OPINION
Berniece J. DeLong appeals the District Court’s judgment denying her motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The District Court vacated a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner), who denied DeLong Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income Benefits (SSI), and remanded DeLong’s case for further administrative proceedings on one of three grounds for relief that DeLong had raised. The District Court concluded, however, that DeLong was not entitled to attorney fees because the Commissioner’s position “was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). For the reasons that follow, we hold that this conclusion does not reflect an abuse of discretion, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
I.
DeLong applied for DIB and SSI in 2003, both of which the Social Security Administration (Agency) denied on initial review. Although she subsequently obtained three hearings before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ concluded after each hearing that DeLong was not disabled. The Agency’s Appeals Council twice intervened, vacating the ALJ’s decision and remanding DeLong’s case for further administrative proceedings after the first and second hearings. After the ALJ’s third determination that DeLong was not disabled, however, the Appeals Council declined further review. Consequently, the ALJ’s determination became the Commissioner’s final decision.
On October 27, 2010, DeLong filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan to challenge the denial of benefits.
DeLong subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees under the EAJA, contending that the denial of benefits and the Commissioner’s defense of the denial had lacked substantial justification. The District Court denied the motion, noting that merely obtaining a reversal did not entitle DeLong to EAJA fees. Instead, the District Court concluded, the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified despite the reversal for several reasons: (1) the court had rejected all but one of DeLong’s arguments; (2) DeLong improperly had attempted to present evidence to the court that she had not presented to the ALJ;
II.
We review the District Court’s denial of attorney fees under the EAJA for an abuse of discretion. Damron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
To recover attorney fees under the EAJA, a plaintiff must satisfy three conditions: (1) she must be a “prevailing party”; (2) the Government’s opposing position must have been without substantial justification; and (3) there must be no special circumstances that warrant denying relief. Marshall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
The Commissioner’s position may be substantially justified even if a district court rejects it. Couch v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs.,
III.
DeLong begins by asserting that the District Court gave too much weight to the arguments that she raised unsuccessfully, and she contends that the District Court’s rejection of those arguments “does not dilute the fatal flaws within the ALJ’s decision — or justify defending it.” Both claims are reducible to an allegation that DeLong levied against the ALJ below— “cherry picking” the record. The District Court observed that this allegation is seldom successful because crediting it would require a court to re-weigh record evidence. It is no more availing on appeal. Cf. White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
The “substantial evidence” standard, according to which a district court reviews decisions by the Commissioner, does not permit the court to resolve conflicts in evidence. Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
As we have explained before, “[remand] alone is not a proper basis for the allowance of fees and expenses under the [EAJA].” Couch,
DeLong also contends that the District Court mischaracterized the merits of the case and the state of the law. Regarding the former, she urges that “[i]t is pellucid from the facts of this case and the District Court’s own opinion that the Commissioner had no reasonable argument that the ALJ’s decision met the good reasons requirement — treating source opinions were ignored in their entirety.” But this argument misses the point. It is undisputed that the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” for the weight that he gave the opinions of DeLong’s treating physicians; that is the (sole) reason that the District Court vacated the Commissioner’s decision and remanded DeLong’s case for further proceedings in the first place. See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
As the District Court recounted, “[T]he fatal flaw in the ALJ’s opinion [wa]s not in the weight he found was appropriate for the various medical opinions,” but rather in his failure to explain his findings adequately. (Emphasis added.) The District Court thus vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded DeLong’s case based on this procedural error rather than on substantive grounds. Relying on this court’s opinion in Howard v. Barnhart,
First, Howard and Flores are readily distinguishable, Howard having concerned an ALJ who selectively considered evidence in denying benefits,
Unlike in Flores, no post-remand administrative hearing is at issue here. Additionally, the district court in Flores wholly failed to consider whether the Government’s position was substantially justified “on the procedural issue that caused it to remand.”
Second, and more importantly, remand on procedural grounds may result in yet another denial of benefits, and we might well sustain such a denial on appeal. Accordingly, we hold that an ALJ’s failure to provide an adequate explanation for his findings does not establish that a denial of benefits lacked substantial justification. A fully justified position may be poorly explained, and remand may be the most appropriate vehicle for elucidating that position. Thus, although remand on any ground theoretically may support an award of fees under the EAJA, such an award is not appropriate when nothing about the specific remand at issue implies a lack of substantial justification. Cf. Thouvenot,
Finally, in alleging that the District Court mischaracterized the state of the law, DeLong, again, misses the point. De-Long takes issue with the District Court’s conclusion that Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security,
What Gayheart did — and this is the context in which the District Court found it instructive — was reaffirm that “[t]he Commissioner is required to provide ‘good reasons’ for discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion.”
IV.
No mistake mars the District Court’s determination that the Commissioner’s position in this case was substantially justified. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its direction, and we AFFIRM the denial of attorney fees under the EAJA to DeLong.
Notes
. DeLong and the Commissioner voluntarily consented to having all aspects of the case conducted by a United States Magistrate Judge, including the entry of final judgment.
. Section 1383(c)(3) provides that final determinations by the Commissioner after a hearing “shall be subject to judicial review as provided in [§ 405(g)] to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under [§ 405(g) ].” See infra note 3 and accompanying text regarding the relevant provisions of § 405(g).
.Section 405(g) permits two types of remand: (1) pre-judgment, under sentence six; and (2) post-judgment, under sentence four. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
. Because much of the factual and medical history of this case is irrelevant to DeLong’s appeal, we address additional facts only as necessary to dispose of the appeal.