintiff must poses vagueness they Plaintiffs claim that curtailed their “(1) seriously that: he wishes to show inquiry firearms counseling practices (2) [speech] arguably would [speak]; such Act, due to the and that they re- would rules, by the but the are be affected rules practices Thus, sume those but for the Act. they arguably vague apply at least self-censorship injury Plaintiffs’ fairly him; there is least a minimal Act, passage traceable to of the and re- enforced, probability that the rules will be by injunction. dressable Accordingly, they (empha if are violated.” Id. at 1254 standing. Plaintiffs have omitted). sis, footnote, and citations Nota argues The State that Plaintiffs existence, bly, imposition, “it is the not the standing lack regard inquiry with to the requirements that causes of standardless provision of provision the Act because that (alteration in injury.” original) Id. [the] Thus, in fact prohibits nothing at all. Fund, (quoting Legal CAMP Inc. v. Def. claims, State Plaintiffs’ fear that will Atlanta, (11th City F.3d face discipline objectively is not reason Cir.2006)). Ga., able. See Wilson v. State Bar of (“A above, For the reasons discussed (11th Cir.1998) F.3d party’s Plaintiffs have met the first and third subjective may fear that she prosecuted be prongs cognizable-injury of the test for engaging expressive for activity will not vagueness challenges. regard to the With injury be held to constitute an standing prong, argue second Plaintiffs is purposes unless that fear objectively inquiries unclear routine whether and rec reasonable.”). Under the proposed State’s firearms, ord-keeping regarding made as construction, merely, the Act recommends part practice preventive medicine physicians “should refrain” from ask and not on patients’ particularized based ing questions about firearms unless rele circumstances, qualify as “relevant” to vant, hortatory language and such does not safety. They health and argue also speech. constitute a bar The State law does define the terms “unnecessar points out that the Executive Director of “discriminate,” ily harassing” leaving posted the Board stated in a to the letter — physicians guidance without as to what shortly Board’s website after Plaintiffs prohibits physi conduct the Act and when filed suit—that the Board does not inter may subject cians for con discipline pret inquiry provision prohibition, as a (contra patients may unpredictably duct deem ob but rather as a recommendation jectionable. determining, Without at this dicting a letter the Executive Director had Bar, ular, 790.338(5) (6), may prohibit be sufficient. See Harrell v. The Fla. conduct (11th Cir.2010) speech. 608 F.3d involve little to no Never- theless, (finding an.attorney standing challenge self-censorship had claim Plaintiffs as a *16 attorney advertising challenged the state bar’s rules when provisions result of all four of the consequence noncompliance challenged provisions regulate the for was dis Act. As all four action, disbarment). ciplinary arguably speech, such as conduct involves this is that standing purposes. sufficient for We need course, not, acknowledge 7. We that the of evaluate the merits of these harassment provisions partic- standing stage. discrimination of the Act in claims at the 1176 provision physicians ing” challenge Florida to of the For- mailed to

previously Accordingly, Intelligence the Act of 1978 opposite). eign the Surveillance stating contends, choosing threat to based “by expenditures there is no credible make State inquiry plain- the regard hypothetical with to future harm” where of enforcement speculate merely government tiffs that the provision. communications, target their and so will disagree. provide Laws that We product the costs incurred were in of viola action case disciplinary for surveillance). fear generalized their generally the Act—should as tion—such Moreover, we note that the Board has hortatory. Compare interpreted as not be consistent that the position not been in its Sec’y Affairs, 312 v. Veterans Liesegang inquiry provision hortatory, is as indicated (Fed.Cir.2002) (“In 1368, the 1377 F.3d by the Executive Director’s first letter for noneom- any consequences absence stating contrary. the The State is also are at timing provisions pliance, [a law’s] in its of the interpretation inconsistent mandatory.”), rather than precatory best language “should refrain” in its briefs. Kornstein, 230 F.3d Kittay v. with instance, For characterizes repeatedly Cir.2000) (2d (noting attorney that n. 3 538 in language provi identical the harassment mandatory rules in char disciplinary “are a mandatory prohibition sion of the Act as they “state the minimum acter” because unnecessary It against harassment. also lawyer can below which no level of conduct inquiry the as provision describes itself being subject disciplinary to fall without ... inquiries,” “proscribing] id. omitted)), and (quotation marks action” conduct,” “prohibiting] id. at 39. Wil Born, Inc., F.2d 391- Cf. v. 792 Edwards son, (holding F.3d at that 1428-29 Cir.1986) (3d attorney that dis (noting attorneys standing disbarred lacked to mandatory” “are because rules ciplinary that challenge ways rules limit the subject vio attorneys discipline are for attorneys represent which disbarred can them). Thus, despite the Board’s lating public to the themselves or have contact as Executive Di position —insofar where with clients “the State Bar ha[d] represent it—that in letters rector’s repeatedly consistently posi taken the constitutes a recommenda quiry provision that no [challenged tion rules] ha[d] mandate, than a the fact that tion rather application to of scenarios the types action provides disciplinary the Act attorneys disbarred posed”). have against Plaintiffs in case of a violation that, that Plaintiffs’ fear that is it provides controlling evidence Neither as the contends, discipline objectively face rea they may Supreme State the Florida Notably, standing purposes. interpreted sonable for Court term “should” as generalized disciplin fear of hortatory this is not reviewing Florida’s Code action, apprehen ary specific but rather a Conduct. In Judicial See re Code Judi Conduct, (Fla. specific group physicians— sion cial So.2d — 1994). targets. interpretation the Act But whose conduct Such is irrelevant cf. Amnesty determining Int’l what Clapper legis effect the Florida USA -, give 185 L.Ed.2d language lature intended Thus, (holding attorneys and var they may Act. Plaintiffs’ fear labor, rights, legal, ious human and media under discipline inquiry provision face organizations objectively cannot “manufacture stand- reasonable.8 accept argument meaningless portion provision 8. We do not al- Plaintiffs' construing lowing physicians inquiry provision’s "should re- make fire- nevertheless language hortatory inquiries doing render when frain” would arm so would be rele- *17 argues The State also that Plain scrutiny. fails—strict Plaintiffs also assert standing lack regard tiffs with to the rec overbroad; that is, Act is they ord-keeping provision of the Act because it claim that even if regulation the Act’s proscribes only entry of firearm infor speech is constitutional in a limited num- mation that is not relevant medical care situations, ber of proscribes nonetheless safety, injury or and Plaintiffs claim no a substantial legitimate amount of speech, arising from a wish to record irrelevant Second, and must fall. Plaintiffs argue However, information. Plaintiffs claim an that the Act violates procedural their injury practice preventive to their medi rights under the Due Process Clause of cine arising being from not free to record Amendment, the Fourteenth in that every the firearm information of patient as Act’s terms vague are so that they fail to a matter of course. perhaps the Some— put person ordinary intelligence on majority these records will therefore —of notice as to what Act prohibits. be irrelevant to the care and safety begin We will with the latter contention Thus, patients and others. the State’s ar and then move to the First Amendment gument unavailing: is Plaintiffs claim an challenges. Brooks, Borgner See injury arising, part, from a desire (11th Cir.2002) (“Before F.3d record irrelevant information. analyzing challenged [the state un- statute] Accordingly, we find that the District der the [appropriate level of First Amend- properly Court held that Plaintiffs have scrutiny], ment we must first determine standing to challenge the Act. We also find statute, whole, whether the taken as a is that the properly District Court held that clear as far required as what is and what is ripe adjudication.9 Plaintiffs’ claims are prohibited.”). IV. A. Now for the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Under void-for-vague “[t]he Plaintiffs’ facial attacks on the Act arise doctrine[,] ness ... ‘a statute which either separate under two provisions of the Con- forbids or requires doing of an act in First, stitution. contend vague [persons] terms so of common 790.338(1), (2), (5), record- —the intelligence necessarily guess must at its keeping, inquiry, discrimination, meaning and differ application, as to its provisions harassment of the Act10—im- violates the first essential process of due permissibly upon trench their rights under ” Foods, view, Specialty law.’ Harris v. Mexican First Amendment. In their Inc., (11th Cir.2009) Act is content-based restriction on F.3d and, such, (third subject to—and original) alteration in (quoting Rob less, safety. vant to Corley care and See inquiry v. United we find that the clause is not a States, recommendation, mere rejection and our (2009) ("[A] 173 L.Ed.2d argument statute Plaintiffs’ does not alter the result given should be standing construed so that effect inquiry. of our provisions, all part its so that no will be inoperative superfluous, insignifi- void 9. The appeal State does not renew on its omitted)). (quotation cant.” argument marks Even ripe. if that Plaintiffs’ claims are not inquiry provision we were to construe the as a physicians mere recommendation that challenge refrain 10. Plaintiffs’ is limited to these four firearms, inquiring about perfectly provisions. it is Accordingly, unless context de- otherwise, legislature may reasonable that wish to mands future references to the Act withdraw this recommendation only should the in- should be understood to refer to these quiry given be relevant provisions. case. Neverthe- *18 1178 we ad 609, 629, challenged provisions, after which 104 Jaycees, 468 U.S.

erts v. U.S. (1984)). 3244, 3256, specific 82 L.Ed.2d 462 contentions. See dress Plaintiffs’ S.Ct. unconstitutionally vague Thus, Oklahoma, 601, is a statute 413 U.S. 617 Broadrick v. uncertain as to the public if “it leaves 2908, 2919, 16, L.Ed.2d 830 n. 93 S.Ct. 37 judges or leaves and prohibits conduct (1973) (“[A] court must determine federal decide, any legally to without jurors free it can a statute means before what state standards, and prohibited fixed what constitutionality.”). facial We do judge its particular in case.” Giac what is not each that light principle in of the familiar so 399, 402-03, Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. cio v. a “readily susceptible a where statute 520-21, 518, 447 15 L.Ed.2d 86 S.Ct. narrowing construction that avoids consti (1966). infirmities,” uphold must it. tutional we Lamar, Life, Inc. v. 273 Right See Fla. Supreme Court has ex The (11th Cir.2001). 1318, 1326 F.3d permissible “standards of plained that in area statutory are strict vagueness Button, NAACP v. expression.” of free 432, 328, 337, 415, 9 371 U.S. record-keeping provision pro The (1963). Nonetheless, “perfect 405 L.Ed.2d “intentionally en physicians hibits from guidance have never clarity precise and tering] any disclosed information concern regulations that re required even been ownership patient’s into the ing firearm activity.” v. Rock expressive Ward strict [physician] if the knows medical record Racism, 794, 109 Against information is not relevant to the that such (1989) 2746, 2755, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 S.Ct. patient’s safety, medical care or or the

(citation omitted); Grayned see v. also 790.338(1). Fla. safety of others.” Stat. 104, 110, Rockford, 408 U.S. 92 City of points regard three salient with We note (1972) L.Ed.2d 222 S.Ct. First, provision. to this the substantive (“Condemned words, to the use of we can in prohibition contained the first clause—- certainty in our expect never mathematical “intentionally not physician that a challenged language.”). When statute is any concerning disclosed information enter enforcement, prior to vagueness ownership,” firearm id.—is conditioned allege litigants must are “chilled in relevancy requirement the second constitutionally protected engaging If, English Dictionary Oxford clause. See activity.” City See Bankshot Billiards (2015) conjunction “if’ as a (defining (11th Ocala, F.3d Cir. sup a clause of condition or “introduc[es] 2011) (“[P]re-enforcement provides review prohibition ap The substantive position”). law-abiding citizens with a middle road in the plies only when the condition second facing prosecution refraining between is, physician met—that when a clause is conduct.”). from otherwise constitutional concerning that information firearm knows Still, possible vagueness about “speculation patient’s is not relevant to the ownership situations not before the hypothetical safety, safety care or or the medical support a facial attack on a Court will not Logically, physician does others. when surely it is statute when valid the vast concerning not know that information fire majority applications.” of its intended Colorado, 703, 733, pa ownership 120 arm is irrelevant Hill v. U.S. safety safety, L.Ed.2d 597 medical care or or the S.Ct. tient’s (citation omitted). quotation others, marks prohibition apply. does not Second, relatedly, the statute is un begin by setting forth our

We high degree of certain- require of each of the written to derstanding meaning of the part subject issue; on the ty point as to non-relevance pertinent prohibition Relevant, ef- specified thing.” before takes to a Oxford terms, By record-keeping (2015). its English fect. Dictionary agree We physicians from enter- provision prohibits relevancy the Act’s requirement does *19 concerning information ing firearm owner- neat, have a definition; one-size-fits-all only physician when the ship has knowl- rather, relevancy necessarily is determined edge of that information’s irrelevance to case-by-case is, on a basis. That whether safety. Any care or mental medical state information is related to the matter at regarding irrelevance that does rise to depends hand entirely specifics on the of knowledge the level of not trigger would the matter at hand. A reading that infor- prohibition. the mation about firearm-ownership is rele- would, every indeed, vant in case render course, Finally, prohibition of if the ap- the record-keeping provision superfluous, plies only physician when a knows the but problem easily this is by avoided irrelevant, information to be then the criti- adhering to a plain-meaning construction cal meaning relevancy issue is the of the relevancy determination, of as an ad hoc requirement. argue Plaintiffs that the requiring physicians to base their calcula- provision vague pro- is because it does not tion as to the relevancy patient’s of a vide them with sufficient notice as to when firearm-ownership particularized status on record-keeping regarding firearms is rele- patient. By information about the employ- safety. vant to care or medical Plaintiffs ing relevancy standard, a flexible the Act specify note that the Act does not whether provides physicians with the freedom to physician must make a particularized regarding record information firearm own- finding patient of relevance for each or ership whenever doing part so would be of physician’s general whether a belief practice good the of medicine. always firearms are relevant will suffice. They argue that also the Act does not Taking points these three together, we specify physician if a must believe that think record-keeping the provision stands firearm information is relevant at the time simple proposition for the physician inquiry of record-keeping, good- or if a may not record a patient’s firearm-owner- faith belief that the may information later ship status unless the physician believes (such practice become relevant as in the of particularized that —because of some infor- medicine) preventive require- satisfies the patient, mation about the individual that, ments of the Act. Plaintiffs contend example, that patient the is suicidal or has reading

because a that information about patient’s violent tendencies —the firearm- always firearms is relevant would render ownership pertains status patient’s the the Act meaningless, physicians reasonably safety, medical care or safety or the requires fear that the Act higher, some record-keeping others. The is provision unspecified level of relevance. sufficiently clear person that a of common intelligence guess need not as to what plain

We find that recourse to meaning prohibits. resolves the issue. See Johnson v. Gover Fla., (11th

nor 405 F.3d Cir.2005) (en banc) (“The step first in stat utory interpretation requires that courts inquiry provision phrased The apply plain meaning statutory of the slightly differently, but we think it is sub language ambiguous.”). unless it is stantially record-keeping “Rele similar to the vant” “[b]earing means on or provision practical connected terms of its effect. hand; closely with the matter in relating inquiry provision The physicians directs particularized of firearms on inquiry ownership or making a written refrain from Thus, patient. phy- information about concerning the owner- asking questions fire- inquiries make as to the sicians ammunition or a firearm ship of any pa- or all arm-ownership status family member of by a or patient tients, they do so with the long so in a of a firearm presence or the patient, specifics belief—based on good-faith other domicile home or private rel- inquiry case—that the patient’s family pa- member of the or a care or patient’s medical evant provision, this Notwithstanding tient. If, safety others. for ex- safety, or the good faith be- ... [physician] informa- seeks firearm ample, is relevant to that this information lieves agenda unrelated to personal tion to suit a safety, care or medical patient’s safety, he would not medical care others, may make such a safety *20 the “good-faith” inquiry, a and so making inquiry. verbal or written him to refrain from plainly Act directs 790.338(2). § Fla. Stat. inquiring. prohibition again, the substantive Here inqui- that the Accordingly, we conclude relevancy requirement, by a qualified is that a sufficiently is clear ry provision may physicians effectively providing intelligence need not person of common good faith they believe inquire whenever guess prohibits. as to what rele- ownership information is that firearm safety. Again, the care or vant to medical to the mental high a bar as sets provision Finally,11 provi harassment the necessary trigger prohibition: the state the same basic elements sion also contains any good-faith lack belief must physician a with a provisions, as the first two albeit relevancy of the information. to the provi harassment few modifications. The require physicians not does provision The “refrain from physicians directs sion of relevance before knowledge to have unnecessarily harassing a about as to only good-faith a but speaking, belief during an examination.” ownership firearm phrased this differ- Although is relevance. 790.338(6). § the record- Fla. Like Stat. record-keeping provision’s than the ently inquiry provisions, the harass keeping and inqui- think the we relevancy requirement, impose a flat ban provision ment does provisions form two record-keeping ry issue, qualifies rather speech on the but prohibitions coin. The the same sides of here, necessity require with a its ban — informa- a knows the apply physician when statute, of the ment. Under the terms if apply and do not tion to be irrelevant harassing physicians prohibited are good-faith belief that physician the has ownership only patients about firearm relevant. is information unnecessary. is when such harassment And, record-keeping provi- as with way pro- in which the harassment One key here. sion, relevancy clause is also previous provi- from the two vision differs assert that the term “rele- again Plaintiffs sions, however, regard is to the with above, we observed vague, vant” is but as triggers the substantive mental state context, simply means requirement imposing high this prohibition. Instead speech prohibiting base their calcula- physicians should bar before —re- of irrelevance or the quiring knowledge relevancy patient’s of a tion as to the result, address their As a we need not cross-appealed the Dis- ness. have not 11. Plaintiffs ‘'discrimina- argument that what constitutes holding that the discrimination trict Court’s 790.338(5), provision is unclear. vague- tion” under this provision, is not void for good-faith manifestly particularized of a belief of rele- ments turn on a absence by determination provision flips vance—the harassment this as to the formula, relatively high relevancy bar imposing of the to the medical care speech. safety patient, Harass- or of the permitting safety before or the ownership permit- firearm others. that link explic- ment about While is not made only necessary. when are not it in connection with necessity require- ted We ment, inversion, however, implication, this be- the clear given pat- troubled this below, tern, although, necessity as we discuss we is that requirement cause scenarios in which “harass- imagine object: can directed to the same the medical warranted, safety even advisa- care or might patient, safety ment” be or the ble, majority think that in the of of we others. cases, Imposing it will not be. a more express Plaintiffs concern that the rele- permitting standard before rec-

rigorous vancy hinge solely determination will on a inquiry might present ord-keeping particular patient’s subjective understand- question, more difficult we do not but ing “unnecessary of what constitutes inappropriate prerequisite think it as a to harassment,” result, and that as a permitting “harassing.” subjected liability discipline be

Finally, necessity arbitrary we think that the re on an basis. this indeed Were case, quirement, record-keeping like the and in the provision likely would *21 Walters, quiry provisions, when read in the context invalid. See Conant v. 309 F.3d whole, (9th Cir.2002) of the Act as a also has the effect of a (holding statute a requiring particularized providing determination for administrative action against physician physicians engage the as to relevance. See who in that “the Co., Young v. Progressive patient Se. Ins. believes to be a recommendation (Fla.2000) (“[A]ll parts marijuana” So.2d of a the requisite lacks narrow Amendment); in together specificity statute must be read order to under the First “ ‘[wjhere whole,” Collins, a achieve consistent see also Thomas v. possible, give courts must effect to all 89 L.Ed. 430 statutory provisions (striking and construe related down on First Amendment statutory harmony in provisions grounds criminalizing with one a statute solicitation ”), approval Borg membership another.’ cited with in of union without state license ner, J.). (Wilson, at distinguish 284 F.3d because the statute did not be- advocacy, tween solicitation and and so points Two inform this conclusion. “put[ wholly ... speaker ] the the mer- First, provision the harassment contains cy understanding of the varied of his hear- explicit temporal an limitation: unneces- consequently ers and of whatever infer- sary harassment an prohibited “during is may ence be drawn to his intent and as 790.338(6). examination.” Fla. Stat. meaning”). purpose Since the of medical examination care, provision is the it the Again, plain meaning medical seems we find the logical any dispel to assume that term “harass” sufficient to these harassment is if context, out, permissible within that it must be fears. “Harass” means wear tire “[t]o out, care, trouble, purpose fatigue, related to the of the medical ex- or exhaust with Second, Harass, v., relevancy require- English amination. the etc.” Oxford Dictio- (2015). in present record-keeping nary ments both the When read the context whole, inquiry provisions provi- Act the harassment illuminate the the meaning necessity requirement physicians in sion should the communicates provision. disparage firearm-owning patients, the harassment not require- These speak to attempting persist should ownership when firearm about patients to summarize, the Act To we read to medical care relevant subject is not the firearm record-keeping about prohibit to of the provisions other Like the safety. or physician the knows ownership only when targets phy-

Act, provision the harassment to the to be irrelevant such information agenda an un- pursue to who wish sicians safety, or or the medical care patient’s safety. care or to medical related others; about firearm safety inquiry Court understood Although the District only physician the lacks ownership when “unnecessarily” proble- to be the modifier information is belief that good-faith in fact matic, The modifier disagree. we medical care or patient’s to the relevant chal- the freedom to physician allows a others; safety of and harass safety, or the is, patient regard- “harass” —a lenge—that only ownership firearm when ment about when, particular- under the' ing firearms necessary physician does not believe case, patient’s circumstances ized safety, patient’s medical care for safety necessary for health or doing so safety of others. reasons, might if find the patient even the record- Having determined unwelcome. For exam- advice physician’s provi- inquiry, and harassment keeping, suicidal, physician patient if a ple, clarity of sufficient conform sions are patient attempt persuade wish to hold process, of due we requirements home, patient’s from the firearms remove holding the District Court erred initially objects. So patient even if the vagueness. them void for physi- considers even if the safety health and ad- cian’s firearm-related harassing, the inclusion of the

vice to B. “unnecessarily” leaves room modifier Plaintiffs’ turn now to the first of We to deliver such advice when challenges. apply First Amendment We safety, care or consis- necessary to medical *22 only scrutiny to the Act First Amendment provisions. Act’s other The tent with the activity if it that falls within the regulates sufficiently clear provision is harassment protec- First Amendment’s ambit of the need intelligence that a of common person Therefore, analysis by begin tions. we our guess prohibits. as to what it issue: resolving necessary preliminary a by point, patients As a final we note that challenged provisions any whether of the subject physicians to themselves cannot significant “speech” a amount of implicate may complaint, discipline. Patients file a in the context that term is understood as triggers investigation by an the which of First Amendment law. Board, may malpractice a bring But, long a is action. so as good faith within the bound- operating First and Four Under pro- and good practice,

aries of medical is Amendments, prohibited States are teenth viding only safety firearm advice that is [any] abridging ... “mak[ing] law necessary, he need not fear relevant and Const, speech.” the freedom of U.S. at the hands of the Board or a discipline literal- I.12“The First Amendment money judgment in a court of law. amend. 146, 150, (1939); ap- L.Ed. 155 see also prohibition is S.Ct. 84 12. The First Amendment’s 296, 303, Connecticut, against through the Four- plied the States 310 U.S. 60 Cantwell v. 900, 903, (1940). Clause. teenth Amendment’s Due Process 84 L.Ed. 1213 S.Ct. 147, 160, Jersey, 60 Schneider v. New 308 U.S. only ly abridgment ‘speech,’ long any forbids the so as inhibition of right that is its long recognized pro- merely but we have that the incidental effect of observing at spoken tection does not end an legitimate regulation.” otherwise Id. at Johnson, written word.” Texas v. 491 1191 (quoting Accountant’s Soc. Va. v. 404, 2533, 2539, (4th Bowman, Cir.1988)). 109 S.Ct. 105 U.S. 860 F.2d 604 (1989). L.Ed.2d Conduct also be That far goes, true so as it but the “sufficiently imbued with elements of com- proffered interpretation State’s begs the scope munication to fall within the of the question we must answer here. An inhibi- First and Fourteenth Amendments.” professionals’ tion of speech freedom of Spence Washington, 418 U.S. does not violate the First Amendment “so ” 2727, 2730, 94 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 842 long “merely it is the incidental effect (1974). particular To determine whether of ... an legitimate regulation.” otherwise implicates protections conduct added). (emphasis Id. The analysis State’s Amendment, First we to whether it look proceeds at a high such level of generality convey a particularized “intenfded] to that regulating practice all laws of a whether, message,” under circum- profession necessarily would impose only stances, highly likely it is “that the mes- incidental on speech, burdens and so would sage by would be understood [observers].” under, always pass muster the First Johnson, 491 U.S. at at 109 S.Ct. Amendment. This cannot be the case. 410-11, (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at The State also cites Justice con White’s 2730). at S.Ct. SEC, curring opinion Lowe v. It would seem under this definition— 181, 211-36, 2557, 2573-86, indeed, any under almost measure —that (1985), L.Ed.2d 130 but we do not find asking questions writing down an- anything opinion in that that would counte protected expression swers constitute un- nance the idea that category the entire However, der the First Amendment. professional regulation only touches argues escapes State the Act First conduct, beyond and thus lies reach scrutiny Amendment because it is directed Indeed, the First Amendment. Justice practice toward conduct—the of medicine. recognized point, White some “[a]t (as must) seemingly conceding While longer regulation measure is no of a that asking questions writing down profession regulation but or of answers would receive First Amendment press; beyond that point, the statute protection if it occurred strangers between scrutiny must survive the level of demand corner, on a street State asserts ed the First Amendment.” Id. activity by phy- because the is conducted *23 2583; 105 at see also v. Hu S.Ct. Holder part practice sician as of the of the medical 1, 28, Project, manitarian Law 561 U.S. profession, pro- and because the medical 2705, 2724, 130 177 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 355 subject long regu- fession has been to close (2010) that (explaining when “the conduct State, by lation the fact that the the law triggering coverage [a] under statute con restricts oral and written communication is communicating message a ... sists we consequence of no whatever. [apply] demanding must a more standard” scrutiny applied regulations than that

The support State finds for this conduct) (second Shore, of noncommunicative proposition in Locke v. 634 F.3d (11th Cir.2011). Stuart, case, original); modification in Miller v. 1185 In that we said (11th Cir.1997) (hold 1376, governs that 117 F.3d 1382 practice “[a] statute the of an that a a occupation ing regula is not unconstitutional as state not insulate an abridgement right speech, speech of the to free tion of commercial from First provision discrimination by classifying simply review

Amendment The 790.338(5), profession Act, part § of the if not a horse of a speech as N.J., accountancy); King color, v. Governor at least a steed of a different (3d Cir.2014) 216, (reject 228-29 767 F.3d provision prohibits different shade. This that verbal communica argument ing the against a based “discrimination] when are “conduct” tions become patient’s exercise of the solely upon services), cert. professional used deliver right possess to own and constitutional Christie, King v. 575 U.S. denied sub nom or ammunition.” Id. Unlike the firearms 2048, -, 191 L.Ed.2d 955 135 S.Ct. considered, the dis provisions first two (2015). facially im provision crimination does not then, task, determine whether is to Our protected a amount of plicate substantial the Act crosses the bound- any provision of course, speech. possible Of it is to dis regulating professional a law ary between speech, by hanging sign on criminate via an incidental effect on conduct with proclaiming room wall the examination protected speech, regulating and a law Here,” Owners Not for ex “Gun Welcome scrutiny “must survive the level of which But this does not transform anti- ample. First Amendment.” by the demanded laws into restrictions on discrimination Lowe, at 2583 472 U.S. S.Ct. Acad. speech. See Forum Rumsfeld for (White, J., concurring). Inc., 47, 62, Rights, & Inst’l U.S. (2006) 1297, 1308, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 S.Ct. record-keeping provision- of The (“Congress, example, prohibit can em 790.338(1), Act, § prohibits physicians ployers discriminating hiring from on “intentionally entering] any dis from concerning information firearm the basis of race. The fact that this will closed patient’s rec ownership into medical require employer sign an to take down certain circumstances. This ord” under Only’ hardly reading Applicants ‘White clearly targets activity making provision analyzed that the should means law — in entry an in a medical record —that employer’s speech rath regulating one convey particular message— tended to conduct.”); er than accord Wisconsin v. firearm ownership. information about Mitchell, 476, 487-88, 113 S.Ct. aside) And, we think that under (legibility (compil 124 L.Ed.2d 436 highly likely it is the circumstances ing upholding cases state and federal anti- content contained in these expressive against laws First Amend discrimination entries would be understood those challenge). provision ment The does not Therefore, hold that the viewing them. we single speech, target speech out record-keeping provision regulates speech, specific rather “the message; carries such, and as must survive some level of point prohibition focal of its the act of [is] scrutiny. First Amendment against individuals in the discriminating provision of [medical treatment] Act, inquiry provision The proscribed ground[ Hurley See v. Irish- ].” 790.338(2), requires physicians to “re Gay, Grp. Am. Lesbian & Bisexual making inquiry a written .frain Bos., U.S. asking questions concerning ownership *24 ” (1995). 2347, Especially L.Ed.2d 487 132 face, provi of a firearm.... On this its light of the facial nature of Plaintiffs’ protected speech inquir sion also inhibits — challenge, we hold the discrimination ing ownership. about firearm It too must provision regulation is a of conduct with Amendment survive some level of First only speech. an incidental effect on As scrutiny. such, offend, provision let alone tile implicate, substantially does regulates First Amendment. speech and so must survive some level of scrutiny.13 First Amendment provision

The harassment of sum, In we conclude while the dis- Act, 790.338(6), § requires physicians provision crimination a regulation unnecessarily harassing “refrain ” professional conduct with merely an inci- firearm ownership.... about speech, dental effect on and thus does not v. point College Plaintiffs us Saxe State Amendment, District, implicate the First which the rec- Area School stands ord-keeping, inquiry, proposition categorical pro- is no harassment “[t]here exception’ regulate significant ‘harassment to the First visions do amount of ” speech protected Amendment’s free clause. 240 speech. Accordingly, we must (3d Cir.2001) J.). 200, (Alito, F.3d 204 proceed Of to determine what level of scruti- course, “non-expressive, physically harass ny the First Amendment demands of these entirely ing conduct is outside the ambit of Lowe, provisions. 230, See 472 U.S. at 105 clause,” speech the free but the First (White, J., S.Ct. at concurring). 2583 “protects variety Amendment also wide speech may deep that listeners consider 206; see,

ly e.g, Sny offensive....” Id. at Not all speech restrictions on are 443, 1207, Phelps, der v. 562 131 U.S. S.Ct. equal. created may Restrictions be con (2011); 179 172 Brandenburg L.Ed.2d v. tent-neutral or content-based. Content- Ohio, 444, 1827, 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. based restrictions on are restric (1969). L.Ed.2d 430 “appl[y] particular tions that speech be topic cause of the discussed the idea or reading A natural of the provi Gilbert, message expressed.” Reed v. Town sion pri would seem to indicate that it is iz., U.S. -, -, 135 S.Ct. harassment, Ar marily concerned with verbal (2015). 2218, 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 The subject since it defines a about un which First Amendment does not suffer content- necessary harassment prohibited. It is based speech lightly. They restrictions of imagine difficult to physi how one would are presumptively generally invalid and cally a patient ] about firearm “harassf 790.338(6) subject scrutiny. to strict See R.A.V. v. ownership.” Fla. See Stat. added). Paul, 377, 382, City St. 505 U.S. (emphasis Even howev assuming, 2538, er, 2542, that there are S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d some situations in which (“Content-based provision applied regulations could be without in are presump invalid.”). volving speech, we think that tively on balance constitutional, bring types judged 13. We note that Plaintiffs two in relation to the stat- challenges provision plainly legitimate sweep.” facial ute’s to this under the United States Stevens, 1577, 559 U.S. 130 S.Ct. First Amendment: a traditional facial chal 1587, (2010) (quotation 176 L.Ed.2d 435 lenge, only which can succeed if "no set of omitted). marks circumstances exists under which the Act valid," State, Cty. would be Am. Fed’n & plainly legitimate applica- If there are some Scott, 851, Emps. Mun. Council 79 v. 717 F.3d provision, tions of the harassment such as to (11th Cir.2013) denied, - U.S. -, cert. harassment, physical that would seem to (2014) (quot- 134 S.Ct. 188 L.Ed.2d 912 doom the first of Plaintiffs’ facial First Salerno, ing United States v. challenges. Amendment This is not necessar- (1987)), however, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 ily dispositive, because a substantial challenge, "whereby and an overbreadth applications may number of its still found law be invalidated as overbroad if a to be unconstitutional in an overbreadth anal- applications ysis. substantial number of its are un- *25 are, however, types speech. eontent-based restriction on The certain There squarely Act fits within the definition of that speech restrictions of content-based ap content-based restrictions because it less-demanding received traditionally have speech “topic based on the dis plies restric scrutiny. example, For judicial Reed, at -, cussed.” See speech receive lesser tions on commercial speak at 2227. “Plaintiffs want to S.Ct. can be no constitu scrutiny because “there patients], they and whether do [their suppression of com objection tional under on depends [the Act] so what accurately that do not messages mercial Holder, 27, say.” 561 U.S. at 130 S.Ct. at activity.” about lawful public inform the Act is a content- 2723-24. Because the Corp. v. Pub. & Elec. Cent. Hudson Gas restriction, based it can avoid strict scruti York, New U.S. Serv. Comm’n of only it ny professional if restriction on 65 L.Ed.2d 341 100 S.Ct. speech professional speech receives (1980). speech on commercial Restrictions scrutiny. lesser scrutiny. traditionally receive intermediate Fortunately, we need not decide this 564, 100 at S.Ct. Id. at question. ultimately difficult We hold that professional speech is The status of scrutiny Act as the survives even strict Supreme The Court has never murkier. a compelling State has asserted interest proper level of precisely addressed narrowly and the Act is tailored to advance speech. Plaintiffs scrutiny professional for conclusion, that interest. Given this we that even if the First Amend- here contend judgment scrutiny no pass what level murky, the previously waters were ment’s here, apply should but would of course recent decision in Reed v. Supreme Court’s any the Act also hold survives less makes clear that all con- Town Gilbert demanding scrutiny. level of See Sorrell speech restrictions on are sub- tent-based Inc., -, -, IMS Health U.S. ject scrutiny.14 explained As be- to strict 180 L.Ed.2d 544 low, ample there was evidence before Reed (2011) (declining precise to decide the level received, speech also professional scrutiny when the result would be the most, scrutiny intermediate and it is hard- possible same under either of the two stan- ly anything changed. clear that has dards). Although apply scrutiny, we strict matter, agree we As an initial with the professional we include an overview of characterization of the Act as a it helpful below as we believe Plaintiffs! Reed, Supreme professional Court 14. In found that ulation of conduct” did not offer -, municipal sign “governing code the manner protection scrutiny. from strict Id. at display people outdoor (internal [could] quotation which 135 S.Ct. at 2229 marks signs” the First violated Amendment. 576 omitted). at -, U.S. 135 S.Ct. at 2224-25. The Court Breyer, concurring judgment, Justice in the suggest scrutiny applies that strict seemed wrote that content "cannot discrimination regulations broadly content-based to all always trigger scrutiny.” and should not strict -, speech. id. at 135 S.Ct. at 2231 See -, J., (Breyer, Id. at 135 S.Ct. at 2234 ("Because Sign imposes the Town’s Code original). concurring) (emphasis in the In speech, content-based restrictions on those particular, ”[r]egulatory pro he noted provisions only they can stand if survive strict grams always require almost content discrim scrutiny.”). The Court first determined ination,” holding always and that that this whether the law was content-neutral or con at -, “triggers scrutiny recipe strict is to write a tent-based. Id. 135 S.Ct. at 2228-29. content-based, judicial management ordinary government Having determined was regulatory activity.” (noting doctor-pa scrutiny Id. applied strict without Court further example confidentiality of content- inquiry. Quoting precedent, the Court tient as an Id. discrimination). reg- emphasized that a in the based state’s “interest *26 apply professional whether to speech the nature of the interests understanding speaker doctrine” to be “whether the at here. is play personalized providing private advice a a. client”); setting paying to a see also Rob Post, ert Consent to Abortion: A First, must examine what constitutes we Informed Analysis Compelled First Amendment speech. concepts Two orient professional of 939, Physician Speech, 2007 U. Ill. L.Rev. profession and relation our discussion: (“[W]hen a physician speaks pa 949 to a only of ship. Physicians are not members treatment, tient in the course of medical they are also fidu profession, the medical opinions normally regu- his are ciary physician-patient members of various lable], ...”). See, relationships. e.g., Phy 61 Am.Jur.2d sicians, Surgeons, Other Healers hand, a physician may On the other also Temkin, (2012); Mangoni § 141 v. 679 speak rally, to a at a extolling crowd 1286, 1288 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996). So.2d particular of a political merits candidate. Although this speech is also uttered a course, speech by not all Of clearly professional, does not constitute It sense professionals equal. is is common Lowe, speech.” “professional See 472 U.S. difference, is a for First “[t]here 232, 105 (White, J., at at 2584 concur S.Ct. ... purposes, profes Amendment between (“Where ring) personal nexus between speech public large at ver sionals’ exist, professional client does direct, personalized speech sus their with speaker purport a does not to be exercis Locke, 1191; also clients.” 634 F.3d see ing judgment any of particular behalf It, Inc., 618, Bar v. For Fla. Went individual with whose circumstances he is 634, 541 132 L.Ed.2d directly acquainted, government regulation (1995) obviously (“Speech by professionals ... regulation speaking becomes of dimensions.”). many profes While a has such, subject as to the publishing First may variety topics on a of in a speak sional ‘Congress Amendment’s command that contexts, only of this variety of some ... abridging shall make no law the free speech category under the doctrinal falls ”); speech, press.’ or of the dom “professional speech.” cf. Sedivy Stenberg, v. ex rel. 5 Neb. State example, physician may For meet with (sug App. N.W.2d patient in an examination room and ex that the First Amendment gesting dicta of a plain particular surgical pro the risks a veter revoking would bar the State from easily cedure. This conversation is classi solely he ex inarian’s license because professional speech. King, fied as See government pressed disagreement with (defining professional speech F.3d at 232 tax policies). speech provide person that “is used to cut, speech clear physician Not all is so to a client on the alized services based may speak A also judg physician however. professional’s expert knowledge and ment”); public practice in furtherance of the Moore-King Cty. Chester (4th Cir.2013) Va., field, physician may speak And a to a 708 F.3d medicine. inquiry determine client on a matter irrelative to medicine.15 (finding “the relevant hypothetical speech'— illustrate and the relational context of the 15. These four scenarios physician speaking physician speech and whether the within the universe of turn on help- professional effectivity fiduciary relationship It two factors: the or not. categories in speech speaking in to think about these four ful —whether not, practice grid, furtherance of medicine or form of a like so: 2007) former, promotional (affirming it includes June revocation of As for the public to the for the advertising physician’s part repeatedly license physicians’ prac- furthering purpose elderly pressuring to conceal the general health advice to the *27 giving tice and physician’s attempt to solicit a loan from talk show or in a public on a television her). See, e.g., Bailey v. newspaper column. in physician speaks patient When a to a Inc., Ctr., Rehab. Diagnostic &

Huggins medicine, practice furtherance of the of (disal- (Colo.App.1997) 952 P.2d one, implicated: but two state interests are grounds First Amendment lowing on regulation profession protec- of the for the against claim negligent-misrepresentation public regulation tion of the and of the suggesting that mer- publicly a dentist for protection pa- for of relationship the the are harmful cury-amalgam fillings and society. tient and the benefit of Converse- removed). should be ly, physician speaks public when a to the Conversely, conversation between a practice on a matter irrelative to the of physician patient and a about their mutu- medicine, neither state interest adheres al of fall in the latter cat- golf love would force; instead, any special with the coun- egory: speech practice unrelated to the tervailing physician’s interests —the inter- of medicine but within the confines of a in speaking freely society’s est interest relationship. A physician patient more — listening freely to the fore. —come example type of this of speech sinister aligns This framework with and illumi intimidating harassing speech by guidance Supreme nates the limited the See, patient. e.g., to a In re provided professional speech. Court has Suspension or Revocation License of Take, A-2181-06T2, example, promotional speech by for Singh, No. 2007 WL (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. professionals. at *1 analysis, regula Under our implicate profession two lation of the medical for type of this the tions protection public, regulation interests: the state’s primary interest fiduciary relationship protec- public by regulating protecting tion and the benefit of soci- society’s interest profession, ety. When one understands that both of Notably, these free flow of information. primary play interests at cut in favor Supreme precisely are the interests cases, government regulation in such analyzing reg has found relevant to Court Supreme Court’s succinct conclusion professional advertising. ulations of See regulation that the implicated physi- “the Bd. Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Va. State First Amendment rights” cian[s’] but sur- Council, Inc., Consumer scrutiny vived some heightened level of 766-68, 1817, 1827, 1828-29, 48 *28 a regulation practice “reasonable” of (1976) the (characterizing L.Ed.2d 346 medicine makes more sense. Id. countervailing society’s interests as the brief WTiile Court’s treatment of this “strong in the free flow of com interest in Casey provide issue does not much in- information,” and the state’s mercial sight analyze regulations into how to of in the “strong protecting public interest” professional speech, why the statute at by maintaining “high professional stan scrutiny,. issue survived First Amendment dards”); accord Bates v. State Bar of holding helpful is insofar as it is consis- Ariz., 2691, 350, 364-79, 97 S.Ct. U.S. speech by tent with our conclusion that a (1977); 2699-2707, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 Ohralik professional is eval- best understood when Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 454- v. Ohio State along uated two dimensions —whether it is 1912, 1918-20, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 profession uttered in furtherance of a (1978). professional— whether it occurs within a addressed, Supreme relationship. The Court has also client category speech by in another of a passing, mark today We need not out professional regulation compelling phy- —a full professional metes and of bounds sicians to discuss certain information with speech. It is sufficient to observe that patients their about the risks of abortion by a in speech physician that is uttered and childbirth. Planned Parenthood of practice furtherance of the of medicine and Casey, Se. Pa. v. fiduciary of a within the confines relation 2791, 2824, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 S.Ct. ship squarely category. falls within this framework, (joint our opinion). Under regulate, what the Act to As this is seeks type regulation this of falls at the intersec- pro a regulation we conclude that is of regu- speech.16 governmental tion of two interests: fessional 16. There can be no argument argue to that Plaintiffs We do not understand Plaintiffs inquiries ownership right view about firearm they Amendment have First to is, preventive matter of care—that in further speak patients within the to their examination practice ance of the of medicine —or practice irrelative to the room matters of patients— these with their wish to raise issues So, we find that the Act is medicine. because is, fiduciary that within the context of a rela permit inquiry tailored to about firearms essentials, Indeed, tionship. stripped to its good believes in faith whenever theory appears Plaintiffs' of the case relevant to the health that such is information prohibits speaking that the Act them from individual, supra safety any part of see patients practice their in furtherance of of indeed, IV.A.2, we cannot-— we need not— medicine, objective but State’s in propriety applying the Act to address the passing prohibit the Act was to them from discussing prohibit physicians matters speaking practice on a matter irrelative to the safety. patients' irrelative to their health or medicine, punish and that it will seek to regu concede that the Act Because Plaintiffs doing them for so. mind, we are action is “the principles least restrictive means these

With to address the issue of the prepared advancing government now inter- compelling of First Amendment level appropriate Solantic, City Neptune est.” LLC v. speech. professional scrutiny accorded (11th Cir.2005). Beach, 410 F.3d

b. parcel cognita Another of terra scrutiny the level of with which to evaluate di Supreme Court has never The regulations speech by professional appropriate level of rectly addressed public promotion profession. of their professional speech reg scrutiny accorded proceed Supreme must from The Court has noted that this therefore ulations. We First, the unknown. we known to type “occurs an area tradition professionals speak on a know that when ally subject government regulation,” practice to the of their matter irrelative and has therefore concluded that it war any particular outside rela profession and protection rants a lower level of under the professional status as a tionship, their Ohralik, First Amendment. 436 U.S. at entirely speech. incidental to their When Correspondingly, 98 S.Ct. at 1918. true, government generally may this is the Court has set a lower bar which to differently speakers not treat professional regulation speech— measure State of such speakers. See Pick nonprofessional than intermediate, *29 scrutiny. than rather strict (9th Brown, 1208, 740 F.3d 1227-28 up v. Bar, 623, Fla. 515 at 115 at U.S. S.Ct. (“[O]utside Cir.2013) doctor-patient the re review, 2375. To survive this of the level constitutionally are lationship, doctors State “must assert a substantial interest in soapbox pam to orators and equivalent regulation” of its support and demonstrate speech and their receives robust phleteers, “directly that the restriction and material Amendment.”); the protection under First ly sweep advances” interest without Madison, Joint City also Sch. Dist. see of widely than ing necessary. more Id. at Comm’n, Emp’t No. 8 v. Wis. Relations 624, (citing 115 S.Ct. at 2376 Cent. Hud 167, 176, 421, 426, 97 429 U.S. S.Ct. 50 son, 2351). 566, 447 at 100 at U.S. S.Ct. (“[The (1976) government] L.Ed.2d 376 speak not ... discriminate between holdings The Court’s in this area of their employ ers on the basis follow a clear trend. When the State ment....”); Pickering v. Bd. Ed. of of impose seeks to content-based restrictions 205, Ill., Twp. Cty., Dist. High Sch. Will speech regula on a context in which its 563, 568, 1731, 1734, 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. diminished, tory interests are such as (1968) (“[T]eachers may L.Ed.2d 811 [not] professional speaks public when a to the constitutionally compelled to relinquish nonprofessional capacity, apply courts rights they the First Amendment would scrutiny. the exacting most the When enjoy as citizens to comment otherwise on regulate speech by profes State seeks to interest....”). public matters of sionals in a context in which the State’s also know that We because the regulating interést in the protection for of in imposing State’s interest content-based rooted, public the is more deeply lesser speech on at low restrictions is ebb when a scrutiny applies. level of professional speaks public to the irrelative think that the We restriction issue practice profession, to the of his the State cleanly here fits latter category, within the required to meet the demands of strict scrutiny demonstrating that its impli- course of because both of the State interests medicine, practice proceed analyze

lates in furtherance of the we to it as such. boundaries, have deep regulatory the Act fessions within their cated and that First, long recognized part power roots. courts have of their to protect public the health, authority duty, safety, even —of States to and the other valid interests — professions to regulate practice power the have broad to establish stan against licensing the the untrust dards for public practitioners regu “shield[] and worthy, incompetent, irresponsi lating practice of professions.”); Wat Collins, 516, Maryland, son ble.” Thomas v. v. 173, 176, U.S. (1945) 646, (1910) (“It 89 L.Ed. 430 S.Ct. 54 L.Ed. 987 see, e.g., Gold (Jackson, J., concurring); too require well settled to discussion at Bar, Va. State day police U.S. this that the power the states farb 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 the regulation S.Ct. extends to of certain trades (“We recognize callings, States have and particularly those which health.”).17 compelling practice pro- closely public interest concern the authority, ing keep legible 17. Pursuant to that states com- to ... medical records” that monly touching profes- responsible identify physicians "by enact laws on what name and Florida, may say. professional example, sionals has title” and that include sufficient quite regulations implicating speech by "justify few information the course of treat- See, physicians. e.g., patient”; § Fla. "failing Stat. 381.026 ment and ... (requiring physicians provide patients to communicate vari- with information about their patients request, patient rights ous patient information to in- and how to file a com- "name, function, cluding: physician’s plaint”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-9.007 qualifications”; concerning surgeons and (requiring "verbally information confirm the identification, planned patient’s "diagnosis, patient’s proce- course the intended alternatives, treatment, risks, prognosis”; surgical/procedure dure and correct site” information; operating, various financial a written before and to document such con- patient rights records); responsibili- patient’s "statement of in the firmation medical ties”); (requiring physicians id. (proscribing 381.986 id. 64B8-9.008 R. all "verbal prescribe provide who cannabis low-THC behavior” between a and a *30 patients potential information "reasonably interpreted to about the that could as ro- of, to, risks and patient”); side effects alternatives and [the] mantic involvement with id. treatment, effectiveness of the im- (mandating as well as R. 64B8-9.013 detailed informa- posing recording reporting physicians various and re- prior tion must record to and dur- quirements); (requiring physi- ing § 456.41 prescribing id. course of the controlled sub- offering complementary patient, physicians cians a requiring or alternative stances for to healthcare to to the plan” specific treatments communicate use a "written with treatment nature, content, patient, orally writing, requiring or in physicians "the and to "discuss benefits, treatment,” and risks as well risks and benefits of the use of controlled the education, practitioner’s as "the experience, patient”); substances with the id. R. 64B8- field,” the (prohibiting physicians "pro- credentials in and to indicate 9.0141 from provision pa- the viding] of such information in the treatment recommendations ... via records); (re- § tient’s medical id. physi- 458.324 electronic or other the means” unless quiring physicians treating patients diag- completes cian ation,” a "documented evalu- high options nosed with or at a risk for breast cancer discusses "treatment and the provide patients to pa- to their various informa- risks and benefits of treatment” with the tient, contemporane- tion about docu- treatment alternatives and ... “[m]aint[ains] records”); provision ment the of such information ous medical id. R. 64B8-11.001 records); patients’ their (imposing medical id. various restrictions on § (requiring physicians, advertising); prior (prohibiting 458.325 ad- id. R. 64B8-11.002 ministering psychosurgi- physicians representing electroconvulsive or licensed procedures, cal promotional to disclose re- information their communications AIDS,” garding procedure); (listing negative § the id. 458.331 "are HIV or free from or action, grounds disciplinary implying stating any various in- or other "that licensee intimidation, fraud, cluding greater patients "the use un- be a of is or risk to due to influence, overreaching provide due form of or a or a failure or refusal to Similar adver- notice”); (re- patients; tising vexatious conduct” solicit "fail- id. or R. 64B8-11.003 1192 promotional speech regulating to when

Moreover, authority of State fiduciary context given the professionals, fiduciary char- relationships of a regulate occurs. the former within which is, anything, if law the common acter via prin- than proposition Supreme venerable Court’s Broadly reading more any regulatory may suggest that possesses decision the State recent Reed ciple that includ- See, regulations, all content-based e.g., and professions. authority over speech, professional commercial and ing Marbury, 91 U.S. v. Oil Co. Twin-Lick scrutiny.18 subjéet to See are now strict (“That (1875) 587, 588-89, L.Ed. 328 not, however, 14. need supra note We occu- corporation joint-stock of a director a lesser conclusively whether determine where fiduciary relations those pies one of applies regulations scrutiny of ever form beneficiary or ... dealings with his in this case speech, because professional his confided to interest whose party strict or the same whether the outcome is courts, by the jealousy care, with is viewed supra scrutiny applies. See intermediate grounds, is slight on may be set aside that, apply we next part IV.B.2. Given morali- on soundest a doctrine founded scrutiny Act. to the strict clearest has received the ty, and which others.”); and in in this court recognition Story, Joseph Commentaries also see scrutiny requires that Strict at 235-36 Jurisprudence Equity acting it is to further State show that 1886) (“In (13th ... which [in cases ed. governmental interest and compelling fiduciary relation between is a there “narrowly tailored to actions are its law, prevent undue in order to parties,] the Fed. Election interest.” achieve confidence, unlimited advantage from the Inc., Life, Right Comm’n Wisconsin the rela- affection, duty or sense which 2652, 2664, 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. creates, requires the utmost naturally tion (2007). The state bears L.Ed.2d 329 ... in all transactions faith degree good on its “heavy justification” based burden Blumstein, any If there is mis- Dunn v. parties. purposes.” “asserted between of a 405 U.S. any concealment representation, (1972). turn to de We first L.Ed.2d fact, just suspicion of arti- any material compel has a termining whether Florida influence, Equity undue Courts fice or ling interest. Tamar generally see interpose____”); will Law, Frankel, 79-99 Fiduciary a. government regula- (tracing the roots *31 four of Florida asserts The State relations back to Hammu- fiduciary tion of (1) the protection of compelling interests: rabi). keep to and bear right Amendment Second Indeed, the ease that one could make (2) arms; privacy patients’ protection type of governing laws the enacting when (3) elimination to of barriers rights; (4) professional speech with quintessential access; prevention and healthcare here, the State of firearm we are concerned and harassment which discrimination than owners.19 regulatory leeway has even more 1, 2015); Pro (W.D.Ky. Contest identify at *5 Oct. quiring physicians to them- licensed motions, City County Fran San patients). LLC to their selves as such 15-cv-00093, cisco, Cal., 2015 WL No. apply- noting 18. It is worth that lower courts 28, 2015). 4571564, (N.D.Cal. July at *4 apply to ing Reed have found that it does not (pre- See, reasons the third and fourth e.g., Chiropractors 19. We find speech. commercial Educ., harassment and Conway, vention of discrimination LLC v. United Research & for healthcare) 5822721, 3:15-CV-00556-GNS, to be inherent- ensuring to access 2015 WL No. ion) begin, To the State’s (holding interest that a free-speech restriction regulating practice professions election-day solicitation is a compelling interest protection public merely protects of the is not because the fundamen- vote). substantial, right tal to “compelling.” Goldfarb, but 792, U.S. 95 S.Ct. at 2016. The do not hesitate to conclude We “obviously asserted interests into” faetor[ ] that states have a compelling interest “paramount objective,” State’s ... Fla. protecting the fundamental right keep to Bar, 624, 2376, 515 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. at in and bear A right arms. expressly guaran the area of professional regulation pro — by teed the Constitution. pro The Act tecting its from citizens harmful or ineffec right tects the keep to by bear arms professional practices. tive See Fla. Stat. protecting patients from ques irrelevant 456.003(2) (stating legisla the Florida tioning guns about that could dissuade preservation ture’s belief that “the of the them from exercising their constitutionally health, safety, and welfare of public” is guaranteed rights, questions that a patient only permissible objective of regula may they answer, feel cannot refuse to professions). tions of the health given significant imbalance of power between and doctor behind the Supreme While the pre Court has never closed doors of the examination room. cisely defined what constitutes a “compel The stories that prompted the leg Florida interest,” ling Wygant see v. Jackson Bd. islature to act illustrate this prob obvious of Educ., 267, 286, 1842, 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. lem. legislator that, One stated during an 1853, (O’Connor, J., L.Ed.2d 260 appointment with his daughter, a pediatri concurring) (observing that the term’s cian asked that legislator remove his “precise uncertain”), contours are it has gun from his home. Audio CD: Regular gravity examined the of the interests as Session House Floor HB Debate on by serted the State here. held the Florida Representa House of The Second provides Amendment 2011) (remarks (Apr. tives at 26:20 Militia, that “A regulated well being neces Artiles) (on Rep. file with Florida House of sary State,' security to the of a free Clerk). Representatives Office of the An right people Arms, to keep and bear legislator reported other complaint Const, shall infringed.” not be U.S. a constituent that his provider healthcare amend. II. It undisputed is now that the falsely told him that disclosing firearm Second Amendment right keep and bear ownership was a requirement. Medicaid arms is a right. fundamental See Mc (remarks Brodeur). Id. at 13:40 of Rep. City Chicago, Donald v. Neither of these required circumstances 177 L.Ed.2d 894 anyone home, a gun remove from their (2010) (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and but activity did chill lawful protected ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Second Amendment. The same can right keep counted the and bear arms election-day said of the solicitation stat among those rights necessary fundamental ute in Freeman: solicitation would not re system to our liberty.”). of ordered En quire vote, give up citizens to right *32 suring guarantee the full of fundamental Freeman, but it right. could chill the See rights certainly can a compelling be inter 199, 211, 1851, at U.S. at S.Ct. See, Freeman, est. e.g., Burson v. 504 1858. requests These doctors’ irrelevant 191, 199, 211, 1846, 1851, U.S. 112 S.Ct. and misinformation pa threatened their 1858, 119 (plurality L.Ed.2d 5 opin- tients’ rights, exercise of fundamental ly wrapped-up in the other two asserted separately. inter- ests and do not discuss them per- records or “confidentiality medical others who re- countless of

likely those of added). (emphasis in finances.” Id. were sonal silent, patients their while mained vulnerability, lacking great of position view, logic In the of Jones our up for themselves fully stand power to the right that the easily leads to the conclusion note 26. See rights. and their infra a firearm in one’s status as privacy to compelling in- Next, asserts the State compelling. and thus owner is sacrosanct gun of privacy the protecting terest in otherwise, argue to rely Plaintiffs on Jones in from inclusion as such owners’ status only argument. undercuts their but Jones Supreme The their medical records. inter privacy maintain that the Plaintiffs in- “recognized privacy long [a] has Court because, like cannot be sacrosanct est here away facts from keeping personal in terest affiliation, on firearm information party v. Dep’t Justice eye.” U.S. public subject to disclosure ownership already of Freedom For Comm. Reporters governments. and federal We of to the state 749, 769, Press, 109 S.Ct. here are disagree. rights The at issue (1989). Specifically, L.Ed.2d and cherished indisputably more valued in- privacy interests recognized previously in society privacy than mere American even when some- “limiting exposure” clude spe affiliation. As the Court party one’s “wholly private.” Id. already is not thing Jones, cifically privacy par in noted omitted). marks (quotation the same as “confiden ty affiliation is not Florida’s tiality medical records.” Id. interests, course, come Privacy the firearm owner keeping commitment to privacy An asserted degrees. varying in of its citizens out of their medi ship status being a “com the level rises to interest then, records, exactly type cal only when it can be said interest pelling” compelling privacy interest sacrosanct Demo See Cal. truly “sacrosanct.” to have contem appears Court Jones Jones, 530 Party v. U.S. cratic plated. 2402, 2413, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 Further, actually here is (2000). has not the situation Supreme Court While Although of that in opposite “sacro Jones. guidance on what is given us clear government the federal re- is not. In Cali Florida and sanct,” know what we do Jones, in of certain information Party quire disclosure Democratic fornia pur- when regards background in checks right privacy one’s found that Court firearm, 790.065; § Fla. chasing a see Stat. could not be considered party affiliation 922(t), § as was the case with compel therefore not 18 U.S.C. sacrosanct—and Jones, Florida also affiliation many party federal statutes “re ling given that — strong policy of exceedingly an party affiliation as evinces quire a declaration greatest protecting of this information to to certain appointment condition of it is a possible.20 example, extent For the Court noted Importantly, fices.” Id. compile a list of fire- party felony Florida privacy interest in of one’s that the § Fla. 790.335. in arm -owners.21 See Stat. not akin to an interest affiliation was compiling lists of firearm own- Amend- 21. The ban on reverence for the Second 20. Florida's governments apples to state and local ers referring begin to it as ment has led some to agencies, including employees, and to their See, e.g., Editorial the "Gunshine” state. private.” any "persons, public or Fla. other Board, your Stand Ground More Mischief 790.335(2). § a handful of There are Stat. A22, Florida, Times, Nov. N.Y. additional exceptions that include their own http://www.njftimes.com/2015/ll/ available at 790.335(3). safeguards. privacy See id. 02/opinion/more-stand-your-ground-mischief- excepted Physicians are the ban. in-florida.html. id. See *33 Bar, policy -, The State maintains this because -, Florida 575 U.S. lists, being such rather than a tool for law 1656, 1671, (2015) S.Ct. 191 L.Ed.2d 570 enforcement, harassing are means for (noting problems that “most great arise in profiling innocent residents and could fall er and gradations, lesser and the First wrong into the hands. See id. Amendment does not confine a State to 790.335(l)(a)(2). hacking As and other form”). addressing evils in their most acute data breaches have become increasingly The State “must demonstrate narrow tai common, the wisdom of such a ban is loring of the challenged regulation to the Thus, increasingly apparent.22 regu- while asserted interest —‘a fit that is not neces lations abound in relation to gun owner- sarily reasonable; perfect, but repre ship, rightfully Florida privacy treats the sents not necessarily single dispo best of such information as sacrosanct and acts sition but one whose scope proportion is aggressively protect it. The Act fur- ” to the interest served.’ Greater New Or policy by thers this limiting what informa- Ass’n, States, leans Broad. Inc. v. United gets patients’ tion into medical records 173, 188, 1923, 1932, 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. day that could one fall into wrong L.Ed.2d 161 (quoting Bd. Trs. purposes hands be used for of harass- Fox, State Univ. N.Y. v. Therefore, ment. we hold that protecting 106 L.Ed.2d 388 privacy of patients’ status as firearm (1989)). by owners prohibiting physicians from in- The Plaintiffs argue first the Act quiring recording medically about and ir- cannot narrowly be tailored to protec- relevant information about firearm owner- tion of Second rights Amendment because ship is also a compelling state interest. speech in question does not interfere conclusion, In we find the State’s assert- with such rights. argument This could not ed in protecting interests Second Amend- be farther off It base. is of course an rights protecting privacy ment to be interference with Second Amendment compelling. turnWe now to the narrow- rights for a trusted to tell his tailoring requirement. patient medically no relevant reason —for b. whatsoever —that it is unsafe to own a gun. actions, own, Though such on their In order for law to survive stop owning strict scrutiny, it also narrowly must be gun, complete prohibition hardly re- tailored to achieve the state’s asserted quired infringe constitutionally guar- compelling Right interest. Wisconsin Inc., anteed Life, Such chills the rights. pa- U.S. at S.Ct. not, however, 2664. A law is tient’s exercise of his required rights and that perfectly tailored. See Williams-Yulee sufficient.23 enabled, digital 22. The you-need-to-know-about-the-hack-of- revolution has on a scale, government-background-investigations/. massive the unauthorized In disclosures of sector, private successfully hackers ac- private Despite existing privacy information. Target cessed credit card information for cus- security technology, laws and govern- neither Sindel, Danny tomers in 2013. See Robin agencies private ment nor actors have been Germano, Target Yadronnd and Sara Hit example, immune from this threat. For Breach, Credit-Card The Wall Street Journal gained employee hackers access to data (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 4.2 employees. for million federal See Lisa SB 10001424052702304773104579266743230 Peterson, Rein and Andrea What You Need to 242538. Know about the Hack Government Back- n ground Investigations, Washington The Post Although concept chilling rights 9, 2015), (July https://www.washingtonpost. generally up comes in the context of facial com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/what- challenges to statutes violations of *34 1196 in or- clinics was Constitutional cannot of medical that the Act argue next

Plaintiffs rights. See protect to abortion not der it does because narrowly tailored be 714, 716, 120 at 2488-89. at S.Ct. sen- U.S. on other speech from protect patients was not unconsti- that buffer zone (such use, ac- Just as drug sexual as topics sitive violence) apply not also when it did tutional because and because tivity, and domestic at a control purchased birth a woman from other patients protect not it does is not unconstitutional (such the Act pharmacy, as guns speech about sources to other areas apply it does not because accountants, clergy, lawyers, from inquiry. sensitive also argument is This gardeners). and First, for two reasons. easily disposed of that because further contend Plaintiffs by asked a doctor answering questions heavily regulated, ownership firearm questions to those the answers guns, about a to own firearm individuals who wish rec- medical patient’s part become infor- personal provide must considerable questions by other not so ord. This is State, Fla. see Stat. mation to the law by Florida prohibited are persons who firearm (requiring prospective § 790.065 regarding any sort of list creating personal range a wide buyers to submit Fla. Stat. 790.335. ownership. See gun background undergo information statute, prohibited are such lists In that check), qualms no should have patients used to harass they can be because their status as firearm revealing about address mo- As we will See id. Act profile. and thus the physicians, owners to informa- of what mentarily, protection Again, patient privacy. does not further record is crucial patient’s gets argument inapposite. tion into to be we find this Second, the Plain- as to some today’s may possess world. The fact that the State regarding other sensitive firearm argument its residents’ tiffs’ information about position conducting take no purpose while we inquiry, ownership areas of for the to utterly could ban irrele- immaterial legislature background checks is on whether history physicians should patient’s private into a sexual or not inquiry vant whether their topics, we have information for posited have access such or Plaintiffs’ other own, Al- medically purposes. irrelevant believing that such information no trouble may interests sometimes greater frequency. though privacy much with is relevant collect informa- yield to the State’s need to the fact that the law point, More to tion, the interest is so that does not mean into other sensi- inquiry prohibit does not will not still destroyed that individuals the Act’s discussion evidences tive areas of the same keep to wish to have reason protecting the identified narrow focus on private public from the in information right privacy interest: compelling Further, firearms large. since Amendment of one’s Second the exercise be- home without the legislature present did not make rights. That the owner, wish to be the Plaintiffs necessary ing expansive than the Act more than Colorado, more information gather even fatal. In Hill v. able .certainly not Moreover, Plaintiffs government.24 eight that an foot held Supreme Court working of the the actual again 100 feet mistake persons around within buffer zone IV.A, 2010) ("[W]e Amendment, agree with those who advocate supra part it can see First guide looking Amendment as a to the First to the Second Amendment be extended the Sec developing review for a standard of See, Chicago, e.g., City well. v. Ezell Amendment.”) (citing v. United States ond aside, Cir.2011) ("Labels (7th F.3d (3d Marzzarella, Cir. 89 n. 614 F.3d doctrine we can distill this First Amendment 2010)). general principles to extrapolate a few context.”); United simplicity, almost the Second Amendment we refer 24. For the sake of opin- (4th ownership in this Chester, exclusively to firearm Cir. 628 F.3d States purpose Act. The of the Act is the National Coordinator for Health Infor- patients protect by shielding them from Technology, mation Federal IT Health *35 any and all discussion about Strategic 2015-2020, firearms with Plan at available physicians; merely requires their the Act https://www.healthit.gov/sites/defaulV physicians to refrain from broaching a con- files/federal-healthIT-strategic-plan-2014. cededly topic they sensitive when any pdf. lack may This information be shared with good-faith belief that such information is many thirty-five as government agen- patients’ relevant to their medical care or cies. See id. at 2. It is not difficult to safety, safety or the of others. imagine this being information accessed by any number of persons unauthorized importance The of protecting gets what negligence due to impossibili- or the sheer patient’s into a beyond record is doubt. ty of guaranteeing impenetrable security. just The Act does that. It would not be supra See note 22. point— More to the able to protect the identified compelling mind, and in keeping once again, that the interests were it not to provide this all applies only Act physicians when have no important protection. dispute Plaintiffs medically relevant gather reason to such this by commonsense conclusion arguing information in place the first is no —there that existing federal and state laws suffi- patients reason for to fear for the confi- ciently protect patient privacy.25 But dentiality of their status as firearm own- protect these laws only information after ers if information about it simply physicians; has been disclosed to collected at all. nothing protect do information from the initial disclosure. In Finally, the federal Plaintiffs contend the Act is government implemented requirements not narrowly problem tailored because the mandating that all providers healthcare legislature fully seeks to cure is pro- begin transitioning to electronic medical tected 790.338(4), § Fla. Stat. which § records. See 300jj~ U.S.C. provides that patients may decline to an- ll(e)(3)(A)(ii). Although government questions swer about their firearm owner- requires transition, this providers service ship. argument That unpersuasive is also responsible are for maintaining the securi- significant because of the power imbalance ty of the electronic records. See Office of patient between and doctor.26 It impor- ion. It is of critique course the case that this 26. One power scholar has summarized the presence dynamics physician patient about the of firearms in the home relation- — ship thusly: applies many also of the circumstances only purpose we ownership. [R]esearch which discuss shows and [that] patient relationship structure of the doctor — physicians authority vest with immense regulations promulgated pursuant Under power eyes patients. Physicians' in the to the federal Portability Health Insurance authority superior derives from their knowl- Accountability Act of Pub.L. No. education, edge prestigious their social 104-191, Stat.1936, covered healthcare status, and economic and the "charismatic providers may kept not disclose information authority" symbolic that derives from their patients' in their except medical records to an conquerors role as of disease and death.... enumerated list of entities. 45 C.F.R. The confluence of these factors leads to an § 164.502. provides Florida law also that a physicians’ "profes- institutionalization patient’s kept medical records must be confi- sional dominance” within the structure of only dential and enumerates limited circum- doctor-patient legit- interaction that in itself provider stances in which a healthcare physician expressions. imizes share party. records with a third Fla. dominance, In patients the face of this 456.057(7)(a). Slat. suspend their critical faculties and defer to physicians’ opinions. disempow- Patients’ proximity in close keep geographical in mind the circumstances

tant to First, office. visit the doctor’s typical to seek In from whom needed treatment. highly disparate balance of there exists vulnerability, patients moments of these pa-A patient. doctor and power between affirmatively hardly expected could confi- relationship in a of trust and tient is by demanding their doctors all non- rebuff a doctor and looks to the doc- dence with medically questioning cease. The relevant opinion guidance.27 informed This tor’s pa- provision, proposes cited which relationship open is not conducted an exactly that, this tients do fails to alleviate forum; place it takes behind closed problem. such, of the examination room. As doors *36 Frankly, precisely we read Act to be usually captive doctor will have a audience to the interests. compelling tailored State’s patient. patients one: must When In this it is worth explaining conclusion in any doctor specialist visit a or visit a reviewing actually what does. first the Act area, any rural choice between available actually prohibits record-keeping The Act may virtually nonexistent.28 In doctors be ownership only about firearm when words, may a feel other rural that physician knows such information to be angering by refusing his doctor to answer irrelevant, IV.A.1, supra inquiry part see question gun owner- an irrelevant about only firearm when the ownership in about ship lapse result in a total medi- would care, good-faith a may physician cal as there not be another lacks belief that position fac- ered stems from a number of 28. Barriers to access in rural ar- healthcare tors, including knowledge, lack of medical are well Rural Health eas documented. See illness, anxiety accompanies that and Services, Health, Dep't http://www. Florida physicians the need to believe have the floridaheaIth.gov/programs-and-services/ power competence and needed to cure community-health/rural-health/rural-health- them. (last 4, ("Ten 2015) services.html visited Dec. currently 30 lack of Florida's rural counties inequities also counter- These structural hospital facility.”); an acute care What’s Dif- patients’ ability question physicians act Care?, about Rural Health Nat’l Rural ferent conversation, and redirect the of a course Ass'n, http://www.ruralhealthweb.org/ Health patients even if have an acute desire to (last go/lefi/about-rural-health visited Dec. Moreover, acquire information. socio-eco- 2015) (noting percent "[o]nly ten about pa- nomic differences between doctor and physicians practice in rural de- America tient, race, class, particularly differences of spite nearly the fact that one-fourth of gender, age, impede communica- further population lives in areas” and "[r]ural these tion. greater transportation have difficul- residents Berg, Paula Toward A First Amendment reaching providers, ties health often trav- Theory care Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Advice, elling great Right a doctor or to Receive Unbiased Medical 74 distances to reach (footnotes Thomas, B.U. L.Rev. hospital”). Craig 225-28 Sen. Understand- omitted). Challenges: ing Rural Health Care Needs and Americans, Why Access Matters Rural 43 positive It common that a doctor— sense (2006) ("Rural Legis. Harv. J. on 256 patient relationship positive a effect has on populations suffer lack of in- from distinct negative health outcomes and that a relation- surance, costs, high transportation and demo- ship' be created doctors’ un- —which graphic challenges. significant There are also questioning topics wanted on irrelevant —has services, in rural barriers health to obstetrical negative Advisory effect. See The Board health, health, mental substance abuse oral Study: Company, Physicians’ Manner Bedside services, recovery many types of other 14, 2014), https: (April Patients' Health Affects //www. Furthermore, higher care. rural areas face advisory,com/daily-briefing/2014/04/ suicide.”) obesity, 14/study-physicians-bedside-manneraffects- depression, rates of (citations omitted). patients-health. relevant, supra part avoiding speech see placed information is IV. den unwanted A.2, firearm listener, and harassment about owner- v. Snyder Phelps, 562 U.S. only ship when the does not 443, 459, 1207, 1220, 131 S.Ct. 179 L.Ed.2d supra necessary, part see IV.A.3. believe (2011), the captive-audience doctrine applies in certain instances where the lis- important It is also to understand what being exposed tener cannot avoid passing has to that the State not done the Act. speech. Jacksonville, a sweeping City The State has not made ex Erznoznik v. inquiry judgment ante that all and medical 205, 210-11, 2268, 2273, 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. record-keeping by about firearm doctors (1975). 45 L.Ed.2d party The assert- ownership is The Act inappropriate. does ing that captive he is a audience must represent legislative not even conclusion privacy show that a substantial interest is of physician subset is cate- “being essentially invaded an intoler- Instead, gorically inappropriate. the Act’s way. Snyder, able” 562 U.S. at prohibitions directly entirely are cou- S.Ct. at 1220 (quoting California, Cohen physicians’ good-faith pled judg- own 1780, 1786, inquiry ments about whether such rec- (1971)). L.Ed.2d captive-audience The ord-keeping appropriate medically doctrine is based on a common law right to *37 patient’s particular circumstances of a left be alone that better is understood If, supra See part case. IV.A. we have today as an “interest that States can concluded, compelling the State has a in- to protect choose in certain situations.” in medical regulating profession terest the Hill, 24, 530 U.S. at 717 n. 120 S.Ct. at prevent ineffective medical care—in this (internal 2490 n. 24 quotation marks omit- by patients instance protecting from un- ted). “placed This interest is in the necessary privacy breaches of threat- against speaker’s right scales” to ex- chilling of ened the continued exercise of 718, at press message. his Id. 120 S.Ct. at right to bear keep their arms —what omitted). 2490 (quotations and citations way narrower to advance this interest by requiring there physi- could be than captive-audience The doctrine spe- has any cians to base inquiry record-keep- in settings cial force confrontational and in ing ownership about firearm genuine, on a regarding cases to medical facili- access subjective determination of medical need? 717, at at ties.29 Id. 120 S.Ct. 2490. In situations, government’s such interest support find We also our already in “protecting people tense or in Supreme cap conclusion Court’s fine of of medical anticipation distressed atten- Although tive-audience cases. the First 731, Amendment that ...” usually requires the bur- tion Id. at 120 S.Ct. at 2501 true, however, 212, (finding It primary captive 29. that the two no 95 S.Ct. at 2274 captive-audience public easily scenarios in which the audience when could doc- avoid applied speech target- exposure private trine has been involve to nude shown at a films private ed at homes: offensive mail sent to a drive-in theatre were visible from the that sidewalk), private picketing private public a home and home. the Court nevertheless rec- 459-60, Snyder ognizes Though at at 131 S.Ct. the doctrine retains some force narrowly may the Court defined has who in situations outside the home. See Lehman 298, 304, "captive City Heights, constitute a v. 418 U.S. audience” such that its Shaker home, 2714, 2718, (1974) application is 94 L.Ed.2d 770 limited outside see S.Ct. 41 460, Snyder, (plurality opinion) (finding 562 U.S. at 131 S.Ct. at no First Amend- 1220 (holding noting municipal of a that attendees funeral held on ment forum but that a also property being picketed banning pub- church by political that was law on advertisements protestors nearby transportation public land were not a lic to minimize the risk served Erznoznik, audience); captive problem). creating captive-audiences 422 U.S. at 1200 Hill, to listen answer a

(Souter, J., concurring). In has no choice but mandating “buffer seeing a law upheld questions, especially when Court doctor’s intend facilities around healthcare zones” may practicable, another doctor not be from unwanted “protect listeners ed supra 26. Pa- possible. even See note 714, 716, Id. at 120 S.Ct. communication.” being their fire- questioned tients about 2488-89; Coakley, v. see McCullen at but are arm-ownership status their doctor 2541, 2518, U.S. -, -, 134 S.Ct. 573 no like Hill who had more unconsti (holding 189 L.Ed.2d 502 speech but to unwanted choice endure thirty-five foot buffer zone tutional care, pursuit obtaining medical see her clinics because it was around abortion 2488-89, at 120 530 U.S. S.Ct. at narrowly when sub “elos[ed] tailored on a who than citizens sidewalk fo public a traditional portion stantial seeing by simply offensive film avoid an ex speakers”). rum to all The Court Erznoznik, away turning gaze. their See cannot speech that while offensive plained 212, 422 at S.Ct. at 2274. U.S. 95 just because a listener does be curtailed it, general Supreme rule does learn not wish to hear We also “so speech far as to include precedent narrowly not extend so tailored Court unwilling audience can intrusive that the abridgments speech can tolerated 716, Hill, 120 at not avoid it.” U.S. other fundamental when vindicate Schultz, Frisby (citing at 2489 S.Ct. Freeman, In rights. Burson v. the Court 2504, 2495, 108 S.Ct. U.S. rights considered conflict of between (1988)). The ‘ver L.Ed.2d 420 “deliberate right freedom of and the to vote. ” of such a situation bal or visual assault’ 1846, 119 504 U.S. 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (quoting Id. may “justif[y] proscription.” (1992). Freeman, challenged In Ten Erznoznik, at n. proscribed campaigning nessee statute *38 6) (brackets omitted). The Court n. 2273 polling 100 Id. at place. within feet of mat rejected the idea that it specifically 193-94, jus 112 A S.Ct. at 1848-49. four spreading “good if the were speakers tered plurality tice of the Court found Tennes 718, (quot 2490 ideas.” Id. at 120 S.Ct. at protecting right interest in the to see’s Dep’t, Post 397 ing Rowan v. U.S. Office 199, to be Id. 112 compelling. vote at 1491, 728, 738, 25 U.S. 90 S.Ct. plurality at The then found S.Ct. omit (quotation L.Ed.2d 736 marks necessary narrowly the law both tai ted)). that inter furthering compelling lored to therefore, must, place We the doctors’ “Given the conflict between these two est: question patients their on the right to we rights, requiring hold that solicitors inter- against compelling scales the State’s poll 100 from the entrances to stand feet fully effecting guarantees the est in ing places not an unconsti does constitute the protecting Second Amendment compromise.” tutional Id. at 112 citizens’ medical records. privacy its essence, at 1858. In Freeman shows S.Ct. only solely the Act apply Not does rare, surviving scrutiny that strict but care, it also to medical speech irrelevant least, at may, not unheard of and be more exclusively in in which applies almost cases likely “compromise” as a be Constitutional in an room a doctor is alone examination competing rights. tween In such the patient.30 with a a situation plurality pa- The Freeman validates between doctor and power balance approach endorsing as if he here tient will make feel State’s often exceptions. say aware that there 30. We "almost” because we are

1201 c. making narrowly tailored propriety rights. compromises competing between Finally, we sec address the Here, compromise is between See id. ond of facial Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights and privacy Amendment and Second challenges: overbreadth. A statute is speech. compromise The freedom of if a substantial “overbroad number of its to the minor certainly akin inconvenience unconstitutional, applications are judged because, of a 100 foot buffer zone as we in plainly legiti- relation to statute’s enough, the Act cannot stress does Stevens, sweep.” mate United States v. speech guns, only prohibit all about but 460, 473, 1577, 1587, 130 S.Ct. which faith speech good there is no (2010) (quotation 176 435 L.Ed.2d marks basis for relevance to medical care.31 omitted). “The overbreadth doctrine is ‘strong not alone in a state upholding generally We are medicine’ should be ” physician against ‘only implicating speech law administered as a last resort.’ Locke, scruti- at application (quoting First Amendment 634 F.3d United Williams, exactly 285, 293, ny. Supreme Court did States v. The U.S. (2008)). supra in See Part While Casey. IV.B.2.a. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 650 of our posture (Casey case is different reject this for the challenge We compelled speech, than re- involved rather rejected same reasons we Plaintiffs’ speech), is the fraining from the conclusion facial free-speech challenge. conventional same: the First Amendment is not bar not prohibit The Act does a substantial achieving compelling their inter- states because, speech amount of even protected medicine, regulation in instead ests accepting “regulates that the Act and re it them to tailor requires appropriately practitioner’s every speech stricts on the their chosen solutions. firearms,” subject only it burdens applies the Act in a small Though only that, judged by circumstances, it number of when does faith, good lacks a sufficient to the nexus an apply plays extremely important role safety medical of a particular care pa: patients. is not protecting The Act may validly tient. the State legislate As revolution, legislative but it does not need practice of within professions ensure “the narrowly protects to be. It in a patients boundaries,” Goldfarb, their at U.S. focused manner order to advance argues and as no one compelling State’s interest in protecting *39 concededly that with speech irrelevant lies Amendment’s to guarantee Second good in medical we scope practice, keep patients’ privacy arms and and bear Act is not hold that the overbroad. records, rights exactly medical their tailoring scrutiny requires. sort of strict D. rights always pro- Those are that must we think Concluding, appropriate to ways big

tected and small. final point. reiterate one we Although Accordingly, we hold that District the Act today facially hold that does not by concluding requirements that the Act conflict Con- with of the Court.erred stitution, not, violates the First The Act do holding, Amendment. we fore- strict scrutiny withstands as a close re- permissible as-applied challenges. Plaintiffs speech. restriction main free assert the First Amendment to course, prohibit physi- say viding 31. Of Act does not and literature brochures that speaking publicly speech protected cians from about need much. Such remains even safely pro- wholly to use store firearms or from if it unrelated to medical care. any proceed- defense in as an affirmative TRIBE INDIANS upon them based MICCOSUKEE OF brought against

ing FLORIDA, the course of treatment made in OF Plaintiff- outside the bounds allegedly fell Appellant, By rejecting Plaintiffs’ good medical care. v. Act, simply are we challenge facial a decla- refusing provide Plaintiffs with Billy CYPRESS, Wayne Dexter a defense will be success- ration that such Lehtinen, Esquire, al., et that the Act does Having concluded ful. Defendants-Appellees. the Four- the First or not offend either Constitution, teenth Amendments No. 14-12115. uphold it. must

we Appeals,

United Court of States V. Eleventh Circuit. District Accordingly, we REVERSE Dec. summary judgment grant of Court’s Plaintiffs, the in- and VACATE favor of of the Act.

junction against enforcement

SO ORDERED.

WILSON, Judge, dissenting: Circuit in on weighed have

Numerous voices requires assess the us to appeal,

this which

constitutionality of Firearm Own Florida’s Thirty amici curiae filed Privacy Act.

ers

briefs, Majority filed its and the has now opinion seeking an iteration of

third Wollschlaeger the Act. See Gov

uphold I), (Wollschlaeger F.3d

ernor Fla. (11th Cir.2014), opinion vacated Wollschlaeger v. Gov

superseded reh’g, II), (Wollschlaeger 797 F.3d

ernor Fla. (11th Cir.2015). considered all Having the con arguments against

these law, I

stitutionality this state continue First it does survive

believe However, I have scrutiny.

Amendment effect,

already two dissents to this written banc plaintiffs sought have en

and the I an Accordingly, pen decline to

review. *40 Majority’s responding

other dissent my previous I rest

evolving rationale.

dissents.

Case Details

Case Name: Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Dec 14, 2015
Citation: 814 F.3d 1159
Docket Number: 12-14009
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
Read the detailed case summary
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In