DAVID CARVER V. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (Parish of E. Baton Rouge)
No. 2017-CA-1340
Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 30, 2018
NEWS RELEASE #005
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of January, 2018, are as follows:
BY CLARK, J.:
2017-CA-1340 DAVID CARVER V. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (Parish of E. Baton Rouge)
This case concerns the constitutionality of
WEIMER, J., Concurs in the result and assigns reasons.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-CA-1340
DAVID CARVER
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
CLARK, Justice
This case concerns the constitutionality of
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2009, Plaintiff was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) pursuant to
As a result of the arrest and refusal to take the chemical test for intoxication, the State again suspended Plaintiff‘s driver‘s license, this time for one year. Plaintiff presented the District Court dismissal to the State in an attempt to reinstate his driver‘s license privileges. The State denied unrestricted reinstatement based on
Plaintiff filed a written request for an administrative hearing to review the State‘s suspension of his driving privileges with the Division of Administration (DOA). After the hearing, the administrative law judge affirmed the State‘s ruling. Plaintiff then filed a petition for judicial review of the State‘s ruling suspending his driver‘s license. The petition alleged that the DOA ruling violated constitutional and stаtutory provisions, exceeded the DOA‘s authority, and constituted an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory judgment, seeking to have
Plaintiff then filed a motion for consideration of the constitutional challenge, re-urging his constitutional challenge of
On May 19, 2017, the District Court declared
The State directly appealed the District Court‘s ruling to this Court as allowed by
LAW AND ANALYSIS
(H). (1.) When any person‘s driver‘s license has been seized, suspended, or revoked, and the seizure, suspension, or revocation is connected to a charge or charges of violation of a criminal law, and the charge or charges do not result in a conviction, plea of guilty, or bond forfeiture, the person charged shall have his license immediately reinstated and shall not be required to pay any reinstatement fee if at the time for reinstatement of driver‘s license, it cаn be shown that the criminal charges have been dismissed or that there has been a permanent refusal to charge a crime by the appropriate prosecutor or there has been an acquittal. If, however, at the time for reinstatement, the licensee has pending against him criminal charges arising from the arrest which led to his suspension оr revocation of driver‘s license, the reinstatement fee shall be collected. Upon subsequent proof of final dismissal or acquittal, other than under Article 893 or 894 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the licensee shall be entitled to a reimbursement of the reinstatement fee previously paid. In no event shall exemption from this reinstatement fеe or reimbursement of a reinstatement fee affect the validity of the underlying suspension or revocation.
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(3). Paragraph (1) of this Subsection shall not apply to a person who refuses to submit to an approved chemical test upon a second or subsequent arrest for R.S. 14:98 or 98.1, or a parish or municipal ordinance that prohibits driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. However, this Paragraph shall not apply if the second or subsequent arrest occurs more than ten years after the prior arrest.
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(I). (1)(a). Any person who has refused to submit to an approved chemical test for intoxication, after being requested to do so, for a second arrest of R.S. 14:98 or 98.1 or a parish or municipal ordinance that prohibits operating a vehicle while intoxicated and whose driver‘s license has been suspended in accordance with law.
Plaintiff‘s allegations stem from his plea of guilty to driving while intoxicated on November 17, 2014. His charge was dismissed on January 8, 2016. He applied to have his driving privileges reinstated by the Office of Motor Vehicles. The Officе of Motor Vehicles denied his reinstatement because he had a prior arrest for driving while intoxicated in 2009. Following a hearing, the District Court held that
All statutory enactments are presumed constitutional, and every presumption of law and fact must be indulged in favor of legality. Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc., 95-2621 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1135. In the case of City of Shreveport v. Pedro, 170 La. 351, 127 So. 865 (La. 1930), this Court explained the basic requirements of a constitutional challenge: “It is elementary that all laws are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is made clearly to appear, and that he who urges the unconstitutionality of a law must specially plead its unconstitutionality, and show specifically wherein it is unconstitutional.” Pedro, 170 La. 351, 127 So. 865. Similarly, in Johnson v. Welsh, 334 So.2d 395, 396 (La. 1976), the court stated: “It is well settled that all laws are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is made to appear, and that аs a general rule a litigant cannot raise the unconstitutionality of a statute unless its unconstitutionality is specially pleaded and the grounds particularized.” The presumption is especially forceful in the case of statutes enacted to promote a public purpose. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So.2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1993). The legislature is given great deference in the judicial determination of a statute‘s constitutionality, and legislators are presumed to have weighed the relevant constitutional considerations in enacting legislation. Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission v. Olivier, 04-2147 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 570, 573. Because a state statute is presumed constitutional, the party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional. State v. Brenan, 99-2291 (La. 5/16/00), 772 So.2d 64, 67. The burden plaintiffs carry in challenging the constitutionality of a statutе is a heavy burden. It is not enough for a
The legislature‘s powers are derived from the citizens of the state who freely elect their legislative representatives; in other words, the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution serve as limitations on the otherwise plenary power exercised by the legislature, which may enact any legislation not prohibited by the Constitution. Polk, 626 So.2d at 1132.
Because of the presumption of constitutionality, in determining the validity of a constitutional challenge, a Court “must construe a statute so аs to preserve its constitutionality when it is reasonable to do so.” M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 07-2371, p. 22 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 31. In addition, when deciding whether a particular legislative enactment is unconstitutional, this Court has repeatedly stated that it is not the court‘s “duty to determine the wisdom behind the enactment of [the] legislation.” M.J. Farms, 998 So.2d at 34. Thus, so-called “policy considerations” are not relevant to the decision, аs such considerations are more appropriately presented to the legislature, in the first instance, when the pros and cons of a proposed law are being debated. M.J. Farms, 998 So.2d at 34.
Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process requires that before an individual is deprived of a property or liberty right, the individual must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. State v. Golston, 10-2804 (La. 7/1/11), 67 So.3d 452, 463.
Plaintiff argued during oral argument that the process was flawed, in that an arrestee who was wrongly arrested would be deprived of the early reinstatement opportunity contained in
“Substantive due process rights are balanced against the police power of a govеrning authority to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people. Governments have an inherent need ‘to protect the safety and welfare of their citizens from the unrestrained liberty of some individuals.‘” Golston, 67 So.3d at 467.
The
The police power of the State was further explained in Polk, 626 So.2d at 1142, which held:
As this Court has said regarding driving while intoxicated:
We have already determined that the right to operate a motor vehicle in Louisiana is a privilege granted by the state and not a constitutional
right. Consequently, the state has and can enact numerous conditions on that privilege. Our constitution wisely provides for separation of powers, and authorizes the legislature to make public policy determinations of controversial issues. Therefore, under our constitution, the legislature has determined that the public policy of Louisiana is to keep drunk drivers off the state highways. [The propriety of such] public policy [] should not be determined by this court.
Moreover, the state‘s interests are immediately apparent: (1) the lack of compliance with the law . . .; (2) the high incidence of motor-vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers; (3) the reduction of deaths and injuries that usually result from motor vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers; and (4) the evident risk of the defendant continuing to drive while intoxicated . . . . The state‘s interests are significant.
State v. Edwards, 00-1246 (La. 6/1/01, 15), 787 So.2d 981, 992-93 (citations omitted). As a means of identifying drunk drivers, the above is applicable to requiring chemical testing. Thus, requiring motorists reasonably suspected of driving while intoxicated to undergo chemical testing is directly and reasonably rеlated to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the citizens of the State.
Further, Louisiana has an “implied consent” law, and this Court has previously recognized that the United States Supreme Court has declared that such laws are constitutional. See Monroe v. High, 223 So.2d 834, 838 (La. 1969) (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), and Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). In Monroe, which dealt with the refusal to give permission to secure a sample of blood by veniрuncture for the performance of blood alcohol determination, this Court noted that the implied consent law provides that any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of Louisiana shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test to measure his blood alcohol content. Monroe, 223 So.2d at 838. Given this implied consent, the legislature, again, clearly has a rational basis for penalizing the refusal of an arrestee for
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, we find that
REVERSED AND REMANDED
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2017-CA-1340
DAVID CARVER
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
WEIMER, J., concurring.
I concur in the result and write separately to point out that the district court focused on the defendant‘s arrest in holding the statute unconstitutional. While the arrest is a prerequisite to offering the test for alcohol consumption to one charged with driving while intoxicated, and the defendant is innocent until proven guilty, the defendant‘s refusal to consent to the test should be the focal point.
Of course, as recognized by the majority,1 driving is a privilege and not a right. State v. Jackson, 00-0015, p. 10 (La. 7/6/00), 764 So. 2d 64, 72. The state can impose reasonable requirements on a driver to exercise that privilege. See id. Under the statutory provisions in question, after the arrest, the defendant is faced with a choice-to take or to refuse the test. A difficult choice is still a choice. Ultimately, the consequences imposed result from the refusal to take the test in this matter, not from the arrest itself. Therefore, the statutory provisions in question satisfy the due process requirements.
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the result in this matter.