Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21573
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Florida enacted the Firearm Owners Privacy Act (Fla. Stat. § 790.338 et seq.) in 2011, restricting physicians from asking/recording firearm-ownership information unless it is relevant to medical care or safety, prohibiting discrimination and "unnecessary harassment," and authorizing disciplinary action for violations.
- A group of physicians and advocacy organizations sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the Act is a content-based restriction on speech, is overbroad, and unconstitutionally vague; the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of key provisions (§§ 790.338(1),(2),(5),(6)).
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed standing/ripeness and the merits on summary judgment after plaintiffs alleged self-censorship (curtailing routine firearm screening and counseling) due to fear of discipline.
- The court held plaintiffs had standing via a credible threat of enforcement and that pre-enforcement review was appropriate for their First Amendment and vagueness claims.
- On the merits the panel construed the Act narrowly: record-keeping is prohibited only when a physician knows the firearm information is irrelevant; inquiry is barred only when the physician lacks a good-faith belief of relevance; unnecessary harassment is prohibited only during examinations when not necessary for care/safety.
- Applying strict scrutiny (the panel assumed and applied the most demanding standard), the court concluded Florida has compelling interests (protecting Second Amendment rights and patient privacy) and that the Act is narrowly tailored to those interests; it reversed the district court and vacated the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Ripeness | Plaintiffs claim self-censorship from a credible threat of discipline; thus injury-in-fact and ripe | State says Act's language is hortatory and allows inquiries when relevant, so no credible threat; plaintiffs should wait for enforcement | Plaintiffs have standing: recent enactment, enforcement mechanism, inconsistent official guidance, and claimed curtailment establish credible threat and ripeness |
| Vagueness (Fourteenth Amendment) | Terms like "relevant," "should refrain," and "unnecessarily harassing" are indeterminate and chill speech | State contends plain meaning and good-faith/relevancy limits supply sufficient guidance | Court narrows construction: ‘‘relevant’’ and "good faith"/"know" standards give adequate notice; provisions are not void for vagueness |
| First Amendment — Whether Act regulates speech or conduct | Plaintiffs: inquiry, record-keeping, and harassment regulate protected speech (content-based) and are subject to strict scrutiny; overbroad | State: law regulates professional conduct/medical practice and any speech impact is incidental; lesser scrutiny applies | Court: record-keeping, inquiry, harassment regulate significant protected speech (professional speech in fiduciary setting) and are content-based; but even under strict scrutiny Act survives as serving compelling interests and narrowly tailored |
| Overbreadth (First Amendment) | Even if some applications are valid, the Act allegedly prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech | State: Act targets only medically irrelevant speech and protects legitimate state interests; not sweeping | Court: Rejected overbreadth — Act burdens speech only when it lacks a good-faith nexus to patient care and so does not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (content-based speech restrictions generally trigger strict scrutiny)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (when conduct consists of communicating a message, heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies)
- Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (regulation of physician speech in clinical context implicated First Amendment but survived as reasonable regulation tied to medical practice)
- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate scrutiny framework for commercial speech)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (narrowly tailored restrictions can be justified to protect other fundamental rights)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (captive-audience and buffer-zone reasoning supporting restrictions around medical facilities)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment protects an individual right applicable to the states)
- Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011) (professional regulation may impose incidental burdens on speech)