SANDHYA DESMOND v. YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.
(AC 44180) (AC 44181) (AC 44182)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.
Argued January 20—officially released May 3, 2022
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court dismissing the substitute complaints in three cases she had filed against her former employer, the defendant hospital, as barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284 (a)) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant when she suffered an injury for which she sought workers’ compensation benefits, and the defendant accepted the claim. The plaintiff filed functionally identical substitute complaints in each of the three actions, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had engaged in retaliatory and discriminatory conduct against her in violation of statute (§ 31-290a) as a result of her having sought workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted the defendant’s motions to strike all three complaints, determining that they did not allege employment discrimination claims pursuant to § 31-290a but, rather, bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim, which was barred by § 31-284 (a). Held that the trial court properly struck the complaints as being barred by § 31-284 (a), as the plaintiff failed to allege any adverse employment action by the defendant, none of its alleged behavior related to or had any effect on her employment status, she admitted in her complaints that the defendant’s behavior did not arise out of or in the course of her employment, and, despite her attempt to recast her claims as alleging employment discrimination, she alleged nothing more than bad faith processing of her workers’ compensation claim.
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, statutory theft, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Nazzaro, J., granted the defendants’ motion to strike; thereafter, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her substitute complaint; subsequently, the court, Ecker, J., granted the defendants’ motion for judgment and rendered judgment of dismissal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, Sheldon, Keller and Bright, Js., which reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings; thereafter, the court, Young, J., consolidated the case with two separate actions the plaintiff had brought alleging discriminatory and retaliatory conduct by the named defendant in connection with her claim for workers’ compensation benefits and transferred the cases to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket; subsequently, the court, Bellis, J., granted the named defendant’s motions to strike and for judgments of dismissal, from which the plaintiff filed separate appeals with this court, which consolidated the appeals. Affirmed.
Eric M. Desmond, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Phyllis M. Pari, for the appellee (named defendant).
SANDHYA DESMOND v. YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.
(AC 44180) (AC 44181) (AC 44182)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.
Argued January 20—officially released May 3, 2022
Opinion
ALVORD,
We begin with the relevant portions of the lengthy procedural history of these actions, which is set forth in part in this court’s decision in Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 138 Conn. App. 93, 50 A.3d 910, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 942, 58 A.3d 258 (2012) (Desmond I). ‘‘[T]he plaintiff was an employee of the [defendant]. On December 30, 2004, she was injured in the course of her employment. According to the plaintiff, she suffered a spill-related fall while at work and subsequently was diagnosed with bilateral, acute posttraumatic carpal tunnel injuries. Her physicians have advised her that, absent medical treatment, she permanently will be unable to use her hands.
‘‘Subsequently, she filed a workers’ compensation claim with regard to her injury, and the [self-insured defendant] accepted the claim. On March 6, 2008, she filed a federal action in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged various claims under state law and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
‘‘On May 20, 2010, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court the operative complaint [of the first appeal] . . . . [That] complaint contained ten counts, alleging . . . workers’ compensation fraud, statutory negligence, breach of contract, unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
she did not receive necessary treatment.’’ (Footnote added.) Id., 95–96.
Following the defendant’s filing of a motion to dismiss, the court, relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 870 A.2d 1066 (2005) (holding that causes of action alleging bad faith processing of
On appeal in Desmond I, this court held that, despite the labels the plaintiff placed on her claims, ‘‘[a]pplying the rule articulated in DeOliveira to the facts of [the] case, it is clear that the plaintiff’s claimed injuries, allegedly caused by the [defendant’s] bad faith delays in medical treatment, arose out of and in the course of the workers’ compensation claims process. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries fall within the jurisdiction of the commission and that, accordingly, the court properly granted the [defendant’s] motion to dismiss.’’ Id., 102. Accordingly, this court in Desmond I affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff’s action. See id., 105.
Following our decision in Desmond I, the plaintiff, in August, 2013, brought a new action (2013 action) against the defendant. This court, in Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 181 Conn. App. 201, 185 A.3d 665, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 902, 191 A.3d 1001 (2018) (Desmond II), set forth additional procedural history related to the 2013 action. ‘‘On October 3, 2013, the plaintiff filed her [first] amended complaint . . . wherein she again set forth ten counts against the [defendant], claiming statutory theft, common-law fraud, violation of CUTPA, breach of contract and statutory negligence. The [defendant] moved to strike all of the plaintiff’s claims on the ground, inter alia, that they are barred by the exclusivity provision of the act, and thus that the trial court had no jurisdiction over them. The plaintiff filed an objection, arguing, inter alia, that her claims were not barred by the exclusivity of the act. . . .
‘‘By way of a memorandum of decision filed on November 26, 2014, the court granted the [defendant’s] motion to strike the plaintiff’s entire complaint on the ground that all of the plaintiff’s claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission. The court reasoned that the alleged misconduct of the [defendant], which the court found to be ‘identical to that alleged in Desmond [I] . . . but for the addition of some conduct by the [defendant] postdating the prior suit,’ was not so egregious to invoke the exception to exclusivity.
‘‘The plaintiff did not appeal from the trial court’s ruling striking her complaint. Rather, on December 11, 2014, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, the plaintiff, in her view, as advanced before this court, filed a substitute complaint ‘in an effort to plead additional facts and to amplify the allegations such that viability of the . . . [General Statutes] § 52-564 [statutory theft] claim (and associated claims) would be sufficient
‘‘On February 5, 2015, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend her substitute complaint, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60, to incorporate a claim for retaliatory discrimination pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a. . . . On April 23, 2015, the court, Nazzaro, J., denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend, and sustained the [defendant’s] objection thereto. . . .
‘‘On May 7, 2015, the [defendant] filed a request to revise the plaintiff’s substitute complaint, which she had filed on December 11, 2014. The [defendant] sought to have the plaintiff’s entire substitute complaint deleted because the allegations of the substitute complaint were substantially similar to those contained in the plaintiff’s previously stricken complaint and the allegations added to the substitute complaint failed to cure the deficiencies of the earlier complaint.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 205–207. The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s request to revise. Id., 207.
‘‘On March 4, 2016, the court, Ecker, J., issued an order overruling the plaintiff’s objections to the [defendant’s] request to revise and rendered judgment dismissing her complaint. In so doing, the court held, inter alia: ‘[I]t is the court’s opinion that the substitute complaint is not, in substance, materially different from the . . . stricken . . . complaint. In other words, the new allegations in the substitute complaint do not cure the legal deficiencies that caused Judge Nazzaro to strike the [amended] complaint. The substitute complaint contains many more pages of allegations, but those allegations, in this court’s view, do not change the nature or character of the underlying claims in a manner that would alter the outcome of Judge Nazzaro’s memorandum of decision striking the [amended] complaint.’ The court also explained that it was disinclined to revisit Judge Nazzaro’s decision striking the plaintiff’s complaint, but that, even if it did so, it would agree that the plaintiff’s allegations could not overcome the exclusivity of the act. The plaintiff subsequently sought reargument, which the court denied.’’ Id., 209. The plaintiff then appealed. Id.
In Desmond II, this court declined to review the plaintiff’s appellate claim that the trial court erred in determining that her claims were barred by the exclusivity of the act, concluding that the claim was inadequately briefed. See id., 213. This court did determine, however,
that the trial court ‘‘considered the wrong complaint when it denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend’’ her substitute complaint in order to add a claim for retaliatory discrimination under § 31-290a, and, therefore, this court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings on her request to amend the complaint and the defendant’s objection thereto. Id., 215.
In the meantime, in 2015, and later, in 2016, the plaintiff filed two additional actions (2015 and 2016 actions) against the defendant arising from the same conduct, both captioned as seeking relief pursuant to § 31-290a.
On remand from Desmond II, on October 19, 2018, the court, Young, J., issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her complaint in the 2013 action to add retaliation and discrimination claims under § 31-290a. In the same memorandum of decision, the court, sua sponte, consolidated the 2013 action, which had been the subject of our review in Desmond II, with the 2015 and 2016 actions, and all three actions were transferred to the complex litigation docket.
On December 23, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to strike each of the substituted complaints, arguing, inter alia, that the actions ‘‘are barred by the exclusivity of the [act].’’5 The plaintiff objected.
On June 3, 2020, the court, Bellis, J., issued three memoranda of decision, one in each action, striking all three of the complaints.6 The court determined that the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaints were properly construed as alleging bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim, not employment discrimination
claims pursuant to § 31-290a. The court set forth the elements of an employment discrimination cause of action pursuant to § 31-290a as requiring adverse employment action and determined that ‘‘[a] close review of the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint makes clear that all of the alleged wrongdoing on the part of the defendant concerns its administration of the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. Notably, there are no specific factual allegations that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff with respect to her employment.’’ The court then determined that such a claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the act, relying on DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 487. Finally, the court noted that, even if the complaint properly was construed as alleging a claim of employment discrimination pursuant to
On June 23, 2020, the plaintiff filed motions for reargument and reconsideration as to the court’s decisions striking all three complaints. The court denied the motions on July 6, 2020, and subsequently granted the defendant’s motions for judgment on the stricken complaints. On July 24, 2020, the plaintiff appealed from each of the court’s decisions striking the complaints, and this court, sua sponte, consolidated the three appeals.7
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in striking her complaints. She argues that the court improperly construed her claims as alleging bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim because she asserted claims pursuant to § 31-290a, which are not barred by the exclusivity provision of the act. The defendant responds that the court properly construed the claims as alleging bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim and, therefore, properly struck the claims. We agree with the defendant.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court’s ruling . . . is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., 335 Conn. 426, 433–34, 238 A.3d 716 (2020). ‘‘Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 649, 126 A.3d 569 (2015). Although ‘‘[w]e assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. . . . A [motion to strike] admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Binkowski v. Board of Education, 180 Conn. App. 580, 585, 184 A.3d 279 (2018). ‘‘A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court and . . . our interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 573 n.12, 864 A.2d 1 (2005).
We next set forth the act’s exclusivity provision which provides in relevant part: ‘‘An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . but an
In DeOliveira, our Supreme Court held that § 31-284 bars actions that allege bad faith processing of workers’ compensation claims.8 The court explained that ‘‘[t]he legislature . . . expressly has conferred jurisdiction upon the commission to adjudicate claims related to untimely payment of benefits and has developed a scheme under which remedies may be provided.’’9 DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 496–97. In addition, as the court explained, ‘‘[t]he legislature has empowered the commission to take other measures to ensure prompt payment of benefits . . . .’’ Id., 497. ‘‘In other words, by providing remedies for such conduct, the legislature evinced its intention to bar a tort action for the same conduct proscribed and penalized under the act. . . . Indeed, construing the act to permit a tort action for an injury for which a remedial process is provided under the act would invite the indefinite prolonging of litigation and risk double recoveries and inconsistent findings of fact, a result which the legislature, in enacting a system of compensation in place of common law remedies, certainly wished to avoid.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 499–500.
Thus, the court concluded: ‘‘In light of the remedies expressly provided, we decline to construe § 31-284 as not barring [actions alleging bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim] . . . [because] to do so would . . . usurp the legislative function. . . . [A] damage suit as an alternative or additional source of compensation, becomes permissible only by carving a judicial exception in an uncarved statute. . . . Neither moral aversion to the [insurer’s act] nor the shiny prospect of a
We next set forth the principles governing a claim of employment discrimination brought pursuant to § 31-290a,11 which provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. . . .
‘‘(b) Any employee who is so discharged or discriminated against . . . may . . . (1) [b]ring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the employer has its principal office for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if he had not been discriminated against or discharged and any other damages caused by such discriminated or discharge. The court may also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be taxed by the court . . . .’’
‘‘To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 31-290a, the plaintiff must show that she was exercising a right afforded her under the [act] and that the defendant discriminated against her for exercising that right. . . . [T]he plaintiff must show a [causal]
connection between exercising her rights under the act and the alleged discrimination she suffered. Implicit in this requirement is a showing that the defendant knew or was otherwise aware that the plaintiff had exercised her rights under the act. . . . [T]o establish [a] prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must first present sufficient evidence . . . that is, evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find [1] that she engaged in protected [activity] . . . [2] that the employer was aware of this activity, [3] that the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff, and [4]
‘‘A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. . . . To be materially adverse a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. . . . [A]n adverse employment action [has been defined] as a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heyward v. Judicial Dept., 178 Conn. App. 757, 767–68, 176 A.3d 1234 (2017).
On review, it is clear that the plaintiff did not allege a claim of employment discrimination pursuant to § 31-290a, as the complaints in these consolidated actions failed to allege any adverse employment action. In the complaints, the plaintiff admitted that the defendant’s behavior ‘‘did not ‘arise out of or in the course of her employment’ . . . .’’ As the court determined, ‘‘all of the alleged wrongdoing on the part of the defendant concerns its administration of the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim.’’ None of the alleged behavior related to or had any effect on her employment status, and, thus, the plaintiff did not allege any adverse employment action.13 See Heyward v. Judicial Dept., supra, 178 Conn. App. 767–68. Not only did the plaintiff fail to allege any adverse employment action, her allegations form the type of claim that DeOliveira prohibits.14
We reject the plaintiff’s attempt to recast her claims as alleging employment discrimination pursuant to § 31-290a. Despite the labels the plaintiff has affixed to her complaints, she has alleged nothing more than bad faith processing of her workers’ compensation claim. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 348,
780 A.2d 98 (2001) (‘‘the labels placed on the allegations by the parties [are] not controlling’’); see also Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 263, 765 A.2d 505 (2001) (‘‘we look beyond the language used in the complaint to determine what the plaintiff really seeks’’). Therefore, the court properly determined that the plaintiff’s complaints alleged claims of bad faith processing. Furthermore, as § 31-284 bars actions that relate to the processing of workers’ compensation claims, the court properly struck the complaints as being barred by the exclusivity provision of the act. See DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 501; see also Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., 335 Conn. 433–34.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim . . . .’’ Id., 489.