Derrick Bates v. Tyler RichardsonDerrick Bates v. Tyler Richardson
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
In Irvin v. Richardson, 20 F.4th 1199 (8th Cir. 2021), we decided a consolidated appeal of separate cases brought by Derrick Jerome Bates and Larenzo Irvin under
I.
The facts of this case are detailed in our prior opinion in Irvin, 20 F.4th 1202-03, but we provide a brief summary here. CRPD Officers Tyler Richardson and Jared Jupin were responding to a 911 call involving “a disturbance with a weapon” when they stopped Bates and Irvin. Id. As relevant to this appeal, Richardson yelled at Bates and Irvin to stop walking, drew his gun, and ordered them to the ground, where they were handcuffed. Id. at 1203. After a witness told the officers that neither Bates nor Irvin was involved in the disturbance that had triggered the 911 call, both were uncuffed and told they were free to go. Id. Richardson arrested Bates fifteen minutes later for interference with official acts, in violation of
Bates1 filed suit against Defendants Richardson, CRPD Chief Wayne Jerman and the City of Cedar Rapids, alleging Richardson unlawfully stopped him without reasonable suspicion and subsequently arrested him without probable cause. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Richardson had, at minimum, arguable reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial investigative stop, and that there was probable cause to arrest Bates for continuing to take steps after Richardson commanded him to stop walking. Defendants argued they had qualified immunity from suit, and that the City and Chief Jerman could not be held liable under Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The district court granted Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims.
On appeal, we affirmed in part, but reversed the grant of summary judgment dismissing Bates‘s federal and state false-arrest claims. Irvin, 20 F.4th at 1202. As a result of the partial reversal, the district court‘s rationale for dismissing Bates‘s claim under Monell no longer applied, and we “decline[d] to resolve the[] Monell issues as a matter of law on this summary judgment record.” Id. at 1209. We left open the issue of state statutory immunity for the district court to take up on remand, “[i]f properly preserved.” Id. at 1208.
Shortly after remand, Defendants were granted leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. In their motion, Defendants claimed they had state statutory immunity and federal qualified immunity
The district court granted the motion. It agreed with Defendants that ”Wilson allows for a clearer assessment of
II.
“We review the ‘grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and making every reasonable inference in [their] favor.‘” Bradford v. Palmer, 855 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). However, because this appeal “follows a previous decision of another panel concerning whether [the defendants were] entitled to summary judgment,” as a threshold issue, we must first decide whether the law-of-the-case doctrine applies. See Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., No. 2, 487 F.3d 1132, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 2007). Under that doctrine, “‘when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same case.‘” Id. (quoting Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 807 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (8th Cir. 1986)).
In Irvin, we held that the material facts were too genuinely disputed to conclude as a matter of law that Richardson had probable cause, or arguable probable cause, to arrest Bates for knowingly resisting or obstructing Richardson in the performance of his official duties. 20 F.4th at 1208 (describing the facts as “too uncertain and contested,” and “too confused” to grant summary judgment). As a result, summary judgment was precluded on Bates‘s federal and state law false-arrest claims. See id. On remand, the parties agreed the record remained the same.
Defendants also concede that Wilson did not change Iowa law on interference with official acts. Instead, they disagree with how we applied state and federal law in Irvin. But a party cannot “‘simply repackage[] [arguments] that were presented unsuccessfully . . . during the first appeal.‘” Maxfield, 487 F.3d at 1137. In this second appeal, Defendants simply add Wilson to the same arguments they made in Irvin. That is not enough “to justify permitting [them] to relitigate issues previously decided against [them].” Id.
III.
We reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We leave open for consideration on remand—as we did in Irvin—whether statutory immunity applies to Bates‘s state law claims. See 20 F.4th at 1208.