JANE DOE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SECOND STREET CORP., Defendant and Appellant.
B330281
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 9/30/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23SMCV00653)
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Matthew G. Kleiner, and L. Geoffrey Lee for Defendant and Appellant.
Schein Law Group and Joshua D. Schein; Sherman Law and Lisa G. Sherman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jane Doe (plaintiff) filed the present case against Second Street Corporation dba The Huntley Hotel (the hotel) and two of its supervisors (collectively, defendants) in 2023. The operative complaint alleges a pattern of sexual harassment and discrimination both before and after the EFAA‘s effective date, as well as a variety of wage-and-hour violations. Defendants moved to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration provision in the hotel‘s employee handbook. The trial court denied the motion to compel, concluding that the EFAA rendered the arbitration provision unenforceable as to all of plaintiff‘s claims. The trial court also granted plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint adding additional claims, including a claim for constructive wrongful termination.
We affirm the trial court‘s order in its entirety. We conclude that the trial court properly found that under the EFAA‘s plain language, (1) plaintiff‘s sexual harassment claims alleging continuing violations both before and after the EFAA‘s effective date are exempt from mandatory arbitration, and (2) plaintiffs other causes of action are also exempt from mandatory arbitration under the EFAA because they are part of the same “case.” Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. We further conclude
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Complaint.
Plaintiff filed the present action in February 2023 against the hotel and supervisors Manju Raman and Eman Rivani.1 Plaintiff‘s initial complaint alleged that plaintiff worked as a server at the hotel‘s Penthouse Restaurant from 2016 to 2022. In October 2019, plaintiff was attacked and sexually assaulted outside of work by a coworker, Ryan Jackson.2 Plaintiff reported the assault to her supervisor and asked not to be scheduled to work with Jackson. Plaintiff nonetheless at times was scheduled to work shifts that overlapped with Jackson‘s shifts.
In October 2021, the hotel hired Rivani as its food and beverage director. During Rivani‘s training, plaintiffs manager told Rivani that Jackson had sexually assaulted plaintiff and should not be scheduled with her unless it was absolutely necessary. The following month, Rivani called plaintiff into his office and asked for details of the assault. Plaintiff said she did not feel comfortable describing it, but Rivani said he would schedule plaintiff and Jackson together unless she did. After plaintiff described the assault, Rivani told her it was her fault. The following day, Rivani scheduled plaintiff and Jackson to work on the same shift, and after that, plaintiff and Jackson were regularly scheduled to work together. Plaintiff began throwing
In April 2022, plaintiff ran into Jackson when she arrived for her shift. She ran up to the stairwell and tried to access the roof, but the exit code to the roof access door had been changed. Plaintiff was relieved because she had thoughts of jumping off the roof. When she came down the stairs, Rivani saw that plaintiff was crying and asked, ” Is this work related?” ” Rivani then “looked her up and down and . . . walked away.”
In early May 2022, when Rivani saw plaintiff, he loudly asked another employee, ” ‘[W]hat [is] the new code to the roof? ” Plaintiff began to have another panic attack and called in sick. Several days later, plaintiff reported to her medical provider that she was suicidal, and she was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold pursuant to
Plaintiff‘s complaint asserted 11 causes of action: (1) sexual harassment and hostile work environment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (
II. Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.
Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration in March 2023. Defendants asserted that in April 2016, plaintiff signed a document acknowledging that she had received and was
Defendants asserted that plaintiffs causes of action were subject to the employee handbook‘s arbitration provision; the arbitration provision was not invalidated by the EFAA because plaintiff‘s claims accrued before the EFAA‘s effective date; the arbitration provision met the threshold requirements of Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 90–91 (Armendariz); and the arbitration provision was not substantively or procedurally unconscionable.
III. Plaintiffs first amended complaint and opposition to the motion to compel arbitration.
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) on May 9, 2023. The FAC added some additional factual detail relating to plaintiff‘s claims, and it alleged that plaintiff was constructively discharged on May 13, 2022. The FAC also alleged seven new
Plaintiff also filed an opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. She contended that her sexual harassment claim accrued on May 13, 2022, the day she was constructively discharged, which was after the EFAA‘s effective date of March 3, 2022. She further asserted that the 2007 employee handbook, which contained an arbitration provision, was superseded by the 2018 employee handbook, which did not; the arbitration provision in the 2007 employee handbook was procedurally and substantively unconscionable; and the arbitration provision was unenforceable under Armendariz.
Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of her opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. In relevant part, plaintiff stated that Jackson sexually assaulted her in October 2019. From late June 2020 through May 13, 2022, she repeatedly asked defendants to separate her from Jackson, who continued to make sexual overtures to her. Instead, defendants forced plaintiff to relive the traumatic experience by retelling it, blamed her for the assault, and required plaintiff to have frequent contact with Jackson. Further, defendants “perpetuated the sexually hostile work environment through [her] constructive wrongful termination.”
IV. Order denying motion to compel arbitration.
The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that plaintiff‘s claims for sexual harassment and constructive discharge accrued either on the day of plaintiff‘s constructive discharge or on the date of the last act alleged to
The hotel timely appealed from the order denying the petition to compel arbitration and permitting plaintiff to file a FAC.
DISCUSSION
The hotel contends that where, as here, a plaintiff alleges sexually harassing conduct that occurred both before and after the EFAA‘s effective date, the case should be sent to arbitration if the plaintiff‘s claims accrued, or the “crux” of the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, before the EFAA‘s effective date. The
As discussed more fully below, we conclude that all of plaintiff‘s claims are exempt from mandatory arbitration under the EFAA, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting plaintiff to file a FAC. We therefore affirm the trial court‘s order in its entirety.
I. Plaintiff‘s sexual harassment claims are not subject to arbitration because they accrued after the EFAA‘s effective date.
As noted above, the arbitration provision of the hotel‘s employee handbook stated that the arbitrability of any claim shall be determined according to the substantive provisions of the FAA and the procedural provisions of the CAA. We discuss the relevant statutes below.
Pursuant to
” ‘The trial court may resolve motions to compel arbitration in summary proceedings, in which “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court‘s discretion, to reach a final determination.” ’ ” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 763–764.) The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense. (Nielsen Contracting, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1106; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)
An order denying a petition to compel arbitration is an appealable order. (
B. The FAA and the EFAA.
The FAA provides that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract or as otherwise provided in [the EFAA].” (
In 2022, Congress amended the FAA by adopting the EFAA. In relevant part, the EFAA provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, . . . no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (
The House Judiciary Committee‘s report on the EFAA explained the Act‘s purpose as follows: “H.R. 4445, the ‘Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021,’ would prohibit the enforcement of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration (‘forced arbitration‘) provisions in cases involving sexual assault or sexual harassment. Over the past several decades, forced arbitration clauses have become virtually ubiquitous in everyday contracts. Often buried deep within the fine print of employment and consumer contracts, forced arbitration deprives millions of Americans of their day in court to enforce state and federal rights. Because arbitration lacks the transparency and precedential guidance of the justice system, there is no guarantee that the relevant law will be applied to these disputes or that fundamental notions of fairness and equity will be upheld in the process. Furthermore, due to the secretive nature of this system, these disputes are often shielded from public scrutiny.
H.R. 4445 would restore access to justice for millions of victims of sexual assault or harassment who are currently locked out of the court system and are forced to settle their disputes against companies in a private system of arbitration that often favors the company over the individual.” (H.R.Rep. No. 117-234, 2d Sess., pp. 3-4 (2022), fns. omitted.)
C. Accrual under the EFAA.
By its terms, the EFAA applies “with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after the date of enactment of this Act“—i.e., March 3, 2022. (Pub.L. No. 117-90, § 3, 136 Stat. 26, 28 (2022), italics added.)6 Courts have interpreted this
The parties agree that no California case has addressed when a sexual harassment claim “accrues” under the EFAA where, as here, a plaintiff alleges sexually harassing conduct
None of the cases on which the hotel relies holds that a plaintiff alleging harassment both before and after the EFAA‘s enactment can be compelled to arbitrate. Instead, in each case the court concluded that the EFAA did not apply because although the plaintiff filed suit after Congress adopted the EFAA, all of the alleged sexual harassment or sexual assault occurred before the EFAA‘s enactment. (See, e.g., Castillo v. Altice USA, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 698 F.Supp.3d 652, 654, 657 [plaintiff alleged harassment and retaliation between Sept. and Dec. 2021; “[b]ecause the discriminatory conduct and retaliation alleged did not occur after March 3, 2022—indeed, Plaintiff concedes that her claims for sexual harassment and retaliation accrued prior to March 3, 2022—the EFAA does not retroactively apply to the
In contrast, several federal courts have held that where a plaintiff alleges sexual harassment both before and after the EFAA‘s adoption, the action accrues on the date of the last alleged act. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Olivieri, supra, 112 F.4th 74. There, Olivieri sued her employer, Stifel, under the New York State Human Rights Law, alleging that her manager sexually assaulted and repeatedly sexually harassed her, and Stifel subjected her to a hostile work environment after Olivieri reported her manager‘s conduct. (Id. at p. 77.) Olivieri filed her initial complaint in January 2021 but continued working for Stifel; after the EFAA‘s enactment, Olivieri sought leave to file an amended complaint alleging subsequent acts of harassment and retaliation. (Id. at p. 83.) The district court permitted Olivieri to file an amended complaint and concluded that the EFAA applied because Olivieri‘s hostile work environment claims were continuing violations. (Ibid.)
The Second Circuit affirmed. It explained that the question of when a claim “accrues” usually arises in the statute of limitations context and “depends on the nature of the claim.” (Olivieri, supra, 112 F.4th at p. 87.) Some claims accrue “when the defendant commits the injurious act,” while other claims
The Olivieri court noted that hostile work environment claims typically are subject to the continuing violation doctrine because “unlike discrete acts, ‘[t]heir very nature involves repeated conduct.’ ” (Olivieri, supra, 112 F.4th at p. 88.) The court explained: “A hostile work environment generally doesn‘t occur on any one day; it emerges ‘over a series of days or perhaps years.’ [Citation.] It is this ‘constellation of events’ that gives rise to a hostile work environment claim. [Citation.] As a result, the continuing violation doctrine provides that such claims do not accrue—and the statute of limitations period does not begin to run—‘until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of the hostile work environment.’ ” (Ibid.) Accordingly, ” ’ [i]f “an act contributing to the hostile environment occurs within the filing period,” the hostile work environment claim is timely, and a factfinder can hold a defendant liable for “the entire time period of the hostile environment,” including the period falling outside of the limitations period.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Olivieri court continued: “Defendants admit that the term ‘accrual’ has ’ “different meanings in different contexts,” ’ [citation], but they resist the logical consequence of that acknowledgment. Essentially, Defendants ask us to read the statute in this context as tying a claim‘s accrual date to the date it first accrued. [¶] But if Congress wanted the EFAA to apply only to claims that ‘first’ accrue after its enactment, it could have said so. Congress is clearly familiar with the phrase, which appears in multiple other statutes. See, e.g.,
The court noted, moreover, that the presumption that Congress intended this meaning of “accrual” was “particularly appropriate here because the EFAA applies to ‘sexual harassment dispute[s],’
The court concluded, finally, that its interpretation of “accrue” did not give the EFAA improper retroactive effect. It explained: “[G]iven the ongoing nature of a hostile work environment claim, which is a singular claim predicated on a series of acts over a course of time, to the extent that Olivieri alleges post-Effective-Date conduct, the application of the statute to a claim arising in part from that conduct can‘t properly be described as ‘retroactive.’ Defendants’ contractual rights are affected not just by ‘conduct arising before [the EFAA‘s] enactment,’ [citation], but also by conduct that occurred after its enactment. [¶] Second, even if application of the EFAA to conduct predating the statute could be considered retroactive, for the reasons set forth above, Congress has expressly indicated
The district court came to the same conclusion in Delo v. Paul Taylor Dance Found., Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 685 F.Supp.3d 173. There, Delo alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed and discriminated against her between September 2021 and her termination in July 2022. (Id. at pp. 177–178.) The district court held that under the EFAA, Delo‘s claims were not subject to arbitration even though some of the alleged harassment and discrimination occurred prior to the EFAA‘s effective date. The court explained: “As the Supreme Court has observed, ‘[h]ostile work environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts‘—instead, ‘[s]uch claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.’ National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) [(Morgan)]. Thus, ‘a single act of [alleged] harassment may not be actionable on its own,’ id., but it can still be considered as part of ‘the entire scope of [the] hostile work environment claim[.]’ ” (Delo, supra, 685 F.Supp.3d at pp. 185–186.) In the case before the court, Delo alleged acts of harassment after March 3, 2022 that were ” ‘sufficiently related’ ” to the earlier alleged acts because they “occurred in the same environment,” “were primarily perpetrated by the same person,” and “uniformly relate to [Delo‘s supervisor‘s] purported mistreatment of and disdain for female employees, particularly those who are pregnant or have childcare responsibilities.” (Id. at p. 187.) Accordingly, the court said, “[t]he post-March 3, 2022 allegations can thus be considered acts that ‘contribute’ to the hostile work environment, and as
such, Delo‘s claim accrued after the EFAA‘s enactment date.” (Ibid.) Other federal district courts have reached similar conclusions. (See, e.g., Turner v. Tesla Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2023) 686 F.Supp.3d 917, 924 [plaintiff‘s claims were “temporally within the scope of the EFAA” because plaintiff first complained to a supervisor about sexual harassment in Mar. 2021, but alleged further harassment from Jan. 2022 for ” ‘several months’ ” and did “not concede that the harassment . . . ceased at any point prior to [plaintiff‘s] termination” in Sept. 2022]; Watson v. Blaze Media LLC (N.D. Tex., Aug. 3, 2023, No. 3:23-CV-0279- B) 2023 WL 5004144, p. *3 [“for purposes of the EFAA, hostile work environment claims . . . accrue on the date of the last act contributing to the violation“]; Betancourt v. Rivian Automotive, LLC (C.D. Ill., Aug. 21, 2023, No. 22-1299-JES-JEH) 2023 WL 5352892, p. *5 [alleged sexual harassment and hostile work environment between Dec. 2021 and Apr. 2022 “represents a continuing violation which was ongoing on the date the EFAA was enacted with the result that the Arbitration Agreement and joint-action waiver are nonenforceable“].) We agree with the federal authorities cited above that the EFAA applies where a plaintiff alleges a course of sexually harassing conduct that occurs both before and after the EFAA‘s enactment. As many of those cases note, the United States Supreme Court has said that where sexual discrimination or harassment claims involve repeated conduct, “[t]he ‘unlawful employment practice’ . . . cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” (Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. atIt is against this backdrop that Congress passed the EFAA.
“A cardinal rule of statutory construction holds that . . . ‘[w]here
Congress borrows terms of art . . ., it presumably knows and
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken.’ ” (Molzof
v. United States (1992) 502 U.S. 301, 307; see also Smith v.
Spizzirri (2024) 601 U.S. 472, 477 [rejecting interpretation of
The hotel contends that we should not import a statute of limitations accrual analysis into the EFAA because the statute of limitations affects a plaintiff‘s substantive rights, while the EFAA “merely dictates procedural rights.” We do not agree. As we have discussed, when Congress passed the EFAA in 2022, there was a well-developed body of case law addressing when hostile environment sexual harassment claims “accrue.” The hotel does not cite any cases adopting a different meaning of “accrue” in this context, nor has the hotel directed our attention to anything in the statute‘s legislative history suggesting that Congress intended a different meaning of “accrue” for purposes of the EFAA.
The hotel also urges that the EFAA should apply only to
claims of harassment that occurred entirely after the Act‘s
passage in order to further the “strong federal and state public
policy favor[ing] enforcement of contractual arbitration.” But as
we have said, Congress articulated an entirely different intent
when it amended the FAA by adopting the EFAA—to contract
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the EFAA applies to continuing violations that occur, at least in part, after the statute‘s effective date, even if some of the conduct constituting the continuing violation occurred earlier. With that framework in mind, we now turn to the allegations of plaintiff‘s complaint.
D. Plaintiff‘s sexual harassment claims accrued after the EFAA‘s effective date.
Plaintiff‘s original and first amended complaint alleged
that the hotel and its agents engaged in conduct that constituted
sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of
the FEHA both before and after the EFAA‘s effective date.
Specifically, both versions of the complaint alleged that beginning
in May or June 2021, the hotel sometimes scheduled plaintiff and
Jackson to work on the same shift; in November 2021, Rivani
insisted that plaintiff describe her sexual assault by Jackson in
detail; in February 2022, Raman told plaintiff‘s general manager
that plaintiff and Jackson had a consensual sexual relationship;
in April 2022, Rivani angrily confronted plaintiff when she began
crying at work after seeing Jackson; and from November 2021
through May 2022, with knowledge that Jackson had sexually
assaulted plaintiff, Rivani regularly scheduled plaintiff and
Jackson on the same shifts. In short, both versions of the
complaint unquestionably asserted actionable sexual harassment
that began prior to the EFAA‘s enactment and continued through
May 2022, after the statute‘s effective date. (
The hotel suggests that the original complaint did not allege conduct subject to the EFAA, and thus the trial court erred by “relying entirely on the new sham allegation” that plaintiff was constructively terminated in May 2022. We do not agree. While the original complaint did not allege wrongful termination, it unquestionably alleged harassing and retaliatory conduct after March 3, 2022. Accordingly, plaintiff‘s claims are subject to the EFAA under both the original and first amended complaint.
II. The trial court properly concluded that all of plaintiff‘s claims are subject to the EFAA.
The hotel next contends that even if the arbitration provision is unenforceable as to plaintiff‘s sexual harassment claims, plaintiff‘s other claims should be ordered to arbitration.11 Plaintiff disagrees, contending that the EFAA precludes arbitration of the entire case. Plaintiff is correct.
The district court considered the same issue in Johnson v.
Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 535 (Johnson),
where some, but not all, of the plaintiff‘s claims alleged sexual
harassment. The court began by explaining that under the FAA
generally, ” ‘if a dispute presents multiple claims, some arbitrable
and some not, the former must be sent to arbitration even if this
will lead to piecemeal litigation.’ ” (Id. at p. 558.) However, the
FAA‘s liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements “may
be ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’ [Citation.]
Turning to the statutory language, the Johnson court noted
that the EFAA makes a predispute arbitration agreement invalid
and unenforceable “with respect to a case which is filed under
Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the . . . sexual
harassment dispute.” (
Having concluded that “case” refers to an entire action, the
court reasoned that the EFAA‘s text “makes clear that its
invalidation of an arbitration agreement extends to the entirety
The court continued: “In construing
Accordingly, the court concluded, where a claim in a case alleges ” ‘conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute’ ” within the meaning of the EFAA, “the EFAA, at the election of the party making such an allegation, makes pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable with respect to the entire case relating to that dispute.” (Johnson, supra, 657 F.Supp.3d at p. 561, italics added.)
Johnson has been widely followed. (See, e.g., Olivieri,
supra, 112 F.4th at p. 92 [citing Johnson]; Turner v. Tesla, Inc.,
supra, 686 F.Supp.3d at p. 925 [”Johnson v. Everyrealm is
persuasive concerning its statutory interpretation of the EFAA
and its result“]; Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton
Inc. (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 23, 2024, No. 23-CV-10753) 2024 WL
3925757, p. *7 [“[T]he EFAA‘s provision that a litigant may elect
to invalidate an arbitration agreement for any ‘case’ requires
courts to render such agreements unenforceable for an entire
case. [Citation.] This is so even if only some or one of the claims
a party asserts specifically relate to sexual harassment and/or
sexual assault“]; Scoggins, supra, 2024 WL 3860464, at *7 [“the
arbitration agreement is unenforceable against the entirety of
Plaintiff‘s case, not just her claims of sexual harassment“];
The hotel urges us to adopt an alternative analysis
articulated in Mera v. SA Hospitality Group, LLC (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
675 F.Supp.3d 442 (Mera), but that case is inapposite.12 In Mera,
the plaintiff sued his employer, alleging both individual hostile
work environment and sexual harassment claims, and
representative wage-and-hour claims on behalf of the employer‘s
nonexempt employees. (Id. at pp. 446–448.) The district court
We adopt Johnson‘s well-reasoned analysis. As Johnson
notes, the EFAA facially applies to ”a case which . . . relates to
the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.”
(
Here, although not all of plaintiff‘s causes of action arise
out of her sexual harassment allegations, the “case”
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting plaintiff to file a FAC while defendants’ motion to compel arbitration was pending.
The hotel contends, finally, that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing plaintiff to file a FAC while defendants’
motion to compel arbitration was pending. Not so. A plaintiff
may amend her complaint “once without leave of the court at any
time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or
after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the
demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is
filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to
the demurrer or motion to strike.” (
The hotel contends that its motion to compel arbitration was “the functional equivalent of an [a]nswer,” and therefore because defendants had filed a motion to compel, plaintiff could not file an amended complaint without court permission. The hotel cites no case authority for this proposition, which we reject. In any event, the trial court expressly granted plaintiff leave to file a FAC; thus, even if court permission were required, it was granted.
The hotel also contends the trial court should not have
allowed plaintiff to file her FAC concurrently with her opposition
to the motion to compel, thus giving the hotel only four court days
to address the new allegations. Instead, the hotel urges, the trial
court “should have required the parties to restart the briefing” to
allow it time to respond to the “drastic change in factual and
legal claims.” But the hotel did not ask the trial court to continue
the hearing or to allow it to refile its motion to compel; instead, it
urged on the merits that plaintiff should not be permitted to file
Finally, the hotel urges that permitting plaintiff to file a
FAC violated its “statutory right to an immediate interim stay
upon filing the Motion to Compel Arbitration.” But
For all of these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting plaintiff to file a FAC.
The order denying appellant Second Street Corporation‘s motion to compel arbitration and granting respondent Jane Doe leave to file a first amended complaint is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her appellate costs.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
EDMON, P.J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
BERSHON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.