DONALD D. GADDIS v. BRYAN J. DEMATTEI, et al.
No. 20-2424
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2021 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2022
Before KANNE, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 18-CV-01729 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.
I.
Because we are reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we accept Gaddis‘s version of what transpired as true, noting discrepancies where relevant. The trouble started on October 20, 2017 with a tree on the property of Gaddis‘s next door neighbor on North Highland Avenue, Dorothy McCombs. Gaddis cut down a number of limbs and branches from McCombs‘s tree that were extending into his yard. He then threw the cut branches back into McCombs‘s yard. McCombs asked Gaddis to pick up the branches from her yard, but he, in his own words “didn‘t say a word to her,” and left the branches in her yard. (Gaddis Dep. at 37.) Charles Winstead, who lived across the street and was aware of the ongoing tree dispute, informed McCombs that the branches were still there.
Upon learning this, Gaddis crossed the street to Winstead‘s home and knocked on the door. Through the glass door he saw a guest of Winstead‘s, Cameron Dunford, who Gaddis had never met. In Gaddis‘s account, he said nothing and turned back around to return home. While Gaddis was still in the street, Winstead appeared, carrying a rake, and asked Gaddis what he wanted. Gaddis told Winstead he needed to mind his
Shortly thereafter, three police officers arrived: Bryan DeMattei, Logan Spinka, and William Lannom. Officer Spinka came to Gaddis‘s front door and spoke with him through the screen door about the situation, at which point Gaddis complained that calling the police had been a cowardly thing to do. Officer Lannom joined them. Gaddis describes talking to the officers for ten to fifteen minutes and telling them, among other things, that “people were acting like girls around this place.” (Gaddis Dep. at 53). Meanwhile, Officer DeMattei went across the street to hear Winstead and Dunford‘s version of what had happened. As this all transpired, a “bunch” of neighbors gathered because, as Gaddis explained, “Dorothy McCombs had stirred them, acting like I‘m trying to cut down a little old lady‘s tree.” (Gaddis Dep. at 53). Officer DeMattei then came over to Gaddis‘s porch and told him through the door that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct. Gaddis initially refused to come out of his home, but stepped out onto the porch after Officer Lannom told him he would also be charged with resisting arrest if he failed to come outside. Gaddis complied and was arrested for disorderly conduct.
In Dunford‘s telling of the event, Gaddis did more than appear on the porch and knock on the door. Instead he told Winstead to “come out you coward” after “pounding and pounding” on his door. He then repeatedly called Winstead and Dunford “little girls,” and said “you want to go old man?” to Winstead. (Dunford Dep. at 16–21).
As Winstead recalls it, Gaddis knocked on his door and said, “this was none of your business.” When Winstead walked outside carrying the rake, Gaddis goaded him by repeatedly saying, “come on, come on,” but eventually went back to his own house when Winstead turned away. McCombs said the whole thing started when Gaddis cut her tree limbs “in the dead of night” and she woke up the next morning and photographed the limbs in her yard. (McCombs Dep. 8). She further testified that on the day of his arrest, Gaddis was “erratic and threatening and screaming” and pounding on Winstead‘s door because he “wanted to fight.” She called the police on the basis of her belief that Gaddis was “out of control.” (McCombs Dep. 19–20).
The responding officers have a fairly limited recollection of what transpired. Officer DeMattei recalls speaking to Dunford when he arrived and deciding to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct based on what he heard about Gaddis coming to Winstead‘s porch. Although Officer Spinka and Officer Lannom remember very little about the incident, it is undisputed that they were on Gaddis‘s porch to make sure he stayed nearby during the investigation and ensure that he was not threatening or dangerous.
In 2018, Gaddis brought this
Ultimately the district court denied Gaddis‘s motion for summary judgment as to liability, and granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants except Winstead, who the district court allowed Gaddis to dismiss without prejudice. The district court held that because Officer DeMattei had probable cause to arrest Gaddis, his false arrest claims failed against the officers as a matter of law. The court also rejected Gaddis‘s claim that he was unlawfully “seized” while the officers stood on his porch and spoke with him. With no underlying viable constitutional claim, Gaddis‘s Monell claim likewise failed. Next the district court entered summary judgment for McCombs and Dunford after concluding there was no evidence either of them encouraged or procured Gaddis‘s arrest as required to support a false imprisonment claim under Illinois law. Finally, the district court granted Gaddis‘s unopposed motion under
II.
Before addressing the merits, we must confront the jurisdictional dilemma posed by the district court‘s dismissal of Winstead without prejudice. As the district court itself recognized, the plain language of
In response to our request for briefing on this issue, Gaddis essentially argues that Winstead‘s dismissal is de facto a dismissal with prejudice, or should at least be treated as one on appeal. His logic is as follows: given that he asserted only a state-law claim of false imprisonment against Winstead, Gaddis maintains that there is no longer a basis for the district court‘s federal jurisdiction and he thus “can never re-file that claim in District Court.” Gaddis‘s assertion that the district court would lack jurisdiction over his claim against Winstead is odd given that he fails to contemplate the possibility that he would prevail against the other defendants on appeal and could again attempt to join Winstead to the suit on remand. We need not, however, consider the merits before deciding whether we have jurisdiction.
Taken together, Gaddis‘s arguments amount to a request that we treat the dismissal as one with prejudice. We have long recognized that a plaintiff may on appeal convert a dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice to resolve the finality problem posed by a dismissal without prejudice. See JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 776–77 (7th Cir. 1999). Although it may be implicitly, that is precisely what Gaddis has done here. Specifically, Gaddis provides the following arguments for finality in his brief: “Because Gaddis believes that Winstead testified honestly, Gaddis moved to dismiss him from this case. He seeks no relief against Winstead in this appeal.” (Appellant‘s Br. at 29.) He further insists that
Turning then to the merits, we review the district court‘s entry of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Gaddis‘s favor. E.g., Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2021). To prevail on his
Although Officer DeMattei himself conceded he did not have a detailed memory of the events, his uncontested report from that day provides ample information from which he could have reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct as defined above. Officer DeMattei documented (1) hearing from McCombs that Gaddis had been causing a disturbance; (2) hearing from Dunford that Gaddis had been calling him a coward and attempting to start a fight; (3) hearing from Winstead that Gaddis‘s disruptive behavior was an “ongoing issue” that had recently been becoming “more aggressive;” and (4) his own assessment that Gaddis may pose a risk to others. These facts, taken together and gleaned firsthand by DeMattei, made it reasonable for him to believe Gaddis‘s behavior alarmed or disturbed others as described in the Illinois disorderly conduct statute. Cf. McComas v. Brickley, 673 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable officer could mistakenly have believed they had probable cause to arrest.”) (Emphasis in original.). Gaddis‘s
The mere fact that in addition to gathering information, Officers Lannom and Spinka wanted to ensure Gaddis stayed nearby does not transform his entirely consensual interaction with them into a seizure. It has long been established that the
Gaddis‘s final theory is that officers violated the
Gaddis must make two showings to overcome the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity. First, he must demonstrate that the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Allin v. City of Springfield, 845 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2017). He must also show that their conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because the second inquiry is often conclusive, we may start our
Gaddis‘s argument boils down to a claim that officers violated—if not the letter, at least the spirit—of the Payton rule by raising the possibility of further charges if he exercised his undisputed right to stay inside his home and demand that officers procure a warrant for his arrest. There are cases recognizing the possibility that officers may violate Payton by engaging in behavior to coerce an occupant out of his home.
Because Gaddis cannot identify the required clearly established law, we need not inquire whether the officers here violated the constitution. (Although we note that our failure to reach the issue should in no way be read as sanctioning the use of threats or deception to “encourage” a suspect to step out of his home.) It is enough that at the time of Gaddis‘s arrest, it was not clearly established that such a statement, followed by an ostensibly consensual choice to exit one‘s home and face arrest, would violate the
That leaves Gaddis‘s state-law claims against McCombs and Dunford. To succeed on his false arrest claim under Illinois law, Gaddis must show 1) arrest or restraint against his will; 2) caused or procured by the defendants; and 3) made without probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe he committed the offense. As discussed above, Gaddis has failed to show that the arresting officers here lacked probable cause. Moreover, private citizens may be liable for false arrest only upon a showing that they commanded or mounted a campaign against the police in order to procure the plaintiff‘s arrest. See Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1978); Odorizzi v. A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1971). Gaddis claims he satisfies this requirement with evidence that both McCombs and Dunford exaggerated his behavior when describing it to police (characterizing him as “out of control” and “pounding” instead of knocking on Winstead‘s door). But merely providing information to police is insufficient to constitute participating in or procuring an arrest. Odorizzi, 452 F.2d at 232 (“[G]iving information to police in itself is insufficient to constitute participation in an arrest.”). In any event, even when viewing
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we direct the district court to convert Winstead‘s dismissal without prejudice into one with prejudice, and we AFFIRM the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to all remaining defendants.