Delong v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6487
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- Berniece DeLong applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and SSI in 2003; after three ALJ hearings the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council declined further review, making the ALJ’s decision final.
- DeLong sued in district court raising three claims: improper reliance on a consulting physician over treating physicians; improper assessment of other medical and lay opinions; and erroneous credibility/findings.
- The district court rejected two claims but vacated and remanded under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because the ALJ failed to give "good reasons" for discounting treating physicians’ opinions.
- DeLong moved for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified; the district court denied fees, concluding the Commissioner’s position had a reasonable basis in law and fact.
- The Sixth Circuit reviews EAJA fee denials for abuse of discretion and affirmed, holding the district court did not err in finding the Government’s position substantially justified despite the procedural remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DeLong is entitled to EAJA fees as a prevailing party | DeLong argued the ALJ ignored treating-source opinions and the Commissioner’s defense lacked substantial justification | Commissioner argued the denial and its defense had a reasonable basis in law and fact; remand was procedural and did not show lack of justification | Denied — court held the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified and district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether remand for failure to give "good reasons" necessarily means the Government’s position lacked substantial justification | DeLong argued procedural error (failure to credit treating opinions) shows lack of justification and supports fees | Commissioner argued a poorly explained but potentially correct position can be substantially justified; remand for clarification does not prove lack of justification | Held — procedural remand alone does not establish lack of substantial justification |
| Whether the district court improperly weighed evidence or mischaracterized the record | DeLong contended ALJ "cherry-picked" and ignored treating opinions entirely | Commissioner and courts noted that evaluating/ weighing evidence is within ALJ’s province and district court did not find entitlement to benefits on the record | Held — no reweighing; district court narrowly remanded and found record did not strongly establish entitlement |
| Whether recent precedents changed the standard so fees should be awarded | DeLong relied on case law (e.g., Gayheart) to argue the ALJ’s error made Government’s position unjustified | Commissioner noted Gayheart reaffirmed the "good reasons" requirement but did not alter EAJA standards; district court properly applied existing law | Held — Gayheart did not mandate EAJA fees here; lines are unclear and defending imperfect decisions is often justified |
Key Cases Cited
- Damron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 104 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 1997) (abuse-of-discretion standard for EAJA fee denials)
- Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (substantial-justification standard requires reasonable basis in law and fact)
- Couch v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 749 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1984) (remand alone is not a basis for EAJA fees)
- Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004) (government bears burden to prove substantial justification)
- Marshall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 444 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2006) (EAJA elements summarized)
- White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 2009) (deference to ALJ’s weighing of evidence)
- Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2012) (standard of review: substantial evidence and proper legal standards)
- Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2007) (treating-source good-reasons requirement)
- Howard v. Barnhart, 376 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2004) (selective consideration of evidence can be reversible)
- Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1995) (post-remand hearing context and fee considerations)
- United States v. Thouvenot, Wade & Moerschen, Inc., 596 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (weight accorded trial judge’s finding on substantial justification)
- Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013) (reaffirmed need for "good reasons" when discounting treating-source opinions)
