MARIA J. DERBLOM, EXECUTRIX (ESTATE OF FRED H. RETTICH), ET AL. v. ARCHDIOCESE OF HARTFORD
(SC 20584)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
March 14, 2023
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.
Argued November 21, 2022—officially released March 14, 2023
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The plaintiffs, who were the putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest that R had made to a defunct archdiocesan school (OLM) under the auspices of the defendant archdiocese, sought, inter alia, to establish and enforce the terms of a constructive trust. The plaintiffs are the executrix of R’s estate, eleven former students of OLM and their parents, and M Co., which operates a private Catholic school that purports to be OLM’s successor. Before his death, R donated a large sum of money to OLM, as it was important to him that parents be able to send their children to a Catholic school in the town of Madison, where OLM was located. After R died, his residual estate was distributed to OLM pursuant to his will, which contained a residuary clause in favor of OLM “or its successor, for its general uses and purposes.” The defendant thereafter announced that it would close OLM and another archdiocesan school and open a new school in the town of Branford. Some parents of students attending OLM, including some of the plaintiff parents, subsequently formed M Co., intending to establish a new Catholic school in Madison that would retain OLM’s mission. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that R’s bequest to OLM should be viewed as an endowment that resulted in a constructive trust benefiting the plaintiff students, with the defendant acting as trustee, and that the defendant had an equitable duty to convey the unspent portion of the bequest to M Co., as OLM’s “successor,” or back to R’s estate. The executrix of R’s estate also sought a judgment declaring whether the endowment should be conveyed to M Co., or some other appropriate entity, for the benefit of the plaintiffs or if the endowment to OLM had lapsed with no clear successor, such that the funds should be returned to R’s estate. The defendant moved to dismiss the action, contending that none of the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the terms of a completed charitable gift to a school. The defendant relied on the common-law rule, codified by statute (
- The Appellate Court correctly determined that R’s bequest to OLM was an outright, unrestricted gift:
When a donor specifies that a gift must be used for the donee’s “general uses and purposes,” the only limitation on the donee’s use of the gift is that the donee must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed by the donee’s charter or articles of incorporation, and, because this limitation applies to all charitable gifts, regardless of whether it is expressly included in the instrument conferring the gift, the “general uses and purposes” language in R’s bequest to OLM evinced an intent that it was unrestricted rather than restricted.
Moreover, the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that R’s gift to
OLM was restricted on the ground that R specified in his will that, if OLM became incapable of possessing or using the gift, the unspent portion should go to OLM’s “successor,” as that claim was based on allegations that R’s will evinced an intent that M Co., as the entity with the mission that most closely approximates the mission of OLM, should be the cy pres beneficiary of the gift to OLM, rather than on any allegation that M Co. was OLM’s successor corporation in the legal sense, and the plaintiffs’ claim was inadequately briefed insofar as the plaintiffs did not refer to the cy pres doctrine in their briefs or cite to any authority for the proposition that proof of such intent means that there is an implied restriction on the trust or gift such that a potential cy pres beneficiary has standing to initiate proceedings to enforce the donor’s intent. - The Appellate Court correctly determined that, under the specific facts and circumstances of the present case, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring an action to enforce R’s unrestricted bequest to OLM under the special interest exception to the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable gift:
When a donor has made a gift to a charitable organization that is unrestricted by any contractual terms or qualifications, the donee organization is the sole beneficiary of the gift, and the only limitation on its use is that the organization must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed on it by its charter or articles of incorporation, and this court was not aware of any case in which a court had held that the potential beneficiaries of a charitable organization have standing to bring an action to compel the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner.
Moreover, even if there were rare instances in which the beneficiary of a charitable organization could be found to have a special interest sufficient to confer standing to bring an action to force the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner, this was not such an instance, as students enrolled in educational institutions constitute a constantly fluctuating group, and concluding that a particular student or group of students has standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a trust created to benefit the institution would undermine the primary purpose behind the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive standing to bring such an action, which is to limit the number of persons who have standing to initiate litigation.
Procedural History
Action to establish a constructive trust, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Pierson, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, Lavine, Prescott and Alexander, Js., which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Drzislav Coric, with whom were Brandon Marley and, on the brief, Cody A. Layton, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Lorinda S. Coon, with whom were John W. Sitarz and, on the brief, Kay A. Williams, for the appellee (defendant).
ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the plaintiffs,1 who are the putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest, have standing under the special interest exception to the common-law rule, codified at
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as established by uncontested evidence submitted in conjunction with the motion to dismiss. “In April, 2012, Rettich executed a will that contained a residuary clause in favor of OLM ‘or its successor, for its general uses and purposes.’3 Beginning in 2004, OLM had become an archdiocesan school under the auspices of the defendant.
“It was important to Rettich that residents of Madison be able to send their children to a Catholic school in Madison. Prior to the execution of his will leaving the residue of his estate to OLM, Rettich had donated $500,000 to OLM. OLM later sent a letter to Rettich that marked the anniversary of that donation and informed him that $200,000 of the donated funds had been used by OLM to establish an endowment to ‘ensure [OLM’s] future.’ The letter stated that the money was ‘invested and protected by the [defendant] for the exclusive use of OLM by US Trust.’ In his will, Rettich made no reference to his earlier donation or to any endowed funds or existing trust benefiting OLM.” (Footnote in original; footnote omitted.) Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 203 Conn. App. 200–201.
“Rettich died on September 27, 2013. [The named plaintiff, Maria J. Derblom, the executrix of Rettich’s estate] administered Rettich’s estate, and, in April, 2015, she filed a final accounting of the estate with the Probate Court. The Probate Court accepted the accounting and ordered distribution in accordance with it. The amount of Rettich’s residual estate was $4,745,110.86.
“More than two years later, in January, 2018, the defendant announced that it would be closing OLM and another parish school in Branford, Saint Mary School. It indicated that it intended to open a new school, East Shoreline Catholic Academy (ESCA), which would be located at the former Saint Mary School site in Branford. According to a press release appended to the underlying complaint, ‘[t]he formation of ESCA is not considered a merger, because [OLM and Saint Mary School] will cease to exist and a new corporation . . . will be formed. ESCA, however, will continue to be operated by the same three parishes [that operated OLM and Saint Mary School].’
“On February 28, 2018, shortly after the announcement of OLM’s closing, some parents of students attending OLM, including some of the plaintiff parents, formed the plaintiff corporation, Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., with the intent to form a new Catholic school in Madison that, as alleged in the complaint, would ‘[keep] the current mission and vision of OLM intact.’5 The plaintiffs further alleged that, ‘[s]ince its founding, [the plaintiff corporation] has raised over $1 million in additional pledges to augment the endowment by [Rettich], filed for 501c (3) status,6 developed a financial plan, identified a sponsor of independent Catholic schools and developed a curriculum. Additionally, [the plaintiff corporation] is in the process of hiring a principal and teachers for the school.’ . . .
“In April, 2018, the plaintiffs initiated the underlying action. The complaint contained seven counts and incorporated by reference and attached a number of exhibits. Count one was brought on behalf of the plaintiff students and alleged that Rettich’s bequest to OLM should be viewed as an endowment that resulted in a constructive trust benefiting the plaintiff students with the defendant acting as trustee. It asserted that the defendant has an equitable duty to convey the corpus of that alleged trust to the plaintiff corporation or, alternatively, back to Rettich’s estate for distribution because the defendant ‘would be unjustly enriched if it were permitted to retain the endowment and disseminate it at its own discretion and for purposes wholly unrelated to the operation and preservation of OLM or a rightful successor.’ Count two, also brought on behalf of the plaintiff students, sounded in breach of fiduciary duty [and was] premised on the defendant’s having closed OLM and its alleged misappropriation of the ‘endowment’ from Rettich. Counts three and four were brought by the plaintiff parents and effectively tracked the first two counts, sounding in constructive trust and breach of fiduciary duty. Counts five and six were brought by the plaintiff corporation and Derblom, respectively, and, as in the prior counts, alleged the existence of a constructive trust and an equitable duty on the part of the defen-
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that none of the plaintiffs had standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a completed charitable gift to a school because, under Connecticut law, only the attorney general has such standing. Id., 204. The plaintiffs objected to the motion to dismiss on the ground that the special interest exception to that rule applied. Id., 204–205. The trial court concluded that the special interest exception does not apply to outright charitable gifts and that, even if it did, the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the special interest exception applied to their claim. Id., 205–206. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id., 205.
The plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had incorrectly (1) “construed Rettich’s bequest as an absolute or outright gift to OLM rather than as an endowment that created or resulted in some type of charitable trust benefiting the plaintiffs”; id., 208; and (2) “concluded that a common-law special interest exception to the rule that the state’s attorney general has exclusive authority to bring an action to enforce Rettich’s charitable gift is limited in Connecticut to actions involving charitable trusts and, thus, was inapplicable to confer standing on the plaintiffs in the present case involving a gift.” Id., 212. The Appellate Court concluded that Rettich’s bequest was an outright gift to OLM; id., 211–12, 217; and that the special interest exception did not apply in cases in which a charitable gift is unencumbered by specific restrictions on the use of the gift. Id., 217. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had correctly determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that they did not have standing to enforce the terms of Rettich’s bequest to OLM under the special interest exception to the rule that the attorney general has exclusive authority to
We begin with the standard of review applicable to a ruling on a motion to dismiss. “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 614, 109 A.3d 903 (2015).
“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . [When] a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn. 307, 318, 71 A.3d 492 (2013).7
Well established principles govern who has standing to enforce the terms of a charitable gift or trust. “At common law, a donor who has made a completed charitable contribution, whether as an absolute gift or in trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of his or her gift or trust unless he or she had expressly reserved the right to do so. [When] property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral, to devote the property to that purpose.” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 243 Conn. 1, 5–6, 699 A.2d 995 (1997). “The theory underlying the power of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral to enforce gifts for a stated purpose is that a donor who attaches conditions to his gift has a right to have his intention enforced. . . .The donor’s right, however, is enforceable only at the instance of the attorney general . . . and the donor himself has no standing to enforce the terms of his gift when he has not retained a specific right to control the property, such as a right of reverter, after relinquishing physical possession of it. . . . As a matter of common law, when a settlor of a trust or a donor of property to a charity fails specifically to provide for a reservation of rights in the trust or gift instrument, neither the donor nor his heirs have
This court noted in Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc., that there is an exception to the rule that the attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable trust for persons who have “a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 8 n.4; see also id., 8–9 and n.4 (recognizing that “[f]iduciaries, such as trustees or cotrustees, have historically been deemed to have a special interest so as to possess standing” to enforce terms of charitable trust but rejecting claim that donor had standing to enforce terms of charitable gift); Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 588, 668 A.2d 688 (1995) (recognizing “a ‘special interest’ exception to the general rule that beneficiaries of a charitable trust may not bring suit to enforce the trust, but rather are represented exclusively by the attorney general,” but rejecting plaintiff’s claim that, as life trustee of university without power to vote or to manage university’s affairs, she had standing to bring action challenging validity of contract entered into by university (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grabowski v. Bristol, 64 Conn. App. 448, 449, 451, 780 A.2d 953 (2001) (plaintiffs who owned property abutting municipal park that was subject to terms of testamentary charitable trust had special interest giving them standing to bring action to compel defendant to comply with terms of trust); Russell v. Yale University, 54 Conn. App. 573, 574, 579, 737 A.2d 941 (1999) (recognizing that person with special interest in charitable trust may have standing to bring action to enforce terms of trust but rejecting claim that heir of trust settlor, alumni donors and students had special interest in enforcing terms of charitable gift to university); 4 Restatement
“The [special interest] concept and its application involve a balancing of policy concerns and objectives. The [special interest] requirement provides a safeguard for charitable resources and trustees by limiting the risk, and frequency, of potentially costly, unwarranted litigation;9 but the recognition of [special interest] standing, in appropriate situations, is justified by society’s interest in honoring reasonable expectations of settlors and the donor public and in enhancing enforcement of charitable trusts, in light of the limitations (of information and resources, plus other responsibilities and influences) inherent in [a]ttorney [g]eneral enforcement.” (Footnote added.) 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, comment (g), p. 9. Courts determining whether the special interest exception applies have considered a wide variety of factors, “including the remedy sought, the presence of fraud, the availability of the attorney general and the nature of the [benefited] class . . . .” M. Blasko et al., “Standing To Sue in the Charitable Sector,” 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 37, 76 (1993); see Restatement, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations § 6.05, p. 527 (2021).10
I
Because whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that Rettich’s gift to OLM was unrestricted has some bearing on whether the plaintiffs have special interest standing to bring this action, we first address that claim. The plaintiffs make two arguments in support of their claim that the gift was restricted. First, they contend that Rettich specified that the gift must be used only for OLM’s “general uses and purposes,” which the plaintiffs contend imposes a restriction. Second, they contend that the gift was restricted because Rettich specified that, if OLM became incapable of possessing or using the gift, the unspent portion should go to its “successor . . . .” We disagree with both contentions.
“The construction of a will presents a question of law to be determined in light of facts [that] are found by the trial court or are undisputed or indisputable. . . . [If] the issue before us concerns the court’s legal conclusion regarding the intent of [a testator] as expressed
We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that Rettich intended to restrict the use of his gift to OLM when he specified that it must be used only for OLM’s “general uses and purposes.” This court has held that, when a donor makes a bequest for the donee’s “general purposes,” “the essence of his bequest . . . [clearly is] the attainment of the objectives for which the [donee] was organized. The [general purposes] language . . . does not manifest an intention to restrict the bequest . . . .” Connecticut Children’s Aid Society v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 147 Conn. 554, 560, 163 A.2d 317 (1960). In other words, when the donor has specified that a gift must be used for the donee’s “general uses and purposes,” the only limitation on the use of a charitable gift is that the organization must use it in furtherance of “the duties imposed [on] it by its charter or articles of incorporation . . . .” G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (2d Ed. Rev. 1992) § 324, p. 380; see id. (“[i]n the case of the absolute gift full ownership of the property given vests in the corporation, subject to the duties imposed [on] it by its charter or articles of incorporation” (emphasis omitted)). This limitation applies to all charitable gifts, regardless of whether it is expressly included in the instrument conferring the gift. Thus, if the plaintiffs were correct that Rettich’s use of the language “general uses and purposes” constituted a restriction on the use of the gift, all charitable gifts would be “restricted,” which would render the concept meaningless. We conclude, therefore, that Rettich’s use of the “general uses and purposes” language did not evince any intent to restrict the bequest within the meaning of the relevant legal principles. To the contrary, it evinced an intent that the gift was unrestricted.
We also reject the plaintiffs’ claim that Rettich intended to restrict the use of his gift to OLM when he specified that the gift should go to OLM’s successor if OLM should cease to exist. The plaintiffs disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that this language was “commonplace testamentary verbiage intended to avoid a potential failure of the residuary bequest in the event that OLM had ceased to exist or changed its name before
We conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim, even assuming that the plaintiffs are correct that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rettich intended that the unspent portion of his bequest to OLM would go to the entity that is deemed to be OLM’s successor if OLM ceased to exist after taking possession of the bequest, and even assuming that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., is indeed OLM’s “successor,” as that term is used in Rettich’s will. We note that the plaintiffs have not alleged that Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., is OLM’s successor corporation in the legal sense that it has succeeded to all of OLM’s rights and obligations. See, e.g., Larkin v. Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 569, 772 A.2d 553 (2001) (“[t]he boilerplate language ‘successors and assigns,’ when referring to corporations, ordinarily applies only when another corporation, through legal succession, assumes the rights and obligations of the first corporation”). Rather, they allege that, by specifying that the gift should go to OLM “or its successor,” Rettich’s will evinces his intent that, if OLM were to become incapable of possessing or using his bequest, the remainder of the bequest should be given to the entity the mission of which most closely approximates OLM’s mission—i.e., the operation of a school for Catholic students in the town of Madison—and that entity is Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc. Thus, the plaintiffs are effectively contending that Rettich’s will evinced an intent that Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., should be the cy pres beneficiary of the bequest to OLM. See Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 243 Conn. 10 n.8 (“[t]he rule of [cy pres] is a rule for the construction of instruments in equity, by which the intention of the party is carried out as near as may be, when it would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect” (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Duncan v. Higgins, 129 Conn. 136, 140, 26 A.2d 849 (1942) (“[o]rdinarily [when] an organization to which a charitable gift or devise is made is incapable of taking it, the question whether its payment to another organization will be permitted is determined [on] the basis of the applicability of the cy pres doctrine or doctrine of approximation; and that doctrine will be applied only [when] the court finds in the terms of the will, read in the light of sur-
Even if the plaintiffs could establish that Rettich intended that the cy pres doctrine should be applied to his gift, however, they have not cited any authority for the proposition that proof of such intent means that there is an implied “restriction” on the trust or gift such that a potential cy pres beneficiary, or other beneficiaries of the original donee organization, has standing to initiate proceedings to enforce the intent.11 Indeed, the plaintiffs have not referred to the cy pres doctrine at all in their briefs to this court. Because this claim is inadequately briefed, we decline to address it.12 See, e.g., Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d 420 (2016). We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that Rettich’s bequest to OLM was restricted.
II
Having concluded that Rettich’s bequest to OLM was unrestricted, we next address the plaintiffs’ claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the special interest exception to the rule that the attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of charitable donations does not apply to unrestricted gifts. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended in their complaint that Rettich’s bequest to OLM resulted in a constructive trust benefiting the plaintiff students and parents, and thereby conferred on them a special interest in the enforcement of the bequest.13 We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the exception does not apply under the specific facts and circumstances of the present case.
As the Appellate Court noted, “[t]he law recognizes a distinction between a donor who expresses an intent to make a donee a trustee and one who intends to make an absolute gift.” Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 203 Conn. App. 210. “In the case of a trust the legal title . . . is in the corporation [only], subject to the duties imposed [on the trustees] by the terms of the trust instrument and by the law of charitable trusts . . . .” (Emphasis altered.) G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra, § 324, p. 380. Thus, a charitable trust by its very nature creates a narrowly defined class of persons who have a special interest in its enforcement or modification, namely, the trustees who have a legal obligation to administer the trust. See Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 243 Conn. 8–9 n.4; 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94 (2), p. 4 (“[a] suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust may be maintained . . . by a [cotrustee] or successor trustee”). In addition, if the instrument creating the trust identifies specific persons as beneficiaries, members of that class of persons may have a special interest in the enforcement of the trust sufficient to confer standing.
Charitable gifts are different from trusts. “Frequently a gift is made to a charitable corporation, either without mention of any particular purpose or with a statement that the object is to aid one or all of the causes for which the corporation operates. . . . In the case of the absolute gift full ownership of the property given vests in the corporation, subject to the duties imposed [on] it by its charter or articles of incorporation and by the terms of any agreements it makes by contract or in its acceptance of a qualified gift. The [a]ttorney [g]eneral has the power, as a representative of the state and by quo warranto or other proceedings, to compel the corporation to perform these duties . . . .” (Emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted.) G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra, § 324, pp. 379–81.
Thus, when a donor has made a gift to a charitable organization that is unrestricted by any contractual terms or qualifications, the organization is the sole beneficiary of the gift, and the only limitation on its use is that the organization must use it in furtherance of “the
Even if we were to assume that there may be exceptionally rare cases in which the beneficiary of a charitable organization could be found to have a special interest sufficient to confer standing to bring an action to force the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner, we conclude that this is not such a case.15 Multiple courts, including the Appellate Court, have held that, because students enrolled in an educational institution constitute a constantly fluctuating group, to conclude that a particular student or group of students has standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a trust created to benefit the institution would undermine the primary purpose of the rule that the attorney general has exclusive standing to bring such an action, namely, to limit the number of potential litigants. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 641, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819) (class of college students is “fluctuating, and no individual among [the] youth has a vested interest in the institution, which can be asserted in a [c]ourt of justice,” and, therefore, individual students would not have standing to enforce terms of trust through which college was created); Russell v. Yale University, supra, 54 Conn. App. 579 (“absent special injury to a student or his or her fundamental rights, students do not have standing to challenge the manner in which the administration manages an institution of higher education” or trustees’ discretionary acts); Miller v. Alderhold, 228 Ga. 65, 69, 184 S.E.2d 172 (1971) (“[i]t is inconceivable that one [eighteen year old] boy or girl the day after his or her admission to a private college could go into court or through the [s]tate’s [a]ttorneys, and seek to enjoin the trustees in the management and operation of the college, and ask for a receiver solely because he or
In support of their claim to the contrary, the plaintiffs rely heavily on the Superior Court’s decision in Grabowski v. Bristol, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-95-0468889-S (June 3, 1997) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 623).17 The issue in Grabowski was whether the plaintiffs—residents, taxpayers and citizens of the city of Bristol—had standing under the special interest exception to enforce the terms of a charitable trust establishing a municipal park. See Grabowski v. Bristol, supra, 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 623, 625–626. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs, who owned property abutting the park, had such standing. See id., 626. In support of this conclusion, the court cited to Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. Honolulu, 69 Haw. 569, 751 P.2d 1022 (1988) (Kapiolani). See Grabowski v. Bristol, supra, 626. In Kapiolani, the plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, the members of which included persons who lived adjacent to and made frequent use of a public park that was the subject of a charitable trust, brought an action against, among others, the city and county of Honolulu, as trustee, to enforce the terms of the trust. See Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. Honolulu, supra, 570–71. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that, “[when] a trustee of a public charitable trust is a governmental agency . . . and that agency does not file periodic accounts of its stewardship, and will not seek instructions of the court as to its duties, even though there is a genuine controversy as to its power
We conclude that the trial court’s ruling in Grabowski is limited to the facts of that case. The primary case on which the trial court in Grabowski relied, Kapiolani, has been characterized as representing “the liberal end of the spectrum [of] cases granting [special interest] standing . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, reporter’s note to comment (g) (1), p. 17. We disagree with these cases to the extent that they can be read to support the broad proposition that any member of the public may bring an action to enforce the terms of a charitable trust when there is a genuine controversy as to whether the terms of the trust have been breached and the attorney general has refused to bring an action to enforce the terms. Such a rule would be entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the rule that the attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable gift or trust, namely, to eliminate the risk and frequency of unwarranted litigation by limiting the scope of potential litigants. See id., § 94, comment (g), p. 9; R. Chester et al., supra, § 414, pp. 47–48. Instead, we conclude that Grabowski stands for the narrow proposition that persons who own land abutting a public park that is subject to the terms of a trust have a special interest sufficient to confer standing to bring an action to enforce those terms. Thus, Grabowski does not support the plaintiffs’ claim that students and their parents have standing under the special interest exception to enforce an unrestricted monetary gift to an educational institution.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined that Rettich’s bequest to OLM was unrestricted and that the plaintiffs did not have standing under the special interest exception to bring an action to enforce the bequest. The Appellate Court, therefore, properly affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this action.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
“(a) the state attorney general is not exercising the office’s authority to protect the public’s interest in the charitable assets at issue . . .
“(b) the charitable assets at issue will not be protected without the grant of standing to the private party;
“(c) the alleged misconduct is egregious or the circumstances are serious and exigent;
“(d) the relief sought is appropriate to enforce the purposes of the charity or the purposes to which particular charitable assets are devoted; and
“(e) the private party has a substantial connection to:
“(1) the matter at issue and the charity . . . or
“(2) the charitable assets at issue . . . .” Restatement, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations, supra, § 6.05, p. 527.