Doyle v. Commonwealth
32 N.E.3d 1256
Mass.
2015
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CHRISTOPHER S. DOYLE VS. COMMONWEALTH

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

July 6, 2015

472 Mass. 1002

Superintendence of inferior courts. Habeas Corpus. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Double jeopardy, Duplicative convictions, Assistance of counsel.

Rescript Opinions.

, cert. denied, (petition for writ of habeas corpus), citing (declaratory judgment action). This appeal does not present an extraordinary circumstance “justifying declaratory relief to prevent disruption of the orderly administration of criminal justice.” . Contrast , S.C., (on reservation and report court considered constitutionality of sentence, noting constitutional significance and impact of case for administration of justice, in light of number of past, present, and future defendants whose sentences would be affected).

2. The plaintiff would fare no better even if we were to consider his claims on the substantive merits, as did the single justice. The single justice‘s memorandum of decision, which we accept, adequately and concisely addressed and rejected the plaintiff‘s meritless contention that persons, like him, who committed murder in the first degree between October 28, 1980 — the date of our decision in — and January 1, 1983 — the effective date of G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended by St. 1982, c. 544, § 3 — are subject to no punishment at all for their offenses.

Judgment affirmed.

William M. Shipps Jr., pro se.

Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Christopher S. Doyle (petitioner) appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court summarily denying relief on his petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

After a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of breaking into a depository in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 16; possession of burglarious tools, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 49; and malicious destruction of property, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 127. The Appeals Court affirmed the first two convictions and reversed the malicious destruction of property conviction. See . A Superior Court judge thereafter granted a motion to dismiss the petitioner‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There is no indication on the trial court docket that he appealed from that ruling. Instead, the petitioner filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court requesting that his convictions be vacated and that he immediately be released from confinement.1 The petition alleged that the Superior Court judge erred in dismissing the writ without an evidentiary hearing; that the convictions violated his right against double jeopardy because the same underlying conduct formed the basis for revocation of his probation in an unrelated matter; that the convictions are duplicative and the sentences are unlawful; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal.

Rescript Opinions.

The single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief. To the extent the petition can be viewed as seeking relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, the errors claimed in the petition either were or could have been raised in the petitioner‘s direct appeal, or in a motion for postconviction relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).2,3 See ; . Where adequate remedies alternative to G. L. c. 211, § 3, are available, relief properly is denied. To the extent the petition can be viewed as seeking habeas corpus relief, it was correctly denied because it does not involve “grounds distinct from the issues at the indictment, trial, conviction, or sentencing stage” (citation omitted). , cert. denied, . See (ineffective assistance of counsel claims); (sentencing structure issues); ; (postconviction double jeopardy claim). Habeas corpus relief is not available for such claims.

Regardless of whether the petition is viewed as a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, neither mechanism may be employed as a substitute for the ordinary process of trial and appeal. See ; (appellate procedure adequate to address constitutional issues). The court‘s extraordinary power of general superintendence under c. 211, § 3, is “exercised sparingly, not as a substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process has run its course.” , quoting .

Judgment affirmed.

Christopher S. Doyle, pro se.

Matthew T. Seras, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Notes

1
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not in the record. The Superior Court judge‘s memorandum of decision suggests, however, that the issues raised in that petition are similar to those presented in the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.
2
Although the petition raises a double jeopardy claim, the petitioner already has been tried and convicted. Our general superintendence power therefore need not be exercised to protect the “constitutional right not to be tried.” . See . Contrast (prior to second trial, under G. L. c. 211, § 3, court concluded probation revocation hearing not basis for claim of multiple prosecutions or multiple punishments).
3
At oral argument, the petitioner claimed that his petition raised arguments that his appellate attorney declined to include in his Appeals Court brief on direct appeal of his convictions. To the extent the petitioner claims that appellate counsel failed to comply with the mechanisms of , or otherwise rendered ineffective assistance, the petitioner may raise such claims in a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court.
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