Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 212 Conn.App. 274

Desmond, a Yale-New Haven Hospital employee, suffered a compensable work injury in 2004 and the hospital accepted her workers’ compensation claim.
She alleges the hospital delayed/denied medically necessary treatment, fabricated allegations, conducted surveillance, and otherwise interfered with her access to treatment, worsening her condition and reducing benefits.
Desmond filed multiple suits (federal and state). Earlier state actions were dismissed under Connecticut’s workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine; she repeatedly attempted to replead and add claims under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-290a (retaliation/discrimination).
The trial court consolidated three later actions (2013, 2015, 2016), and Desmond filed functionally identical substitute complaints alleging § 31-290a claims but also expressly stating the alleged harm did not arise out of or in the course of employment.
The hospital moved to strike, arguing the complaints merely alleged bad-faith processing of the workers’ compensation claim and thus were barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284(a); the trial court struck all complaints for that reason and for failure to allege any adverse employment action.
The Appellate Court affirmed: the complaints pleaded bad-faith claims within the exclusive remedial scheme and, in any event, failed to allege the adverse employment action required for a § 31-290a claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the substitute complaints are barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) because they allege bad-faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim	Desmond: complaints state claims under § 31-290a (discrimination/retaliation), not barred by exclusivity	Yale-New Haven: complaints actually allege bad-faith claims intrinsic to the workers’ compensation process and are therefore barred by § 31-284	Held: Complaints allege bad-faith processing tied to the compensation process and are barred by exclusivity (DeOliveira controls)
Whether the complaints adequately plead a § 31-290a claim by alleging an adverse employment action	Desmond: argues § 31-290a claims can encompass discrimination against workers’ compensation claimants and that targeting claimants affects employment-related wages/benefits	Yale-New Haven: no allegations of any materially adverse change in employment status or terms; conduct concerns claim administration, not employment	Held: Plaintiff failed to allege any adverse employment action; § 31-290a claim was legally insufficient

DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487 (Conn. 2005) (holds exclusivity bars tort actions alleging bad-faith processing of workers’ compensation claims)
Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., 335 Conn. 426 (Conn. 2020) (motion to strike standard and plenary review of pleading sufficiency)
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313 (Conn. 2001) (labels in pleadings do not control; courts look to substance of allegations)
Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 143 Conn. App. 351 (Conn. App. 2013) (elements required to establish a prima facie § 31-290a retaliation/discrimination claim)
Heyward v. Judicial Dept., 178 Conn. App. 757 (Conn. App. 2017) (definition of adverse employment action: materially adverse change in terms or conditions of employment)