JOHN DEATON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON; JAMES CUNHA, Town Manager, Town of Barrington; DAVID WYROSTEK, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; ANTHONY DECRISTOFORO, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; JOHN LACROSS, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 23-1794
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
May 3, 2024
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND [Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]
John E. Deaton, with whom Deaton Law Firm LLC, was on brief, for appellant.
Marc DeSisto, with whom Sarah D. Boucher, Kathleen A. Hilton, and DeSisto Law LLC, were on brief, for appellees.
I. Background
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case, Deaton. See Mancini v. City of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018). The facts below
A. Facts
In September 2017, Deaton and his partner attended a Pop Warner football game in Barrington, Rhode Island.1 Deaton‘s partner‘s ex-husband, Ronald Warner (“Warner“), and his new partner were also in attendance. A verbal and physical altercation occurred between Deaton and Warner, and while the details of the encounter are disputed, it is undisputed that Deaton said something to the effect of not wanting to “whip [Warner‘s] ass.” Warner called 911 and claimed he was assaulted by Deaton. While Warner claimed that Deaton “put his hands on [Warner‘s] throat,” Deaton claimed that he pushed Warner away and likely touched his throat or “neck area.” A football coach told the men to “knock it off and get out of there.”
The Barrington Police Department dispatched Officers David Wyrostek (“Officer Wyrostek“) and Anthony DeCristoforo (“Officer DeCristoforo“) to Barrington High School where Officer Wyrostek arrived first and spoke with Warner. Warner claimed Deaton placed his hands on his throat and choked him. Officer Wyrostek did not notice any apparent injuries on Warner. As Deaton drove by, Warner pointed him out to Officer Wyrostek who
Officer DeCristoforo arrived at the field shortly after Officer Wyrostek pulled over Deaton. Officer DeCristoforo spoke with Warner and his partner, confirming the account Warner gave to Officer Wyrostek. Officer DeCristoforo obtained a witness statement from the football coach who stated that he witnessed Deaton “put his right hand on [Warner‘s] throat.”2 Officer DeCristoforo noted that Warner‘s throat was not red, swollen, or had any indication of finger marks. After Deaton had been handcuffed, Officer DeCristoforo told Officer Wyrostek that he had a witness who confirmed Warner‘s story. Later that day, Officer DeCristoforo became aware of an active arrest warrant for Warner who was then arrested pursuant to that warrant.3 After approximately two hours at the police station, Deaton was released on his own recognizance.
The Town of Barrington prosecuted the charges against Deaton. The criminal case was scheduled for trial in state court, but the town dismissed the charges without prejudice, with Warner‘s consent, in exchange for Deaton‘s completion of thirty hours of community service. Deaton then filed suit in Providence County Superior Court. Deaton alleged civil rights violations pursuant to
The Defendants removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island on federal question grounds.
The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts arguing that Deaton‘s arrest was justified and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment, entering judgment on false imprisonment in violation of
II. Discussion
Deaton argues that summary judgment was not proper because (1) probable cause to arrest Deaton did not exist at the time of his arrest, (2) several facts materially undermined the determination of probable cause, and (3) the district court improperly made credibility determinations and weighed the evidence. In addition, Deaton argues that (4) denial of Deaton‘s post-judgment motion was plain error, and (5) the district court should have abstained and remanded to allow full resolution of the state court claims by the state court. His arguments are unpersuasive. Therefore, we affirm the district court‘s judgment.
A. Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
We review a district court‘s determination of a summary judgment motion de novo. See López-Hernández v. Terumo P.R. LLC, 64 F.4th 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Murray v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015)). We examine the record in “the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[] all reasonable inferences in that party‘s favor.” Id. Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
2. Probable Cause5
Deaton asks us to find that probable cause did not exist at the time of his arrest and therefore the district court‘s grant of summary judgment should be vacated. We disagree. Because the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Deaton, support
Counts II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI hinge on Deaton‘s claim of lack of probable cause to arrest.7 Deaton
“A warrantless arrest, like the one at issue here, must be based on probable cause.” United States v. Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2002). The probable cause determination turns on “whether . . . the facts and circumstances within [the police officer‘s] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
For us to determine if an officer had probable cause, we look to the totality of the circumstances and “examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” United States v. Flores, 888 F.3d 537, 543 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018)). The existence of probable cause is determined by what the police officer knew “at the time of the arrest.” United States v. Jones, 432 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1999)). “[P]robable cause determinations predicated on information furnished by a victim are generally considered to be
It is helpful to establish the relevant, undisputed facts that Officer Wyrostek knew at the time of the arrest in order to proceed with our analysis. At the time of the arrest, it is undisputed that Officer Wyrostek had interacted with Warner and collected his statement that Deaton had assaulted him and put his hands on his throat, had interacted with Deaton and collected his statement that he was assaulted by Warner and denied choking him, did not observe any injuries on Warner, and knew that Deaton was the new partner of Warner‘s ex-wife. Officer Wyrostek, then, knew that Warner claimed Deaton choked him and that Warner and Deaton had a strained relationship. These facts, standing alone, constitute “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient
However, Deaton claims that additional facts should be factored into the probable cause analysis and ultimately result in a lack of probable cause, or at least, disputed facts that must go to a jury. First, Deaton claims that because Warner had an active warrant out for his arrest at the time Deaton was arrested, this should have impacted Warner‘s credibility. However, as the district court pointed out, Deaton merely mentioned to Officer Wyrostek that Warner could have a warrant out for his arrest, and Officer Wyrostek did not have actual knowledge of the warrant until after Deaton was placed in handcuffs. Officer Wyrostek was “not required to credit a suspect‘s story,” Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 32 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004), and therefore did not need to take Deaton‘s claim of an alleged warrant into consideration when determining probable cause. Second, Deaton argues Officer Wyrostek knew at the time of the arrest that Deaton told him Warner seemed to be under the influence of illegal substances and had a propensity for violence. However, Officer Wyrostek was not required to consider these statements as true, as we just explained. Third, Deaton also argues that because Officer Wyrostek admitted in his deposition that he did not have probable cause before receiving a corroborating statement from a witness, the issue was required to go to the jury. This argument fails. “The question of probable
Thus, the additional facts that Deaton claims Officer Wyrostek knew at the time of his arrest, even if taken as true, do not materially alter the analysis. “On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof,” as here, “he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)). Evidence provided that is “merely colorable or is not significantly probative” cannot successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Deaton claims that the following were also known to Officer Wyrostek at the time of his arrest and should have been, and should be, considered.8 Officer Wyrostek had limited information about Warner as he did not confirm Warner‘s identifying information, Deaton told Officer Wyrostek that Warner had
We now turn to the probable cause analysis pertaining to Warner as the alleged victim in the altercation. Thus, we must determine if, based on the totality of the circumstances and information known at the time, Officer Wyrostek acted unreasonably
Warner, the alleged victim, gave Officer Wyrostek his account of the incident, after having called 911, claiming to have been in a verbal altercation with Deaton that resulted in Deaton grabbing his throat. Deaton claimed that Warner was the initial aggressor and he was defending himself by pushing Warner away. Warner‘s “uncorroborated testimony . . . standing alone . . . can support a finding of probable cause” that Deaton committed assault, battery, or disorderly conduct. Acosta, 386 F.3d at 10. Deaton argues that because Officer Wyrostek did not see any injuries on Warner, this fact negated the probable cause determination and lends to the unreasonableness of crediting Warner‘s account. This argument fails for two reasons: (1) apparent injuries are not required for a battery, and (2) probable cause need only be determined for one of the three charges Deaton was arrested for, which include disorderly conduct and assault, both of which do not require a physical touching.
Deaton also argues that even though the district court acknowledged that Officer Wyrostek knew of the relationship between Deaton and Warner, the district court “completely ignored the fact that [Officer] Wyrostek testified that it was cause to suspect Warner‘s credibility in this case.” However, to support this contention Deaton relies solely on Officer Wyrostek‘s
The facts in Holder are comparable. Mr. Holder and his estranged wife Ms. Holder got into an altercation at their child‘s soccer game. Id. at 502. Ms. Holder called the police and told the officer on scene that Mr. Holder had pushed her. Id. Mr. Holder told the officer on scene that Ms. Holder initiated a verbal confrontation and “made contact with him” before he pushed her back. Id. He told the officer that Ms. Holder was his estranged wife who was attempting to get a restraining order and keep him from their child. Id. He further informed the officer that the
In addition, we have held that a police officer is not required to further “investigate potential defenses or resolve conflicting accounts prior to making an arrest.” See id. (citing Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11). “[W]e have made it clear that an officer normally may terminate her [or his] investigation when she [or he] accumulates facts that demonstrate sufficient probable cause.” Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11. Deaton implies that because Officer Wyrostek did not interview other witnesses to the altercation, he could not have made a proper probable cause determination. But because Officer Wyrostek could have found probable cause by
Similarly, Deaton attempts to argue that because he and Warner had conflicting accounts, there could not have been probable cause to arrest him. He supports this claim with Officer Wyrostek‘s deposition, which he alleges the district court ignored. However, “[a] reasonable police officer is not required to credit a suspect‘s story.” Cox, 391 F.3d at 32 n.2. Police officers “do not have an unflagging duty to complete a full investigation before making a probable cause determination,” even when presented with conflicting accounts. Charron v. Cnty. of York, 49 F.4th 608, 616 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11 (explaining that police do not have an obligation to investigate defenses before finding probable cause). An “officer [is] not obligated to make a definitive credibility judgment about the relative accuracy of the accounts of the protagonists.” Holder, 585 F.3d at 506. Therefore, Deaton‘s arguments as to conflicting accounts, the past relationship, lack of apparent injuries, and lack of witness statements fails to materially alter the probable cause analysis. See id. at 506 (“The fact that Mr. Holder and Ms. Holder were not on good terms and had given somewhat differing accounts of the encounter did not render unreasonable Officer Morrow‘s conclusion
Deaton lastly claims that “[t]he [district] court held that [Officer] Wyrostek‘s credibility determination was not unreasonable yet also stated that a reasonable officer could decide Warner was more credible than Deaton.” Deaton argues that the district court was contradicting itself and making its own credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. This is incorrect. The district court was analyzing what Officer Wyrostek‘s credibility assessment could have been and his permissible probable cause determination. The district court was analyzing whether Officer Wyrostek had enough facts known to him at the time of arrest to support a credibility analysis of Warner, Deaton, and the probable cause determination. Accordingly, the district court did not engage in a credibility determination.
In conclusion, Officer Wyrostek had sufficient information to make a probable cause determination and arrest Deaton. “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Police officers are permitted to “draw reasonable inferences from [the] facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior
B. Post-Judgment Motion
Deaton asks us to conclude that the district court‘s denial of his post-judgment motion for relief was plain error. “The hurdle [to succeed] is a high one.” Latin Am. Music Co. v. Am. Soc‘y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 642 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that “relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and that motions invoking that rule should be granted sparingly“). “To obtain relief, the movant must demonstrate either that newly discovered evidence (not previously available) has come to light or that the rendering court committed a manifest error of law.” Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)); see also Karak, 288 F.3d at 19 (noting “a party who seeks recourse under Rule 60(b) must persuade the trial court, at a bare minimum, that his motion is timely; that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff
Deaton claims that the district court found probable cause on a clear mistake of fact. In other words, because Officer Wyrostek testified in his deposition that he did not have probable cause to arrest Deaton until he had the coach‘s witness statement corroborating Warner‘s account, then it was impossible for Officer Wyrostek to make a credibility determination that Warner‘s account was more credible than Deaton‘s at the time of arrest. This claim was already made in the opposition to the motion for summary judgment and was properly considered by the district court, as we explained, therefore there was no error. “[A] motion to alter or amend is not ‘a mechanism to regurgitate old arguments previously considered and rejected.‘” Ing v. Tufts Univ., 81 F.4th 77, 85-86 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014)).
In addition, Deaton argues that because the district court found that “there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Officer Wyrostek was plainly incompetent,” as to
C. Remanded State Court Claims
Lastly, Deaton asks us to reverse the district court‘s entry of summary judgment and order it to abstain from hearing any federal claims. Deaton argues that the constitutional claims in this case rest on unsettled questions of state law under
A party seeking Pullman abstention has the burden of showing that the resolution of “settling [an uncertain] question of state law [raised by the suit] will or may well obviate the need to resolve a significant federal constitutional question.” Casiano-Montañez v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 707 F.3d 124, 128 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, questions about
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the district court‘s orders granting summary judgment and denying post-judgment relief are Affirmed.