Dockery v. Sprecher
68 A.D.3d 1043
N.Y. App. Div.
2009
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THOMAS DOCKERY et al., Appellants, v STANLEY SPRECHER et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York

December 15, 2009

68 AD3d 1043 | 891 NYS2d 465

THOMAS DOCKERY et al., Appellants, v STANLEY SPRECHER et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. [891 NYS2d 465]—

A defendant‘s motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 should be granted only when, accepting the plaintiff‘s evidence as true, and according that evidence the benefit of every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from it, “there is no rational process by which the jury could find for the plaintiff against the moving defendant” (; see ). In considering the motion, “the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant” (; see ; ).

To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant departed from good and accepted standards of medical practice, and that the departure was a proximate cause of the injury (see ; ). Generally, expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from accepted standards of medical care and to establish proximate cause (see ; ; ; see also ).

The Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendants Stanley Sprecher (hereinafter Dr. Sprecher), Peninsula Radiology Associates, P.C., and Peninsula Hospital Center pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiffs’ contention that Dr. Sprecher, a radiologist, departed from accepted medical practice by failing to include, as a differential diagnosis, in his magnetic resonance imaging (hereinafter MRI) report dated March 14, 2002, the possibility that a lesion discovered in the brain of the plaintiff Thomas Dockery (hereinafter Dockery) might have been a brain abscess caused by infection, overlooks the limited nature of the legal obligations of Dr. Sprecher relating to his treatment of Dockery. “Although physicians owe a general duty of care to their patients, that duty may be limited to those medical functions undertaken by the physician and relied on by the patient” (; see ). In this case, Dr. Sprecher was not Dockery‘s treating physician; his role was to interpret the MRI film and document his findings. He did not assume a general duty of care to independently diagnose the patient‘s medical condition (see ; ; ). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record contains no evidence that Dr. Sprecher‘s misreading of the March 12, 2002, CAT scan or the alleged delay in performing the aforementioned MRI was a substantial factor in causing Dockery‘s injuries (see ).

However, the Supreme Court erred in granting, after the jury verdict, that branch of the motion of the defendants M. Chris Overby (hereinafter Dr. Overby) and Levine Overby Hollis, M.D.s, P.C. (hereinafter together the Overby defendants) pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, which was for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of causation. The evidence at trial was sufficient for the jury to infer that Dr. Overby‘s conduct in failing to recommend that surgery be performed on Dockery within 24 hours diminished his chance for a better outcome or increased his injuries (see ; ; ).

As the jury apportioned fault and awarded damages, and the plaintiffs and the Overby defendants fully briefed these issues, we consider the issues in the interest of judicial economy. We find that the jury‘s apportionment of fault was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and that an apportionment of 10% of the fault to the Overby defendants and 90% of the fault to nonparties Philip Howard Gutin and Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center better reflects a fair interpretation of the evidence (see ; ; ). Moreover, we conclude that the damages awarded here were excessive to the extent indicated, as they deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Skelos, J.P., Florio, Leventhal and Hall, JJ., concur.