Diaz v. StateDiaz v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Appelwick
¶1 — The Diazes filed this medical malpractice action alleging misdiagnosis of cancer of the larynx resulting in the unnecessary removal Mr. Diaz’s larynx. The question presented is whether
FACTS
¶2 Louis Diaz and his wife sued several health care providers, alleging malpractice relating to the diagnosis of Mr. Diaz’s cancer of the larynx. The Diazes named Dr. Neal Futran, the otolaryngologist and oral surgeon who performed the related surgery, and his employer, the University of Washington Medical Center (UW), in the lawsuit. The Diazes also named Dr. Jayanthi Kini, the pathologist who reviewed Mr. Diaz’s biopsy specimen and diagnosed cancer, and her employer, Medical Center Laboratory Inc. PS (MCL).1 Prior to trial, the Diazes reached a settlement with Futran and UW for $400,000. The case proceeded against Kini and MCL. In the first trial, the evidence of settlement was not admitted. The jury deadlocked and could not render a verdict. Before the second trial, the trial court ruled that the evidence of the Diazes’ settlement with Futran and UW, including the amount, was admissible under
¶3 Midtrial, the Diazes renewed the motion to exclude evidence of the settlement or to reserve a decision regarding
¶4 The trial court then gave the following instruction:
You have heard evidence that the University of Washington and Dr. Neal Futran were once parties to this litigation and later entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs, paying the plaintiffs $400,000. This evidence should not be used to either (a) assume the University of Washington or Dr. Futran acted negligently to cause damage to the plaintiffs, (b) excuse any liability you find on the part of Dr. Kini or MCL, or (c) reduce the amount of any damages you find were caused by Dr. Kini or MCL. By giving you this instruction, the court does not mean to instruct you for which party your verdict should be rendered.
The jury found in favor of Kini and her employer. The trial court denied the Diazes’ motion for a new trial. The Diazes appeal both the judgment and the denial of the motion for a new trial.
DISCUSSION
¶5 The Diazes contend that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the settlement between the Diazes and defendants Futran and UW. The trial court found that
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Any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the injury complained of from any source except the assets of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s representative, or the plaintiff’s immediate family. In the event such evidence is admitted, the plaintiff may present evidenceof an obligation to repay such compensation and evidence of any amount paid by the plaintiff, or his or her representative or immediate family, to secure the right to the compensation. Compensation as used in this section shall mean payment of money or other property to or on behalf of the plaintiff, rendering of services to the plaintiff free of charge to the plaintiff, or indemnification of expenses incurred by or on behalf of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this section, evidence of compensation by a defendant health care provider may be offered only by that provider.
The Washington Legislature added
The medical malpractice issue is national in scope, and represents a wide range of factors which combine to create the overall problem. The most commonly cited examples of symtoms [sic] of the problem include: insurance carriers’ [sic] dropping or restricting their coverages or refusing to cover certain providers, large increases in malpractice insurance rates which add to already rising medical care costs, providers limiting or changing their patterns of practice in order to reduce the cost of coverage; and, in some cases, providers’ shutdown and strikes.
1976 Final Legislative Report, 44th Wash. Leg., 2d Ex. Sess., at 22.
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¶8 Our purpose in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement the intent of the legislature. Columbia Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Benton Franklin Orthopedic Assocs., 168 Wn.2d 421, 432, 228 P.3d 1260 (2010). If, when looking to the entire statute in which the provision is found and to related statutes, we determine that the meaning of the provision in question is plain, our inquiry ends. Id. at 433. But, if the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and we may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law. Id.
¶9 Both parties, here, argue that the plain language of the statute is clear. Kini argues that, because the statute refers to “any party,” only a defendant who is still a party at the time of trial can constitute a “defendant health care provider.” The Diazes argue the statute refers to any health care provider who is a defendant at the time the agreement to pay compensation is made.
¶10 The only case addressing the meaning of
This statute reserves for the finder of fact — in this case, the jury — the task of examining the extent to which the plaintiff has already been compensated by third parties for the injuries incurred by the defendant and the additional task of offsetting these recoveries from the damages being assessed against the defendant.
Id. The Supreme Court nevertheless found the error harmless, but cautioned: “[W]e do not condone the trial court’s failure to follow
¶11 We hold that the statute is unambiguous. The plain meaning of the phrase “defendant health care provider,” in the context of the greater statutory provision, contemplates only those defendants who participate in trial. The provision limits its application to “any party.”
fl2 The Diazes also argue that the settlement is not collateral source evidence as contemplated by
¶13 The Diazes next contend that ER 408 prevents the admission of the settlement. Generally, if a statute appears to conflict with a court rule, we will first attempt to harmonize them and give effect to both, but if they cannot be harmonized, the court rule will prevail in procedural matters and the statute will prevail in substantive matters. Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 166 Wn.2d 974, 980, 216 P.3d 374 (2009). This court reviews the trial court’s interpretation of evidentiary rules de novo. State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d 11, 17, 74 P.3d 119 (2003).
¶14 ER 408 provides that evidence of settlement “is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.” It further states, however, that “[t]his rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” ER 408. Kini argues that the settlement evidence here was not admitted for any purpose proscribed by ER 408. Instead, she contends that the purpose of the admission of the evidence, as instructed by
¶15 Northington is not to the contrary. Northington v. Sivo, 102 Wn. App. 545, 8 P.3d 1067 (2000). The reason for admission under ER 408 in that case, witness bias, is not at issue here. Id. at 548. Although Northington recognizes that evidence of settlement is “potentially corrosive,” id. at 550, it does not prevent the admission of settlement evidence for the purposes prescribed by
¶16 Additional case law cited by the Diazes provides no further guidance in interpreting the statute or ER 408. Grigsby v. City of Seattle, 12 Wn. App. 453, 529 P.2d 1167 (1975), was not a medical malpractice case and was decided before both
¶17 The Diazes argue that permitting the introduction of evidence of settlements with defendants will have a chilling effect on out-of-court settlements of health care disputes. The Diazes theorize that no health care provider will want to be the first to settle for fear of paying a higher proportion of damages. This is a consideration to be weighed by the legislature.
¶18 Finding no error, we need not reach the Diazes’ arguments regarding prejudice. We affirm the judgment on
Reconsideration denied April 27, 2011.
Review granted at 172 Wn.2d 1010 (2011).
Notes
An additional defendant, Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association, was voluntarily dismissed.
We note that neither this case nor Adcox involved apportionment of liability under
The Diazes contend that Adcox related only to other types of collateral sources, not settlements. They extrapolate that settlement proceeds are not the type of collateral sources contemplated by
Kini additionally argues that the trial court actually erred in instructing the jury that the settlement evidence should not be used “to reduce the amount of damages it found Dr. Kini and MCL had caused.” Kini contends that the purpose
ER 408 was adopted in 1979.5A Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Evidence Law and Practice § 408.1, at 59-60 (5th ed. 2007).