54 Conn. App. 573 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1999
The plaintiffs, an heir of the settlor of a charitable trust,
The following facts are necessary for our resolution of this appeal. Yale is a nonprofit corporation organized pursuant to a 1745 charter, which was reconfirmed in
The divinity school is one of Yale’s graduate professional schools, which educates men and women for the Christian ministry and provides theological education for persons engaged in other professions. Prior to the commencement of this action, the president of Yale appointed a committee to undertake a comprehensive study of the divinity school and its future. In late 1996, the Fellows of the Yale Corporation approved certain recommendations, as made to them by the president and dean of the divinity school, calling for the reorganization of the divinity school, including the demolition of large portions of the Sterling Divinity Quadrangle.
The plaintiffs took exception to the reorganization and instituted this action seeking a temporary and permanent injunction enjoining Yale from carrying out the reorganization, a declaratory judgment that Yale’s reorganization plan constitutes an abuse of discretion as a trustee of a public charitable trust, and an accounting of all gifts and donations Yale received for the benefit of the divinity school and of charges against the divinity
“It is a basic principle of our law . . . that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. ... A party pursuing declaratory relief must . . . demonstrate, as in ordinary actions, a justiciable right in the controversy sought to be resolved, that is, contract, property or personal rights ... as such will be affected by the [court’s] decision. . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the defendant’s action has invaded. . . .
“Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . . The determination of aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and a plaintiff has the burden of proving that fact. . . . The conclusions reached by the trial court cannot be disturbed on appeal unless the subordinate facts do
“A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts. Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 63, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988). A motion to dismiss raises the question of whether a jurisdictional flaw is apparent on the record or by way of supporting affidavits. Bradley’s Appeal from Probate, 19 Conn. App. 456, 461-62, 563 A.2d 1358 (1989).” Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 41 Conn. App. 790, 793, 677 A.2d 1378 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 243 Conn. 1, 699 A.2d 995 (1997).
Although Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 243 Conn. 1, 699 A.2d 995 (1997), concerns the interpretation of a statute,
“[Tjhe donor himself has no standing to enforce the terms of his gift when he has not retained a specific right to control the property, such as a right of reverter, after relinquishing physical possession of it. ... As a matter of common law, when a settlor of a trust or a donor of property to a charity fails specifically to provide for a reservation of rights in the tmst or gift instrument, neither the donor nor his heirs have any standing in court in a proceeding to compel the proper execution of the tmst, except as relators. . . . There is no such thing as a resulting tmst with respect to a charity. . . . Where the donor has effectually passed out of himself all interest in the fund devoted to a charity, neither he nor those claiming under him have any standing in a court of equity as to its disposition and control.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 243 Conn. 7-8.
The trial court found the facts noted previously in this opinion and concluded that if Sterling were alive today, he would have no right to enforce conditions of his gift, and that, therefore, his heir and successor lacks standing to bring this suit, as well. We agree. See id., 5-6.
With regard to the third group of plaintiffs, the students, the trial court determined that they also lack standing. We agree with the trial court and hold that, absent special injury to a student or his or her fundamental rights, students do not have standing to challenge the manner in which the administration manages an institution of higher education. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 641, 4 S. Ct. 526, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819);
We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly concluded that, although the plaintiffs are sincere in their efforts to maintain the divinity school as a leader in theological education and preparation for the Christian ministry and they acted in good faith based on motives that are beyond question, the plaintiffs, as a matter of law, lack standing to adjudicate the equitable remedies they seek.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Cynthia Sterling Russell is an heir and claimed successor in interest to John W. Sterling, benefactor of the named defendant, Yale University.
The following plaintiffs are graduates of and donors of monetary gifts to the Yale divinity school: David R. Adams, Tabithe Arnold, Gilmary Bauer, Alvord Beardslee, Cecily Broderick y Güera, David E. L. Brown, Alice Chapman, J. Shannon Clarkson, Rebecca Clouse, George Cole, J. Ann Craig, Cornelia Dinnean, E. Odell Disher, Elaine Fitzpatrick, Karin Fowler, John M. Gessell, Jeanne Hein, Norvin Hein, Emily Holcomb, Jamie Holmes, Mark Hulsether, Laurence C. Judd, Ann McKee, David Maxwell, Wilma J. Reichard, Dale Rosenberger, Cynthia Russell, Beverly Thompson-Travis, Elgin W. Watkins, Eric Wefeld, Chester Wickwire and Jan Witman.
The following plaintiffs were matriculated at the divinity school at the time the cause of action was commenced: Matthew Barlow, Heather D. Boonstra, Nancy Eggen, Matthew Fitzgerald, Jamal Johnson, Susan McCone, James Montgomery, Stephen Murray, Amy B. Perry, Margaret Reichard and Charlotte White.
The attorney general was named as a defendant based on the allegation that he is a necessary party representing the public interest. The attorney general did not commence any action against Yale based on the subject of this action and did not participate in this appeal.
General Statutes §§ 45a-526 through 45a-534 are commonly known as the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act.
“[Sjtudents are fluctuating, and no individual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution, which can be asserted in a court of justice.” Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra, 17 U.S. 641.