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Mark Laster v. City of Kalamazoo
746 F.3d 714
6th Cir.
2014
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 also Corps operation. mining entire approving its discretion

did not abuse requiring provisions mitigation plan streams, other local improvement rationally de- were provisions

since those a net is not that there to ensure

signed mine loca- function in the aquatic

loss of watershed.

tion’s AF- judgment court’s

The district

FIRMED. LASTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Mark KALAMAZOO, et al.

CITY OF

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-1640. Appeals,

United States Court

Sixth Circuit.

March 2, 2014.

Rehearing April Denied *4 BATCHELDER,

SILER, J., concurred. 733), separate delivered (pg. C.J. concurring opinion.

OPINION CLAY, Judge. Circuit the dis- appeals Mark Laster summary judg- granting order trict court’s Defendants, City in favor ment individuals, named Kalamazoo and several and retal- race discrimination on Plaintiffs Complaint, In his iation claims. alia, violat- that Defendants alleges, inter (“Title 2000e-3(a) seq. § et ed U.S.C. seq. Comp. VII”), § 37.2101 et Laws Mich. (“Elliot-Larsen Act”), Rights Civil alleg- § Specifically, U.S.C. discharged “constructively that he was es “other experienced his will” and *5 on racial dis- job actions” based adverse for his vari- retaliation crimination racial complaints ous discrimination. below, we reasons discussed For the conclusion the district agree with court’s that he has not established that Plaintiff and, conse- constructively discharged, not shown quently, that has pur- action” for employment “adverse Title VII discrimination poses of his race However, that the district we find claim. improper- analyzed improperly court —and retalia- ly Title dismissed—Plaintiffs tion claim. analyzed Plain

The district court of “Race only tiffs the context claims and “First Amendment Discrimination” Cherry, Kala- O. BRIEF: Richard ON Retaliation,” Complaint, but Plaintiffs Kalamazoo, Office, Attorney’s City mazoo experienced alleges that Plaintiff which Laster, Mark Michigan, Appellee. in “retaliation job actions” “adverse Kalamazoo, Michigan, pro se. and in complaints” prior [discrimination] 2000e-3(a), seq.,” et of 42 USC “violation BATCHELDER, Judge; Chief Before: claim. clearly a Title VII retaliation raises CLAY, Judges. Circuit SILER and Plaintiffs analysis of court’s The district claim Amendment retaliation First CLAY, J., opinion delivered 1983) § to 42 U.S.C. BATCHELDER, C.J., (brought pursuant court, in which analyze does not obviate the need to Plain- (“PSO/EO”) cer/Emergency Officer for the tiff’s Title VII retaliation claim because the Department Kalamazoo of Public Safety (“KDPS”) type activity protected by the First for more than twenty-three years. Amendment is than type different Plaintiff claims that throughout his activity protected by Moreover, employment, Title VII. he was treated less favorably the district analysis court’s than similarly-situated Spe- co-workers. Title VII race cifically, discrimination claim does Plaintiff alleges that KDPS sub- provide jected a sufficient basis for heightened dismiss- scrutiny, se- ing his Title lectively VII retaliation claim policies Plaintiff, because enforced against the two claims have different complicit elements. when individual employ- “materially adverse action” element of ees harassed and discriminated a Title VII retaliation claim substantially Plaintiff.1 alleges that such dispa- different from employment the “adverse rate attributable, treatment was at least in action” part, element of a Title VII race discrim- Plaintiffs race or to his complaints ination claim. Burlington See N. & Santa about discrimination. White, Ry.

Fe v.Co. 548 U.S. In his briefing Court, before this Plain- (2006); S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d 345 Mi- tiff contends that the below enumerated Caterpillar chael v. Corp., Fin. Sens. 496 instances of disparate treatment establish (6th Cir.2007). F.3d Under the the fourth and final prong prima of his former, Plaintiff only need show “that a Title VII discrimination claim: that reasonable employee have found would the Plaintiff was treated less favorably than challenged adverse, action materially similarly situated individuals outside of the which this context might means it well note, protected however, class. We inso- have dissuaded a reasonable worker from far as Plaintiff alleges that the unfavorable making or supporting charge of discrimi- treatment was retaliation for Plaintiffs fil- N., Burlington nation.” 548 U.S. at ing discrimination complaints, some of (internal *6 quotation S.Ct. 2405 marks these alleged same events also establish omitted). and citations The fact that the “materially adverse action” element of Plaintiff cannot show he that was construc- Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim. tively discharged dispositive is not alleges Plaintiff that each of the following Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim where attributable, was at least in part, to Plain- Plaintiff provided has evidence of other tiffs race or complaints to his about dis- adverse actions which genuine raise a issue criminatory treatment: of fact as to they satisfy whether Downgrade. 1. Evaluation On May this standard. 1, 2007, Sergeant Vernon Coakley in- below,

For the reasons forth set we formed Plaintiff that he was changing part, AFFIRM in in part, REVERSE and performance Plaintiffs 2006 evaluation REMAND for proceedings. further from to “satisfactory” improve- “needs ment.” complained Plaintiff to Coak-

BACKGROUND ley’s supervisor, direct Captain Uridge, Plaintiff an African American male but Uridge “complicit was in his re- who worked as a Safety Later, Public sponse.” Offi- Plaintiff went when to alleges generally 1. Plaintiff periors that he "suffered ... [who] [no] took action to correct demeaning racist slurs and epi- other racial disrespect- [the] behavior [and] allowed such (white) constantly thets from his co-workers ful conduct to continue.” despite complaints and from [P]laintiff to su- date, Plain- requested the occupied on re- office to KDPS Administration the has was denied. Plaintiff request that file, told tiffs was he his personnel view that the to show Coakley produced was affidavits and that missing, it was approved it. has been meeting to room access have had same to person last to employees KDPS grievance for filed a formal at other times After Plaintiff as evaluation such events improper host non-work-related contesting down- religious reversed contained downgrade, KDPS “seminars evaluation parties changed Plaintiffs “retirement speech,” grade and themes and “satisfactory.” and non- personnel to back KDPS that included for civilians,” Train- school tours Request to Attend Outside KDPS On December Denied. ing Program children. a written Plaintiff submitted July 1, Meeting on Invited to 4. Not Department the Fire to attend

request was not July 2009. On (“FDIC”) for Conference Instructor’s meeting department about informed Indiana. days Indianapolis, two to ob- by Sergeant VanDerWiere hosted from employee first was the regard- personnel KDPS input tain from training request to attend KDPS to of a new purchase prospective de- was request Plaintiffs program. only person fire truck. Plaintiff Approx- nied, given. and no reason to the not invited who was on the shift later, two Caucasian imately two weeks co-workers, Plaintiffs meeting. One of to permission granted were employees via cell LeRoy, called Plaintiff Richard days, with all FDIC five attend the inform in the meeting while phone in full. paid trip their of the costs progress. meeting Plaintiff of Caucasian that his two learning After shortly thereafter Plaintiff arrived five-day, for a approved were co-workers meeting. During in the participated pro- trip to attend all-expense-paid reprimanded meeting, VanDerWiere re-applied. gram, Plaintiff “being LeRoy both requesting application again second — they opined disruptive when rude” and two FDIC for attend the permission purchase unnecessary it was the condition with days approved —was updating instead of fire new truck own of his pay fifty percent that Plaintiff existing trucks. Plain- hundred dollars. four expenses: Counseling and 5. Memorandum re- were not co-workers tiffs Caucasian July After the Suspension. of their own any portion quired pay *7 a memo- wrote meeting, VanDerWiere Plain- five-day trip. for their expenses administrators, in KDPS randum to proffered that Defendants’ tiff asserts and that both Plaintiff he which stated treatment the difference reasons for (a were employee) LeRoy evidence to Caucasian and offers pretextual, are disruptive the meet- disrespectful reason. negate stated each memorandum, VanDerWi- In ing. the Meeting De- Request Room to Use 3. LeRoy the more that was ere “states 2009, 12, February or about nied. On in the person disruptive egregious request a Plaintiff written submitted 29, 2009, Plaintiff April meeting.” On fire at the meeting large use the room Counseling 22, received Memorandum February two hours on station for gener- two violating accusing Plaintiff birthday for his party to host July in the provisions al order Although the one-year-old daughter. suspended for was meeting. Plaintiff to be was not scheduled meeting room days pay. without LeRoy, two on the campaign sign with the caption “Good hand, other any was never disciplined Boy!” Plaintiff felt that this was a per- way. complained After Plaintiff sonal on him attack because Plaintiff treatment, disparate the two-day sus- proudly had displayed a photograph of pension was revoked. his family with President Barack Obama Regarding Play- E-mail 6. Children’s to approximately 150 personnel KDPS set. On June VanDerWiere during prior the week. Plaintiff report- Plaintiff told that Plaintiff had to remove incident, ed the but felt that it was never a collapsible play set that kept properly investigated. Plaintiff alleges in the station’s storage room for his that KDPS young children to use when they visited investigated matter, never the never him at work. VanDerWiere told Plain- inquired as to who utilized the com- tiff that it was a violation of General puter day, never conducted a fo- G-133 to store personal property Order rensic evaluation of computer the at the station. In response, Plaintiff see who using was the computer dur- if asked he could store play set in the time political the photo was storage Deikman, room Doug where ..., uploaded [and] a Caucasian never in- employee, even stored his large, quired personally-owned personnel freezer KDPS containing see meat from Deikman’s who privately-owned had [harassed Plaintiff and] vio- farm. replied VanDerWiere that Plain- lated policy KDPS that ... prohibits] tiff could not store the play any- set uploading of such ... materials. where the station. 9.Reprimand for Failure to Air Fill Reprimand Violating 7. Firearm Bottle. In May Plaintiff inadver- Policy. April On Sergeant tently failed to fill a Scott air bottle Mark Johncock directed Plaintiff during inspection of a fire truck. wear his firearm at all times while on operator who noticed Plaintiffs duty. Captain Uridge told had John- small reported offense, error coek to communicate this spe- directive reprimanded. Typically, cifically to Plaintiff. following when an equipment operator finds some- days, Johncock and spoke sev- thing needs (e.g., attention top off eral times regarding the policy, firearm bottle), an air customary practice which Plaintiff being believed was selec- “to simply perform duty missed/ne- tively enforced. The contact between glected by prior shift without the Johncock and Plaintiff way its found into necessity formally reporting said of- daily (“DAR”) activity report pre- superior However, fense to officials.” pared by Johncock April the employee who noticed er- Plaintiff was led to believe a copy ror reported the offense because had he DAR placed per- into Plaintiffs been file, “report anything instructed to he although sonnel that was later found doing saw wrong supervi- [Plaintiff] to be false. to a *8 immediately.” sor According to Union 8. Anti-Obama Screen Saver. On Misner, Representative Laura 26, 2010, “ap- March Plaintiff entered the peared being that was Report singled- [Plaintiff] Room to utilize a common com- Thereon, out puter. reprimand for formal he saw for failure to somebody that uploaded had and set a comply policy/procedure as saver a this screen with or for photo dog of a urinating on an any Obama may future incidents which be rou- requests denial of both serted by fellow customarily ignored tinely and Plaintiff is was, part, least because at employees.” ... KDPS 4, 2009, Plain- May On African American. Scrutiny. early In Heightened 10. human complaint with another yet filed tiff Jeffery Malcolm 2010, employee KDPS and dis- alleging harassment resources that he of Misner presence in the stated retaliation on race and based crimination immediately order to given direct a complaints filing the earlier for Plaintiff to by any wrongdoing report Plaintiffs officers. superior his of some Stan- of Professional Inspector KDPS repri- focused on complaint May 2009 other Coakley or dards Vernon 27, 2009 April on Plaintiff received mand In KDPS. within administrator superior policy. firearm violating for in- addition, personally Plaintiff was Hemmingway Defendant 2009, 11, formed with dissatisfied June On Plaintiff to be hard “pushing grievance proce- of internal outcome involving a “minor on issue” disciplined” with the Charge a dure, Plaintiff filed to service failure inadvertent Plaintiffs of racial discrimination complaining EEOC training exer- during a equipment employer, used by Plaintiffs and retaliation May cise on disparate complained Plaintiff KDPS. citing five of workplace, Training in the treatment in HR Session. 11. Threat instances of discrimi- mandatory human the aforementioned May 1) denial of and retaliation: discrimina- nation training session on resources train- to attend outside alleg- request Harris Plaintiffs tion, Samuel Chief Deputy 2) the denial of ing program; atten- the classroom toward edly turned 3) room; meeting Plaintiff, use the request and said: dees, included which suspen- Counseling and better Memorandum department this “No one from meeting; following the VanDerWiere without sion to the EEOC a report make 4) violation of Plaintiffs the accusation coming to me.” first storing personal order G-133 general aforemen- many of the reported 5) station; the failure to and at property harassment, perceived instances tioned meeting. July to the invite Plaintiff discrimination, On and retaliation. racial “sys- of “overt” and complained a harassment Plaintiff filed June racism, that he was explained and temic” City of Kalamazoo with the complaint form treatment, subjected disparate “being Resources, com- Human Department of retaliation, a hostile work environment and downgrade. the evaluation plaining about ... race.” upon based complaint that he in his expressed 5, 2010, issued the EEOC harassed, February “tormented, On believe[d felt conciliation proposed determination its personal were] named incidents The EEOC indicated agreement. destroy ca- attempt [his] professional to believe cause make “there reasonable reer, effect to intended with the are true.” allegations Party’s Charging April fired.” On quit get [him] di- agreement conciliation proposed hu- The complaint with another Plaintiff filed things: KDPS to five do and rected Defendant alleging harassment man resources 1) outside train- to the next send Plaintiff Specifically, on based race. discrimination 3) 2) $20,500; available; pay Plaintiff to attend request he cited denial items personal to store allow Plaintiff as the as well training program the outside 4) station; a Memo of remove the fire to use the request of his written denial file; Plaintiffs personnel from Counseling Plaintiff as- meeting room. unoccupied *9 5) city provide appropriate staff with “crashed” his vehicle into a police car and training with an emphasis on race. Defen- accident, left the scene of the “negatively agree dants did not to the terms of the engaged officers,” with supervisory conciliation, proposed and the matter was tried to make an entry unauthorized into Department referred to the of Justice the area where the President of the United (“DOJ”). States was seated. Defendants contend that “Plaintiff entered building 19, 2010, July On Plaintiff filed a second engaged in a series of acts that may have Charge with the EEOC. Plaintiff alleged constituted violations of either law or de- that he was “retaliated and further partment policy and rules.” subjected to harassment and intimidation department, within [his] to which he com- began KDPS an internal investigation plained management, to no avail.” In possible into wrongdoing by Plaintiff. particular, he described the incident of During the investigation, KDPS inter- 26, March in “subjected 2010 which he was viewed Plaintiff employees and various a display racist of a dog urinating on a who either interacted with or observed campaign President Obama sign found on day. Plaintiff that Each witness submit- city a computer.” The matter was re- varying ted factual encounters of the inci- DOJ, 28, ferred to the dent, and on October investigation but the resulted in no 2010, the DOJ a “right issued to sue within findings conclusive that Plaintiff had been days” letter for Case drinking 471-2010-02663. or was intoxicated. later, Two weeks on November Plaintiff has submitted various affida- “right DOJ issued Plaintiff a to sue within vits, own, including his suggesting that days” letter for Case 471-2009-02289. Defendants’ version of the events is “abso- meantime, In incredible,” June Presi- lutely and that Defendants ob- dent Barack Obama guest speaker false, was the tained accusatory reports because it at the Kalamazoo High Central School is the “culture” of KDPS for officers to ceremony commencement provide which was held style memoranda of a police Michigan’s Western Field House. To report when asked. Plaintiff submits that ensure safety, the President’s posi- KDPS simply possible on-duty Pub- police tioned personnel at all Safety entrances. lic Officers and Command would Plaintiff was not among those officers who have allowed Plaintiff to sit within 80-50 duty Rather, were on day. feet of President Barack Obama if Plaintiff acquired had four tickets to attend the noticeably intoxicated. Plaintiff fur- commencement family. with his ther Safety submits that a Public Officer arrested, detained, would have or investi- Plaintiff attended the commencement gated they Plaintiff if they believed that along with his wife and daughters two on had observed committing felony June 2010. Plaintiff contends that he presence. their Plaintiff was not inves- had ascertained a permissible parking lo- tigated, detained, or arrested on June cation in advance from Western Michi- permitted and was indeed entry into gan Safety Public Officer. According building, where he sat near President Plaintiff, he parked in the park- indicated Obama and took a photograph with him. incident, location without and did not any negative have interactions with August KDPS when KDPS had con- personnel, Service, Secret other investigation cluded its internal into Plain- individuals or law enforcement alleged officers. tiffs wrongdoing, Plaintiff and Un- According Defendants, ion Representative Laura Misner were *10 Plaintiff that he be- that he attests told Plaintiff would that with notice provided know) (but Plaintiff not that on did hearing” lieved “pre-determination have conclusion of at the to Plaintiffs be terminated Pursuant would 2010. September hearing Septem- on pre-de- agreement, pre-determination the bargaining collective (¿a, to opportunity hearing an termination ber before the conduct or defend explain if that Plaintiff also told Plaintiff McCaw as to what a determination makes KDPS terminated, challenge could Plaintiff were take) action, neces- any, if to is disciplinary grievance pro- through the termination gives conduct an officer’s sary whenever bargaining collective outlined in the cedure disciplinary ac- possibility to the rise collecting pension his while agreement tions. informed response, Plaintiff benefits. pre-determination Prior to the scheduled terminated, he that if he were McCaw if he Plaintiff was advised hearing, his for insurance would not receive health terminated, eligible not be he would

were specifically Plaintiff “was dependents. depen- his for health insurance benefits for his wife and [pregnant] that his concerned and pregnant wife including his dents— by covered health be daughters would not retirement children—and his young two Plain- if he were terminated.” insurance Plaintiff was be would deferred. package not to that he could tiff indicated McCaw losing health extremely concerned about children uninsured having his wife and risk family. benefits his insurance therefore, was, considering retiring and he morning September On the health insurance in order secure hearing, pre-determination skeptical about the McCaw was benefits. McCaw, a Michael spoke with about accuracy of the information previously who had employee KDPS benefits, encouraged insurance health deputy chief assistant chief as served information. Plaintiff to confirm that opin- sought McCaw’s KDPS. advice, Plaintiff Pursuant McCaw’s tenure as an ion, part on McCaw’s based Lau- Representative inquired with Union KDPS, what McCaw as to administrator it was true he ra whether Misner during him occur to would believed coverage if he insurance were would lose hearing scheduled pre-determination the infor- confirmed terminated. Misner undisputed It on that date. Department Human mation with the disciplinary what did not know McCaw Specialist. Plaintiff Benefits Resources oversee- action, if any, administrators sent from the presented an e-mail has hearing were pre-determination confirming Specialist to Misner Benefits take, did not McCaw planning employ- terminated Plaintiffs belief that disciplinary action. any input have for health insurance eligible are not ees However, Plaintiff that he had McCaw told undisputed that this It is coverage. now Deputy co-defendant rumors that heard inaccurate, and that information was conducting pre- Harris was Sam Chief insur- lost health Plaintiff would not have had hearing and that Harris determination if he were terminated. (but coverage ance personnel to KDPS statements made However, produced any Plaintiff has McCaw), Craig John- and to Officer not to was in- that this misinformation evidence that Harris particular, suggest son tentional, that the mi- allege and does not Plaintiff from terminating be would given with discrimi- sinformation at the conclusion employment with KDPS retaliatory intent. natory or hearing. McCaw pre-determination (mistaken) After confirming his belief pages released. Robinson at- *11 his that health insurance would be termi- tested that he to redact any intended men- fired, if he spoke nated were to be tion of address; however, Plaintiffs home again McCaw on the morning Sep- with of Robinson inadvertently failed to redact the 2, conversation, tember 2010. this address on two documents. Robinson also McCaw informed Plaintiff that he had spo- claims that he decided not to redact the Uridge. ken Assistant Chief McCaw names of Plaintiffs wife and mother after indicated that his belief that Plaintiff applied Robinson the balancing test set would be terminated at the conclusion of forth in the FOIA and concluded that the pre-determination hearing had not public interest disclosure outweighed changed, but that McCaw believed that the interest in nondisclosure. Plaintiffs retirement arranged, could be 16, 2011, On January avoiding hearing Kalamazoo and termination. Ga- published zette an article describing the Plaintiff did not pre-determi- attend alleged incident involving Plaintiff at the Instead, hearing. nation he submitted a graduation by Obama, attended President 2, letter of resignation September on and included a link to a PDF of the re- Because Plaintiff resigned twenty- after leased documents. Plaintiff claims that he years service, three of he was entitled to by humiliated by the article and only partial pension, and not his fall publication personnel file, of his for which pension, feels employees eligi- become that private after his twenty-five years ble of service. information was released in retaliation for filing Charges with 3, 2010, September Hall, On Rex a staff the EEOC with the intent to intimidate or for writer the Kalamazoo newspa- Gazette dissuade him filing from a federal com- per, City submitted to the a request pursu- plaint. ant the Freedom of Information Act Comp. (“FOIA”), Mich. Laws 15.2312 et seq., 4, 2011, On October Plaintiff timely filed relating to the investigation” “internal a five-count Complaint the United graduation. conduct at the City States District Court for the Western Dis-

Attorney Clyde Robinson that claims he trict Michigan alleging, among other Plaintiff a sent letter him advising of the things, that Defendants violated Plaintiffs request, FOIA but Plaintiff claims that he rights civil by under Title VII engaging in never received a letter. 5, On October discriminatory conduct that led to Plain- 2010, Hall submitted request another for tiffs discharge. constructive Plaintiff also copy “a Department Kalamazoo alleged that Defendants retaliated Public Safety personnel file of Officer him for exercising rights protected by Ti- Mark Laster.” Robinson claims he sent tle VII and the First Amendment. Plaintiff, another letter but Plaintiff claims he did not receive this letter On March Defendants filed a January 6, either. On Robinson re- summary motion for judgment and dis- requested leased the documents to the brief, missal. responsive Plaintiff filed a Kalamazoo Gazette. which contained a counter-statement of material facts as prior thirty-eight Defendants assert well as releasing exhib- (over Gazette, its pages) support documents to 500 posi- Robinson of his reviewed page each tion. possible granted withhold- The district court Defen- redactions, Robinson re- dants’ motion argument. without oral dacted information approximately from 100 timely appeal. filed notice of 726 credibility low, make determi- may we

DISCUSSION when de- weigh the evidence nations nor grant court’s the district review We of fact remains an issue termining whether See Ka de novo. summary judgment Inc., 259 F.3d Denny’s, Logan trial. v. LLC, Mobility, 679 F.3d T AT & lich v. Schebil, (6th Cir.2001); Ahlers v. 566 (6th Cir.2012); City DePiero 469 (6th Cir.1999). F.3d 369 (6th Cir. Macedonia, F.3d 1999). appropriate Summary judgment *12 record, light most viewed

when Claims I. Race Discrimination nonmoving party, reveals favorable it be shall provides Title any as to genuine is no issue that there discharge “to employer an unlawful for enti moving party is fact and material individual, to discriminate or otherwise a of law. as matter judgment tled to a respect to his any individual with against 56(c). of genuine A issue Fed.R.Civ.P. conditions, terms, or privi compensation, is suffi fact exists when “there material of such indi employment, because leges of nonmoving par favoring the evidence cient § 42 U.S.C. 2000e- for that race....” a vidual’s jury to return verdict ty for Inc., 2(a)(1). Lobby, Elliot-Larsen Civil Liberty Similarly, v. Anderson party.” 2505, 242, 249, 91 “discriminat[ing] 106 S.Ct. prohibits Act Rights 477 U.S. (1986). ques “The ultimate 202 to em respect with L.Ed.2d an individual presents a the evidence term, tion is ‘whether condi compensation, or a ployment, require submis disagreement to sufficient tion, employment, because privilege or of one-sided jury or whether sion to a so Comp. ... race.” Laws Mich. a matter of prevail must as party that one 37.2202(l)(a). prima require § The facie ” USA, Inc., 694 F.3d Back v. Nestle law.’ case a discrimination are ments for Cir.2012) Anderson, (6th 571, (quoting 575 and federal law. Michigan law same under 2505). 251-52,106 at S.Ct. 477 U.S. & Blue v. Blue Cross See Sniecinski 124, Mich., Mich. 666 469 N.W.2d summary judg- Shield moving for party theAs (2003). 186,193 ment, the burden Defendants bear issue of genuine of a showing the absence may establish a claim plaintiff A at essential fact as to least one

material introducing by either direct discrimination claim. See Celotex of Plaintiffs element by presenting Catrett, 106 of discrimination 477 U.S. evidence Corp. v. (1986). 2548, support 265 Once evidence that would 91 L.Ed.2d circumstantial S.Ct. v. produc- their burden of Kline Defendants meet an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff, Auth., 337, tion, nonmoving party, as 128 F.3d 348 Valley Tennessee interroga- Cir.1997). here, must—by deposition, (6th Where, answers to as claim affidavits, tories, admissions on file— evidence, and we circumstantial is based on a genuine specific facts reveal show burden-shifting framework set employ trial. Id. issue Douglas. See McDon forth in McDonnell Green, 792, 411 v. U.S. Douglas Corp. nell Plaintiffs evidence as accept must We 1817, 802-04, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 93 S.Ct. all reasonable inferences true and draw 4,77 Community (1973); Dep’t see also Tex. 255, Anderson, at U.S. his favor. See 248, 252-53, Burdine, v. 450 U.S. 2505; Gas Martin Cincinnati 106 S.Ct. Affairs (1981) (clar 1089, 207 67 L.Ed.2d (6th 101 S.Ct. Co., 561 F.3d 443 Cir. and Elec. burden-shifting Douglas McDonnell Potter, ifying 403 2009); 488 F.3d Jones v. framework). (6th Cir.2007). court be- Like the district

727 Under McDonnell Douglas, Plain company act. decision in most cases tiff first carries the burden of establishing is documented in official company records, a prima case. 411 U.S. at may subject and be by facie review higher S.Ct. 1817. To establish a prima supervisors.” level Id. at 118 S.Ct. case of discrimination under both Title VII addition, 2257. In it typically “inflicts di- and the Act, Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights rect economic harm.” Id. 1) Plaintiff must show that he ais member Plaintiff alleges that he an suffered ad- 2) class; protected of a he qualified was employment verse action when he was job for the performed it satisfactorily; “constructively discharged” on 3) September qualifications despite perform Kocsis, (em- 2010. See ance, F.3d he suffered an employment adverse ployee 4) action; may establish an adverse replaced employ- he was by person ment by outside the action protected demonstrating class or treated that he favorably less similarly constructively than a in discharged). situated Plaintiff also dividual protected outside of his suggests class.2 he suffered “other adverse *13 567; See Logan, 259 F.3d at Mitchell v. employment actions,” but fails to specify (6th Hosp., 577, Toledo 964 F.2d 582 Cir. what, precisely, those other em- adverse 1992). parties agree that Plaintiff has ployment actions were. Plaintiffs two-day elements, the satisfied first two but dis suspension does not meet the standard pute whether Plaintiff has met the third an employment “adverse action” since it element. ultimately addition, revoked. In we agree with the district court’s conclusion In the context of a Title dis resignation did not amount claim, crimination an employment adverse to a discharge. constructive action is defined as a “materially adverse in change the terms or conditions” em “A constructive oc discharge

ployment. Kocsis v. Mgmt. Multi-Care curs when the employer, rather than act Inc., (6th Cir.1996). 876, 97 F.3d 885 An ing directly, ‘deliberately makes an em employment adverse action “constitutes a ployee’s working conditions so intolerable significant change employment status, in employee the is forced into an invol hiring, such firing, failing as promote, ’ untary resignation.” Lopez v. reassignment S.B. with significantly different Thomas, Inc., (2d 1184, responsibilities, 831 F.2d or a causing decision a 1188 Cir.1987) significant in Pena v. change (quoting benefits.” Brattleboro Re Burling Indus., treat, (2d Ellerth, 322, Cir.1983) 742, ton 702 Inc. v. 524 F.2d 325-26 U.S. 761, 2257, 118 S.Ct. 141 (quoting Young L.Ed.2d v. 633 Southwestern Sav. and (1998). Ass’n, (5th employment Adverse Loan action “re 509 F.2d 144 Cir. quires 1975))). an official act enterprise, of the a To demonstrate a constructive recognized 2. As Burlington we in White v. N. plaintiff may We also note that a succeed Co., Ry. & Fe on a Title VII Santa 364 F.3d n. 1 discrimination claim 796 without (6th Cir.2004), showing the existence of an employ- adverse Burlington sub nom. N. aff'd by showing ment White, subject- action that he “was Ry. & Santa Fe Co. v. 548 U.S. 126 pervasive ed [discriminatory] or ... severe (2006), S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d 345 "Al by supervisor.” harassment Morris v. Old- though this court and most courts use other Court, County ham Fiscal 201 F.3d 792 action,’ the employment 'adverse term some (6th Cir.2000). However, Plaintiff does courts, Court, including Supreme the use the allege sug- the facts of this case do not —and 'tangible employment term action' or some gest pervasive such harassment existed —that other variation for the same concept.” at KDPS. working intolerable deliberately created evidence must adduce discharge, forcing with the intention 1) deliberately conditions employer to show conditions, as quit. Plaintiff to working intolerable created 2) person, and by a reasonable perceived However, Circuit as Seventh intention of so with employer did University Chi v. in E.E.O.C. explained quit. Saroli employee to forcing the can discharge constructive cago Hospitals, Components, Modular Automation forms: two take on different (6th Cir.2005); Logan, Inc., 405 F.3d a situa- ordinarily faced with areWe F.3d at 568. alleges only employee tion which formally adopted Logan, we of discrimi- resigned because that she to determin approach Fifth Circuit’s cases, harassment, in such natory con prong first ing whether to demonstrate require plaintiff we met, has been inquiry discharge structive even discriminatory work environment counseling that: high than the standard egregious more person would a reasonable Whether work environment. for hostile resign depends compelled to have [felt] only method of not the But that case, but we consid- each on the facts of discharge. constructive demonstrating relevant, singly following factors er manner so acts in a employer anWhen (2) (1) demotion; re- in combination: a reason- as to have communicated (3) job salary; reduction duction will be terminat- employee that she able (4) reassignment responsibilities; ed, resigns, plaintiff employee and the (5) work; reassign- degrading menial or *14 to may amount employer’s conduct younger supervi- under a ment to work discharge. constructive harassment, (6) hu- sor; or badgering, Cir.2002) (inter- (7th 276 F.3d 331-32 to employer calculated by the miliation (em- omitted) quotations nal citations and resignation; employee’s encourage v. Okla- added); see also Burks phasis (7) or con- early retirement or offers (10th Co., 978 Publ’g 81 F.3d homa on less favor- employment tinued terms Cir.1996) (“An a con- prove can employee former status. employee’s able than the that by showing she discharge structive Bunge (quoting Brown 259 F.3d at 569 resigning choice faced with a between was Cir.2000)). (5th 776, 782 Corp., 207 F.3d words, fired.”). con- In other being presented has Although Plaintiff where, discharge also occurs structive subjected to that he was some evidence actions, “the hand- employer’s on an based differently scrutiny and heightened treated axe was the wall and the writing was on has not non-minority peers, he than his Chicago Hosp., fall.” Univ. about to this behavior any evidence that presented (internal quotations at 332 276 F.3d intention specific with the was undertaken omitted); Bragg v. generally see citation Indeed, Plain quit. Plaintiff to forcing F.3d Corp., Transp. Int’l Navistar of the because ultimately resigned not tiff Cir.1998) (“Constructive (7th discharge conditions, but be working “intolerable” to protection Title give VII exists Upon bad information. cause he received than quit rather who plaintiff decides evidence, that this appears it review the fired.”). to be wait around error was inadvertent informational case, undisput it is In the instant quit. to force Plaintiff was not intended that directly told was not that Plaintiff suffi ed Plaintiff has adduced Simply put, pre-deter- at the he would be terminated Defendants to show that cient evidence mination hearing. speculated McCaw that Title Although VII. Plaintiff clearly raised likely seemed that Plaintiff would be claim, Title VII retaliation the district terminated at the hearing, but there is court analyze failed to it as such.3 In- in nothing the record to indicate that stead, the district only court analyzed actually KDPS communicated as much to whether Plaintiff had prima established a say Plaintiff. McCaw had no in the deci- case of discrimination under Title VII facie sion-making process, and not privy was and whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief any inside information regarding the defi- § under 1983 for in retaliation violation of nite outcome of hearing. This situa- Plaintiffs First rights. Amendment distinguishable tion is from the cases district court dismissed Plaintiffs Title VII our sister circuits that have found con- claim after concluding that was discharge structive where a quits not constructively discharged, and dis- See, being order to avoid e.g., fired. missed Plaintiffs First Amendment claim Lopez, (genuine 881 F.2d at 1188 issue of after concluding that “Plaintiffs EEOC material fact employee as to whether eharge[s] did not encompass matters of constructively discharged supervi- where a concern,” public and Plaintiff therefore employee told sor he would be fired “has not identified constitutionally 90-day the end of the probationary period protected speech.” Because the district no matter what he to improve did court misconstrued Complaint Plaintiffs allegedly performance). deficient Conse- improperly analyzed Plaintiffs Title quently, Plaintiff has genuine not raised a claim, VII retaliation and because Plaintiff issue of material fact regarding whether or genuine has raised a issue of material fact resignation not his awas constructive dis- as to whether or not Defendants retaliated charge. against him in VII, violation of Title dis-

Because we conclude Plaintiff can- missal of this claim improper. prima, not establish a case of discrim- ination, Title proceed prohibits we need not discriminating to the re- maining steps against an employee Douglas McDonnell because that employ analysis, agree engaged and we ee has protected conduct by Title *15 2000e-3(a). VII discrimination Title 42 § claim and related VII. See state U.S.C. law claims properly were The opposition dismissed. of clause Title VII makes ... “unlawful for employer an to discrimi II. Title VII Retaliation Claim nate any ... employe[e] ... be In his cause he has Complaint, opposed any practice alleges Plaintiff also made that he was ... unlawful ... “constructively by this discharged subchapter.” 2000e-3(a). § against his will and experienced ‘oppose,’ other ad- term being “The job verse actions” in by statute, retaliation for left undefined the the carries its complaints discrimination ordinary that Plaintiff meaning, ‘to resist or antagonize with employer [...]; raised his and filed with confront; to contend against; to re ” EEOC, sist; and that this was a violation of withstand.’ v. Metro. Crawford mistakenly Because the district court Complaint ana- retaliation claim. his as well as lyzed Plaintiff's retaliation claim under the briefing before district court and this framework, First Amendment and because Court, argue continues that Defen- representing Plaintiff is pro ap- himself se on rights by dants violated his under Title VII peal, party correctly neither articulated the retaliating against complaining him about However, issue before appeal. this Court on workplace. discrimination in the certainly Plaintiff has waived his not Title VII 730 Plain Douglas, McDonnell Under Cnty., & Davidson Nashville

Gov’t of a to establish initial 846, 172 tiff bears the burden 276, Tenn., 129 S.Ct. 555 U.S. If Plaintiff case of retaliation. (2009) prima New (citing Webster’s L.Ed.2d 650 facie of a (2d the elements making out succeeds Dictionary 1710 International case, produc “the of burden prima ed.1958)). clause protects opposition employer to to the of evidence shifts tion formal discrimination only filing non-discrimina legitimate, some EEOC, articulate but com also charges with the If the defen for its actions. tory reason less formal plaints management production, burden of satisfies its dant discriminatory employment protests to demon to Plaintiff shifts back” Auto. burden Henniges v. Trujillo See practices. proffered reason that Defendants’ Inc., strate Am., Fed.Appx. 495 N. Sealing Sys. employ (“We for the (6th Cir.2012) not the true reason re was have 651, 655 Gonzales, F.3d v. 481 Dixon to human ment decision. complaints held that peatedly Cir.2007) (6th marks (quotation 333 vi regarding potential personnel resources omitted). the bur “Although and citations protected constitute of Title VII olations par production shifts between pri a den of establishing activity purposes per retaliation.”) ties, burden plaintiff bears the Mi (citing facie case of ma Id. through process.” chael, 595); Tran suasion Hill v. 496 F.3d at Air (6th 494, 498 Cir. Fed.Appx. 416 Airways, of a retaliation The elements 72 Fed. 2011); Uniboring, v. Shepard those of distinct from similar but claim are Cir.2003). Thus, (6th 333, 336 Appx. pri- claim. establish a discrimination To filed Charges that Plaintiff to the addition under Title case of retaliation ma facie EEOC, consider the must also with the we “(1) VII, that: Plaintiff must demonstrate that Plaintiff filed complaints harassment by Title activity protected engaged he pro to be internally resources with human (2) VII; protected such his exercise of Title VII.4 activities under tected (3) defendant; by known activity was thereafter, an action took the defendant with Title VII discrimination As plain “materially to the can be that was adverse” claim, retaliation claim a Title VII (4) existed tiff; a causal connection by direct introducing established “either and the ma activity protected by proffering between evidence retaliation v. Jo terially adverse action.” Jones support that would evidence circumstantial (6th hanns, 466 Cir. Fed.Appx. of retaliation.” Imwalle an inference Co., 2007) Motor Products, Inc., (citing Abbott v. Crown 515 F.3d Reliance Medical (6th Cir.2003), Inc., (6th Cir.2008). Here, has 348 F.3d 67-68,126 N., S.Ct. Therefore, analyze 548 U.S. at Burlington latter. we done the *16 to re (modifying the third element bur 2405 claim under the Plaintiffs retaliation rather “materially action” quire a adverse den-shifting McDonnell framework action”)).5 employment than “adverse an 93 S.Ct. 1817. Douglas, 411 U.S. filing City the took the considering only after 'action' district erred 4. The court scheduling Charge the EEOC was Charges with the second the Plaintiff filed the formal Hearing. EEOC, the Predetermination concluding that and in claim, Charge a Title VII in Au- 5. As with discrimination EEOC filed Plaintiffs second alternatively this ele- establish can properly form basis gust 2010 the cannot subjected by showing "was City that he had ment claim where the his [retaliation] by retaliatory pervasive harassment investigation severe or already completed of Plain- its Caterpillar Pin. only supervisor.” Michael graduation tiff's conduct at

731 Title retaliation claims “must be “less onerous in the retaliation context proved according principles to traditional than in the anti-discrimination context.” causation,” Michael, of but-for which “requires 496 F.3d at (citing 595-96 Bur- proof N., unlawful retaliation would lington 67-71, 548 U.S. at 126 S.Ct. 2405). not have occurred the absence of the Unlike a Title VII discrimination alleged wrongful action or actions of the claim, provision “the antiretaliation does employer.” Univ. Tex. Sw. Ctr. v. Med. not confine the actions and it for- harms — Nassar, -, U.S. 133 S.Ct. bids to those that are related to employ- (2013). 2533,186 L.Ed.2d 503 ment or occur workplace.” at the Bur- N., lington 548 U.S. 126 S.Ct. dispute do not seem to parties To the third establish element of the pri- Plaintiff has established the first two ele- ma claim, Title VII retaliation “a parties dispute ments. The whether De- plaintiff must show that a reasonable em- took materially fendants ac- adverse ployee would have found the challenged Plaintiff, and, so, tions if against whether adverse, action materially which in this there causal connection was between a context it might means well have dissuad- protected activity and such action. ed a worker reasonable from making or alleges: supporting a charge of discrimination.” as a result of reporting [P]laintiff vari- (internal 68,126 Id. at S.Ct. 2405 quotation ous acts of by misconduct [KDPS] ad- omitted). marks and citations analyz- ministrators/personnel, [PJlaintiff be- ing the significance of any given act of object disdain, came the of their distrust retaliation, “[c]ontext matters. ‘The real contempt causing said administra- impact social of workplace behavior often [Pjlaintiff against tors to retaliate by depends on a constellation of surrounding heightened/increased monitoring and circumstances, expectations, and relation- by surveillance as ordered KDPS admin- ships fully which are not captured by a istrators; trumping up bogus allegations simple recitation the words used disciplinary to support hearings, where ” physical performed.’ acts Id. at prior to hearing, already pre- (quoting S.Ct. 2405 Oncale v. Sundowner determined that going [P]laintiff was Services, Inc., 75, 81-82, 523 U.S. Offshore be terminated.... (1998)). 118 S.Ct. 140 L.Ed.2d 201 “A alleges Plaintiff also that “after [P]laintiffs supervisor’s refusal employee to invite an resignation, forced knowing that he would trivial, to lunch normally a nonactionable likely rights file a civil lawsuit petty slight. But by to retaliate excluding City/KDPS, Robinson, co-defendant Clyde an employee weekly from a training lunch City Attorney Coordinator, and FOIA significantly contributes em- [Pjlaintiffs file,” personnel released entire ployee’s professional might advancement which subsequently uploaded to the well deter a reasonable employee from Kalamazoo website Gazette/MLive.com complaining about discrimination.” Id. at “for world to personal see his and 82, 118 (citing S.Ct. 998 EEOC private privileged information.” and/or 8-14). 8,§ p. Manual “An act that would

Plaintiffs burden of establishing a be immaterial some situations is materi- materially (citation employment omitted). adverse action is al in Id. others.” “This *17 (6th Cir.2007) Court, Corp., (6th Cir.2000)).

Servs. 496 F.3d 595 201 F.3d 792 (quoting County v. Morris Oldham Fiscal 732 (2) discrimination; super- of charge a ing actions permits definition

more liberal have management members of or anti- visors of an purposes for materially adverse knowledge of the or constructive actual in as such qualify to claim discrimination (3) behavior; and retaliatory Michael, coworker’s 496 context.” the retaliation management of or members supervisors employee (holding placing F.3d at 596 tolerated, encouraged condoned, or have leave and 90- administrative paid on brief retaliation, responded have or acts of “relatively low the meet plan day performance inadequate- so complaints plaintiffs the pur for materially action adverse of bar” indifference response the manifests ly that claim); see also retaliation pose Halfa circum- under the Inc., unreasonableness U.S.A., 221 Fed. or Depot, cre v. Home at 347. Cir.2007) Id. (6th (remanding stances. 424, 432 Appx. Burlington reconsideration, light of for light in the most Viewing the evidence a

Northern, plaintiff assigning the whether Plaintiff, the as we must favorable consti score performance-evaluation poor has stage, Plaintiff judgment summary action for employment an adverse tuted Title retali- prima a established a retaliation setting forth purpose the scrutiny, Facing heightened claim. ation claim). for break- reprimands receiving frequent being policies, selectively enforced case, Plaintiff In the instant similarly harshly than more disciplined a filing that after evidence presented has a and forced attend peers, situated human resources complaint with un- hearing based on pre-determination racially a dis he felt was regarding what might wrongdoing allegations of founded action, Plaintiff denied criminatory was worker reasonable have dissuaded a well sin privileges, and opportunities training charge of making supporting or from depart two violating at least for gled out issue genuine is a There discrimination. selectively en that were policies ment or not fact whether regarding disciplined more him, and against forced action, materially subject to adverse viola for identical peers than his harshly activity protected Plaintiffs and whether addition, the viewed evidence tions. In (i.e., complaints informal formal sup to Plaintiff most favorable light EEOC) human resources ini that KDPS allegation Plaintiffs ports action. cause such investiga frivolous and malicious tiated a sum, in dis- district court erred following the June tion of Plaintiff Title VII pled missing properly that he alleges Plaintiff further incident. employee al- an claim. When retaliation harassing, discriminato complained about has both employer an discrimi- leges that by his co retaliatory conduct ry, and in viola- him against retaliated nated and take workers, did not KDPS VII, must district court ap tion Title “[i]n action. note that We corrective Title separately claims under analyze circumstances, these permits Title VII propriate standards) (and for VII, as elements coworker employer an for claims Moreover, not- are distinct. claim Anheuser- each retaliation.” Hawkins concern that both (6th withstanding the fact Inc., Cir. Busch, 517 F.3d activity protected for Circuit, retaliation and/or 2008). employer an In the Sixth Ti- analyzing a framework speech, if actions for the coworker’s liable will be from is distinct claim tle (1) conduct is VII retaliation retaliatory coworker’s First analyzing a rea framework as to dissuade sufficiently severe so claim. retaliation Amendment making support- from worker sonable *18 III. First Amendment Retaliation absolutely there is no in evidence the rec-

Claim ord to indicate that Plaintiff actually com- plained to the USDA about the unregulat- alleges Insofar as Plaintiff that he is also sales, ed meat that Defendants were aware entitled to protection First Amendment that complained USDA, Plaintiff to the or from retaliation for the that Charges he that complaint was the cause of EEOC, filed with the agree we with the any adverse action. There simply is no district court that Plaintiffs EEOC genuine issue of material fact as to Charges were not of entitled to First Amend- the elements However, alleged ment protection. Plaintiffs First as this Court Amendment briefs, reads the record and retaliation claim. According- basis ly, for the district Plaintiffs First Amendment court did not retaliation err dismiss- claim is not the Charges, EEOC but rath- Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation complaint er the alleges claim. he

filed with regarding the USDA his co- Doug worker Deikman’s sale unregulat- of CONCLUSION ed meat. Because the district court did Therefore, we AFFIRM the district issue, briefly examine this we will ana- court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs state and lyze appeal. it on federal race discrimination claims and prima To establish a case First claim, Amendment retaliation RE- retaliation, of First Amendment a public VERSE the district court’s dismissal (1) employee must engaged show that he Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim, and in constitutionally protected speech or con REMAND the proceed- case for further (2) duct; employer took an adverse ings consistent with this judgment. against him action that would deter an ordinary person engaging from in that con BATCHELDER, ALICE M. Chief duct; (3) protected speech was a Judge, concurring. motivating substantial or factor the ad II Count of his first amended com- verse action. Scarbrough Morgan Cnty. plaint, the plaintiff pled a Title VII Educ., (6th retalia- Bd. 470 F.3d Cir. tion claim distinct from his Title 2006); Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d (6th VII claim Cir.2004). discrimination and his First To determine whether retaliation Amendment claim. The met, defen- first element the Court undertakes (1) summary dants judgment moved on two-part inquiry, asking whether the the discrimination claim and the speech involved is a First public matter of con (2) claim, cern, Amendment which the district court and whether employee’s inter granted, challenge did not addressing est in but the Title public these matters outweighs VII retaliation claim. Consequently, concern interest his em district ployer “in court did not promoting efficiency address the Title public performs opinion services it retaliation claim in its through judg- its em ployees.” ment. Scarbrough, 470 F.3d I alleges agree opinion the lead complaint with that we concerning the USDA should Deikman’s remand this case to the Doug district

sale unregulated court protected proceedings meat further on the Title speech. element, As to this Plaintiff is VII claim. I agree retaliation But do not However, correct. prevail analyzed cannot that the court district this claim on his First Amendment claim improperly because as the district court —inasmuch *19 leery of I am all—and it at analyze did not America, STATES UNITED circumstances facts characterizing the Plaintiff-Appellee, district limit that would way in a summary of a examination plenary court’s on remand. this claim on motion

judgment Hunter, ADAMS, Christopher Tommy Bostic, Gill, Dana thoroughly Ladonta rather has opinion The lead Defendants-Appellants. burden- Douglas the McDonnell laid out all of accepting shifting framework 12-2759, 12-2125, 12-2379, 12-2975. and — Nos. true —essen- as accusations plaintiffs Appeals, Court United States has plaintiff tially determined Seventh Circuit. Precisely case. prima his out made facie Sept. Argued all must, stage, accept at this we because true, of fact as allegations 26, 2014. plaintiffs Decided Feb. has plaintiff only that may hold we genuine remain there

demonstrated claim that he fact material to

issues But action. material adverse

suffered has established hold that he may not

we also case, while particularly

prima facie re- of fact questions material

holding that issue. dispute as

main has framework Douglas

The McDonnell has Assuming plaintiff stages.

three and satisfied case prima aout

made that the defen- might be stage, first (and stage satisfy the second could

dants

third) judgment. summary obtain and still likelihood of opine on the not mean to

I do entirely to the

this, I would leave that as court on remand.

district entirety of summary, agree I with opinion.

the district court’s well-written court overlooked

The fact that district claim, which the

the Title retaliation attention, does bring its

parties failed to I because also my But change view. pled this properly

agree plaintiff that the to remand for

claim, judgment join I it now.

the district court address

Case Details

Case Name: Mark Laster v. City of Kalamazoo
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 13, 2014
Citation: 746 F.3d 714
Docket Number: 13-1640
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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