DENZIL EARL MCKATHAN, Petitioner - Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent - Appellee.
No. 17-13358
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
August 12, 2020
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:15-cv-00611-KD, 1:14-cr-00290-KD-C-1
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
[PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
ROSENBAUM, Circuit
Darned if you do and darned if you don‘t. That dilemma is nothing new. Indeed, around 800 B.C.E., Homer wrote of the problem in his epic poem The Odyssey. There, the conundrum appeared when Odysseus found himself “caught between the Scylla and Charybdis,” a phrase we continue to use today to refer to the darned-if-you-and-darned-if-you-don‘t scenario.1
But the Supreme Court has also identified a solution to this problem: when a “classic penalty situation” occurs, the
Petitioner-Appellant Denzil McKathan‘s habeas petition raises the question of whether, while on supervised release, McKathan faced a “classic penalty situation” when his probation officer asked him to answer questions that would reveal he had committed new crimes. For reasons we explain below, we conclude that he did.
McKathan‘s attorneys never raised this argument during his criminal proceedings on the newly revealed crimes. Had they done so and on that basis filed a motion to suppress the statements McKathan made and the evidence the government derived from those statements, the government would have had to establish that it nonetheless would have obtained the incriminating evidence against McKathan through other, lawful means. If the government had been unable to do so, it is reasonably likely that McKathan would have prevailed on his suppression motion, and the outcome of McKathan‘s case would have been different. As a result, McKathan would be entitled to habeas relief upon a showing that his counsel‘s performance was deficient in failing to raise this argument. But because the current record lacks information concerning whether the evidence derived from McKathan‘s statements otherwise would have been admissible, we vacate the district court‘s denial of McKathan‘s
I.
To understand the issue in this case, we must review the facts of four events: (1) McKathan‘s 2005 conviction for possession of child pornography; (2) McKathan‘s 2014 violation of his supervised-release term that was imposed as a result of his 2005 conviction; (3) McKathan‘s 2014 conviction for receipt of child pornography; and (4) McKathan‘s
In 2005, McKathan pled guilty to possessing child pornography, in violation of
Once McKathan completed his prison term in 2007, he began living under the terms of his supervised release. One of those terms required McKathan “to answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer.” Another allowed his probation officer to conduct reasonable searches of McKathan‘s residence—including of his electronic devices, since McKathan had also agreed to forgo using a computer with internet access. McKathan‘s terms of release informed him that if he violated his supervised release, the court could revoke his supervised release and send him back to prison.
B. McKathan‘s 2014 Violation of his Supervised Release
In September 2014, McKathan‘s probation officer, Rafael Goodwin, Jr., became concerned with McKathan. Goodwin had conducted a Facebook search on all sex offenders under his supervision and learned that someone had opened a Facebook account in McKathan‘s name, in September 2014, using an Android mobile device. Because McKathan‘s terms prohibited him from using a computer with access to the internet without Goodwin‘s permission, on September 19, 2014, Goodwin paid McKathan a surprise visit at his apartment to investigate.
When Goodwin walked into McKathan‘s apartment, he spotted an Android phone on the bed. Upon seeing it, Goodwin asked McKathan if he recently obtained a new phone. McKathan responded that he had had the same phone for some time. Then Goodwin wanted to know whether the phone could access the internet. McKathan conceded that it could. Goodwin examined the phone. Discovering its contents to be protected by a personal identification number (“PIN“), Goodwin instructed McKathan to enter his PIN to unlock the phone, and McKathan complied.
Once Goodwin had access, he explored McKathan‘s phone. He found that McKathan was using a mobile application for Facebook. Goodwin asked about McKathan‘s Facebook use, and McKathan admitted the account Goodwin had found was his. When Goodwin examined the account, he found no inappropriate content on it.
But then Goodwin reviewed McKathan‘s phone‘s internet browser history. The browsing history reflected that somebody had visited sites with terms such as “preteen” and “sexy lil girls.” Upon seeing this, Goodwin asked McKathan whether he had been viewing child pornography. McKathan conceded he had. So Goodwin confiscated the phone and instructed McKathan to report to Goodwin on September 22, 2014. At Goodwin‘s request, McKathan also provided him with the PIN itself.
Goodwin took McKathan‘s phone back to the Probation Office, where he “more thorough[ly] inspect[ed]” it. He found downloaded images of child pornography.
When McKathan checked in with Goodwin on September 22, Goodwin gave McKathan a blank affidavit form and instructed him to write, consistent with McKathan‘s admissions to Goodwin on
The district court then held a hearing to determine whether McKathan‘s supervised release should be revoked. At this hearing, Christopher Knight represented McKathan. Goodwin testified, describing his Facebook search, the evidence he obtained from accessing McKathan‘s phone, and McKathan‘s subsequent admissions. After hearing Goodwin‘s testimony, the court revoked McKathan‘s supervised release and sent him back to prison, to be followed by a reimposed term of supervised release for life, with the same conditions that had been imposed in McKathan‘s 2005 Case. We refer in this opinion to the events leading to and resulting in the revocation of McKathan‘s supervised release as the “Supervised-release Proceedings.”
C. McKathan‘s 2014 Conviction for Receipt of Child Pornography
That, however, was not the end of the story. Goodwin had provided the U.S. Attorney‘s Office with a copy of images he had found on McKathan‘s phone. He had also turned McKathan‘s phone over to the Department of Homeland Security, so its agents could seek a search warrant, relying on Goodwin‘s investigation. Based entirely on what Goodwin told the Homeland Security agents, they procured a warrant for the phone. The agents used the PIN McKathan provided to Goodwin to access the phone and then imaged and searched it. The search revealed that McKathan had downloaded images of child pornography.
In November 2014, a federal grand jury charged McKathan with three counts of knowingly receiving child pornography, in violation of
But McKathan soon filed a pro se motion requesting that the court appoint him new counsel. Contrary to McKathan‘s desire, Knight did not want to file a motion to suppress challenging whether Goodwin‘s search was lawful under the
Soon after Powell was appointed, McKathan filed a pro se motion to suppress “(1) any and all evidence seized as a result of any search and/or seizure and the fruits of any search and/or seizure, [and] (2) any and all written and/or oral statements taken from me and the fruits of any such statements.” Three days later, Powell filed an amended motion to suppress on behalf of McKathan. Although the amended motion stated that McKathan sought suppression “pursuant to the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution,” it set forth only a
During the hearing on the suppression motion, defense counsel argued only that McKathan‘s cell phone does not qualify as a “computer device” that is prohibited by
Since the district court had already found no
Having lost his suppression motion, McKathan asked Powell about the possibility of entering a conditional plea that would allow him to preserve his right to appeal on the suppression issue. But Powell dismissed the idea and said to McKathan, “Did you not hear [the judge] the other day? You don‘t have any meritorious arguments. There‘s nothing . . . to preserve.” So Powell advised him that he should consider pleading guilty.
McKathan followed that advice and entered into a plea agreement with the government. Under that agreement, McKathan pled guilty to one count of knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of
D. McKathan‘s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Petition
In November 2015, McKathan filed a pro se habeas petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction in the 2014 Case under
McKathan eventually enlisted counsel to assist him and filed an amended habeas petition, raising the same
A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on McKathan‘s habeas petition. During that hearing, as relevant here, McKathan presented testimony from Knight and Powell. In addition, McKathan himself testified.
Knight, who had represented McKathan throughout the Supervised-release Proceedings and during the initial stages of the 2014 Case, testified that he considered filing a motion to suppress based upon the
Though Knight looked into a motion based on the
Cindy Powell, who took over McKathan‘s defense from Knight in the 2014 Case, testified that she filed the amended motion to suppress based on the
McKathan then took the stand on his own behalf. He stated that his probation officer instructed him that “if [he] did not follow the conditions [of his supervised release,] [he]‘d be revoked and go back to prison.” So when Goodwin showed up at McKathan‘s house in September 2014, McKathan understood he had to truthfully answer Goodwin‘s questions about whether the phone was his, whether it had internet access, and whether he had been using it to view child pornography. He also believed he had to comply with Goodwin‘s request for the phone‘s PIN. McKathan had understood that if he had refused to enter his phone‘s PIN or answer any of Goodwin‘s questions, then his supervised release “would certainly have been revoked.” To avoid that outcome, he answered Goodwin‘s questions about the phone and its internet connection, and he provided his PIN.
After considering McKathan‘s motion and the evidence adduced at the hearing the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R“). As relevant here, the R&R recommended that the district court deny McKathan‘s § 2255 claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys did not seek under the
McKathan objected to the R&R, but the district court agreed with it. So addressing
Dissatisfied with the court‘s ruling, McKathan moved under
The district court rejected McKathan‘s request to vacate its prior judgment. But it granted McKathan‘s other request and issued a COA on “the issues presented.” In light of the fact that the district court denied the habeas claim on Strickland‘s prejudice prong, we understand the district court to have granted the COA solely on the question of prejudice.
McKathan now appeals.
II.
On an appeal of a § 2255 motion to vacate, we review legal issues de novo and factual findings for clear error. Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In a § 2255 proceeding, we “allot substantial deference to the factfinder in reaching credibility determinations with respect to witness testimony.” Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alteration adopted and citation and quotation marks omitted).
III.
We begin our analysis with a review of the standard that applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must establish both that (1) his counsel‘s “performance was deficient” and (2) his counsel‘s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Because the district court denied McKathan‘s petition without considering counsel‘s performance under Strickland, we likewise limit our analysis to considering only Strickland‘s prejudice requirement. Under this second prong, McKathan must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
In the context of pleas, the prejudice prong “focuses on whether counsel‘s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. We must ask whether a reasonable probability exists that “but for counsel‘s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. And when the defendant‘s sole complaint with his counsel‘s performance stems from her actions in pursuing a plea instead of litigating a suppression issue, the defendant can demonstrate prejudice only if a reasonable likelihood exists that the suppression issue the attorney did not advance would have affected the outcome of the case. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017).
In assessing the likelihood of success of a suppression motion based on the
A.
We begin by reviewing the right at issue in the forfeited
If an individual is compelled to answer an incriminating question, “his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution.‘” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The
To succeed under a
The parties do not dispute that McKathan could have succeeded on the last two elements—that is, he engaged in testimonial communications of his PIN and statements to Goodwin, and those communications incriminated him. We agree. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346–49 (holding that compelling a defendant to produce data protected by his password without providing constitutionally sufficient immunity violates the
1. The Fifth Amendment privilege can be self-executing
Ordinarily, to claim the protections of the
To date, the Supreme Court has identified only three “self-executing” circumstances. See, e.g., Garner, 424 U.S. at 657–64. These include custodial settings, unless the speaker has knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege to remain silent, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–69 (1966), extremely limited tax-return-filing circumstances, see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48–49 (1968), and situations where the government imposes a penalty if the speaker invokes the privilege to remain silent, see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). Only the last exception is relevant here.
2. The Fifth Amendment privilege is self-executing when the government creates a “classic penalty situation”
In Murphy, the Supreme Court examined this last exception in the context of a
Murphy was sentenced to a suspended prison term and three years of probation. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422. Among other conditions, his probation required him to report to his probation officer as directed and be truthful with the probation officer “in all matters.” Id.
During one of the probation officer‘s required meetings with Murphy, the officer informed him that she had received information that Murphy had admitted committing a rape and murder several years earlier. Id. at 423–24. Over the course of the meeting, Murphy confessed that he had in fact committed these crimes. Id. at 424. A couple of days later, the probation officer obtained an arrest and detention order from the judge who had earlier sentenced Murphy to the term of probation he was serving. Id. Not long after that, a grand jury indicted Murphy for first-degree murder. Id. at 425. In that new case, Murphy sought suppression of his confession on the basis that the state had procured it in violation of the
In evaluating Murphy’s claim, the Supreme Court first observed that a defendant does not lose his Fifth Amendment privilege simply because he is imprisoned or on probation. Id. at 426. So if the government compels incriminating statements of a prisoner or probationer, those statements are inadmissible in a later trial for a crime other than the one for which the speaker has been convicted. Id.
Nevertheless, the Court observed that “the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in itself” change any of Murphy’s otherwise voluntary statements into compelled confessions. Id. at 427. Rather, to compel a statement in the penalty situation, the government must threaten to impose a “substantial” penalty if the speaker chooses to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Id. at 434 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In particular, the Court reasoned, if the government expressly or implicitly suggested that claiming the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, “it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.” Id. at 435. So the Court homed in on whether the government expressly or implicitly indicated to Murphy that his invocation of the Fifth Amendment would result in revocation of his probation.
Despite this rule concerning the “classic penalty situation,” the Court recognized that the government can “validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions” in the course of probation supervision, provided it understands it may not use the required answers in a separate criminal proceeding, as opposed to a revocation-of-probation proceeding. Id. at 435 n.7. Indeed, the Court explained, the government can revoke probation if a probationer refuses to answer a question, in violation of an express condition of probation. Id. But the government cannot both require answers to incriminating questions in the course of probation supervision, upon pain of revocation if the probationer
In light of these concerns, the Supreme Court evaluated whether the government had, in fact, required Murphy to answer the probation officer’s questions or else have his probation revoked. See id. at 437–39. It found that the government had not. Id. at 439. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that (1) Murphy’s probation condition precluded only false statements but did not suggest that “his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution“; and (2) no reasonable basis existed for concluding that the state tried to tether an impermissible penalty to a probationer’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 437–38. As the Court explained, it was aware of no case in which the state had attempted to revoke probation simply because a probationer declined to answer questions about his own criminal conduct, and so against the background of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence prohibiting threats of penalties upon invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, “Murphy could not reasonably have feared” that his probation would be revoked merely because he remained silent. Id. at 439.
- Robinson created a “classic penalty situation” when it permitted probation to be revoked because the probationer there invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and thereby refused to comply with the condition of his probation requiring him to completely and truthfully answer his probation officer’s questions
Unlike the probationer in Murphy, McKathan was under federal supervised release, not state probation. So to apply Murphy’s guidance, we must determine whether the conditions of McKathan’s federal supervised release threatened to penalize him with revocation of his supervised release if he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. We do that by looking to the factors the Supreme Court evaluated in Murphy.
First, we examine the precise terms of McKathan’s supervised-release condition that he answer his probation officer’s questions. McKathan’s supervised-release terms required him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer.” They further informed him that, “[u]pon a finding of a violation of . . . supervised release, . . . the court may . . . revoke supervision,” sending him back to prison. Like the probation terms at issue in Murphy, these supervised-release provisions, on their face, prohibit only false statements and do not indicate that McKathan’s supervised release “was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution.” Id. at 437. So if the inquiry ended here, we would find that McKathan’s supervised-release terms did not create a penalty situation and therefore did not compel him to incriminate himself.
But the analysis does not end with this step. Rather, we must also consider the second Murphy factor, which is whether there was any reasonable basis for McKathan to have thought that his invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege would result in revocation of his supervised release. See id. Relatedly, we also consider whether, in the Eleventh Circuit, the government has successfully attempted to revoke supervised release in any case, merely because
McKathan points to United States v. Robinson, 893 F.2d 1244 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), as an example of such a case. Robinson was serving a term of probation following his conviction for currency smuggling. Id. at 1244. Under his probation agreement, Robinson was required to report to his probation officer and to “give an account of himself and to respond completely and truthfully to questions asked by the probation officer.” Id. at 1244–45 (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). Robinson had previously reported $25,000 in income on his tax return but had asserted the Fifth Amendment as to the income’s source. Id. at 1244 & n.1. The probation officer asked Robinson about the source of that income. Id. at 1244. In response, Robinson again claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. Id. Based on Robinson’s refusal to answer the probation officer’s question, the court later revoked Robinson’s probation. See id.
This Court affirmed. Id. at 1245. Quoting Murphy, we first noted that a probationer’s reliance on his Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid self-incrimination does not preclude the government from, as relevant in Robinson’s case, “revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation . . . .” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7). In applying this rule, we determined that Robinson’s failure to “completely and truthfully” report his “continuing . . . unlawful money smuggling activities” as the terms of his probation required was a violation of his probation. Id. (emphasis omitted). Though we reasoned that “[t]he issue is not invocation of the privilege, but the failure to report,” we nonetheless concluded that the failure to report—regardless of why—“alone can justify revocation of probation.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because unlike McKathan, Robinson did not challenge the use of his silence in separate criminal charges, our decision was not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s distinction between use of a probationer’s statements in revocation proceedings following a prior conviction and their use in a “pending or later criminal prosecution.” See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 & n.7.
Nevertheless, as the government conceded during oral argument, Robinson does “take the extra, impermissible step” Murphy warned against, of requiring a supervised releasee “to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.”5 Id. at 436; see Oral
Argument at 20:20–23:10,
The Dissent asserts that Robinson did not “take the extra, impermissible step” that Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436, prohibits. Dissent at 51 n.4. It bases this argument solely on the premise that in Robinson, the government revoked Robinson’s probation because Robinson “invo[ked] the privilege” and “was found to be in violation of the reporting condition of his probation, but it was the reporting violation that was the issue, not the defendant’s invocation of the privilege.” Id. at 50 (emphasis omitted).
Most respectfully, that is a distinction without a difference. Invoking the privilege and not reporting (meaning not answering questions) after the privilege has
been invoked are one and the same thing—like six of one, half dozen of the other. And it is not possible to both invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and “completely and truthfully” answer the probation officer’s incriminating question. See United States v. Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2005). Robinson necessarily approves of a “classic penalty situation.” And a reasonable person in McKathan’s position would understand Robinson to authorize punishment for a supervised releasee’s refusal to answer his probation officer’s questions.
Moreover, unlike with the probationer in Murphy, the record contains direct evidence that McKathan incriminated himself because he feared that his supervised release would be revoked if he remained silent. See id. at 437. McKathan testified that his probation officer instructed him that “if [he] did not
For that reason, under Murphy, the government was well within its rights to revoke McKathan’s supervised release, based on the incriminating statements McKathan made in response to Goodwin’s questions. But it could not also use those same statements, which McKathan made under the “classic penalty situation,” to prosecute McKathan for a new crime.
We are not the first Circuit to reach this conclusion. In Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073, the Ninth Circuit considered the same issue we face today. See id. at 1075. Saechao’s state probation conditions required him to “promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries by the Department of Correction or County Community Correction Agencies.” Id. His probation terms also stated that failure to comply with any of the conditions “was grounds for arrest, revocation of probation, or modification of conditions.” Id. Saechao’s probation officer questioned him about whether he possessed a firearm, which would be a violation of his probation and a violation of the felon-in-possession statute. Id. at 1075–76. Saechao acknowledged that a hunting rifle was in the apartment that he shared with his parents. Id. The probation officer and a colleague then confiscated the rifle and left Saechao’s residence. Id. at 1076. Soon after, Saechao was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. Id. In that separate case, Saechao moved to suppress his statements to the probation officer. Id. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the statements had been “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1081. It determined that the state had taken the “impermissible step of requiring Saechao to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.” Id. at 1076 (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436) (alterations adopted and quotation marks omitted). And it found further that “there [was] certainly a reasonable basis under Murphy for a probationer to conclude that, although the invocation of the Fifth Amendment [was] not explicitly prohibited, an exercise of that right by invoking the privilege or simply by remaining silent would constitute grounds for revocation of probation.” Id. at 1079 (emphasis in original).
In reaching these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit explained that the condition requiring Saechao to “promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries” required Saechao to actually provide an answer to the question asked, and invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent would not be an “answer” to the question. Id. at 1080 (emphasis in original). In support of this determination, the Ninth Circuit pointed to Robinson. Id. at 1080–81. It said, “[t]he Eleventh Circuit, confronted with a nearly identical probation condition, explicitly rejected the argument that by ‘answering’ a probation officer’s inquiry with an invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the probationer would comply with an obligation to answer or respond to his
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has also felt a need in the wake of post-Murphy opinions like Robinson to clarify that defendants should not be punished for failing to truthfully answer their probation officer’s questions if the failure resulted from an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. In 2016, the Commission, in Amendment 803, added Application Notes to the Commentary to Sections 5B1.3 and 5D1.3 of the
But McKathan answered his probation officer’s questions in 2014, before the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 803. So Amendment 803 cannot control our analysis in his case.
Nevertheless, the changes to the Commentary further demonstrate that we held in Robinson that the government may revoke supervised release simply because a probationer invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to a question from his probation officer. Having so held in that case, we may not now find that McKathan’s supervised-release provision requiring him to answer all inquiries from his probation officer did not place him in the “classic penalty situation” Murphy warns against.
- Robinson’s existence requires us to conclude that McKathan’s view that he was subjected to a “classic penalty situation” was objectively reasonable
As we have noted, in Robinson, the government did not seek to use Robinson’s silence in a separate criminal prosecution, and Robinson did not complain in a separate criminal proceeding that he had been coerced to answer his probation officer’s questions on penalty of revocation of his probation. Rather, the government used Robinson’s silence—and Robinson objected that the government used his silence—only to punish him for violating his probation conditions. But that is permissible under Murphy. What is not permissible is giving a probationer a reasonable belief that if he refuses to answer his probation officer’s incriminating questions, his probation will be revoked
We suggested in 2003 that a case like McKathan’s might well require suppression, in a criminal prosecution, of statements elicited by a probation officer in the course of supervising supervised release:
There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.
See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1091 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435). Here, because of Robinson and the government’s use of McKathan’s coerced statements in his separate criminal prosecution, McKathan’s counsel could have argued that suppression was required on exactly this “substantial basis.”
Finally, the laundry list of cases the Dissent sets forth for the proposition that a penalty may not be imposed on someone for exercising his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself, see Dissent at 49-50, does not change the analysis or somehow allow us to ignore Robinson. The cited cases speak in general principles; none of them other than Murphy and Robinson themselves deals with the ways in which the government coerced or made use of compelled testimony that are at issue here.6 And we have already explained why, under Murphy, Robinson creates the “classic penalty situation” here, where the supervised-releasee’s statements, coerced on pain of revocation for invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, were used against him in a separate criminal case.
In short, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that a Fifth Amendment suppression motion would have been successful.
B.
That brings us to whether the fruits of McKathan’s statements would have nonetheless been admissible for an independent reason. The government argues that they would have been, so any Fifth Amendment legal win would have been a purely Pyrrhic victory.7
In particular, the government suggests that it would have inevitably discovered
The “inevitable discovery” doctrine applies when the government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have discovered the evidence by some other lawful means. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.“); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). For that doctrine to apply in this Circuit, the government must also demonstrate that before the unlawful activity occurred, it was actively pursuing the lawful means that would have rendered discovery inevitable. United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007). The inevitable-discovery doctrine can apply when a Fifth Amendment violation occurs. United States v. Martinez-Gallegos, 807 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
Here, in the context of McKathan’s
As a result, we cannot evaluate, in the final analysis, whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of McKathan’s case would have been different, had his counsel filed a suppression motion based on the Fifth Amendment. But because McKathan would have prevailed on the Fifth Amendment suppression
issue, it now becomes necessary to consider whether the evidence would have otherwise been admissible.
Therefore, we must vacate the denial of McKathan’s
IV.
For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s denial of McKathan’s
VACATED AND REMANDED.
BRANCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In this case, McKathan, while on supervised release as a result of his 2005 conviction for possession of child pornography, failed to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to his probation officer’s questions and made testimonial statements (including revealing his PIN which was used to unlock his phone) that both revealed he had violated the terms of his release and implicated himself in a new crime. His supervised release was thereafter revoked based upon a finding that he had violated the terms of his release. The government then used the incriminating statements he made to his probation officer against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution for receipt of child pornography. After pleading guilty to the new charge, McKathan filed a
The ultimate question in this case is whether McKathan established that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to file a Fifth Amendment based motion to suppress the testimonial communications he made to his probation officer pursuant to the two-prong deficient performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice, McKathan must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 129 (2011) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). This inquiry in turn requires an evaluation of the merit of the underlying Fifth Amendment challenge. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (explaining that when defense counsel’s failure to litigate a suppression issue is the basis of the ineffectiveness claim, in order to demonstrate prejudice,
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”
As previously noted, at the time of the statements in question, McKathan was serving a lifetime term of supervised release after pleading guilty and serving a term of imprisonment for possession of child pornography. In relevant part, the terms of his supervised release: (1) required McKathan “to answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer“; (2) prohibited him from possessing and using a computer with internet access without the permission of his probation officer; (3) authorized his consent “to periodic, unannounced examinations of his computer equipment, which may
include retrieval and copying of all data from his computer and any internal or external peripherals to ensure compliance with this condition, and/or removal of such equipment for the purpose of conducting a more through [sic] inspection“; and (4) authorized his consent to reasonable searches of his person and residence based upon reasonable suspicion that he had violated a condition of his release.1
Finally, McKathan‘s terms of release informed him that
I now turn to McKathan‘s
As in this case, the issue before the Murphy Court was whether the
This conclusion leads us to the second inquiry—whether it was reasonable for McKathan to conclude that he faced a “classic penalty situation.” How do we tell if McKathan‘s belief was reasonable? The Supreme Court‘s opinion in Murphy provides guidance. In Murphy, without deciding whether the reasonableness inquiry is subjective or objective, the Court held that Murphy‘s belief that he was in a classic penalty situation was unreasonable because: (1) there was “no direct evidence Murphy confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent,” (2) Supreme Court case law made it clear that such a revocation is constitutionally impermissible, and (3) no case had been identified where the state “attempted to revoke probation merely because a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclosures concerning his own criminal conduct.” Id. at 438−39 (emphasis added). Applying a similar analysis to this case, the majority holds that McKathan‘s belief that his supervised release would have been revoked if he did not answer the probation officer‘s questions was reasonable because there is direct evidence that he feared as much and there is caselaw in this Circuit where the government attempted to revoke probation merely because the probationer asserted his
The majority points to McKathan‘s testimony during the
Likewise, McKathan‘s asserted understanding that, because of this instruction,
McKathan and the majority point to this Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Robinson, 893 F.2d 1244 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), as supporting the reasonableness of McKathan‘s classic penalty situation belief. They contend that Robinson is purportedly an example of a case in which the government attempted to revoke a term of probation merely because a defendant invoked his
But Robinson was not a classic penalty situation case where the government attempted to revoke a defendant‘s probation simply because he invoked his
Accordingly, contrary to the majority‘s conclusion, “McKathan‘s understanding that he was in a ‘classic penalty situation‘” was not reasonable simply because he was “in a post-Robinson world.” In fact, such a belief is directly contradicted by Robinson‘s express acknowledgement that “a probationer has a fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination,” Robinson, 893 F.2d at 1245, as well as a plethora of well-established precedent from both the Supreme Court and this Court. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768–69 (2003) (“[N]o ‘penalty’ may ever be imposed on someone who exercises his core
Consequently, for the above reasons, McKathan did not face a classic penalty situation, and, therefore, he cannot benefit from this exception to the general rule that the
Notes
Oral Argument, at 21:24–22:11. And second, the government did not suggest that Robinson was somehow consistent with Murphy or that it could be factually distinguished from Murphy; rather, it argued that the probation condition at issue in Robinson could be factually distinguished from that at issue in McKathan’s case, so Robinson’s authorization of punishment for invocation of the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself did not reasonably suggest that McKathan would be punished for invoking his Fifth Amendment right. See id. at 19:44–20:50. Later in the oral argument, though, the government effectively conceded that the probation condition at issue in Robinson could not be meaningfully distinguished from that at issue here:Court: [W]e’ve said in Robinson, if you don’t comply with the conditions of your supervised release, you go to jail. I mean, isn’t that what we’ve said?
Government: That is what you said in that case for Robinson. I do know . . . while Minnesota v. Murphy, at least in certain portions disagree with Robinson of the fact that . . . a petitioner cannot be forced to give a statement and then go to jail on that, but that is of course what you say in terms of Robinson, that they can be revoked.
Court: . . . Since we’re bound by Robinson, don’t we have to accept that when we’re reviewing this?
Government: I think yes, unless we tailor Robinson to the specific language that was used in that particular [probation condition requiring the probationer to respond “completely and truthfully” to inquiries from the probation officer].
(cont’d.)Court: [I]f we’re holding that the reason that . . . revocation was appropriate was because [Robinson] failed to report [answer] in response to inquiries, which . . . would you agree that’s what Robinson holds?
Government: Yes.
Oral Argument, at 26:37–27:30.Court: . . . Then how could [McKathan] not fail to report so [he] would avoid the Robinson problem and still not respond to the question about the PIN? Is there a way to do that? Maybe there is.
Government: . . . There may be a way. At this very moment, I can’t think of a way . . . .