THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES еx rel. NORA L. NIETO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ALFREDO R. AREVALO, Respondent-Appellee.
Docket No. 1-15-0504
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
December 19, 2016
2016 IL App (2d) 150504
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice McLaren concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Schostok dissented, with opinion.
Appeal
OPINION
¶ 1 Petitioner, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Department), filed a petition in the circuit court of McHenry County to establish a support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On August 18, 2014, the Department filed a “uniform support petition” on behalf of Nora L. Nieto, a resident of Mexico, alleging that respondent, a resident of Crystal Lake, Illinois, owed support for their two minor children, Navid and Jukari, also residents of Mexico.
¶ 4 The form petition, titled “Uniform Support Petition,” and the appended documents are in Spanish with English translations. Documentation accompanying the petition shows that Nora and respondent were married in Mexico on October 3, 1996. The children‘s birth certificates are included in the documentation and indicate that respondent is Navid and Jukari‘s father. In addition, Nora furnished an “affidavit in support of paternity.” The petition also alleged that there was no existing support order in place and that respondent had not paid any support.
¶ 5 Respondent was personally served with process on August 28, 2014, and he filed an appearance on October 3, 2014. Pursuant to court order, respondent filed a financial affidavit prescribed by local rule. In the affidavit, he listed Navid and Jukari as his children with Nora.
¶ 6 On January 14, 2015, respondent filed a “two-count” motion to dismiss. “Count I” was brought pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (
¶ 7 In its response to the motion, the Department argued that respondent was the noncustodial parent and owed child support; the form petition used was prescribed by statute and federal regulations and specified the relief sought; Nora would shortly be filing an updated financial affidavit; and the Marriage Act was irrelevant, as the UIFSA did not require that a dissolution action be pending or that the parties be divorced.
¶ 9 On March 6, 2015, the Department filed Nora‘s updated financial affidavit in compliance with the local rule. Nora also alleged that respondent was currently living with a woman in Crystal Lake, with whom he had two sons.
¶ 10 At a hearing on respondent‘s motion to dismiss on March 6, 2015, the court sua sponte ordered the parties to comment on “whether entering a child support order in this case would result in a de facto custody order pursuant to
¶ 11 The court conducted a second hearing on April 10, 2015. Respondent argued that a support order would require a custody determination, which was beyond the court‘s jurisdiction. The Department argued the points it raised in its written memorandum. In its ruling, the court observed that the Department was seeking an initial order of support on behalf of a resident of Mexico. The court opined that it would have to make a paternity determination as a prerequisite to ordering support. The court further opined that the presumption of paternity arising from the fact that Nora and respondent were married when the children were born was “only a presumption” and that the court “would still be required to determine paternity” before it could award Nora support. In the court‘s view, a support order would result in a de facto custody determination, which, according to the UIFSA, the court had no jurisdiction to make. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition. The Department filed a timely appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The Department contends that the trial court‘s only obligation was to review the financial information and set child support using the appropriate Illinois guidelines. The Department argues that the court erred in sua sponte exploring issues of paternity and custody that were not in dispute. Respondent contends that the court correctly relied on the Parentage Act of 1984 (
¶ 14 While this appeal was pending, the legislature revised the UIFSA (Pub. Act 99-119 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending
¶ 15 The primary objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Collins, 2014 IL App (2d) 130536, ¶ 15. The plain language of the statute is the best indicator of the legislature‘s intent. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 364 (2005). The court will examine the statute as a whole, considering all of its relevant parts. Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 364. Where the statute‘s language is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to extrinsic construction aids. Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 364.
¶ 16 The purpose of the UIFSA is to unify state laws governing the establishment, enforcement, and modification of support orders. Gowdey v. Gowdey, 825 So. 2d 67, 69 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Section 401(a)(1) of the UIFSA provides that an Illinois court with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order when the individual seeking the order resides “outside this State.” Pub. Act 99-119 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending
¶ 17 An individual “petitioner” may initiate a proceeding under the UIFSA by filing а petition in a tribunal that has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent. Pub. Act 99-119 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending
¶ 18 Section 303(1) of the UIFSA provides that the court “shall” apply the procedural and substantive law “generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this State and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings.”
¶ 19 At oral argument, we asked the parties to expound on the meaning of section 303 of the UIFSA. The Department responded that it was unprepared to do so but that it would be willing to address the question in supplemental briefing. Consequently, we ordered supplemental briefing. The Department contended that section 303 was not addressed by the trial court and that we cannot address it sua sponte. We find this response remarkable. The trial court perforce applied section 303 when it looked to Illinois‘s substantive law for a duty of support. Furthermore, respondent‘s motion to dismiss challenged the applicability of the UIFSA. The Department should not be surprised that the construction of the UIFSA is at the heart of this appeal.
¶ 20 Next, the Department asserted that we need address only whether the court had jurisdiction. Presumably, because the court dismissed Nora‘s petition for lack of “jurisdiction,” the Department believes that this is the sole issue in this appeal. To the contrary, it is but a threshold issue on which we clarify that the court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
¶ 21 The trial court determined that it lackеd jurisdiction, because section 104(b)(2) of the UIFSA states that the court is without “jurisdiction” to render a judgment relating to child custody. Pub. Act 99-119 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending
¶ 22 What the trial court lacks under the UIFSA is authority to decide issues relating to child custody. See In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847, ¶ 17 (discussing the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and authority to act under the UIFSA).
¶ 23 Having determined that the trial court had jurisdiction, we turn to the issue of whether the court correctly ruled that a duty of support must be found in Illinois‘s substantive and procedural law.
¶ 24 A fundamental principle of statutory construction is to view all provisions of a statute as a whole, interpreting words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions. Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847, ¶ 13. In violation of this principle, the Department asks us to apply section 401(a)(1) of the UIFSA in isolation. Section 401(a)(1) provides that a court of this state “may” issue a support order if the individual seeking the order resides outside this state. Pub. Act 99-119 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending
¶ 25 The Department suggests that рarents’ common-law duty to support their children furnishes the duty of support under the UIFSA. Under the common law and prior to support provisions in the earliest divorce statutes, circuit courts had the power to order the father to pay child support. Eckiss v. McVaigh, 261 Ill. App. 3d 778, 783 (1994). Women, postemancipation, were also held legally responsible for the support of their children, equally with their husbands. Eckiss, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 785. In Eckiss, the court held that the parents of a child who had been removed from their custody owed a common-law duty to support the child, including the payment of support to the child‘s court-appointed guardians. Eckiss, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 785. The court observed that no Illinois statute relieves parents of their common-law duty to support their children. Eckiss, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 785.
¶ 26 While there may be no statute that affirmatively states that the common-law duty of support has been abolished, our legislature has abolished common-law marriage.
¶ 27 In In re Parentage of M.J., 203 Ill. 2d 526, 541 (2003), our supreme court held that the Illinois Parentage Act (
¶ 28 We first consider whether the Marriage Act can furnish a duty of support. Nora and respondent are married. Under Illinois law, none of the conditions exist that would trigger a duty of support under section 505(a) of the Marriage Act.
¶ 29 The Department contends that a duty of support exists under the Illinois Public Aid Code (
¶ 30 Respondent does not question the above premise, but he argues that a custody order must precede an order of support. Section 10-1 of the Public Aid Code provides that the Department enforces child support on behalf of a spouse or a parent or another person having “custody” of a child.
¶ 31 Next, we address the Department‘s contention that the Parentage Act can be the source of a duty of support. The purpose of the Parentage Act is to provide a statutory mechanism that legally establishes parent and child relationships in Illinois. Galvez v. Rentas, 403 Ill. App. 3d 491, 494 (2010). Every child has equal rights regardless of the parents’ legal relatiоnship. Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
¶ 32 Section 802(a) of the Parentage Act provides that the court “shall issue” an order adjudicating parentage. Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
¶ 33 The Department asserts that the court erred, because (1) a parentage order is not required, and (2) a child support award would not constitute a custody determination. The Department maintains that respondent‘s admission that he is the children‘s natural father dispensed with the necessity of a parentage judgment. We disagree. A parent-child relationship can exist as a natural fact, but this is insufficient to establish a legal relationship. Alexander v. Samuels, 58 P.2d 878, 881 (Okla. 1936). The establishment of the legal relationship is necessary, because the “entry of a paternity order and determination of child support are the two basic orders needed to complete a paternity action.” Baldassone v. Gorzelanczyk, 282 Ill. App. 3d 330, 333 (1996). Thus, the Parentage Act sets forth a two-step process, the first of which is a parentage determination. J.S.A. v. M.H., 384 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1011 (2008).
¶ 34 The Department suggests that parentage can be established without a court order, where, as here, there is a statutory presumption of paternity. Under section 204(a)(1) of the Parentage Act, a husband is presumed to be a child‘s parent if the child is born to the wife during the marriage. Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
¶ 35 This brings us full circle to the proposition in the Parentage Act that a support order pursuant to a parentage judgment necessarily renders a custody judgment. Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
¶ 36 The Department contends that we cannot apply section 802(c) to the present situation, where the children reside in another jurisdiction. The Department maintains that the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction аnd Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (
¶ 37 The Department raised this argument for the first time in the petition for rehearing.8 Arguments not raised until the petition for rehearing are forfeited. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016); A.J. Maggio Co. v. Willis, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1048 (2000). Forfeiture aside, we cannot read section 802(c) out of the Parentage Act. Courts cannot rewrite a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not expressed by the legislature. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm‘n, 2014 IL App (1st) 132011, ¶ 35. For this reason, we respectfully disagree with the dissent‘s discussion of section 802(c). Infra ¶¶ 75-77. In attempting to harmonize the UIFSA with the Parentage Act, the dissent effectively reads section 802(c) out of the statute and ignores the Department‘s argument on appeal that the Parentage Act can be a basis for a support order.
¶ 38 The Department asserts further that construing the Parentage Act as we do renders the UIFSA “toothless.” According to the Department, it is in the interests of both Illinois and Mexico to assist custodial parents in collecting child support from noncustodial parents. We do not question the premise of that statement, but the Department has not demonstrated that Nora is legally entitled to child support under the facts of this case.
¶ 39 The facts of this case are simple. The legal resolution is less so. However, there are two key points: (1) the UIFSA requires the court to look to state law to determine whether a duty of support exists, and (2) the applicable state law requires a threshold determination of custody before the court can enter а child support order. As discussed, the UCCJEA governs the issue of custody, as Navid and Jukari‘s home state is Mexico. Once Nora obtains a custody order in Mexico, she (or the Department on her behalf) can then proceed in Illinois by filing a new petition under the UIFSA to obtain a child support order.
¶ 40 To make our holding crystal clear, we summarize it as follows. The UIFSA does not create a duty of support. Section 303 of the UIFSA requires courts to look to the procedural and substantive law of the forum state to determine whether the respondent owes a duty of support. In considering Illinois‘s procedural and substantive law, the trial court properly looked to state statutes, because there is no blanket common-law duty of support. The Marriage Act does not create a duty of support in the present case, because no dissolution or legal separation proceeding is pending. The Parentage Act does not apply at this juncture, because a parentage determination would involve a custody judgment, which is prohibited by the UIFSA. Similarly, at this juncture, there is no duty of support under the Public Aid Code, because Nora does not have a custody order. We also wish to be clear that nothing in this opinion infringes on the Department‘s responsibilities to operate a child support enforcement program in compliance with Title IV-D (
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES ex rel. NORA L. NIETO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ALFREDO R. AREVALO, Respondent-Appellee.
Docket No. 1-15-0504
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
December 19, 2016
2016 IL App (2d) 150504
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK, dissenting.
¶ 45 In this opinion, issued following our grant of rehearing, the majority now recognizes
¶ 46 Contrary to the majority‘s assertion (supra ¶ 23), the issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Department‘s child support petition for lack of “jurisdiction.” As the majority concedes (supra ¶ 21), the answer to this question is clearly yes. The trial court unquestionably had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Department‘s petition for child support, as well as personal jurisdiction over Alfredo. Instead, the trial court‘s comments relating to the dismissal indicate that it incorrectly believed that it lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by the Department. (The trial court thought that it could not grant the child support order sought by the Department, because doing so would result in an implicit award of legal custody to Nora under section 802(c) of the Parentage Act, and that would conflict with section 104(b)(2) of the UIFSA.) Thus, we can ignore the court‘s mischaracterization of the issue as “jurisdictional.” However, the issue on appeal remains whether the dismissal was correct.
¶ 47 On appeal, Alfredo raised two arguments: that the trial court‘s understanding of the interaction between section 802(c) and the UIFSA was correct, and that, even if it were not, the dismissal should be upheld because Alfredo had no legal duty to support his children with Nora, given that the parties remained married and Nora was not receiving public aid. Upon rehearing, the majority now rejects this latter argument, recognizing that Alfredo owes a duty to support his children under the Public Aid Code regardless of the parties’ marital status and that child support services under that code are not limited to public aid recipients. However, the majority ultimately concludes that the trial court still may not entertain the Department‘s petition, because (1) there is no prior court order granting Nora custody and (2) Alfredo‘s interpretation of the effect of section 802(c) is correct. Respectfully, I believe that both of thеse conclusions are mistaken.
Requirement of a Prior Custody Order
¶ 49 As the majority correctly notes, the UIFSA permits the entry of an initial child support order, not just the registration and enforcement of preexisting child support orders. Under section 401 of the UIFSA, an Illinois court must enter a child support order “[u]pon [a] finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that a respondent owes a duty of support.”
¶ 51 Further, our supreme court recently made clear that there is no bar to imposing child support obligations on custodial parents. In re Marriage of Turk, 2014 IL 116730, ¶ 17 (“Illinois law does not confine the obligation to pay child support to noncustodial parents.“). Although Turk involved the application of section 505 of the Marriage Act, the supreme court noted that, prior to that statute‘s enactment, courts had found that custody was not determinative of whether a parent could receive child support. See id. ¶ 26 (“That custodial parents may be required to pay child support to noncustodial parents where circumstances warrant it has long been recognized by [Illinois] courts.“); id. ¶¶ 26-28 (discussing Illinois cases); id. ¶¶ 29-30 (discussing other states’ case law reaching same conclusion).
¶ 52 Even if some type of custody were a prerequisite to the Department‘s ability to seek child support on behalf of a parent, however, there is simply no basis for the majority‘s assertions that (a) “custody” as used in section 10-1 of the Public Aid Code means legal custody rather than physical custody, and (b) this supposed requirement of custody can be met only where a prior custody order has been entered. This reading of the single word “custody” is contrary to the liberal spirit of section 10-1, which states expressly that it has the broad purpose of “locating an absent parent or spouse, *** determining his financial circumstances, and *** enforcing his legal obligation of support.”
¶ 53 The majority cites Portman as support for its decision to require a prior custody order, but that case actually holds that the existence of a court order awarding custody is not dispositive. Indeed, in Portman this court ruled that, in providing its services, the Department could prefer a parent with primary physical custody of the children over a parent with equal court-ordered legal custody. Portman, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1091.
¶ 54 In that case, the parents shared joint legal custody pursuant to a judgment of dissolution. Thus, under the judgment of dissolution, the father met the requirement that the majority would impose here—custody pursuant to a court order. The father requested child care assistance from the Department. The Department denied the request on the ground that it provided such services only to a child‘s “custodial parent,” and under its regulations, this meant only the parent designated as the primary residential parent of the child. Although under the judgment the father shared equal parenting time with the mother, the judgment also identified the mother as the children‘s “primarily residential parent,” and the Department contended that it was obliged to provide services only to her. We upheld the Department‘s denial of assistance on the ground that the regulations’ reference to “custodial parent” was ambiguous. Although a parent who shares joint legal custody could “be considered a ‘custodial parent’ if the term is understood to mean a parent who provides care, control, and maintenance of a child, pursuant to a court order,” the fact that the phrase “custodial parent” was singular raised a contrary possibility that the term should apply only to one parent, the primary residential parent. Id. at 1090-91. We therefоre deferred to the Department‘s interpretation of its regulations, despite the fact that the father did have a prior court order designating him as a legal custodian of his children. Portman thus does not support the proposition that the word “custody,” as used in section 10-1 of the Public Aid Code, means a formal award of custody contained in a court order.
¶ 55 It is undisputed that Alfredo is the father of the children for whom support is sought. Further, Alfredo has never contested that Nora has physical custody of their children, providing them with shelter, food, clothing, affection, and other necessities on a daily basis. In a brief filed in the trial court, Alfredo stated that he admitted the truth of the following statements: “Alfredo Arevalo is the non custodial parent in this case, and he does not live with Nora Nieto or their children, who all reside in Mexico. He is the presumed father of the two children *** who were both born during the parties’ marriage. *** Alfredo Arevalo is a legally responsible relative, as defined in the Illinois Public Aid code, and Nora Nieto is in need of support from him for their two children.” On apрeal, Alfredo stated in his opening brief that Nora lived in Mexico “with their two children.” In light of these unequivocal admissions, I am at a loss as to why the majority seeks further evidence on this subject, much less a court order of custody that Nora might or might not be able to obtain from a Mexican court.
¶ 57 Finally, I would note that, under the 2015 rewriting of the Marriage Act and Parentage Act, the term “custody” has almost vanished from those statutes. See P. André Katz & Erin B. Bodendorfer, The New and Improved Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 103 Ill. B.J. 30, 34 (2015) (under the 2015 rewriting of the Marriage Act, “[c]ourts will no longer award ‘custody’ or ‘visitation’ ***. Rather, courts will allocate ‘parental responsibilities’ (formerly custody) and ‘parenting time’ (formerly visitation).“); Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
Common-Law Duty of Child Support
¶ 59 Evеn beyond the support provided by the Public Aid Code, the common law of Illinois supports the Department‘s ability to seek a child support order from Alfredo under the facts of this case. The Department argues that Alfredo owes a duty of support because he has admitted that he is the father of the children for whom Nora is seeking support. This is a correct statement of the law: fathers (and mothers) have a legal duty to support their children.
¶ 60 Contrary to Alfredo‘s arguments, statutes such as the Marriage Act and the Parentage Act are not the primary (let alone the sole) source of parents’ duty to support their children. Rather, this has been a fundamental principle at common law for centuries. “A parent‘s duty to support his or her minor child is among the oldest principles of law.” People ex rel. Sheppard v. Money, 124 Ill. 2d 265, 269 (1988); see also Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 634 (1937) (“[t]he duty of a parent to support his minor child arises out of the natural relationship“); Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290, 291 (1868) (“The law of nature, the usages of society, as well as the laws of all civilized countries, impose the duty upon the parent of the support, nurture and education of children.“).
¶ 62 The majority suggests that this common-law duty of parents to support their сhildren has been abrogated by the enactment of statutes such as the Marriage Act and the Parentage Act. See supra ¶¶ 25-26. However, the majority wholly fails to support this suggestion. To the contrary, as the majority itself notes, courts have held that “no Illinois statute relieves parents of their common law duty to support their children.” Supra ¶ 25 (citing Eckiss, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 785). When the General Assembly determined that marriage and divorce should henceforth be regulated entirely by statute, it expressly invalidated common-law marriages. See
¶ 63 Moreover, courts continue to recognize that common-law duty. Indeed, M.J., upon which the majority relies, addressed the issue of whether the Illinois Parentage Act “precludes common law claims for child support.” M.J., 203 Ill. 2d at 537. In identifying this as the legal issue, the supreme court implicitly recognized the continuing vitality of the common-law duty of support unless specifically abrogated by a statute. The supreme court held that the mother there could bring common-law claims seeking child support, because “if the legislature had intended to bar common law actions for child support, it would have clearly stated its intent, and we will not imply a legislative intent where none is expressed.” Id. at 540. Nothing in M.J. supports the majority‘s strained conclusion that the supreme court did not recognize the broad and vibrant common-law duty of child support or that it intended to limit that duty only to artificial-insemination cases. Supra ¶ 27. Rather, read in context, the supreme court merely wished to emphasize that every artificial-insemination case must be decided on the facts of that case, and thus its holding was limited to the case before it. See M.J., 203 Ill. 2d at 537-38, 542. However, the supreme court also noted that the public policy of Illinois recognizes “the right of every child to the physical, mental, emotional, and monetary support of his or her parents” (emphasis added) (id. at 539), and that courts have “a duty to ensure that the
Interpreting Section 802(c) of the Parentage Act in Harmony With the UIFSA
¶ 65 The final piece of this puzzle is the issue directly posed by the dismissal of the Department‘s petition: was the trial court correct in deciding that it could not enter a child support order under the UIFSA, because doing so would result in a de facto custody order under section 802(c) of the Parentage Act, a result prohibited by the UIFSA? Under any reasonable construction of the relevant statutes, the answer is no.
¶ 66 Throughout this litigation, the Department has asserted that it brought this action under the UIFSA and the Public Aid Code: the UIFSA is the mechanism for interstate child support enforcement, and the Public Aid Code establishes Alfredo‘s duty to support his children. Thus, there was no basis at all for the trial court‘s appliсation of the Parentage Act—nothing in the Department‘s petition requires the application of that act.
¶ 67 The majority misses this essential point, stating that the “entry of a paternity order and a determination of child support are the two basic orders needed to complete a paternity action.” Baldassone, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 333. I have no quarrel with this statement as a general matter, but this case is not a “paternity action.” Alfredo has already admitted his paternity of the children for whom the Department seeks child support.
¶ 68 Rather, the UIFSA permits the entry of a child support order whenever a court finds “that a respondent owes a duty of support.”
¶ 69 Moreover, even if the application of the Parentage Act were somehow warranted, bedrock principles of statutory construction would prevent the interpretation of section 802(c) advanced by the trial court and the majority, because that interpretation has the effect of rendering the entry of a child support order—one of the core purposes of the UIFSA—impossible.
¶ 70 In construing a statute, our task is to “ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent.” Lieb v. Judges’ Retirement System, 314 Ill. App. 3d 87, 92 (2000). To determine that intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature‘s objectives in enacting a particular law. Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 38, 43 (2003). “One of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all provisions of an enactment as a whole,” and thus “words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.” J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 197 (2007). Under the doctrine of in pari materia, “where different statutes touch on the same or related subject matter, we consider them together so as to render a harmonious result.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Burke, 2016 IL App (2d) 150462, ¶ 39.
¶ 71 Finally, we must construe the statute to avoid rendering any part of it meaningless or superfluous. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009). “We may also consider the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other. [Citation.] In doing so, we presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust consequences.” Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass‘n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440-41 (2010).
¶ 72 The UIFSA, the Public Aid Code, and the Parentage Act all touch on a common subject—the establishment and enforcement of child support obligations. Thus, they must be read together to reach a harmonious result. Burke, 2016 IL App (2d) 150462, ¶ 39. Further, we must read these statutes in a manner that will not render any of their provisions meaningless or absurd.
¶ 73 The UIFSA, a uniform act adopted by every state, was created to facilitate the entry and reciprocal enforcement of child support orders across state lines. See In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847, ¶ 15; In re Marriage of Hartman, 305 Ill. App. 3d 338, 342 (1999). The UIFSA expressly permits the establishment of a child support obligation when the obligor owes a duty of support.
¶ 74 I now turn to the Parentage Act of 2015. As stated in the “public policy” provision of the Parentage Act:
“Illinois recognizes the right of every child to the physical, mental, emotional, and financial support of his or her parents. The parent-child relationship, including support obligations, extends equally to every child and to his or her parent or to each of his or her 2 parents, regardless of the legal relationship of the parents ***.” Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
750 ILCS 46/102 ).
Section 802 governs the judgment that may be entered by a court in a parentage case, and states, in pertinent part:
“The judgment shall contain or explicitly reserve provisions concerning any duty and amount of child support and may contain provisions concerning the custody and guardianship of the child, parenting time privileges with the child, and the furnishing of bond or other security for the payment of the judgment ***.
***
(c) If a judgment оf parentage contains no explicit award of custody, the establishment of a child support obligation or of parenting time rights in one parent shall be considered a judgment granting custody to the other parent. If the parentage judgment contains no such provisions, custody shall be presumed to be with the mother; however,
the presumption shall not apply if the father has had physical custody for at least 6 months prior to the date that the mother seeks to enforce custodial rights.” Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 750 ILCS 46/802 ).
¶ 75 The trial court thought that section 802(c) meant that it could not enter a child support order on the Department‘s petition under the UIFSA, because if it did so, that would be “considered a judgment granting custody” to Nora, and the UIFSA states that courts may not enter orders “relating to child custody” in UIFSA proceedings. Pub. Act 99-119 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding
¶ 76 The majority suggests that thе problem posed by this reading of section 802(c) will be avoided if a prior custody determination is already in place before the child support is ordered. However, nothing in section 802(c) supports this conclusion—there is no limitation in section 802(c) for cases in which custody has already been awarded. The only limitation imposed by the actual words of section 802(c) is whether the judgment of parentage contains an “explicit award of custody.” On its face, this language appears to pose an insurmountable catch-22: regardless of whether a child support order explicitly awards custody or contains no explicit award of custody (and thus is a de facto award of custody to the other parent), it will always be an order “relating to child custody” and thus cannot be entered under the UIFSA.
¶ 77 It cannot have been the intention of the General Assembly, which chose to enact the UIFSA, to render that entire statute nugatory through the operation of section 802(c) of the Parentage Act. This would be an absurd result, which we must avoid. Solon, 236 Ill. 2d at 441. Moreover, the Department noted thаt our prior opinion (vacated upon the grant of rehearing) would have prevented the entry of child support orders under the UIFSA, thereby imperiling the millions of dollars of federal funding provided to Illinois to finance its child support enforcement efforts. The majority‘s reading of section 802(c), which would likewise prevent the entry of child support orders under the UIFSA, poses the very same threat.
¶ 78 We must read section 802(c) in a manner that will harmonize with the purposes of the UIFSA and the Public Aid Code, not undermine them. We can do this by reading section 802(c) to permit a court to enter a child support order that explicitly states that the order is limited to child support and does not affect custody or visitation. Contrary to the majority‘s characterization (supra ¶ 37), such an interpretation does not read section 802(c) out of the Parentage Act. Rather, it simply permits a court to exercise its inherent authority to limit the scope of its own orders by clarifying that a child support order is not to be construed as a custody order. Nothing prevents the trial court in this case from еntertaining the Department‘s petition and entering a child support order that contains language confirming that the issues of custody and visitation are not before the court and that the order shall have no effect on those issues.
¶ 79 For all of these reasons, I believe that the correct course is to reverse the trial court‘s dismissal of the Department‘s petition and remand for the setting of an appropriate amount of support and the