Devin Seats v. Mindi NurseDevin Seats v. Mindi Nurse
Before EASTERBROOK, PRYOR, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
The district court dismissed Seats‘s petition because he filed it outside the statute of limitations. Seats relies on Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005), to argue that the limitations period should start from the date two of his unlawful use of a weapon felonies were vacated, which would render his claim timely. Because Seats forfeited that argument by not making it in the district court and presents no argument that requires us to reverse on plain error, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of his petition.
I. Background
A. Seats‘s Underlying Criminal Case
In late 2012, after a bench trial in Cook County Circuit Court, Seats was convicted of three felonies—aggravated battery with a firearm, armed habitual criminal, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. The pre-sentence investigation report listed six prior felonies, including three convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. During the sentencing hearing, the judge referenced Seats‘s “considerable criminal background” and noted that “[h]e‘s been through the system before.” Seats was sentenced to 20 years, 12 years, and 10 years in prison for the three respective felonies, with the sentences running concurrently. Seats was not sentenced pursuant to a recidivism regime, i.e., there was no statutory requirement that forced the sentencing judge to assign a particular range of years because of a prior conviction.
Seats appealed his conviction, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed in July 2015. Seats filed a petition for leave to appeal, but the Illinois Supreme Court denied it in November 2015 and Seats‘s conviction became final on February 24, 2016.
B. Changes in Illinois Law
Seats‘s criminal appeal (and later post-conviction proceedings) took place in the context of changes to Illinois‘s aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute, codified at
In early 2016, the Illinois Appellate Court vacated a sentence that was enhanced due to a defendant‘s prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and remanded the case for resentencing. People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (2d) 130997, ¶¶ 18, 26. Four months later, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated a defendant‘s conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon even though the predicate felony was an aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction. People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶¶ 15, 29-32, 37. The court held that if an aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction had not been previously vacated, it could serve as a predicate felony conviction for a status crime such as felon in possession. Id. ¶ 37.
Then, in 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, under a portion of the statute deemed unconstitutional in Aguilar, could be used to find a father unfit. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 31-32. The Illinois Supreme Court held that when a criminal statute is facially unconstitutional a conviction under that statute is void—the formerly prohibited conduct was “constitutionally immune from punishment“—and cannot be used as a predicate felony for any purpose. Id. ¶¶ 36-39.
C. Post-conviction Relief
Seats sought post-conviction relief in Illinois state court. He filed a pro se petition on December 22, 2016, arguing he was entitled to a resentencing because the sentencing court improperly considered his prior aggravated unlawful use of a weapon felonies and that statute had been found unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The trial court denied his petition and Seats timely appealed. While the appeal of his petition was pending, Seats moved to vacate the two 2007 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon convictions and they were vacated on November 1, 2019.
In the appeal of Seats‘s petition for post-conviction relief, the Illinois Appellate Court vacated Seats‘s conviction for armed habitual criminal because it relied on the vacated aggravated unlawful use of a weapon convictions. People v. Seats, 2020 IL App (1st) 170738-U, ¶ 14. But the court declined to order a resentencing because it found that “any consideration of the [vacated] convictions by the trial court did not result in a greater sentence.” Id. ¶ 17. The 2007 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon convictions were only two of Seats‘s six prior felonies and the sentencing judge did not specifically refer to those convictions, instead mentioning generally Seats‘s “considerable criminal background.” Id. In reviewing the sentencing transcript, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that the most important factors for the trial court in fashioning Seats‘s sentence were the amount of evidence against him and the
This all brings us to the instant case, where, through counsel, Seats filed a
The state moved to dismiss based on timeliness, and the district court granted the motion.4 The district court found that Seats‘s petition was untimely because, even accounting for the tolled time when Seats‘s petition for post-conviction relief was pending in Illinois court, it was filed more than one year after the underlying criminal judgment became final. As we discuss in detail below,
II. Discussion
With that background, Seats‘s argument before us distills to asking that we apply Johnson to re-calculate the statute of limitations period even though he never brought the case or theory to the district court‘s attention. Then, Seats argues, we should order a new sentencing because the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably concluded that his two vacated convictions did not increase his sentence in the underlying criminal case. That is a steep hill for Seats to climb. Appointed counsel ably brought
We review de novo the district court‘s denial of a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds. Patterson v. Adkins, 124 F.4th 1035, 1045 (7th Cir. 2025). First, we review the statutory limitations period for a
A. Statute of Limitations for Habeas
With Seats‘s argument in mind, we turn to a more detailed review of the limitations period he faced. Under
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
... or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
On appeal, Seats does not challenge the district court‘s calculation of the statute of limitations pursuant to
Instead, Seats argues that we should apply
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the state-court vacatur of a predicate felony is “a matter of fact” that can trigger the one-year period of limitation under
Seats urges us to apply Johnson to find his petition timely because he filed it less than one year after the two aggravated unlawful use of a weapon convictions were vacated, accounting for the tolling effect of his post-conviction petition in state court. The State contends that Seats waived—although it must mean forfeited—this argument because he did not raise it in district court.
B. Forfeiture
An argument not raised in the habeas petition or briefing in district court is waived or forfeited on appeal. Santiago v. Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2022) (waived); Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (forfeited).5 In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Seats argued he was within the statute of limitations because he had filed within one year of the Illinois Appellate Court refusing to remand his case for resentencing, which he contended was when his sentence became “final.” That argument was not only likely incorrect as a matter of law (because the Illinois Appellate Court‘s judgment was not on direct review of his sentence), but its sole focus is the final judgment as the triggering event and therefore relies only upon
Seats argues that he preserved his
issue is before the trial court). Recall subsection (d)(1)(A) requires us to look to the date a judgment became final. That is a far different analysis than subsection (d)(1)(D), which turns on when the factual predicate for the habeas claim could have been discovered with due diligence.
Seats‘s reliance on United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2003), is likewise misplaced. There, although the defendant‘s arguments were “underdeveloped,” he cited the cases on which his legal argument was based. Id. at 727. Here, Seats‘s only briefing in the district court, his petition, does not invoke
contends that an error which heightens a prison sentence implicates substantial rights and the failure to correct such an error undermines the “public legitimacy of our justice system.” However, we see that analysis focusing more on the merits of Seats‘s petition rather than the question of what provision of
Because Seats has forfeited the argument that Johnson applies to the limitation period for his
C. Review of Illinois Appellate Court‘s Opinion
Even if we were to address the merits of Seats‘s petition, he could not overcome our deferential review of the Illinois Appellate Court‘s determination of fact.7
A federal court may “grant habeas relief only if the state court decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law’ or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.‘” Cal v. Garnett, 991 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Because Seats argues that his due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information was violated, he bears the burden of showing “the sentencing court [ ] relied on the critical inaccurate information when announcing its sentence.” Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2010). “A sentencing court demonstrates actual reliance on misinformation when the court gives ‘explicit attention’ to it, ‘found[s]’ its sentence ‘at least in part’ on it, or gives ‘specific consideration’ to the misinformation before imposing its sentence.” Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)). The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the sentencing judge gave Seats‘s aggravated unlawful use of a weapon convictions “insignificant” weight that “did not lead to a greater sentence.” Seats, 2020 IL App (1st) 170738-U, ¶ 18. The court found that the factors “expressly discussed and emphasized by the trial court during sentencing were the amount of evidence against the defendant and the serious nature of his crime—shooting the victim in the face.” Id. ¶ 17. Seats‘s criminal history was mentioned, but only in general terms. And the vacated convictions were but two of his six convictions.
The Illinois Appellate Court‘s finding is a reasonable determination of the facts. The sentencing judge‘s explanation of the sentence referred to Seats‘s “considerable criminal background,” but also related the victim‘s injury and the fact that Seats would be serving most of his sentence. The judge concluded: “Fortunately this man was not hurt worse than he was although he was hospitalized for quite some time. He did receive serious injuries. He was shot in the face. I‘m mindful of the fact the sentencing range is at 85 percent.” We have reviewed the sentencing court‘s statements and believe the Illinois Appellate Court‘s factual finding that the sentencing judge did not rely upon the vacated convictions is reasonable based upon the record.
Seats argues that the transcript of the trial court‘s ruling on his petition for post-conviction relief shows that the sentencing court did take the vacated 2007 felonies into account. The trial judge said during the hearing on Seats‘s petition for post-conviction relief that he did not consider the 2005 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon felony because he was thinking of “two other cases, felony cases.” Seats says that statement is evidence that the judge relied on the two 2007 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon felonies. But the rest of the judge‘s comments show otherwise. The judge said he did not consider the 2005 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon felony because “he had other, two other cases, felony cases where he was sentenced at the same time.” That suggests that the trial court was referencing the two other felony convictions that Seats received in 2005, not the vacated 2007 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon convictions. It is certainly not evidence that the Illinois Appellate Court‘s factual finding is unreasonable. And that factual finding is determinative to Seats‘s claim—if the sentencing court did not actually rely on the vacated convictions in fashioning his sentence, then Seats does not have a due process claim.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the district court‘s decision dismissing Seats‘s