JAYE DONNELLY, Appellant, v SURAKANT PARIKH, M.D., et al., Defendants, and LONG ISLAND MEDICAL IMAGING, P.C., et al., Respondents.
150 A.D.3d 820 | 55 N.Y.S.3d 274
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
2017
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent against, among others, the defendants Albert Zilkha and Joel D. Reiter, who were radiologists employed by the defendants Long Island Medical Imaging, P.C. (hereinafter Long Island Medical), and Long Island Magnetic Resonance Imaging, P.C. (hereinafter Long Island MRI), and the defendant John A. Saugy, an orthopedic surgeon employed by the defendant Suffolk Orthopaedic Associates, P.C. (hereinafter together the Saugy defendants). The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Zilkha negligently failed “to timely identify a malignant process in the left lung of the plaintiff evidenced by [an MRI] performed on or about August 7, 2007,” and negligently failed “to note the presence of a mass in the left lung.” Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that Saugy departed from accepted medical practice in, among other things, misinterpreting X rays of her shoulder, “failing to document any pathology in the lung,” “failing to diagnose lung cancer,” and “negligently diagnosing shoulder impingement syndrome” and “rotator cuff pain.”
In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the Saugy defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. In addition, the court granted the separate motion of Zilkha, Long Island Medical, and Long Island MRI for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Zilkha and so much of the complaint as alleged that Long Island Medical and Long Island MRI were vicariously liable for Zilkha‘s acts or omissions. We affirm the order insofar as appealed from.
“‘Although physicians owe a general duty of care to their patients, that duty may be limited to those medical functions undertaken by the physician and relied on by the patient‘” (Meade v Yland, 140 AD3d at 933, quoting Chulla v DiStefano, 242 AD2d 657, 658 [1997]; see Burns v Goyal, 145 AD3d 952, 954 [2016]). “[T]he question of whether a physician owes a duty to the plaintiff is a question for the court, and is ‘not an appropriate subject for expert opinion‘” (Burns v Goyal, 145 AD3d at 954, quoting Burtman v Brown, 97 AD3d 156, 161 [2012]).
Here, the Saugy defendants submitted, inter alia, a detailed affirmation of an expert orthopedic surgeon, who opined that Saugy properly diagnosed the plaintiff with left rotator cuff disorder, and that the plaintiff‘s symptoms, a physical examination, and positive findings on X rays and an MRI of the left shoulder were consistent with Saugy‘s impression of shoulder impingement syndrome. In addition, the expert opined, among other things, that Saugy, as an orthopedist, appropriately obtained X rays of the plaintiff‘s left shoulder that “were optimized for the bone” and did not “show any evidence whatsoever of a lung tumor.” Accordingly, the Saugy defendants made a prima facie showing that Saugy did not deviate from the accepted standard of care in the field of orthopedic surgery in his evaluation and treatment of the plaintiff‘s shoulder (see Leigh v Kyle, 143 AD3d at 782; Shields v Kleiner, 93 AD3d 710, 712 [2012]). Moreover, the Saugy defendants established, prima facie, that Saugy‘s duty of care as an orthopedic surgeon did
In opposition to the Saugy defendants’ prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Saugy deviated from the standard of care in the field of orthopedic surgery in his treatment of the plaintiff, or whether Saugy assumed a duty of care beyond the evaluation and treatment of the plaintiff‘s orthopedic issues. Contrary to the Saugy defendants’ contention, the affirmation of the plaintiff‘s expert radiologist was not deficient by reason of the redaction of the expert‘s name, since the unredacted original was offered to the Supreme Court for in camera inspection, as is required (see Turi v Birk, 118 AD3d 979, 980 [2014]; Cerny v Williams, 32 AD3d 881, 886 [2006]). However, where, as here, “‘a physician opines outside his or her area of specialization, a foundation must be laid tending to support the reliability of the opinion rendered‘” (Shashi v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 104 AD3d 838, 839 [2013], quoting Bey v Neuman, 100 AD3d 581, 582 [2012]; see Bongiovanni v Cavagnuolo, 138 AD3d at 18; Bjorke v Rubenstein, 53 AD3d 519, 520 [2008]). The plaintiff‘s expert, a board-certified radiologist, did not indicate any familiarity with the standards of orthopedic care. Moreover, the expert‘s opinion that Saugy assumed a duty to discover the plaintiff‘s lung cancer was a bare legal conclusion that is unsupported by the record and insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Burns v Goyal, 145 AD3d at 954; Leigh v Kyle, 143 AD3d at 783; cf. Olgun v Cipolla, 82 AD3d 1186, 1187 [2011]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the Saugy defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Contrary to the contention of Zilkha, Long Island Medical, and Long Island MRI (hereinafter collectively the Zilkha defendants), they failed to demonstrate that Zilkha, as a radiologist, did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to discover and note the mass allegedly visible on the MRI films interpreted by him (cf. Meade v Yland, 140 AD3d at 933; Covert v Walker, 82 AD3d 825, 826 [2011]; Dockery v Sprecher, 68 AD3d 1043, 1045-1046
In opposition to the Zilkha defendants’ prima facie showing with respect to the element of departure, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the MRI films interpreted by Zilkha showed the apex of the plaintiff‘s left lung, where the tumor was located. While her expert‘s board certification in the field of radiology was sufficient to demonstrate the expert‘s specialized skills (see Bongiovanni v Cavagnuolo, 138 AD3d at 18; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1242 [2008]), the plaintiff‘s expert failed to address the evidence that the plaintiff‘s tumor presented on an MRI taken in October 2008 as a mass in the left lung apex, that none of the MRI films interpreted by Zilkha in August 2007 showed the apex of the lung, and that “the lateral, upper part of the lung” seen on some of the August 2007 MRI images was “not the apex of the lung.” Under the circumstances, the opinion of the plaintiff‘s expert radiologist that the plaintiff‘s tumor was visible on the MRI films taken in August 2007 as “a left lung mass . . . in the lateral left upper lobe adjacent to the chest wall” was conclusory and failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Zilkha departed from accepted medical practice (see Lyons v DeNise, 118 AD3d at 554; Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 44 [2012]).
Thus, the Supreme Court properly granted the Zilkha defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Zilkha and so much of the complaint as alleged that Long Island Medical and Long Island MRI were vicariously liable for Zilkha‘s acts or omissions.
Dillon, J.P., Roman, Cohen and Miller, JJ., concur.