Dorothy Ellen TREVARTON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of SOUTH DAKOTA; South Dakota Game, Fish, and Parks, Defendants-Appellees, Rails to Trails Conservancy, Amicus on Behalf of Appellees.
No. 15-1766.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Oct. 21, 2015. Filed: March 25, 2016.
III
For the reasons stated, we deny Securitas’s petition for review and grant the NLRB’s cross petition for enforcement of its order.
Steven R. Blair, argued, and Richard Marshall Williams, on the brief, Pierre, SD, for Defendants-Appellees.
Andrea Carol Ferster, Kevin M. Sheys, Mari R. Lane, Justin J. Marks, Washington, DC, Christopher Vieira, San Francisco, CA, on the brief, for Amicus on Behalf of Appellees.
Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs are ranchers in Fall River County, South Dakota, who own properties underlying and surrounding a railway right-of-way easement granted by the United States to Grand Island and Wyoming Central Railroad Company in 1897. Burlington Northern Railroad Company (“BN”) subsequently acquired the easement but ceased railroad operations on the line in 1986. In 1987, BN applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission, now the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”),1 for an exemption permitting expeditious abandonment of the line. See
In April 2014, Plaintiffs commenced two separate actions in state court against the State and the Department of Game, Fish, and Parks, seeking a declaration quieting title to the right-of-way in Plaintiffs because the easement terminated by operation of law when BN ceased railroad operations. Defendants removed to federal court and moved to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed Amended Complaints seeking declarations (i) that the STB erred in ruling that the right-of-way was not abandoned before BN sold its interest to Defendants; and alternatively (ii) “that Defendants stand in the shoes of their railroad predecessors-in-interest concerning easement rights.” Defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See
1. BN’s easement was initially granted under the General Railroad Right-Of-Way
2. In the district court, Plaintiffs’ primarily focused on their claims that, when BN ceased railroad operations, the railway easement died and their fee interests became unburdened by the right-of-way that formerly passed through their properties. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brandt clarified property law principles underlying this argument. The Court explained that “the 1875 Act clearly grant[ed a railroad such as BN] only an easement, and not a fee.” 134 S. Ct. at 1267, quoting Great N. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 271, 62 S. Ct. 529, 86 L. Ed. 836 (1942). “Unlike most possessory estates, easements ... may be unilaterally terminated by abandonment, leaving the servient owner with a possessory estate unencumbered by the servitude.” Id. at 1265, quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.2 cmt. d (1998). In Great Northern, the Court held that an 1875 Act right-of-way granted the railroad only an easement, and therefore the United States as owner of fee title to the right-of-way retained the underlying oil and minerals. 315 U.S. at 279-80, 62 S. Ct. 529. In Brandt, the Court adhered to its decision in Great Northern and held that, when railroad operations were abandoned, an 1875 Act right-of-way easement was extinguished; it did not revert to the United States, owner of the land when the easement was first granted. 134 S. Ct. at 1268.
The problem with Plaintiffs’ claims that the easement acquired by Defendants had been extinguished by abandonment was the STB decision in 1989 revoking BN’s exemption before abandonment of the right-of-way was completed, and authorizing BN to enter into an interim trail use agreement. Plaintiffs argued to the district court that the STB erred in ruling the right-of-way was not abandoned. The district court held, quite properly, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider this collateral attack on the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a rail line has been abandoned, a decision that was subject to judicial review only by a petition to this court. See Grantwood Village v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 95 F.3d 654, 657-58 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149, 117 S. Ct. 1082, 137 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1997). Plaintiffs do not challenge this jurisdictional ruling on appeal.
3. The district court extended its jurisdictional ruling to Plaintiffs’ second claim, seeking a declaration that South Dakota “stand[s] in the shoes of [its] railroad predecessors-in-interest concerning easement rights,” and therefore Defendants’ nonpossessory easement requires only that Plaintiffs as servient landowners not interfere with the railroad uses the right-of-way easement authorized. Defendants argued, and the district court agreed, that the court “does not have jurisdiction to determine the relative rights of the parties over the use of the easement” because the STB “retains ‘exclusive and plenary jurisdiction’ over the right-of-way.” We disagree.
In support of the district court’s ruling, Defendants and their amicus rely on
The Trails Act established a national trails system “to provide for the ever-increasing outdoor recreation needs of an expanding population and ... the preservation of ... outdoor areas and historic resources.”
Section 8(d) furthered the first purpose by directing the STB to impose terms and conditions on interim use sufficient to preserve the right-of-way for reactivated rail service, and not to permit its abandonment. See
The STB regulations contain no provisions regulating how the trail operator will manage a trail. This is consistent with other Trails Act provisions. Section 8(e) provides that interim-use trails “may be designated and suitably marked as parts of the nationwide system of trails by the States ... with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.”
As the STB has itself recognized, its exclusive jurisdiction under
4. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants acquired only a non-possessory easement that was limited to BN’s use of the right-of-way for railroad purposes. “[S]tate law creates and defines the scope of the reversionary or other real property interests affected by the [STB’s] actions pursuant to [§ 8(d)].” Preseault, 494 U.S. at 20, 110 S. Ct. 914 (O’Connor, J., concurring). When the issue does not affect present or future railroad operations, state and federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of the real property interests held by interim trail users and adjacent landowners such as Plaintiffs. Cf. Allegheny Valley R.R., Docket No. FD 35388, 2011 WL 1546589, at *3 (S.T.B. Apr. 21, 2011) (“[T]he size and extent of a railroad easement is a matter of state property law and best addressed by state courts.”); Allegheny Valley R.R., Docket No. FD 35239, 2010 WL 2388142, at *7 (S.T.B. June 11, 2010) (“This is a question of property law, and it should be handled by a tribunal that frequently addresses such matters.”).
Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief turns on their allegation that South Dakota “stand[s] in the shoes of [its] railroad predecessors-in-interest concerning easement rights.” In Preseault, the Supreme Court held that, to further the dual purposes of the Trails Act, Congress authorized the STB to prevent abandonment of a right-of-way by approving conveyance of the right-of-way for interim use to a trail operator, and that such actions may give rise to a takings claim by the fee owner. 494 U.S. at 11-17, 110 S. Ct. 914. In subsequent decisions, the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims held that “[a] Fifth Amendment taking occurs if the original easement granted to the railroad under state property law is not broad
In our view, these decisions properly reflect the plain meaning of § 8(d) and establish that Plaintiffs’ second claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Congress in the Trails Act intended to convey to the interim trail user a property interest that includes the right to use the acquired right-of-way for recreational trail purposes. Though the conveyance here took the form of a quit claim deed from BN to Defendants, as a matter of federal law it granted “a new easement for the new use.” Plaintiffs contend that Defendants acquired from BN “only an easement for railroad purposes,” as the 1875 Act was construed in Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (quotation omitted). But even if that accurately describes what Defendants acquired directly from BN, it does not describe the “new easement” they acquired under the Trails Act, an interest which authorized Defendants to use the Trail for Trails Act purposes. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants “stand in the shoes” of the BN, and therefore Defendants cannot impose non-railroad restrictions on Plaintiffs’ rights as servient landowners, fails as a matter of federal law.
Though this result may seem harsh, it is essential to note that the conveyance to Defendants under the Trails Act did not leave Plaintiffs without a remedy as property owners. Indeed, it left them with a variety of possible remedies—for example, a takings action seeking compensation because Defendants’ new easement diminished the property rights Plaintiffs enjoyed when the right-of-way was limited to railroad uses; or a court action claiming that Defendants are unlawfully managing the Trail as a matter of federal or state law; or a petition to the STB claiming that Defendants’ management of the Trail impairs restoration of the right-of-way to railroad use. And of course Plaintiffs can negotiate with state officials to allow Plaintiffs reasonable access and use of the right-of-way for their ranch operations, as they presumably negotiated with railroad operators in the past.
For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the district court for modification of its Order and Judgment to reflect that Plaintiffs’ alternative claim for a declaratory judgment defining the parties’ rights to use the easement is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.