Dorothy Mae JOHNSON; Lois Townes, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MEMPHIS LIGHT GAS & WATER DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-5484.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 6, 2015.
777 F.3d 838
Our decision today does not require us to decide whether a religious employer could enter into a judicially-enforceable employment contract with a ministerial employee not to fire that employee on certain grounds (such as pregnancy). Judicial enforcement of such a contract might unduly interfere with the independence of religious institutions, but barring religious institutions from offering such a legally binding guarantee might make it harder for some religious institutions to hire the people they want. Conlon in this case now disavows any contractual argument. Thus, to the extent that any analysis in the majority opinion might be read to govern non-Title VII employer obligations, such analysis is not necessary to our judgment.
Finally, with respect to part III.D of the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that Michigan law recognizes the ministerial exception, without analyzing the extent to which the federal Constitution would require Michigan to do so even if Michigan did not.
Before: MERRITT, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.
J. Dean Johnson was denied utility services by Memphis Light, Gas & Water (MLGW), a division of the City of Memphis, in February 2010 because he did not possess a state-issued photo identification card. Mr. Johnson, who lacked a birth certificate, was illiterate and had intellectual disabilities that made it difficult for him to navigate the process of obtaining the necessary state identification. He lived without utilities for over eighteen months and died of heat stroke in August 2011. Plaintiffs—his wife and sister—sued MLGW bringing claims under
BACKGROUND
J. Dean Johnson, a long-term employee of Memphis‘s Public Works Division, worked in sanitation, lifting and emptying garbage cans. MLGW denied him public utility services for his new apartment in February 2010 because he could not produce state-issued photo identification. On August 4, 2011, Johnson died of heat stroke in his apartment, where the internal temperature was 93.2 degrees Fahrenheit. He was sixty-five years old at the time of his death and had no electricity, heat, or air conditioning in his home. Plaintiffs allege that his death was caused by MLGW‘s denial of services. Id.
Johnson, an African American, was born in rural Mississippi and delivered by a midwife. He had no birth certificate and had difficulty acquiring one from the state, in part due to his intellectual disabilities. In sworn affidavits, Johnson‘s niece, Lorena Jackson, and a longtime co-worker, Melvin Hunt, testified that although Johnson was able-bodied, he was substantially intellectually impaired. Ms. Jackson described Johnson as having “severe learning disabilities,” such that he was unable to read and write, could not do basic math, had “severe memory problems” and difficulty planning, and was unable to care for himself without help. He had problems communicating with others and often became angry or frustrated as a result. Johnson could apparently write his name but would misspell it and was unsure of his birthdate, he did not drive or keep a bank account, and he was dependent on co-workers to bring him to and from work. In order to pay bills and feed himself, Johnson used cash, but he was often cheat-
When Johnson moved to 2931 Park Avenue, # 8, in Memphis, Tennessee, two nieces—Ms. Lois Taylor and Ms. Jackson—accompanied him on two different occasions in February 2010 to MLGW offices to help him obtain services for his new apartment. Johnson apparently had had utility services in past residences, and Ms. Jackson had accompanied him to MLGW offices on several previous occasions and dealt with bill irregularities and service problems on his behalf. Both nieces characterized Johnson as easily confused and frustrated by such encounters. When she accompanied him to MLGW on February 5, 2010, Ms. Taylor had to explain to Johnson that he could not go straight to the billing department but had to inform another employee there that he wanted utilities turned on. Ms. Taylor then waited with him until his name was called. She went back to an office with him and participated in the conversation, during which the MLGW employee told Johnson that he didn‘t have the proper identification—he “had to either have a State I.D. or a driver‘s license.” Ms. Taylor described Johnson‘s attempts to communicate his situation: “He didn‘t drive, and he was explaining that he couldn‘t get a State I.D., and he was asking what was wrong with [his work] I.D., it had a picture on it.” Ms. Taylor showed the MLGW employee Johnson‘s work identification card while Johnson showed his social security card. Ms. Taylor then asked if the MLGW employee could call Johnson‘s job to verify his identity, but she refused. The MLGW employee then gave Ms. Taylor a copy of a slip on which she had written “invalid I.D.” As they left Johnson appeared to be upset or “heated.” Ms. Taylor testified in her deposition that to her knowledge Johnson only contacted MLGW while with her or her sister, as “[h]e wouldn‘t have called because he didn‘t know how to call, . . . he wouldn‘t know what to say.” After their encounter with MLGW, Ms. Taylor told Johnson that she would need to take him to Jackson, Mississippi, to see about getting a birth certificate, and he agreed, but she never did so.
After MLGW denied Johnson utility services, he spoke with his sister, Lois Townes, who told him that to get a state identification card he had to go to Brownsville, Tennessee, where he had started school, and get his school record. Ms.
In 2010 only, MLGW had a policy that required applicants to produce a state-issued photo identification card in order to have utilities connected. However, in the years prior to and following 2010, the forms of identification that Johnson presented—a photo identification issued by his employer, Memphis‘s Public Works Division, and a social security card—would have been sufficient to obtain utilities. The 2010 policy also stated that “[e]xceptions will be considered for customers 60 years of age and older,” but the MLGW employees Johnson encountered did not attempt to see if he qualified for an exception. MLGW did not train employees regarding how to advise customers who did not possess the necessary photo identification, nor did it train employees on how to deal with customers who were illiterate. MLGW made no efforts to contact potential customers who were denied utilities as a result of the policy in effect in 2010.
After Johnson‘s death, Plaintiffs sued MLGW in the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, claiming violations pursuant to
ANALYSIS
We review de novo a district court‘s order granting summary judgment. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir.2014). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
a. Statute of Limitations
The district court held that Plaintiffs’
As
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the statute of limitations for
In this case, MLGW‘s denial of utility services constituted an injury to Johnson, and a “typical lay person” should have been alerted by that denial “to protect his or her rights.” Id. Although Johnson‘s death later converted his cause of action into a wrongful death claim, at the time MLGW denied him utility services in February 2010, he had grounds for a suit alleging violations of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F.Supp.2d 950, 956-57 (W.D.Tenn.2003) (holding that plaintiffs’
Plaintiffs also dispute the accrual date of their state law claims, yet the statute-of-limitations analysis under Tennessee‘s GTLA and wrongful death statute
Tennessee‘s wrongful death statute does not contain a statute of limitations, but Tennessee has long held that wrongful death actions are governed by the statute of limitations for personal injuries, which provides that an action must commence within a year after accrual.
In tort actions, “the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the injury occurs or is discovered, or when in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it should have been discovered.” McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn.1975). “A cause of action for wrongful death accrues as of the date a cause of action accrues for the injury which resulted in the death,” Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., 794 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), meaning that the date of a decedent‘s death is the latest, but not the only, date from which the one-year limitation could run, Johnson v. Metro. Gov‘t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 665 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tenn.1984). Where a decedent was injured and died months later, her tort claims accrued on the date of her injury. McCroskey, 524 S.W.2d at 488, 491. As a general rule, an “injury” is “understood as any wrong or damage done to another‘s person, rights, reputation, or property.” Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (citing Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Tenn. 1977)). And like Plaintiffs’
b. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs argue that even if the claims had accrued, there is sufficient dispute over the material fact of Johnson‘s intellectual or mental disability that a jury should determine whether the applicable statutes of limitations should be tolled. Viewing the facts and making all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we agree that they have presented facts sufficient to
Having borrowed the state‘s statute of limitations for the
Under Tennessee law, a person was of “unsound mind” under the former version of the Act when that individual “was unable to manage his or her day-to-day affairs at the time the cause of action accrued.” Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584, 601 (Tenn.2010). In Sherrill, the Tennessee Supreme Court cited with approval the following “general test” for tolling a statute of limitations: “whether a person could know or understand his or her legal rights sufficiently well to manage his or her personal affairs. . . .” Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 172 (2010)). “The focus of the inquiry,” the court made clear, “should be on a plaintiff‘s mental capacity to understand his or her legal rights and responsibilities, including the cause of action that has accrued.” Id. “[P]hysical infirmity . . . has little bearing” on such an inquiry. Id. at 600.
Plaintiffs have introduced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Johnson‘s mental incapacity. Based on her lifelong relationship with her uncle, Ms. Jackson described him as able-bodied yet mentally disabled to the extent that he “did not understand . . . whether or not he had any rights with respect to” MLGW‘s denial of utilities. She observed that he had “severe learning difficulties” and thus was illiterate and unable to do basic math, was burdened by “severe memory problems” and so had difficulty planning his daily life, and was “unable to care for himself without help.” Although he could carry out simple transactions with cash at local stores, he was often “cheated.” He needed assistance filling out legal forms or documents, would misspell his name, was unsure of his own birthdate, had difficulty carrying on conversations, and may not have attended school beyond second grade. He did not have a birth certificate and did not know how to obtain the papers neces-
MLGW argues that these affidavits were improper lay opinion. They were, however, based upon the personal and rational perceptions of Ms. Jackson and Mr. Hunt,3 and “the modern trend among courts favors the admission of opinion testimony, provided that it is well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to specific cross-examination.” Harris v. J.B. Robinson Jewelers, 627 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir.2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explicitly held that evidence regarding an individual‘s “unsound mind” can be proved by “affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence that contain specific factual allegations showing the petitioner‘s incompetence,” and can be supplied not only by mental health professionals but also by “family members . . . or any other person who has knowledge of facts that demonstrate” the disabling condition. State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tenn.2001).
MLGW also points out that Plaintiffs did not raise the applicability of
The decision below determined that Ms. Jackson and Mr. Hunt‘s affidavits were insufficient to create a dispute of material fact because they contradicted “previous sworn statement[s] . . . without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity.” Providing no conflicting deposition testimony, it referenced Plaintiffs’ (unverified) Complaint because it alleged that Johnson was “healthy, active, and industrious” and worked full time for Memphis‘s Public Works Division but lacked a specific allegation that he was of unsound mind. A complaint need only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim,”
The test of whether an individual was of “unsound mind” focuses on his capacity to understand his legal rights. Sherrill, 325 S.W.3d at 601. “The general test that is applied in determining whether a mental condition is of the type that will toll a statute of limitations, is whether a person could know or understand his or her legal rights sufficiently well to manage his or her personal affairs. . . .” Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 172 (2010)). The term is “intended to apply to the incapacity to
Rather than contradictory, the deposition excerpts and affidavits read together plausibly show Johnson to have been an individual with extremely limited intellectual abilities who lacked the capacity to “carry out legal functions.” Sherrill, 325 S.W.3d at 601. He was able to function somewhat independently only with the regular assistance of family, friends, and co-workers. The record suggests that Johnson, poor and apparently disconnected from social services, was as dependent on such informal networks as a comparably disabled middle-class individual might be dependent on an assisted living facility or a court-appointed guardian. There is a genuine dispute as to the material facts in this case, and the true extent of Johnson‘s mental disability is an issue that must be submitted to the trier of fact. Sherrill, 325 S.W.3d at 599-600. (“Whether an individual was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, thus tolling the statute of limitations, is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact.“)
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of Johnson‘s mental disability, and thus the applicability of a prior version of Tennessee‘s tolling statute,