Spokane County v. StateSpokane County v. State
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Johnson, Alexander (en banc)
The central issue presented in this appeal is whether the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) has jurisdiction to hear labor related complaints against the Spokane County Deputy Prosecutors (Deputy Prosecutors). The Superior Court held the Deputy Prosecutors do not fall within the statutory definition of “employee” under the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act,
FACTS
On July 17, 1992, PERC designated Local 1553-PA of the Washington State Council of County and City Employees (Union) as the exclusive bargaining representative of the Deputy Prosecutors. Spokane County and the Union then began to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for the Deputy Prosecutors. Negotiations never produced an agreement but did result in several unfair labor practice complaints filed with PERC against Spokane County.
Prior to any decision from PERC on any of the unfair labor practice complaints, the Deputy Prosecutors filed a petition against state officers in this court, seeking to prohibit PERC from exercising jurisdiction over them. The Deputy Prosecutors did not join the Union as a defendant and the Union moved to intervene. The case was transferred to the Spokane County Superior Court, where the Deputy Prosecutors moved for summary judgment. PERC moved for dismissal of the case. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Deputy Prosecutors and issued a writ of prohibition to PERC, enjoining it from hearing complaints against the Deputy Prosecutors. PERC obtained direct review of the Superior Court‘s decision.
ANALYSIS
Union Intervention
At the trial court, the Union argued it was entitled to either intervention as a matter of right1 or, in the alternative, permissive intervention. The trial court denied the Union‘s motion. The Union appealed to the Court of Appeals and its appeal was consolidated with this action. In denying the Union‘s motion to intervene, the trial court stated, in part:
1. The actions filed by the Petitioners are solely related to the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Commission over the office of Prosecuting Attorney. The motions to intervene fail to meet the four criteria set forth in Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash.2d 277, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994), since their interest is that of PERC and the interest of PERC are adequately represented by the Office of Attorney General.
2. The motions by the intervenors claimed only an interest and were silent as to the essential issue of adequate representation by an existing party.
Clerk‘s Papers at 55.
The denial of a party‘s motion to intervene as a matter of right will be reversed “only if an error of law has occurred.” Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash.2d 277, 302, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994) (citing 7C Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1902, 1923 (2d ed.1986)). An error of law is “an `error in applying the law to the facts as pleaded and established.‘” Westerman, 125 Wash.2d at 302, 892 P.2d 1067 (citing In re Estate of Jones, 116 Wash. 424, 426, 199 P. 734 (1921) (quoting Morgan v. Williams, 77 Wash. 343, 345, 137 P. 476 (1914))). In Westerman, we set out the following four requirements that must be met before intervention of right can be granted:
(1) timely application for intervention;
(2) the applicant claims an interest which is the subject of action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition will impair or impede the applicant‘s ability to protect the interest; and
(4) the applicant‘s interest is not adequately protected by the existing parties.
Westerman, 125 Wash.2d at 303, 892 P.2d 1067 (“[a]ll four of these requirements must be met for reversal to be justified.“).
The Union argues its interests in this case are different from those of PERC because it is the certified bargaining representative and PERC is an administrative agency of the state which “does not purport to represent the interests of the Union, but to carry out and enforce the law.” Opening Br. of Appellants (Union) at 11.
The Deputy Prosecutors urge that the Union has a right to represent them only if the deputies fall under PERC jurisdiction. If the Deputy Prosecutors are correct and they are exempted under the Act, the Union has no interest. The Deputy Prosecutors also argue any interest the Union may have is protected by PERC, which is “vigorously defending its position that the employees [deputy prosecutors] are covered under the statute.” Opening Br. of Resp‘ts at 15. Lastly, the Deputy Prosecutors point out that Union intervention would prejudice the rights of other parties because the only remedy sought is a writ of prohibition which is directed to a state agency and cannot be issued against a private party.
While there is no question of timeliness of the Union‘s motion to intervene, the other three Westerman criteria have not been met. As the Deputy Prosecutors point out, the ability of the Union to bargain on their behalf exists only if PERC has jurisdiction. While the Union might be affected by the ultimate outcome of this case, its interest is not direct. That PERC adequately represents the Union‘s position is evidenced by the fact that the Union presents no argument on the issue of PERC‘s jurisdiction different from the arguments advanced by PERC. We affirm the trial court and hold the Union is not entitled to intervention as a matter of right.
The Union also argues it is entitled to permissive intervention under
Although we hold the Union is not entitled to intervention as a matter of right or permissive intervention, we treat its arguments as amicus for the substantive issues presented in this action.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
PERC next asserts the Deputy Prosecutors are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking relief from this or any other court.3 Specifically, PERC urges that the Deputy Prosecutors had a “`plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law,’ namely, judicial review following the APA proceeding before PERC[.]” Opening Br. of Appellants (PERC) at 8. According to
The Deputy Prosecutors respond that reversing the trial court‘s issuance of the writ of prohibition and requiring them to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile because the case would eventually work its way back to this court. They argue that PERC‘s contention that it has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction was specifically rejected by this court in State ex rel. Graham v. Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417, 99 Wash.2d 232, 662 P.2d 38 (1983) and Local 2916, IAFF v. Public Employment Relations Comm‘n, 128 Wash.2d 375, 907 P.2d 1204 (1995). Lastly, the Deputy Prosecutors rely on the well established legal principle that a challenge to jurisdiction may be made at any time during the proceedings. See In re Saltis, 94 Wash.2d 889, 621 P.2d 716 (1980).
PERC‘s argument that the Deputy Prosecutors are required to advance through all the steps of the PERC administrative process prior to judicially challenging PERC‘s jurisdiction is not well taken.
We have held in cases dealing with the jurisdiction of PERC that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. In Local 2916, PERC sought judicial review of a lower court‘s decision that PERC did not have jurisdiction to hear complaints filed by union members against their union. We affirmed the trial court, stating “[d]etermining the extent of that authority [of PERC] is a question of law, which is a power ultimately vested in this court.” Local 2916, 128 Wash.2d at 379, 907 P.2d 1204. See also Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash.2d 743, 745, 539 P.2d 823 (1975) (“failure to exhaust remedies under the bargaining act . . . does not bar [plaintiffs‘] access to the courts.... [R]emedies prescribed by [bargaining act or contract] would have been futile where the controversy centers on the applicability of the act[.]“).4
More illustrative of the issue is our decision in Washington State Bar Ass‘n v. State, 125 Wash.2d 901, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995). In that case, the Bar Association sought a writ of prohibition from this court preventing PERC from exercising jurisdiction over a labor dispute between the Bar Association and its employees. State Bar Ass‘n, 125 Wash.2d at 906, 890 P.2d 1047. The Bar Association did not exhaust administrative remedies with PERC prior to challenging PERC‘s jurisdiction nor did we require it to do so. It would be manifestly unfair of this court to now require the Deputy Prosecutors to expend the time and financial resources necessary to trek through PERC administrative proceedings prior to seeking judicial relief, while not requiring the same of others.
Because this case involves PERC‘s jurisdiction, we hold the Deputy Prosecutors are not required to exhaust PERC administrative remedies prior to seeking relief from this court. We, therefore, address the merits of the jurisdiction issue raised.
Statutory Definition of “Employee”
PERC asserts the trial court erred in concluding the Deputy Prosecutors are exempt from the Act and, thus, are excluded from PERC jurisdiction. The Act applies to:
any county or municipal corporation, or any political subdivision of the state of Washington, including district courts and superior courts, except as otherwise provided.... The Washington state patrol shall be considered a public employer of state patrol officers appointed under
RCW 43.43.020 . The Washington state bar association shall be considered a public employer of its employees.
In State Bar Ass‘n, we held that portion of
Critical to the analysis and outcome of this issue is the specific language of
PERC argues the Deputy Prosecutors included in the bargaining unit do not fall within the exception in
The Deputy Prosecutors assert they are appointed to office pursuant to statute, ordinance or resolution, specifically
The prosecuting attorney may appoint one or more deputies who shall have the same power in all respects as their principal. Each appointment shall be in writing, signed by the prosecuting attorney, and filed in the county auditor‘s office.... The prosecuting attorney shall be responsible for the acts of his deputies and may revoke appointments at will.
The Deputy Prosecutors assert that because the Legislature “spelled out” that they serve “at will” and are to be “appointed,” rather than simply employed, the Legislature intended to include them within the exception in
Amicus Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA) agrees with the Deputy Prosecutors and asserts “deputy prosecutors are appointed for definite terms of office which coincide with the term of the officer granting the authority, subject to the prosecutor‘s ability to shorten the term at will.” Br. of Amicus Curiae (WAPA) at 10.
Deputy prosecutors are undeniably appointed.
Deputy prosecutors are appointed for specified terms of office because their terms coincide with the elected prosecutor‘s term. Unless a deputy‘s appointment is revoked, the term of office for a deputy prosecutor ends when the term of the elected prosecutor ends. Once hired, deputy prosecutors are not entitled to remain deputy prosecutors should a new prosecutor become elected.
We addressed a similar issue in State ex rel. Day v. King County, 50 Wash.2d 427, 312 P.2d 637 (1957). That case involved a mandamus proceeding to compel a newly elected King County sheriff to appoint the plaintiffs as deputies. Similar to
The argument that the Deputy Prosecutors are not appointed for a specified term of office because (1) their appointments are “at will” and may be revoked at any time, and (2) they may continue in their positions as deputies after a new prosecutor is elected is unpersuasive and hypertechnical. It is not argued, nor could it be argued, that elected prosecutors are not elected for specified terms of office. Similar to the at will nature of a deputy prosecutor‘s employment, the term of an elected official may be cut short by recall. As to the second point, reelection to another term allows an elected official to continue in his or her office after the prior term has expired. Elected prosecutors, however, are clearly elected for a specified term of office. The similarities between the tenure of an elected prosecutor and the deputy prosecutor appointed by the elected prosecutor establish why the above arguments fail.
The term of office for a deputy prosecutor appointed under
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court‘s issuance of a writ of prohibition to PERC, preventing it from exercising jurisdiction over the Deputy Prosecutors. We do so because the Deputy Prosecutors fall within the statutory exemption found in the definition of “public employee” under
Affirmed.
DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY and SANDERS, JJ., concur.
DURHAM, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I agree with Justice Alexander Talmadge that, on the merits, deputy prosecutors are public employees who do not fall within the exception for employees appointed for “a specified term of office.” Accordingly, the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) does have jurisdiction over the deputy prosecutors. As to the threshold issues in this case, I also agree with Justice Talmadge that the court had no authority to issue a writ of prohibition under
The majority reasons that PERC may not consider questions of jurisdiction because the power to determine agency jurisdiction is ultimately vested in this court. Majority at 309 (citing Local 2916, IAFF v. Public Employment Relations Comm‘n, 128 Wash.2d 375, 379, 907 P.2d 1204 (1995)). Yet, the court‘s role as the ultimate arbiter of the scope of agency authority only reinforces the notion that PERC should make the initial determination. The Administrative Procedure Act,
The majority also erroneously relies on Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash.2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975). In Zylstra, juvenile court employees challenged the applicability of the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act,
Lastly, the majority cites to Washington State Bar Ass‘n v. State, 125 Wash.2d 901, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995) in which we considered a challenge to PERC jurisdiction which was brought directly before this court. At no point does that opinion address exhaustion. It is quite a leap to suggest that this court‘s failure to raise the issue sua sponte is tantamount to a “holding” on the matter.
We have never held that exhaustion of administrative remedies may be excused for challenges to PERC jurisdiction. In fact, the APA resolves the exhaustion question in this case.
ALEXANDER, Justice (dissenting).
Although I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in denying the Union‘s motion to intervene and in refusing to require the deputy prosecutors to exhaust administrative remedies, I disagree with its more significant conclusion that deputy prosecutors are exempt from the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act (Act).
As the majority points out, the central issue before us is whether deputy prosecutors fall within the exception to the definition of public employees as persons “(b) appointed to office pursuant to statute, ordinance or resolution for a specified term of office by the executive head or body of the public employer.”
In holding that the deputy prosecutors fall within the exception, the majority relies on
The prosecuting attorney may appoint one or more deputies who shall have the same power in all respects as their principal. Each appointment shall be in writing, signed by the prosecuting attorney, and filed in the county auditor‘s office.... The prosecuting attorney shall be responsible for the acts of his deputies and may revoke appointments at will.
Despite the language that a prosecutor may revoke the appointment of a deputy “at will,” the majority makes a major leap to a conclusion that deputies are appointed for a “`specified term of office.‘” Majority op. at 310. What, I ask, is the specified term of office of a person who serves entirely at the pleasure of the appointing authority—is it one day or the entire term of office of the appointing authority? The answer to the question is that it depends on the judgment of the appointing person. The employment relationship, in short, is a classic at will employment relationship and cannot by any stretch be considered employment for the “specified term of office” referred to in
MADSEN, J., concurs.
TALMADGE, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with Justice Alexander‘s excellent analysis of the employment status of the deputy prosecutors in his dissenting opinion; they are classically at-will employees of the Spokane County Prosecutor during the Prosecutor‘s term of office. The deputies are subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC).
I dissent as well, but separately to indicate I disagree with the majority opinion regarding the questions of the Union‘s motion to intervene and the exhaustion of administrative remedies question.
First, with respect to intervention, the Union here was entitled to intervene. Plainly, the Union that has long represented the deputy prosecutors has a significant interest in the outcome of the principal litigation involving PERC jurisdiction. While PERC was represented with considerable skill by the Office of the Attorney General, the Union had a direct interest in the outcome of the case with a distinct historical and present perspective on the jurisdictional controversy that would have been of assistance to the trial court in this matter.
We have liberally construed the right to intervene under
At issue here is whether NWPPA [Northwest Pulp and Paper Association] has a legally protected interest in the subject of this action. NWPPA is a nonprofit trade association representing pulp, paper, and pulping chemical industries in Washington and other Northwest states. Because the mills whose permits are being challenged are members of NWPPA, the association contends that the trial court properly allowed it to intervene in order to protect its members’ rights. In argument before this court, counsel for NWPPA stated that all the holders of the challenged permits were members of the association. This is a sufficient basis for allowing intervention by the association.
Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr., 119 Wash.2d at 779, 837 P.2d 1007 (footnotes omitted). I can discern no principled distinction between allowing a trade association to intervene as a matter of right to represent the interests of its members and allowing a union to intervene as a matter of right to represent the interests of its members in an administrative proceeding. I would hold the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Union the opportunity to intervene in this action.
With respect to the second issue, the majority holds the trial court had authority to issue a writ of prohibition in this case notwithstanding the statutory requirement that parties pursue review pursuant to Washington‘s Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
The majority acknowledges, but then ignores, the specific direction of
This chapter[1] does not apply to state agency action reviewable under chapter
34.05 RCW or to land use decisions of local jurisdictions reviewable under chapter 36.70C RCW .
Plainly, the Legislature indicated that special statutory proceedings for writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition were foreclosed where judicial review existed pursuant to the APA,
The majority‘s treatment of the writ of prohibition continues our unfortunate trends2 to convert the ancient common law writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, employed historically only in those rare circumstances in which there was no adequate remedy at law, into a roving charter to obtrude even when the Legislature has specifically said we have no jurisdiction. In this case, we are dealing with the statutory writ, not the constitutional writ. While we make the rules as to when a constitutional writ lies, we have absolutely no authority to scorn the Legislature‘s determination of who may sue out a statutory writ of prohibition. I cannot understand or join the majority‘s willingness to flout the law, no matter how many times we may have done so in the past.
In summary, I believe the Union has stated an adequate basis for intervention under