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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
B. Proceedings
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Final Marital Estate Did Not Reflect All Marital Assets And Liabilities.
1. Omission of mortgage from marital estate
2. Omission of retirement accounts from the marital estate
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Its Calculation Of Child Support Arrearages.
V. CONCLUSION
Notes

Dawn M. Grimm v. Ryan J. GrimmDawn M. Grimm v. Ryan J. Grimm

Alaska Supreme Court
Jul 29, 2026
S19212

NOTICE

Mеmorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite such a decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT*

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Kelly J. Lawson, Judge.

Appearances: Dawn M. Grimm, pro se, Kenai, Appellant. Ryan J. Grimm, pro se, Kenai, Appellee.

Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.]

I. INTRODUCTION

A marital estate was divided between two self-represented litigants aftеr a two-day divorce trial. The superior court‘s apportionment of the estate resulted in the wife owing an equalization payment. Because the husband was in arrears on his child support payments, the court ordered that the equalization payment be offset by the arrearages.

The wife appeals, disputing valuation of the marital estate and the resulting equalization payment, along with the determination of child support arrearages. Because we observe errors in the valuation of the marital estаte, we reverse and remand to the superior court. We affirm the determination of child support arrearages.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

Dawn and Ryan Grimm were married in June 2002. The parties separated in September 2021. Four of their five children were minors at the time of separation. During the course of these proceedings, another child reached the age of majority.

B. Proceedings

The parties filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in March 2023. Later, Dawn reported that the parties no longer agreed to the terms of the dissolution and moved tо convert the proceeding to a divorce action. Her complaint for divorce was filed in July 2023 and Ryan filed his answer in August 2023.

In July 2023, Dawn filed a motion for interim custody and child support. In August, the court ordered an interim custody plan. The court then directed the parties to submit updated interim child support calculations that would reflect the approved shared physical custody arrangement.

The parties submitted differing child support calculations. In December 2023, the court approved an interim child support order, obligating Ryan to pay $1,130 per month1 in child support, retroactively beginning on September 1, 2023, which was “the first full month after the [approved] interim custody began.” This order did not address the amount of child support due from the time of separation, September 2021, to the approved interim custody order.

The parties agreed to a parenting plan filed with the court in December. Under this plan, the parties adopted two custodial patterns, one referred to as Schedule A and one referred to as Schedule B. Under Schedule A, the parties had shared custody on a two-week rotation with scheduled overnights. Under Schedule B, which accommodated Ryan‘s work schedule, his time would be reduced. The parties then would alternate between Schedule A and Schedule B on an annual basis. Schedule A afforded Ryan about six and a half days in a two-week period, and Schedule B provided for four days in a two-week period. Schedule A gave Ryan about 40% custodial time; Schedule B resulted in primary custody in Dawn‘s favor, as Ryan was left with only about 25% of the parenting time. In Januаry 2024, the court adopted the parents’ proposed parenting agreement.

The court held a divorce trial in January 2024. Among other areas of dispute about marital assets, the parties disagreed about the valuation of the marital home and a motor home (RV). Dawn‘s complaint valued the marital home at $243,100. However, at trial, Dawn relied on the tax assessed value from a property tax bill which set the value of the home at $239,900. And although Ryan‘s answer to the complaint contended the home was valued at $393,000, at triаl he submitted a comparative market analysis listing the home‘s value in the $300,000 range. Both parties agreed that the remaining mortgage debt was roughly $167,000. As to the RV, Dawn asserted it was valued at $42,000, and Ryan contended that the retail price of the RV should be around $25,000. The parties also agreed that the remaining debt due on the RV loan was about $33,000.

Although the parties addressed additional assets, relevant here, the parties identified but did not dispute the values of their marital retirement accounts. At trial, Dawn testified that early in the marriage, she and Ryan initially agreed to focus on funding his retirement account, and as such, half of the value of his account should be hers. The property and debt worksheet filed with Dawn‘s complaint identified that Dawn held $226,000 in retirement assets with Ryan‘s retirement holdings valued as “TBD” — to be determined. She testified that her retirement account was worth approximately $200,000, though the only documentation of this amount was her estimate filed with her support calculations.

As to Ryan‘s retirement accounts, the property and debt worksheet filed with his answer to the complaint disclosed that he held retirement assets in the amount of $354,858. Although Ryan did not testify about the retirement account values, he submitted retirement account statements reflecting holdings of about $324,575 as of the date of separation.

Despite the parties’ agreement to the custody arrangements, they disputed the total amount of Ryan‘s payments toward child support and related arrearages. Ryan testified that he had previously made payments to Dawn “somewhere in the ballpark of $34,000,” and submitted an exhibit showing bank transfers he made to her. Dawn denied Ryan‘s assertions but did not provide documentary evidence to support this. Instead, she took the position that Ryan had paid a thousand dollars a month in child support from the time of separation in September 2021 to the divorce filing in March 2023, despite having no official accounting of those payments.

In July 2024, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‍that valued the marital home at $239,900 and awarded it to Dawn.2 The court did not address the mortgage, but held that Dawn would “be responsible for any/all repair cоsts to the home, as well as any/all payments for the home,” and that she would have to “take any steps necessary to refinance or otherwise remove [Ryan‘s] name from the

property.” However, the court also required both Dawn and Ryan to split the responsibility to pay a separate home equity line of credit. The court did not include the mortgage in its valuation of the marital estate.

Regarding the RV, the court determined that it was “most equitable and fair to award this vehicle to [Ryan],” reasoning that he was currently in pоssession of it and had also “taken on the responsibility of making payments for [it].” Again recognizing that “[n]either party provided any documentation as to their [proposed] amounts,” the court concluded that the RV was worth $31,000 — the amount Ryan testified he still owed on the RV. The court did not include the RV loan in its valuation of the marital estate.

The court also considered Dawn and Ryan‘s retirement accounts. The court noted the “limited testimony” it heard regarding both accounts and the lack of “supporting documentation or other evidence” regarding Dawn‘s account in particular. The court found that each party had similar income earning capacity and concluded that “the most equitable thing to do [was] to allow each party to keep and maintain their respective retirement accounts.” The court did not make a finding as to the values for either party‘s retirement accounts.

The court acknowledged that the distribution of estate assets was “uneven . . . primarily based on the marital home” but concluded this was nonetheless “just and equitable” in light of the Merrill factors.3 The court did “not find good cause to depart from the presumption of a 50/50 divide of the property.” Instead, because Dawn received the marital home, she was set to receive a greater share of the marital estate than Ryan, so the court determined that an equalization payment from Dawn to Ryan in the amount of $97,813 would be necessary.

The court then addressed child support, determining that the equalization payment should be offset by Ryan‘s child support arrearages. The court found thаt Dawn had had primary custody of the children from the date of separation in September 2021 “through the Interim Order with child support beginning September 1, 2023.” For this time period, the court held that Ryan owed $54,699 in child support. The court also found that Ryan owed $12,431 in child support for the time period since the interim order, and that Ryan owed $5,269 for his share of medical bills and extracurricular and school fees. In total, the court found that Ryan‘s support obligation was $72,399.

The court then calculated the final amount due considering support obligations аnd the equalization payment. For the period after separation and before interim orders, the court found that Ryan had paid Dawn $30,460 in support, and applied that to the amount due, calculating that Ryan owed Dawn $41,939 in support arrearages. The court then subtracted Ryan‘s arrears from the amount due to him as an equalization payment, and concluded that Dawn owed Ryan a final equalization payment of $55,874.

Dawn moved for reconsideration on several grounds. First, she argued that the court‘s findings had not factored in all mаrital debts and assets, including the debt on the couple‘s home, the debt on their RV, and their “four retirement accounts.” She argued that the excluded debts were nonetheless part of the debt worksheet she submitted at trial. She also argued that the child support calculation was erroneous because it did not use updated adjusted income amounts or factor in the two different schedules established in the parenting plan. Dawn attached a property debt worksheet and printout of her retirement account information to her motion for reconsideration.

The court granted Dawn‘s motion in part. It first declined to consider evidence not produced at trial. However, the court did “issue an additional child support order to reflect the agreed upon Schedule B, as the court [had] overlooked that portion.” The court indicated that the change resulted in a $2,882 increase in child support owed to Dawn, an amount that was to be deducted from the equalization payment. The equalization payment Dawn owed to Ryan then was reduced to $52,992.

Dawn appeals the superior court‘s valuation of the marital estate, the determination of child support arrearages, and the court‘s application of arrearages to the equalization payment.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a divorce action, courts must follow a three-step process to divide property.4 The superior court must determine what property is available for distribution; it must value the property identified; and lastly, it must determine the most equitable allocation of the estate.5 The characterization of property as marital or separate may involve both legal and factual questions to which this court applies its independent judgment.6 “Underlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate are factual questions.”7 Valuation of an asset is reviewed for clear error, which exists when we are “left with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made.”8

IV. DISCUSSION

In valuing the marital estate, courts consider that property and ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‍debt acquired during a marriage are presumed to be marital.9 Although courts cannot value

assets or debts without adequate support,10 in such cases, the “best practice is for the trial court to direct the parties . . . to fill the evidentiary void.”11 Dawn objects to the court‘s omission of marital debt and retirement assets from the marital estate, and as such, asserts that the equalization payment is incorrectly calculated. She also argues that child support arrearages, applied against the resulting equalization payment, were miscalculated. We address Dawn‘s arguments below.12

A. The Final Marital Estate Did Not Reflect All Marital Assets And Liabilities.

1. Omission of mortgage from marital estate

On appeal, Dawn is concerned with the superior court‘s omission of the mortgage associated with the marital home from the court‘s calculation of the marital estate. Dawn notes that the court omitted the loan associated with the couple‘s RV from the marital estate as well. In both instances, the parties did not dispute the amount of the debt, and the court appeared to assign the debt to a respective party. So while the court properly identified and distributed the debts, it fаiled to include the value of those debts in the marital estate. We agree that this was in error.

There was no dispute before the superior court that the home was marital. Both parties agreed that the associated mortgage was marital debt, both parties were roughly in agreement as to the amount of the mortgage, and neither party objected to Dawn‘s assumption of the debt. The court held that Dawn would be “responsible for any/all repair costs to the home, as well as any/all payments for the home.” Although thе court required both parties to share equally in satisfying a separate home equity loan, the court was silent with regard to the mortgage.13 Ultimately, the court‘s final calculation of the marital estate omitted the value of the mortgage.

Similarly, the court also did not value the loan on the RV when calculating the marital estate. Both parties agreed that the RV was marital and agreed to the approximate amount due on the note. The court appeared to require Ryan to take responsibility for the notе, and allocated the RV to Ryan in the distribution. The court then explicitly used the amount due on the note as a proxy for the value of the RV, explaining that in the absence of documentation from either party, “the amount currently owed is the most reliable value available.”

Because these debts were marital they should have been valued and included in the calculation of the marital estate.14 The court‘s order with respect to the mortgage requires Dawn to pay the debt while overstating her distribution of the estate by the amount of the associated debt.15 The court‘s order with respect to the RV loan

appears to require Ryan to pay the debt while overstating his distribution of the estate in this respect.16 The court clearly erred when it failed to value and include these significant debts in the marital estate.

We reverse and remand to the superior court for valuation and inclusion of these debts in the marital estate. Because proceedings on remand will impact the equalization payment due, the equalization payment should be recalculated as well.17

2. Omission of retirement accounts from the marital estate

Dawn contends that the court erred because it did not include the value of the retirement accounts in the marital estate. With regard to these accounts, there was no dispute that the accounts were marital. But in recognizing the retirement accounts as marital assets, and distributing them as part of the divorce, it is true that the court did not determine values for these assets when it calculated the marital estate. Instead, due to its finding that there was a lack of sufficient proof as to the retirement accounts, the court distributed these accounts but did not include them in the marital estate. This was clearly erroneous.

We turn first to the court‘s finding that it had inadequate information to value these accounts. The court found that it “heard limited testimony and received some exhibits,” but concluded that there was “not sufficient testimony upon which to make a complete determination regarding these accounts.” We disagree. While Dawn testified at trial and did not provide documents, Ryan did not testify but provided

account statements.18 Yet there was no dispute about the accounts or the values in them. In effeсt, each party implicitly admitted the values of their retirement accounts and did not contest the values asserted by the other.

While a court cannot value property where there is insufficient evidence to do so,19 here the court noted only minor variances in the values attested to by the parties. It did not signal a position that the documentation was insufficient.20 The parties presented evidence through their pleadings, testimony, and documents. This evidence was advanced and not contested by the other. Although parties more typically rely on documentary evidence ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‍to establish the value of retirement accounts, here the parties’ testimony and concessions provided the court sufficient information to value the accounts and include them within the marital estate.

We next turn to the court‘s decision to let each party retain their respective retirement account. The court explained this decision on the basis that the parties “each earn a similar income” and thus “neither party is left disadvantaged by this determination.” In the absence of a valuation, though, there was no factual basis for the court to determine that neither party would be disadvantaged. Indeed, where Dawn testified that Ryan‘s retirement account had a higher value because the parties had

focused on funding his retirement, there could have been a relative disadvantage by allowing Ryan to retain the higher value account.21

As a final matter, because the court failed to value the retirement accounts, it could not determine that allowing the pаrties to retain their respective retirement accounts was in accordance with its equitable distribution scheme. In Thompson v. Thompson, we reviewed a property division where the superior court found that a 55/45 split was equitable.22 However, in considering a marital asset — a boat — the superior court allocated the boat 70/30. As a result, the net equitable distribution was not 55/45 but 62/38. Given income disparity and the lack of evidence to support treating the asset differently from other marital property, we remanded the property division so that the boat could be equitably divided.23 Here, given the lack of a finding of the value of the accounts and some evidence that the accounts were not equivalent, it may very well be that the division was inconsistent with the court‘s intended 50/50 split.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the superior court to determine the value of the retirement accounts and to include those values in the marital estate. Because proceedings on remand will impact the equalization payment due, the equalization payment must be recalculated as well.24

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Its Calculation Of Child Support Arrearages.

Dawn raises four arguments as to how the superior court erred when it determined child support arrearages. We address each argument.

Dawn first asserts that the superior court inappropriately placed the burden on her to prove what child support had been paid by Ryan. The parties’ dispute about Ryan‘s payments were with respect to the time period between separation and interim orders. The сourt did not place an inappropriate burden on either party: Ryan was called upon to prove what he had paid,25 and Dawn was called upon to prove what was owed.26

Ryan testified that he generally made payments to Dawn of $2,000 per month toward child support. He provided bank statements in support of his contention that he had paid support. And while unable to account for Ryan‘s payments, Dawn conceded at trial that Ryan had paid her $1,000 a month for child support for about 19 months. Although she does not appeal the court‘s factual finding that Ryan paid $30,460 into a joint account during this period, she argues that the payments should not count as child support because they were not “earmarked” as such. But “[c]onflicting evidence is generally insufficient to overturn the superior court, and we will not reweigh evidence when the record provides clear support for the court‘s ruling.”27 Further, the court here explicitly held that Ryan‘s testimony was “supported and credible” with regard to the amount he paid as child support, and we will not disturb that finding.28 The court‘s findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.

Next, Dawn contends that although the superior court‘s findings of fact relied on shared custodial time under Schedule A, the parties had transitioned to a different allocation of custody under Schedule B by the time the order was issued.29 As a result of this error, Dawn contends that for the time period interim orders were in effect, the superior court‘s calculations understated the amount due to her by $2,882. But on reconsideration, the superior court agreed with Dawn on this point; the court found that it had “overlooked” the distinction in custodial schedule, and adjusted the calculated arrearages by $2,882. We observe that any error regarding this finding was corrected.

Dawn also argues she is still owed arrearages for Ryan‘s share of medical and extracurricular costs in the amount of $5,269. However, the superior court agreed that Ryan owed $5,269 for medical, extracurricular, and school fees. When it calculated the final amount due in arrearages, the court included this category of costs when it netted the support due since seрaration with the payments Ryan had made. We see no error on this basis, either.

Finally, the superior court found that Ryan‘s support arrearages were satisfied when offset by the amount Dawn owed Ryan as an equalization payment. Dawn argues that because the equalization payment was incorrectly calculated, Ryan‘s arrearages were not satisfied. Because we remand for valuation of the estate and recalculation of the equalization payment, this argument is moot.30

V. CONCLUSION

The superior court‘s valuation of the marital estate and calculation of the equalization payment ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‍is REVERSED and REMANDED. We AFFIRM the determination of child support arrearages.

Notes

1
This amount is in line with Dawn‘s interim child support calculation.
2
There appears to be a clerical error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law on this point. The superior court found that the tax assessment valuation was “the most equitable and evidentiarily supported number,” but instead of valuing the home at $239,900 as appeared on the tax bill, the court concluded the home was valued at $293,900. This appears to be a transposition error, e.g., $293 instead of $239. We rely on the tax bill value because that is the number credited by the court.
3
Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962). The Merrill factors have been codified in AS 25.24.160 and must be considered to “fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce.” AS 25.24.160(a)(4).
4
May v. Petersen, 565 P.3d 194, 201 (Alaska 2025) (citing Aubert v. Wilson, 483 P.3d 179, 186 (Alaska 2021)).
5
Root v. Root, 851 P.2d 67, 68 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 223-24 (Alaska 1986)).
6
Id. (quoting Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7
Pasley v. Pasley, 442 P.3d 738, 744 (Alaska 2019).
8
Burts v. Burts, 266 P.3d 337, 341 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Alaska 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9
Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Alaska 1997); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 829 P.2d 303, 308 (Alaska 1992). See also Jones v. Jones, 942 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Alaska 1997) (“Doctor‘s fees, incurred during the marriage, are marital debts which must be included in the marital estate and divided like any other marital property.“).
10
Stanhope v. Stanhope, 306 P.3d 1282, 1290-91 (Alaska 2013).
11
Root, 851 P.2d at 69.
12
Dawn also argues that the court erred by not requiring her name be removed from the RV loan. It does not appear that relief was requested at trial, although Dawn‘s motion for reconsideration suggested that her name should be removed. A litigant may not introduce new evidence or arguments on reconsideration. Katz v. Murphy, 165 P.3d 649, 661-62 & n.47 (Alaska 2007). We consider the argument not properly preserved and waived on appeal. See Carvalho v. Carvalho, 838 P.2d 259, 261 n.5 (Alaska 1992) (clarifying that issues not argued at trial are not preserved for appeal and generally waived).
13
The court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law did not incorporate a property division worksheet. Instead, the court performed the calculations in narrative form. Although a worksheet is not required, it may have assisted the superior court in translating its detailed findings into a financial outcome and also served as a check for what appear to be inadvertent omissions.
14
Johns, 945 P.2d at 1222; Jones, 942 P.2d at 1137; McDaniel, 829 P.2d at 308.
15
Because the court valued the home at $239,900, Dawn was allocated that value in the distribution. The parties contended that the mortgage was about $167,000. If the value of the home were offset by the amount of the debt, the net value of the allocation to Dawn would have been around $72,900, supra n.2.
16
Because the court used the amount due on the loan as a proxy for its value, if it had included the debt in the marital estate as well, the net value of the RV would have been $0.00.
17
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 454 P.3d 981, 997 (Alaska 2019) (recognizing that decision reached necessitated recalculation of equalization payment).
18
It is not clear from the order why the superior court did not find Ryan‘s account statements to be sufficient proof of the amount in his retirement accounts. If properly authenticated, account statements would appear to be reliable evidencе of account values. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 105 P.3d 1136, 1143-44 (Alaska 2005) (relying on account statements to corroborate value of account at time of separation); Gambini v. Hamilton, 440 P.3d 184, 193 (Alaska 2019) (finding no clear error in superior court‘s valuation of retirement account based, in part, on account statements).
19
Stanhope, 306 P.3d at 1290-91.
20
See Root, 851 P.2d at 69. Although evidence may be “less than optimal,” Forshee v. Forshee, 145 P.3d 492, 499 (Alaska 2006), so long as the court is not entirely without evidence about any of the assets, it may rely on the limited information presented without soliciting additional information.
21
The record reflects that Ryan‘s share of retirement assets appears to be more thаn $100,000 higher than that retained by Dawn.
22
See 454 P.3d 981, 988 (Alaska 2019).
23
Id. at 997.
24
Id.
25
Because the contested direct payments were not related to the time period after interim orders, Ryan was not required to carry the burden of proof of direct payments by clear and convincing evidence. See AS 25.27.020(b); State, Dep‘t of Revenue, Child Support Enf‘t Div. v. Green, 983 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Alaska 1999).
26
See, e.g., Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971) (establishing that party who initiates action regarding nonpayment ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‍of child support bears burden to prove nonpayment).
27
Grove v. Grove, 400 P.3d 109, 113 (Alaska 2017) (citing Fink v. Mun. of Anchorage, 379 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2016)). See also O‘Brien v. Delaplain, 556 P.3d 1170, 1181 (Alaska 2024) (citing Fiehler v. Mecklenburg, 538 P.3d 706, 722 (Alaska 2023)).
28
Aubert v. Wilson, 483 P.3d at 190-91 (recognizing that we “give deference to the superior court‘s credibility assessments, especially when such assessments are based on oral testimony“) (quoting Sherman B. v. State, Dep‘t of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.‘s Servs., 310 P.3d 943, 949 (Alaska 2013)).
29
The family intended to shift to custodial time under Schedule B in June of 2024. The court entered its findings of fact on July 17, 2024.
30
The trial court has “broad discretion to authorize an offset against child support so long as good cause exists and the offset is in the child‘s best interests.” Wills v. Humphries, 564 P.3d 272, 276 (Alaska 2025). See also Brandal v. Shangin, 36 P.3d 1188, 1195 (Alaska 2001) (remanding case where trial court did not make findings that arrearage offset was in best interests of child). Although the trial court did not make such findings in this case, on remand with proper findings it may determine the appropriate disposition of the equalization payment and arrearages.
*
Entered under Alaska Appellate Rule 214.

Case Details

Case Name: Dawn M. Grimm v. Ryan J. Grimm
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 29, 2026
Citation: S19212
Docket Number: S19212
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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