DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Pеtitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent, and Gloria Mitchell, Intervenor.
No. 11-AA-1396.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued March 19, 2014. Decided Aug. 27, 2015.
121 A.3d 947
Ronald Wick, with whom Jonathan M. Grossman and Chad E. Kurtz, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for intervenor.
Tonya A. Sapp, Washington, DC, filed a statement in lieu of brief for respondent.
Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, BECKWITH, Associate Judge, and REID, Senior Judge.
WASHINGTON, Chief Judge:
This appeal arises out of a workers’ compensation claim filed by intervenor, Gloria Mitchell (“Ms. Mitсhell“), against her former employer, District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS“). On April 9, 2008, while working for DCPS as a special education teacher, Ms. Mitchell slipped on baby oil that a student had spilled on the floor. Ms. Mitchell was unable to work for a period of time as a result of her injuries and received temporary total disability (“TTD“) benefits, including wages and medical services, for over two years. In the summer of 2010, two independent medical evaluations determined that Ms. Mitchell had reached maximum medical improvement, could return to work, and needed no additional treatment. DCPS notified her that it would be terminating her benefits, and Ms. Mitchell aрpealed to the Department of Employment Services (“DOES“). After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“) determined that Ms. Mitchell was still temporarily totally disabled and ordered reinstatement of her benefits “to the present and continuing, causally related medicals, and interest.” DCPS appealed to the DOES Compensаtion Review Board (“CRB“) contesting only the award of interest, and the CRB affirmed. DCPS now appeals only the interest award to this court.
The question before the court is whether, if the District terminates a claimant‘s disability compensation benefits and the claimant subsequently wins reinstatement of the terminated benefits on apрeal, DOES is permitted to award interest on accrued benefits that were not paid to the employee pending the appeal. In deciding this question, we must determine whether the CRB‘s construction of the Compensation Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA“),
I. Facts
The undisputed facts are as follows. On April 9, 2008, Ms. Mitchell was working as a special education teacher for DCPS when shе slipped and fell on a hallway
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, this court‘s review of an administrative agency decision is “limited,” and the court “must affirm an agency decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Asylum Co. & Ins. Designers v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Emp‘t Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 624 (D.C.2010); see also Muhammad v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Emp‘t Servs., 34 A.3d 488, 491 (D.C.2012). We review questions of law de novo, and the judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Emp‘t Servs., 683 A.2d 470, 472 (D.C.1996). However, “we defer to an agency‘s interpretation of the statute and regulations it is charged by the legislature to administer, unless its interpretation is unreasonable or is inconsistent with the statutory language or purpose.” District of Columbia Office of Human Rights v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Corr., 40 A.3d 917, 923 (D.C.2012) (citations omitted) [hereinafter ”OHR v. DOC“]. We will defer to an agency‘s interpretation “so long as it is not plainly wrong or inconsistent with the legislature‘s intent.” Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Emp‘t Servs., 952 A.2d 168, 173 (D.C.2008) (citation omitted). Further, this court “must sustain the agency‘s interpretation even if a petitioner advances another reasonable interpretation of the statute or if we might have been persuaded by the alternate interpretation had we been construing the statute in the first instance.” Id.
Here, the CRB‘s determination that the CMPA authorizes an ALJ to award interest to a successful claimant is a question of law which we review de novo. However, because DOES is an administrative agency that we have recognized as having “expertise ... and responsibility for administering” the CMPA, we will affirm its interpretation unless it is unreasonable or inconsistent with the statutory language
III. Analysis
The CMPA,
In this case, after finding that Ms. Mitchell continued to be temporarily totally disabled from the period of August 20, 2010, to the present, the ALJ awarded her TTD benefits, including medical expenses plus interest on the award, and the CRB affirmed. In its 2-1 decision, the CRB correctly recognized that it had never before addressed whether an employer can be ordered to pay interest on a workers’ compensation award pursuant to the CMPA. However, the CRB identified a series of prior cases in which the court upheld the agency‘s authority to award interеst on accrued workers’ compensation disability benefits pursuant to the private workers’ compensation statute,5 even though that statute, like the CMPA, is silent concerning interest awards. Thus, the CRB reasoned that because the parallel public and private workers’ compensation statutes are substantiаlly similar and serve the same purpose, and because it could “discern nothing within the public-sector Act that dictate[d] following any other course than that endorsed under the private-sector statute,” the authority to assess interest on accrued benefits under the public-sector statute was similarly permissible.
Aрpellant‘s primary argument is that the District of Columbia enjoys sovereign immunity from an award of interest unless it has waived immunity by explicitly authorizing payment of interest. Appellant contends that because the CMPA‘s provisions are silent concerning interest, interest awards are not authorized and are prohibited by the District‘s sovеreign immunity, citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986), and District of Columbia v. Brown, 739 A.2d 832 (D.C.1999). Shaw acknowledged the “no-interest” rule, holding that the United States is immune from an interest award in the absence of an express statutory waiver of immunity by Congress. See 478 U.S. at 314-15. In Brown, the court denied interest on a back pay award under the pre-1987 Federal Back Pay Act, a statute which contained no authority for an award of interest. 739 A.2d at 837-40. However, the cases upon which appellant relies make it clear that in order for the federal government to waive its liability for interest there must be an explicit waiver with respect to the government‘s immunity from interest payments in the statute. The Supreme Court subsequently indicated that its ruling requiring an explicit statutory waiver bеfore the government can be ordered to pay interest on an award applies only when a successful plaintiff or claimant challenges the federal govern-
Appellee asserts that an agency in the District of Columbia is authorized to award interest even lacking an express stаtutory provision permitting such an award, citing, inter alia, OHR v. DOC, 40 A.3d at 923. In that case, a former employee sued the D.C. Department of Corrections for violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA“), but the D.C. Office of Human Rights concluded that it lacked authority to award interest on the award because the controlling statute was silent concerning interest. The Superior Court reversed, and this court agreed, rejecting the proposition that if a statute does not explicitly award interest, such an award is prohibited. See id. at 928; see also Riggs Nat‘l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1253 (D.C.1990) (“A statutory obligation may bear interest even though the statute makes no provision therefor.“); Burke v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, 26 A.3d 292, 306 (D.C.2011) (“Significantly, the obligation to pay рrejudgment interest arises under the common law and may be payable even in the absence of a statutory authorization to that effect.“). The court in OHR v. DOC reasoned that interest is “part and parcel” of an award and that its purpose is to “preserve the value of the damages awarded.” Id. The samе reasoning has been applied in the CRB‘s workers’ compensation rulings. In upholding the interest award in the present case, the CRB cited a series of cases6 in which the agency authorized payment of accrued benefits under the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act of 1979 (“WCA“), the “private” workers’ compensation statute. Noting that
Finally, appellant argues that “the equities” do not support an award of interest in the present case because terminating Ms. Mitchell‘s benefits was “reasonable” and was not done “irresponsibly.” This argument misapprehends the interest award as a form of penalty for either bad faith or negligent termination. We do not consider the District‘s intent or level of care in deciding whether interest may be awarded under the statute. On the contrary, an interest award on accrued disability benefits, as with interest generally, merely recognizes the time-value of money, and in doing so affords the worker the full value of benefits due for her injuries under the statute. The District suggests that awarding interest would impermissibly provide benefits above and beyond the 66 2/3% of the worker‘s salary designated as a worker‘s “exclusive” remedy in the statute. See
In sum, having recognized DOES‘s expertise in and responsibility for applying the CMPA, and having examined pertinent case law from this jurisdiction and elsewhere, we are satisfied that the CRB‘s ruling that DOES is authorized to award interest on accrued worker‘s compensation disability benefits is neither “plainly wrong” nor inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. Howard Univ. Hosp., 952 A.2d at 173.
Accordingly, the CRB‘s order is
Affirmed.